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Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Studies in War, Society, and the Militar)

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The main thesis of Pollack's book is that the Arab armies lose wars because of the low quality of the junior officer corps. The first army that Pollack evaluates is the Egyptian army from 1948-1991. Pollack states the main reason for the severe defeat suffered by the Egyptians in 1967 was due to the poor quality of lower ranking officers. These Egyptian lieutenants, majors, and colonels failed to react to Israeli manuevers or look for routes of escape. However Pollack praises the Egyptian high command's decision to move forces closer to the Israeli border because if they waited behind defensive works, the Egyptian army would have been outmaneuvered by the Israelis. When planning for the 1973 war the Egyptian high command planned every detail of the lower officers moves for the upcoming offensive. The end result was that the Egyptian army was suuccesful in the opening phases of the offensive but faced defeat in the unplanned later phases of the conflict.Pollack thinks that the Egyptian high command made the right move in staying in the Northern Sinai and not retreating because the Egyptian army lacked the maneuver skills to implement the later option. The second that Pollack details is the Iraqi army that faced problems similiar to the Egyptian army. In the opening phases of the Iran-Iraq the Iraqi army was outmaneuvered by Iranin forces because of the medicore qaulity of the Iraqi forces. The Iraqi high command compensated for this weakness by carefully planning every operation in minute detail. This soon led to the later Iraqi victories against the Iranians although the Iraqi junior officers still suffered from poor intiative. Because of the above mentioned weaknesses the Iraqi army was swiftly defeated by the United States during the Gulf War, but Pollack states that the Iraqi high command saved the Iraqi army from complete destruction by sacrificing some units of the elite Republican Guard against the American armored forces so that a great percentage of the Iraqi army could escape. The the third army that Pollack details is the Jordainin army from 1948-1991. The Jordanian army was able to defeat the Israelis in the 1948 war because it was officered by British officers thereby escaping the previously mentioned weaknesses of the Iraqi and Egyptian armies. But once the British officers were replaced by Arabs in 1956, this led to the poor showing of Jordanian forces in 1967. The forth army mentioned is the Libyans that had similiar problems with their junior officers and this caused the Libyan defeat in Chad during the late eighties. The Saudi Arabian army which had exactly the same problems as the above mentioned armies was more ineffective since the Saudis never bothered to learn the technical skills to run a mechanized army. The final army that Pollack describes in the book is the Syrian army and how the poor quality of Syrian lower officers led to defeat in it's wars against Israel. The inefffectiveness of the Syrian officer corps allowed the Israelis were able to outflank the Syrians by moving into the Northern Golan Heights during the 1967 war. In planning their moves against the Israelis in the 1973 war, the Syrians copied from Soviet tactics by massing their forces on both flanks of the Israeli army in the Golan Heights but the Syrians restrained the moves of their lower officers to react personally to any Israeli moves. The end result was the near destruction of the Syrian army that was only saved by last minute reinforcements from Iraq and Jordan. During the 1982 war in Lebanon the Syria commandos performed well but the vast majority of the Syrian regular forces performed poorly. I would reccomend this book to anyone interested into the reason why the Arabs lose in war.

The Middle East has been, regrettably, one of the most active "laboratories" of war-fighting since WWII. The lessons learned from the numerous conflicts there have had tremendous influence on the development of the concepts of maneuver warfare which are so central to current Western military doctrine. The success of that developmental process has been manifestly evident in the Coalition (essentially U.S.)-Iraqi conflicts of 1991 and 2003. Pollack's book, which is well-summarized by the other reviewers, is a fairly technical survey of the course of each of the individual Middle-East conflicts, with an eye towards elucidating the causes for the defeats of the Arab militaries in each of those wars. His analytic style will be familiar to those who have read his other, more politically charged, book, The Threatening Storm. He proposes hypotheses for Arab military ineffectiveness in his introduction, and then proceeds to evaluate the degree to which performance of each country in each conflict supports or refutes each of those hypotheses. It is a very logical, detailed method of argument which has an aura of inevitability in its conclusions. However, some in the general readership may find it a bit dry. There are few anecdotes of small unit action to liven up the narrative, which reads more like a War College document than a popular history.

