Customer Reviews

Archaeology, History, and Custer's Last Battle: The Little Big Horn Reexamined

5 star:		(22)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(4)
2 star:		(4)
1 star:		(3)

 

 

I think the polarisation of the reviews here tells the whole story. You are either going to love this book or hate it. Those who favour the revisionist view will love it, and those who like the accepted, "historical" image of Custer's Last Stand are going to hate it.

So let me help you to figure out whether you want this book or not. For me there should be a middle ground. You can disagree -- but you have to admire the scholarship and the effort. Fox clearly stands on his own -- a "blazed pine in a clearing of Custer devotees" (to paraphrase James Fenmore Cooper).

In a nutshell, Fox's thesis is that there WAS no last stand. He took advantage of the burndown that occured some years back to get in there with metal detectors. He undertook a minute forensic examination of the battlefield. For Fox, the evidence seemed to suggest a rout. Were there to have been a last stand, one would have expected multiple shell casings from a given gun in a given firing position. In fact, he could find no evidence of this. What he did find was shell casings from the same gun in positions that suggested the individual firing the gun was "vectoring" -- i.e. constantly on the move. The image is of a group of men running, stopping briefly to fire over their shoulders, and then moving on. This is but one of dozens of examples he gives.

As with any evidence, it is open to interpretation. And people will always disagree. But agree or disagree with Fox, the reason the book HAS to get four stars and not one, is that it is so well written, so persuasively written. I do not believe a book earns a one star review because it advances a thesis that may be incorrect. For me? I have to say the jury is still out.

Yet Fox is persuasive not only because of the archeological evidence, but because he relies quite heavily upon the oral tradition handed down by the aboriginal fighters who were present that day.

I find it amusing that certain of Fox's detractors actually purport to RELY on the oral evidence. For generations the accepted view of the battle completely IGNORED the oral historical evidence. And, indeed, the preponderance of this evidence favours Fox's view. One has to decide for oneself whether there is credence to be given to the oral histories -- I am not so sure how much credence should be given.

Fox also analyses then current manuals of combat to try and figure out how Custer's men would have fought and stationed themselves -- and again, he makes this evidence neatly fit his hypothesis.

Now, we have to be careful about something here. Fox at no time questions the heroism of the men involved in this struggle -- though Custer's command performance clearly ranks up there with the top dumb ... performances of all time -- but his men were brave, fought valiantly and died heroically.

So, if you absolutely LOVE the accepted view of Custer -- be preared for a rough ride. But if you have an open mind and are ready for an extremely interesting, but rough, ride buy this book.

And, one foot note - something that has always saddenly me is the treatment doled out by history to Major Reno and Captain Benteen. These guys DID conduct a displined, last ditch defence. And did so dug into a hillside for THREE days. There is no debate about this at ALL. They were down to throwing rocks at their tormentors when the Souix suddenly pulled out. Yet such was Custer's luster, that Reno was branded a coward for NOT going to his commander's aid -- even though that was clearly impossible. He was originally buried in a paurer's grave. Scandalous. WILL SOMEONE PLEASE MAKE A MOVIE ABOUT MAJOR RENO?

After reading this book I only wish that I had read it before I visited the LBH this past September. Dr. Fox provides great detail to properly explain how the excavations and laboratory findings were done and in explaining what they mean. This detail is neccessary to understand Dr. Fox's explanation of what he thinks ocurred at Custer's battleridge. After reading the evidence first, then his well researched literary quotes, his conclusions on the Custer portion of the battle are very believable and fit well with the Indian oral histories. I found it very revealing and immensely stimulating. The early chapters may seem slow to someone who does not appreciate archaelogy but it picks up speed as Fox moves to his conclusion which is virtually a climax of the battle. I have reread several sections and it's a mainstay in my Custer library.

As a cultural anthropologist with emphasis on plains indian tribes and history and a frequent visitor to the Little Big Horn Battlefield Monument, I have read Mr. Fox's book a number of times and have gone over the ground with it in hand. I have also read many of the other accounts, both contemporary and historical to attempt an understanding of what occurred at the Little Big Horn. Fox's precise, analytical and well-reasoned account, taking into consideration the physical evidence at the site, seems irrefutable. Contrary to one reviewer, I found no evidence of "rambling" at all, but a thorough analysis of all aspects of the battle from archeological evidence, oral and written histories to US Army Calvary tacitcs in use at the time, that support Fox's thesis, which is different and original from all that have preceeded it. Congratulations to Mr. Fox for a model of historical, archeological and anthropological research. I believe he has indeed broken new ground in the field. If you have any interest at all in the plains tribes, Custer or western history you owe it to yourself to read this fine book.

