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Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945

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Max Hastings has written a masterpiece on the battle for Germany in 1944-1945. The book is remarkable because Hastings is able to cover many different things simultaneously, while weaving everything together in a narrative that is well-written and engaging. Indeed, topics that are typically researched as independent issues (the Holocaust; the plight of civilians; the quality of the various armies; issues of military command; issues of politics) are all treated together to give, finally, the reader "the big picture". The meaning of all of this is driven home with personal accounts, which makes the book pointed and poignant. Quite simply, this book must rank highly on anyone's list of "best WWII books of 2004."

There are several issues that I think are worthy of special attention.

First, Hastings argues that Allied armies (UK and US) fought under conditions that forced caution and an attention to casualties. Being democracies, their militaries operated under different constraints than the German and Red armies which instead relied upon fanaticism and ruthless disregard for the value of an individual's life. That the allies produced no commanders of German or Soviet caliber is explained by the fact that they could not engage in East-front style operations, where a butcher's bill of hundreds of thousands of casualties was "normal." Hastings even states that a general like Zhukov would have been decidedly ordinary had he been forced to adopt the constraints the US and the UK operated under.

Second, Hastings does not use these constraints to excuse poor performance by the UK and US. He instead points out several failures of operations and command, as well as pointing out missed opportunities to move more quickly. Hastings blasts Montgomery and the British Army for failing to secure the approaches to Antwerp. He is correct in identifying this as perhaps the single most important hindrance to moving further in 1944. Without the port, supplies had to come over the D-Day beaches or up from the Mediterranean coast of France. This was wasteful and slow. Hastings further blasts Montgomery for his insistence on a narrow northern thrust. Hastings clearly and convincingly shows that it would not have worked. Concurrently, Hastings shows that the British failures in Market-Garden offer further evidence of (a) Montgomery's inabilities and of (b) the British army's poor quality. Finally, regarding the British, Hastings is quite scathing in his assessment of Montgomery's elaborate and basically pointless battle to cross the Rhine, which moved slowly and painfully, even as American units were already across elsewhere. Nor does Hastings spare American commanders, although they come out looking a bit better. Hastings is critical of Eisenhower's military command decisions, particularly in terms of passing up an opportunity to encircle the Germans in the "Bulge" and in terms of moving very slowly once across the Rhine. Even in 1945, when meeting fleeting resistance, Eisenhower seemed overly concerned with the possibility of German counter-attacks and wanted a tidy front line. Hastings criticizes Soviet decisions regarding the pointless attacks in Prussia and Silesia, which served, he argues, only to divert attention away from the Berlin axis of attack. What Hastings fails to recognize is that Red Army commanders were operating like Eisenhower: they were still afraid of the potential for German counter-attacks. The Red Army, like Eisenhower, continued to over-estimate the strength of the German army until the very end.

Third, the author reminds us that the slowness of the Allied armies had very real consequences. To those who study World War II from a purely military perspective, there is typically not much concern about how quickly the end of the war was brought about. After all, by the fall of 1944 it was obvious that Germany would lose the war, even if when it would lose was not known. Hastings points out, however, that the failure to end the war more quickly caused a tremendous amount of suffering. Dutch civilians starved to death in the winter of 44-45. The Nazis had more time to carry out their brutal Holocaust. Slave laborers continued to toil. Hastings' point is that if the US and UK were fighting for democratic and moral ideals, then they had an obligation to move more quickly.

Fourth, Hastings points out that the Red Army, fighting for revenge, exacted it in terrible ways on German civilians. Much like Beevor, Hastings documents the rape and pillage perpetrated by the Red Army. However, Hastings, unlike Beevor, is quick to remind the reader that the Germans, despite their complaints about "honor" behaved in exactly the same way, and worse, in the occupied region of the Soviet Union. In the absence of any other justice system, an "eye for an eye" is perhaps an understandable, although not morally perfect, result.

Finally, Hastings address a variety of political issues. He exposes Churchill's naivety in, well, everything from the UK's declining position in global politics, to the UK's declining importance in the alliance, to the lack of any influence in Eastern Europe (considering the Red Army was firmly in charge). Eisenhower, criticized for operational decisions, is credited for wise political decisions. Hastings gives him credit for holding the alliance together, especially in the face of downright unprofessional conduct of Montgomery and the petty sniping between other commanders. Eisenhower is also given credit for his correct decision to abandon a drive on Berlin. Hastings assesses Stalin's behavior and concludes that although it was brutal, it was very effective in securing his goals. Stalin knew he owed very little to either Churchill or Roosevelt and he had his armies covering the eastern half of Europe. He knew he could do as he pleased, and did so. The western allies did not "lose" eastern Europe because that assumes they had it in the first place.

Hastings has written a very perceptive book. Finally, an author has tackled simultaneously the military, moral, and political element of the end of the war in Europe, and has done so brilliantly.

In Armageddon Mark Hastings has provided an in depth and wide ranging history of the last months of World War II in Europe. This massive tome provides an organized and intimate window into the appalling toll of war, a toll exacerbated by errors overconfidence contributed particularly among the Western allies on the one hand and the incalculable atrocities the vengeance of the Russians contributed on the other.

Hastings effectively shows how overconfidence born from the success of the western invasion on D-day led the western allies into a series of questionable decisions of both tactical and psychological nature. The failure to secure the deep water port at Antwerp and the miscalculation as to the willingness and capabilities of the retreating Germans to continue to battle led to unnecessary disaster at Arnheim and the Ardennes.

Hastings also provides what may be the first authoritative overview of the raping and pillaging of Prussia by Russian troops, a saga of atrocities unparallel in 20th century history and possibly the most savage actions in Europe sine the days of the Mongol invasions.