The conclusions have also been summarized by the other reviewers. As I see it, Pollack proposes that Arab military ineffectiveness stems mainly from an inability of smaller units, either on land or in the air, to engage in the free-flowing maneuver and combined-arms co-ordination required for tactical success on the modern battlefield. He proposes that problems reliably using and maintaining sophisticated modern weapons systems are also significant, but the root cause is the inflexibility of the small unit. Pollack attributes this mainly to failings of the junior officer corps, but I would like to have seen a discussion of the role of the non-commissioned officers in Arab armies, since the ability of Western NCOs is a major factor in the strength of Western militaries.

Pollack does not propose an explanation for the limitations he identified. It would be fascinating to read an evaluation of his conclusions in light of the Arab Development Report, to assess the degree to which the military deficiencies are indirect manifestations of aspects of Arab culture. My own hypothesis (although I am certainly no expert) is the observed limitations arise from an absence of a technological, machine-oriented, society that emphasizes individual empowerment and action, an inherent conservatism that values the collective (umma) at the expense of personal initiative, and an system of personal worth and honor that limits the ability to recognize and convey negative information. In other words, many of the factors that are at the heart of criticisms of Western (and especially U.S.) society by the Arab world are those that are associated with Western success, and Arab failure, in modern war.

Of course, as Pollack points out, the nature of war is not static. And there may come a time in the future when Arab militaries are more effective, politically if not tactically or operationally. For instance, the development of asymmetric warfare takes advantage of Arab personal courage and willingness to sacrifice for the collective, and suicide bomber vests are not sophisticated weapons systems. But, without a significant restructuring of Arab society, it is hard to see how the limitations detailed so mercilessly in this book will be overcome in a way that will allow the Arabs to prevail on a conventional battlefield.

After reading "The Threatening Storm", I bought this for further background and to continue to assess the quality of Pollack's research. This seems a detailed and objective analysis.

Pollack analyzes each of the Arab armies, and finds, as noted in other reviews, that Arab soldiers have often been incredibly brave, but with tactical leadership uneven at best, and often truly awful.

I take away from this that at least part of the problem is not just that lower-ranking officers are not good, but that the common problem has been *architectural*. That is, the structures and motivations of these governments have almost never allowed for independence and initiative at the lower levels. In some cases, it is clear that various rulers never wanted the military to be too independent, and this resulted in a rigid centralized-control approach.

Hence, perhaps it is possible this is a military problem, i.e., train better tactical leadership, but the consistency of the problem makes me think that it is more of a government/society issue, where the existing structures simply don't encourage the long-term existence of flexible troops.

In any case, fine analysis with comprehensive military history of the era.

Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq are six major players in the Middle East. Whether they are US allies (such as Saudi Arabia or Jordan) or die hard enemies (such as Syria or Libya) Pollack gives an objective analysis of their military prowess, or lack there of.

Pollack's argument is twofold. He claims that because of Arab society Arab militaries lack basic skills that modern European armies take for granted. For instance because Arab culture looks down upon those who preform physical labor nations like Saudi Arabia wouldn't teach maitenance skills for rifles and aircraft. As a result Saudi Arabia still rely on foriegn advisors. Pollack notes that "Saudis also were limited in the fact that very few of their people were willing to take on a job that they considered menial labor-hence the support services suffered." (pg. 431)

The second portion of his thesis is that the junior officer corps of most Arab armies is incredibly poor. Considered having one of the finest armies in the Middle East, Jordan showed that on a tactical level it simply could not preform. While most Western militaries have based their soldiers tactics off of the old WW2 German saying "every corporal should carry a field marshalls baton." Arab countries such as the Hashemite Kingdom have good generals but poor lower level leadership. This was evident when Pollack states (talking about the battle of al Karamah), "The artillery was accurate but almost exclusively preplanned, preregistered fire missions and, therefore, did not demonstrate any real improvement over 1967. Whenever Jordanian armor encountered Israeli armor-and these were mostly even fights in both numbers and types of tanks engaged-the Jordanians either lost or, at best gained a draw which still favored the Israelis."(pg.334-335) There was simply little or no improvisation on plans that were drawn earlier.

There was only one minor flaw I found, this had nothing to do with what was written but with the book itself. The sofcover copy has a bit of a poor spine and doesn't do well under a little stress.

Pollack's book is as one review by Choice Magazine says, "[an] encyclopedic study will be of great interest to scholars, military planners and analysts, and policy makers." it really is a true encyclopedia chronicaling every major and minor conflict the above countries were involved in. Whether you are reading because you love military or Middle East history, this book is for you. I couldn't recommend Pollacks book more.