This is an update on my previous review. I recently took a two-day tour of the LBH with Fox and former Superintendent Jim Court and reading the text before the tour was very helpful. Aside from the archeology that determine that the Sioux and Cheyenne were well armed with at least 200 repeaters, the key to the mystery of what happened to Custer and his battalion(s) takes place at Medicine Trail Coulee. Some historians say that Custer was repelled and forced to retreat, others say he was shot at he ford putting the attack into confusion and early historians thought the ford was at the center of the village and that he had to move further downstream. Fox's theory is that the main population had already fled north thus "no one was home" other than the warriors fighting Reno and a few that happened to be at the ford. Thus Custer moves further north to cut them off leaving a rear guard on Calhoun Hill (south battle ridge) possibly for Benteen to connect. Fox essentially believes Custer was still on the offensive and confident when the high influx of warriors began to fracture his spread command. As Fox pointed our on the tour the lack of headstones near the ford and the ridges east of it indicate that there was not any significant loss of casualties which helps support his theory that Custer was still on the offensive and not retreating. The latter would seem to make sense to anyone at the battlefield since Custer's commands are spread far apart and not in a defensive perimeter. May not be the final theory but a very reasonable possibility and very thought provoking.

First, I'm hardly what you would consider a "Custer buff." I've read most of the secondary literature, especially the older material (Stewart, Utley, etc.) and kept up with the debates in the Western history mags. That said, Richard Fox, in my mind, nailed down a case for a new interpretation of the Custer battle, much the way Gerald Posner did with the JFK assassination in "Case Closed."

Much of the book, by the nature of the proof needed, is dry archeology: bullet calibers, spatial analysis, topography, and so on. But surprisingly, Fox really has done his homework in how armies of the day fought. His quick study, early in the book, of cavalry tactics, skirmish lines, and so on, is useful in and of itself, and is not contained in many standard histories of the Custer massacre or cavalry actions in general. Further, his research in the historical sources on men's behavior in war is exceptional. In short, he's pretty good for an archeologist :)

Fox's thesis is that, based on where cartidges and bullet fragments (plus a few metal arrowheads) were recovered, reveals the initial dispositions of Custer's troops. Not only had Custer already divided his forces (the famous Benteen and Reno columns, plus the pack train), but now, preparing to attack the large village, Custer apparently had his forces in two "wings," one of three companies and one of two. While one body of men waited near Calhoun Hill, other companies advanced toward Custer Hill and some of the coulees. A sudden Indian counterattack was briefly stalled by effective fire from the 7th in a skirmish line. But unknown to the troopers, the Sioux and Cheyenne were carefully moving through the gullies and approaching them in large numbers, virtually surrounding them. When the Indian counterattack suddenly materialized, the troopers of the 7th were overwhelmed. Meanwhile, those back on Calhoun Hill sought to link up through Capt. Keough, and as the units disintegrated, the men "bunched" (a typical behavior) and/or retreated to where they thought other units would be. Some of these retreats turned to routs, and the close combat is revealed in the number of cavalry pistol rounds discovered.

Some reviewers here want to label Fox "PC." Nonsense. While I doubt he is a conservative, he seems to give credence to Indian testimony ONLY because it conforms to his thesis, not because they were Indians. Indeed, he disproves some of the Indians' recollections using the same archeological methods. As one of the co-authors of "A Patriot's History of the United States," I don't detect any "PC" mission here. And, as a historian, I appreciate any help archeologists can render.

As to some of the criticisms, while it is true many of the bullets/casings would have been taken by souvenir hunters, that only supports Fox's thesis more, because since it is unlikely souvenir hunters would know whether they were picking up cavalry or Indian rounds, or what type, there would be a randomization in the degradation of the battlefield that would essentially leave the patterns intact. (In other words, it's doubtful someone would say, "I'm going to find all the rounds fired by Private Ryan that day.")

It says nothing of men's courage or even their training that they broke in the face of overwhelming numbers and a fractured command. It is no different than the units that ran at Isandlwana: the "western way of war" depends on training and unit cohesion for its superiority, and when that breaks down, it all comes down to numbers. Custer bears full blame for his poor troop disposition, and for repeatedly dividing his forces despite evidence he was in for the fight of his life.

While I agree with most of the author's conclusions, I will say it was written in a very disjointed and hard to read style. Very typical "academic" professorial book. Very dry, wordy, and it went off on tangets about the virtues of archaeology vs oral tradition that had little to do with the subject.

The author was very loose with what he considered "Facts", and took the tiniest shred of evidence that supported his conclusions to be solid facts, while anything against it was shot down.

The fact is, we will never understand exactly what happened that day. The author makes some brilliant guesses, but then irritates the reader by considering them facts to build the rest of his case on. The most glaring problem I saw was using Indian accounts to "prove" Custer rode on to the second ford, then returned and hung out on Cemetery hill for an hour or two. Nothing really definitively supports this either way, and the author should admit its only his guess as to what happened. The book gives some good insight to what happened, it just needs to be written in a better flowing style, and those things that can't be proven need to be stated as such.

This volume should be the primary book on the Battle of the Little Big Horn for serious historians whether or not one agrees with the author's conclusions. His theories concerning the progress of the battle are supported better than the best of the more generally accepted ones by archaeological evidence, contemporary accounts, and near-contemporary analyses.

This book should be purchased in tandem with Scott, Fox, Connor and Harmon, "Archaeological Perspectives on the Battle of the Little Bighorn." For the story of Custer himself, I recommend Connell's "Son of the Morning Star", Stewart's "Custer's Luck", and Custer's own "My Life on the Plains" edited by Milo Quaife. The Scott, et al, book provides much more detail evidence supporting the author's theory of the battle, and combining it with the subject of this review, one might even consider them compelling. At any rate, they must be read and considered before coming to an opinion concerning the progress of the battle.

