Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and the Six Day War: The Crystallization of Arab Strategy and Nasir's Descent to War, 1957-1967 [Hardcover]

Moshe Shemesh (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: February 2008

The Six Day War was the climax in the deterioration of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The downturn began in 1957 when Nasir began preaching the idea of Arab nationalism, while placing the Palestinian problem at its centre. The decade between the Sinai War and Six Day War was marked by preparations by both sides for an all-out military confrontation which both sides viewed as inevitable. As the Arab states formulated their positions on the conflict's goals and the ways of attaining them, differences of opinion erupted between Egypt and Syria. Nasir wanted to decide the time and place for the war that would 'liberate Filastin'. He was determined to meet Israel on the battlefield only when he was certain that the outcome would mean a decisive Arab victory. He consciously and strategically led Egypt to war, carefully weighing the implications of each political/military step. This study, based almost exclusively on hitherto unavailable Arab primary sources, sets out the crystallisation of Arab strategy to reveal conclusions substantively different from previous scholarly and political-military assessments. Issues dealt with include: the relevance of the Filastin problem as key to understanding the descent to war; the pivotal Syrian water struggle as a key motivating factor; Nasir's military blunders with respect to advice received from the Egyptian High Command; Nasir's acceptance of the principle that Egypt had to absorb the first Israeli strike, to be followed by Egypt's delivery of a second, decisive strike; the 'political process' approach to solving the conflict as evidenced by the Khartoum protocols notwithstanding the '1948 refugee problem'; and, the Hashemite regime's response to Palestinians' heightened national awakening. The enlistment of all the Arab states to Nasir's moves in May 1967 testifies not only to the president's charismatic leadership, but also to the depths of the 1948 trauma (al-nakba), which lies at the heart of any future compromise or agreement.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 345 pages
• Publisher: Sussex Academic Pr (February 2008)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1845191889
• ISBN-13: 978-1845191887
• Product Dimensions: 9.7 x 6.8 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.8 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #3,358,563 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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4.0 out of 5 stars Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism, and the Six Day War, February 7, 2009

By 

Michael Rubin "Middle East Quarterly" (Washington, DC) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and the Six Day War: The Crystallization of Arab Strategy and Nasir's Descent to War, 1957-1967 (Hardcover)

In this latest book, his fifth in English, Shemesh, a professor of Middle Eastern studies at Ben Gurion University, makes a valuable contribution to the understanding of Arab politics in the decade before the Six-Day War. Well-referenced and injecting new Iraqi, Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese, and Palestinian documents into the narrative, Shemesh's book challenges historians' conventional wisdom. He argues, for example, that the Palestinian issue was far more important to Arab states in the decade before the Six-Day War than earlier historians believed. He also dismisses the idea that the war occurred because Nasser's recklessness caused events to spin out of control. Rather, Shemesh suggests that the January 1964 Arab summit set the region down the path to war. In 1967, Nasser "marched to war open-eyed," believing Arab victory to be assured.

Shemesh also examines both internal Palestinian Arab dynamics and the interplay of Palestinian nationalism within intra-Arab relations of the period. Palestinian fida'i terrorism, for example, changed the dynamics of the Arab fight against Israel. No longer did Arab states alone seek to eliminate Israel on behalf of Palestinian Arabs; Palestinian groups began to take an active role in the fight against Israel. Shemesh argues that while, prior to the Six-Day War, Palestinian terrorism did not gain the prominence that it would in later years, by 1965, fida'i activity along Israel's borders with Syria and Jordan posed a serious security threat and hastened the war.

Arab Politics is a welcome relief from the trend by which Israeli "new historians" such as Avi Shlaim, Benny Morris, and Neve Gordon eschew serious research for polemic. Shemesh may seek to revise the existing narrative, but he does so meticulously, offering evidence for each claim he makes. Nor, unlike so many of his contemporaries, is Shemesh afraid to document his work. He reproduces facsimiles ranging from a cover of Fatah's 1959 monthly Filastinuna; to a 1965 Jordanian military report on acts Palestinian terrorists might perpetrate against Israel; to a 1967 letter from Hafez al-Assad, at the time still Syria's defense minister, regarding Israeli troop movements.

While dry, Arab Politics is a necessary addition to any serious library or scholar's bookshelf. Shemesh deserves congratulations for breaking new ground.

Michael Rubin
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2009