Accessibly written by Kenneth M. Pollack (a former Persian Gulf military analyst for the CIA), Arabs At War: Military Effectiveness 1948-1991 is a straightforward and comprehensive "power history" of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria during the post-World War II epoch. Studying in meticulous detail the often difficult evolution of Arab militaries in terms of how they learned from their past experiences and conflicts, the frame of mind that permeates the military strategy of these nations today, and much, much more, Arabs At War is a seminal and sobering contribution to contemporary Military Studies and Middle East Studies reference collections and supplemental reading lists.

Kenneth Pollack's main thesis is that the low quality of junior officers in the Arab armies leds them to defeat. The first army that Pollack analyzes is the Egyptian army from 1948-1991. The low quality of Egyptian lower officers to innovate led to Egyptian defeat during the Six Days War. Pollack praises the Egyptian high command's decision to move closer to the Israeli border prior to the war, because if they stayed behind the original fortifications the Egyptians would have been outmaneuvered. Before the Yom Kippur War the Egyptian high command planned the operation to cross the Suez canal in minute detail since they did not trust their junior officers to display any personal intiative. Once the Egyptian army advance beyond the planned goals the Egyptians were defeated because their lower officers did not know to improvise in combat. Pollack states the Egytian high command made the right decsion in holding the Northern Sinai instead of retreating because if the later option was followed the Egyptian army officers could not have reacted to this fluid situation and the Egyptian army would have faced total defeat.The next army that Pollack evaluates is the Iraqi army with an emphasis on it's war with Iran. In the opening phases of the Iran-Iraq War the Iraqis were constantly out maneuvered by the Iranians because of the low quality of Iraqi offices. To compensate for this low quality, the Iraqi high command developed highly complex plans to be followed to the letter by junior officers. This allow Iraq to gain some victories in the closing stages of the Iran-Iraq War. The Iraqi army was totally unprepared to fight the Americans during the Gulf-War due to the above mentioned problems with it's officer corps. However Pollack believes that the Iraqi high command made the right decision in sacrificing units of the elite Republican Guard against American armored forces so that a large percentage of the Iraqi army could escape from the Coalition forces. The third army is the Jordanian army that was originally officered by British officers in the 1948 war against Israel. Due to the it's British officers the Jordanian army was able to repel Israeli attacks in the 1948 war. However once the army was commandered by Arab officers it faced the same problems as those mentioned in the Iraqi and Egyptian armies and this led to the medicore showing of the Jordanian army during the Six Days War. The Libyan army face similiar problems with it's officers and this led to defeat against the Chadians in the eighites. Pollack states the Saudi Army is perhaps the least effective of the arab armies because the Saudis refuse to learn technical skills to operate hig tech machinery. The final arab country that Pollack evaluates is the Syrian Army. The dismal performance of the Syrian officer corps during the 1967 War, led to a lack of a Syrian response to the Israeli flank attack on the Northern Golan heights. During the 1973 war the Syrians planned a Soviet style attack with forces massed on both Israeli flanks. However unlike the Soviets, the Syrians allowed little freedom for their officers to adapt to the situation. The end result was that the Syrian army came close to collaspse and had to be saved by Iraqi and Jordanian units. During the 1982 war in Lebanon the Syrian army was ineffective except for it's commado units. I would reccomend this book for anyone interested how the poor performance of junior officers can weaken an army.

This is a superb and easily read treatise, of use both to the military professional and the interested lay reader. The book meticulously details strategic and tactical performance of each of the prinicple Arab states, not only with respect to their well-publicized conflicts with Israel, but it also investigates the lesser-known military endeavors (e.g., Egypt's war in Yemen, Libya's adventures in Chad). As a result, this is a comprehensive evaluation. Fortunately, it was not burdened with background details on Islam and it's baleful influences on the technical aspects of modern warfare: this material would constitute a separate treatise and has been detailed elsewhere. Nonetheless, the insights gained from Pollack's investigation of military performance transfer to Arab domestic politics and Islamic cultural influence on military doctrine.

Unfortunately, the cost of the book and it's length will deter many readers. In summary, this is an outstanding book and should be on the 'must read' list of readers of Middle Eastern affairs. It's only shortcomings were in the maps: symbols used throughout the text were only annotated in one map and never completely explained. Otherwise, a superb work.