I was surprised by the negative reviews, particularly since this work is so well written, researched, and structured. If a reader doesn't like the author's conclusions, then all right, but the book at a minimum should receive four stars. Of all the books on Custer's annihilation, this book is the most heavily researched and supported by the evidence (in my opinion.) I would like one of the negative reviewers to produce a competitor so that evidence can be compared with evidence.

This book does not detract from the fighting qualities of the 7th Cavalry, but does not present the image of a heroic band of warriors, clustered around their leader, selling their lives as dearly as possible. Instead the image is more complex. The two wings of Custer's detachment maintained their discipline until L Company was decimated after C Company was defeated in Calhoun's Coulee/Ridge, Keogh's Company I was swept up on the ridge from south to north by the Indian rush, and E and F companies rallied to Last Stand Hill. There order was maintained until half were dead or wounded, and the able-bodied soldiers, mostly from Company E, charged down the hill into the Deep Ravine (the South Skirmish Line area) where all were killed. Immediately thereafter, the remainder of the men, probably all wounded, on Custer's Hill were overrun and killed.

The major bit of evidence still outstanding in support of this theory is that cutting of the Deep Ravine has so far failed to find the 28 bodies of the soldiers supposedly buried there in a cluster (see Scott, et al.) If these bodies are unearthed or another explanation is found, then this work can most probably be considered definitive. Personally, I await such evidence with baited breath.

At any rate, this book and the others I have listed above belong on the shelves of everyone interested in Custer, the Battle of the Little Big Horn, and Indian Wars in the West.

I do admire the work and dedication he put into this book and work but some of the Indian testimony he gives for the purpose of backing his claim of no last stand is suspect. For every Indian testimony he gives that say there was no last stand and the fight was short I can find and give at least 3 different Indian testimony that says that their was a last stand and the men gave their lives dearly. New evidence points to somewhere around 250 warriors losing their lives which is a very close to a one for one ratio which would mean some intense fighting. He also talks about not many shells or casings around last stand hill but he fails to mention up into at least the late 1960's people were free to pick up souveniers on the site (Bullets and shell casings) and many people did. I have read one historian account on one afternoon in the early 1960's a couple of friends picked up over a hundred ( I dont remember the exact number but I saying a hundred because I know the number was actually higher) because he has tried buying some from these guys for a long time. He also fails to mention they have also put a park road in and they also put some kind of water tank in and had to dig up the ground to put that in. Keeping inmind of tourists being able to pick up shells for so long where do you think they are going to go to do this. Of course last stand Hill. Mr Fox's conclusions of not finding many shell or shell casings there have to be taken in context. I just find it very disappointing he never mentions any of this. When this first came out he received awards from the battlefield. Now though after some historians have came out with other books such as James Donavaon, Skelnar,Michino and have called his findings into questions and have given much better evidence to dispute foxes claims and pointing out a lot more Indian testimony doesnt jive with Foxes conclusions the Battlefied is kind of distancing themselves from Foxes work especially about Last Stand Hill and what happened there.

The book is an interesting read, however his conclusions that there was no "Last Stand" due to lack of archaeological evidence is simply wrong (a simple research on Indian casualties in '06 showed that 200 warriors had been killed on the battlefield alone, which couldn't be the case if Custer's men had actually shown little resistance and lasted over 2 hours). The fact that this fight occurred over 100 years ago, a visitor center built, monuments and markers placed, not to mention scores of relic hunters picking the hill clean for years (until 1984), and changes in the topography have contaminated any evidence or lack thereof. No conclusions are possible according to what was or what was not found on that hill. Certainly not enough to prove his theories.
He does rely heavily on Indian oral accounts. However, I was disturbed by his continued excuse to discount every account that contradicted his own conclusions, claiming that they were merely telling their white interviewers what white America wanted to hear. He seems to only accept their statements as valid as long as they coincide with his theories.
Would I recommend this book? While I agree it is interesting, it simply cannot be considered a reliable version of what took place on that hill in 1876. There are better books available.

I do not doubt Dr Fox summarises accurately the recent archeological evidence, and is the only book--as opposed to article--to do so. His interpretation of that evidence is much less reliable. For example, if his sample is accurate, and 3% of all Springfield carbine rounds jammed and had to be pried out of the breech with a knife, this does NOT mean that only 6 of 210 carbines misfired. It means that if a weapon fired 10 rounds, there was a 26% chance of jamming--and indeed, he quotes but ignores burial party accounts of "dozens" of jammed weapons the victorious Sioux and Commanche didn't even bother to carry away. His confidence that he knows the distribution of companies between wings because he knows what Upton's CAVALRY TCTICS prescribed bespeaks a man who never served in any branch of any service. Clearly he never heard that "doctrine is the opinion of the senior officer present." Other instances abound.
Buy the book. James Donovan quarried it heavily for TERRIBLE CLORY and gave Dr. Fox less credit than was his due. But don't take the conclusions as seriously as the evidence.