The main thesis of Pollack's book is that the Arab armies lose wars because of the low quality of the junior officer corps. The first army that Pollack evaluates is the Egyptian army from 1948-1991. Pollack states the main reason for the severe defeat suffered by the Egyptians in 1967 was due to the poor quality of lower ranking officers. These Egyptian lieutenants, majors, and colonels failed to react to Israeli manuevers or look for routes of escape. However Pollack praises the Egyptian high command's decision to move forces closer to the Israeli border because if they waited behind defensive works, the Egyptian army would have been outmaneuvered by the Israelis. When planning for the 1973 war the Egyptian high command planned every detail of the lower officers moves for the upcoming offensive. The end result was that the Egyptian army was suuccesful in the opening phases of the offensive but faced defeat in the unplanned later phases of the conflict.Pollack thinks that the Egyptian high command made the right move in staying in the Northern Sinai and not retreating because the Egyptian army lacked the maneuver skills to implement the later option. The second that Pollack details is the Iraqi army that faced problems similiar to the Egyptian army. In the opening phases of the Iran-Iraq the Iraqi army was outmaneuvered by Iranin forces because of the medicore qaulity of the Iraqi forces. The Iraqi high command compensated for this weakness by carefully planning every operation in minute detail. This soon led to the later Iraqi victories against the Iranians although the Iraqi junior officers still suffered from poor intiative. Because of the above mentioned weaknesses the Iraqi army was swiftly defeated by the United States during the Gulf War, but Pollack states that the Iraqi high command saved the Iraqi army from complete destruction by sacrificing some units of the elite Republican Guard against the American armored forces so that a great percentage of the Iraqi army could escape. The the third army that Pollack details is the Jordainin army from 1948-1991. The Jordanian army was able to defeat the Israelis in the 1948 war because it was officered by British officers thereby escaping the previously mentioned weaknesses of the Iraqi and Egyptian armies. But once the British officers were replaced by Arabs in 1956, this led to the poor showing of Jordanian forces in 1967. The forth army mentioned is the Libyans that had similiar problems with their junior officers and this caused the Libyan defeat in Chad during the late eighties. The Saudi Arabian army which had exactly the same problems as the above mentioned armies was more ineffective since the Saudis never bothered to learn the technical skills to run a mechanized army. The final army that Pollack describes in the book is the Syrian army and how the poor quality of Syrian lower officers led to defeat in it's wars against Israel. The inefffectiveness of the Syrian officer corps allowed the Israelis were able to outflank the Syrians by moving into the Northern Golan Heights during the 1967 war. In planning their moves against the Israelis in the 1973 war, the Syrians copied from Soviet tactics by massing their forces on both flanks of the Israeli army in the Golan Heights but the Syrians restrained the moves of their lower officers to react personally to any Israeli moves. The end result was the near destruction of the Syrian army that was only saved by last minute reinforcements from Iraq and Jordan. During the 1982 war in Lebanon the Syria commandos performed well but the vast majority of the Syrian regular forces performed poorly. I would reccomend this book to anyone interested into the reason why the Arabs lose in war.

I won't repeat all of the detail and commentary provided by other reviewers, but I wanted to provide a favorable review for this excellent work.

In the introduction, the author addresses the factors often cited for the poor performance of Arab armies--poor junior leadership, poor equipment, lack of intestinal fortitude, etc. etc. He then provides rare detailed coverage of specific operations of the various Arab armies, including their successes and failures, and then returns to address, on the basis of his analysis, the "poor performance factors" for each of the armies which he covers. Very interesting (to military history fans) and well done.

TMR

The author of this book does an excellent job of analyzing the operational and tactical performance of Arabic Armies in the latter 20th Century. But, be forewarned, the book can be a slog to get through for the novice. Mr. Pollack examines the good, bad and ugly of the national performance of several armies (Iraqi, Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian) in a manner which is useful to any decision maker who might have to confront an Arab Military foe. The best part of this book and its most useful application is in detailing Arabic Armies 'mismanagement' of information. Yes, poor leadership has doomed many Arabic Military operations, but within Arab Military leadership the fatal mismanagement of information is at the heart of each defeat. As detailed by the author, Senior and Junior officers both lie. They lie to their troops, lie to their political masters and lie to each other. At times they seem incapable of any truth telling whatsoever. The author details Senior Officers describing "Great Victories" where battles are being lost. Junior officers repeatedly fail to provide timely analysis of opposing forces or give a true picture of ongoing operations (lest they be termed cowards?). This has caused missed opportunities to adjust deployments and often leads to catastrophic defeats. Another excellent point is that the author never dismisses the ability of the individual Arab foot soldier to display extreme bravery and tenacity often despite overwhelming odds.