Although great in scope the book has curious omissions. There is virtually nothing here relating to the war in southern Europe. Although some major characters get the full historical overview, others are given relatively short shrift. And there is a definite element of personal commentary as to certain players (Monty in particular) that are less than objective in my view.

However, on the whole this is an awesome historical review of a major historical event with lessons for today. The perils of the end game in Europe may well have implications as to the possible end game in Iraq. If so, the lessons are not heartening.

So, in the end, this book has value not only as a historical reference but as a warning about the perils that sill face those who wage war today.

Max Hastings' "Armagaddon" is a fantastic book about the last year of World War II in Europe. In ways, it is a follow-up to his book "Overlord," although Hastings does also devote considerable attention to the fighting on the East Front. Hastings seamlessly shifts his narrative from the big picture to analysis to individual viewpoints, and in doing so gives the reader an accurate and informed history of the last year of WWII in Europe.

Much of Hasting's focus is on the "big picture," the campaigns and battles from August 1944 until May 1945. Hastings describes all of the major battles of the last year of the war - Market-Garden, the Ardennes, the Allied Spring Offensive, the Vistula Offensive, and the Battle for Berlin - while also devoting more print than others to Operation Varsity, the Soviet offensives in the Balkans, and other lesser-known actions. He describes at length the Warsaw Uprising. Sometimes, though, the details of these battles are lost or get confusing because Hastings' narratives of these battles often jump between the "big picture" and the individual accounts of the battles. .

Hastings also analyzes the conduct of the battle and the military leaders of each side. As in "Overlord," Hastings is critical of the American and British leaders who lacked the initiative, vision, and experience to end the war as quickly as they could. He is also critical of the fighting abilities of the American and British soldiers. Hastings contrasts these commanders and soldiers with those of the Germans and Soviet Russians, all of whom he believe were superior to the American and British. Reading Hastings' opinions serve as a counterpoint to those such as Stephen Ambrose, and certainly the truth lies somewhere between the two. Still, Hastings does differentiate between the individual leaders; for example, he is extremely critical of Montgomery while seeming to hold Patton in fairly high regard.

Hastings peppers his narrative individual stories in the war, telling the experiences of the soldiers and civilians caught up in the war. These stories are based on recently-conducted interviews with the participants. He uses these stories to support his larger theses and to color his battle accounts. These personal stories are most telling during "Armageddon's" chapters about the aerial bombing of Germany, POWs, and the Soviet pillaging of East Prussia.

"Armageddon" gives the reader a great overview of the last year of WWII in Europe. Hastings weaves his history with analysis of the campaigns and with the personal stories of those who were there. He has written an excellent work that should be read by anyone with an interest in WWII. It's just a shame that he couldn't find a better title for his book.

Hastings has wriiten a book that is harshly critical of the allies during the Second World War. According to Hastings the Western allies missed numerous opportunities to conquer Germany such as after the capture of Aachen and the Battle of the Bulge. Moreover the Western allies were too reliant on firepower and not able to improvise in combat. Hastings also chatises Soviet miltitary abiltity as well, by criticizing the decision to halt the advance into Berlin by pausing to reinforce the northern flank, and Zhukov's frontal attack on that city. Hastings writes that the allies committed numerous atrocities such as bombing and strafing civilians while the Russians crucified and raped women.Plus Hastings questions the morality of the Western allies by provoking the doomed Warsaw rebellion without having the means to support it. The main fault of Hastings's work is that he leaves out the siege of Budapest and ignores the works by David French, Peter Mansoor, and Michael Doubler that contradict his thesis about the military abilties of the Western allies. Despite these criticisms, I would reccomend this book for those who want a new perspective on the Second World War.

Things were going so swimmingly for the Allies in September 1944. After bitter fighting in Normandy following D-Day, American and British forces had chased the retreating Germans across France and were preparing to deliver the final blow to defeat the Nazis on their home turf. The killing had raged for five years, but now there was hope.

Yet the war dragged on for eight more months, spurring millions of additional deaths and the leveling of dozens of cities.

Why? Why did all the concentration-camp sufferers, slave laborers, prisoners of war, starving children - not to mention soldiers - have to wait, and die, until May 1945?

That question inspired historian Max Hastings to write "Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945." Hastings explains that while the Allies had more planes, more tanks and infinitely more fuel and supplies, the Germans had more men, were more adept at military tactics and fought more tenaciously to defend their homeland.

Hastings blames plodding, overcautious Allied generals, poor strategic planning and an unwillingness of some soldiers to fight with fury, preferring to let machines and massive bombing do the dirty work. Germany, meanwhile, considered the Allies a secondary concern. Most of the fighting, and dying, was against the Red Army in the east, where the Soviets bore the brunt of casualties.

Hastings, a British foreign correspondent, former newspaper editor and author of "Overlord" among other military histories, does an excellent job of weaving together the war's multiple layers: from the high command and midlevel officers to infantry grunts and confused civilians. Readers get glimpses of the famous and infamous leaders - Churchill, Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Hitler, Stalin - but the more telling stories are often the personal ones. It's one thing to hear a town was destroyed, another to hear it from a woman who lived there and saw her friends repeatedly raped by Red Army soldiers.

Rich descriptions of displaced families mix with fascinating details: Hitler, desperately afraid of poison, drank from a thermos marked with a big "F" when dining with the Goebbels; a Soviet soldier's diet consisted of bread, cabbage soup, canned meat, milk powder and 100 grams ("the official daily issue") of vodka; in the final months, "thick dust, generated by countless millions of explosive concussions from end to end of Germany, lay upon everything - windows, furniture, vehicles, houses, corpses, living people."

Hastings dismisses many of the generals in the conflict as pompous windbags or incompetent. Two are worthy of high praise: Gen. George S. Patton of the United States, for his cunning and sense of urgency; and Gen. Georgi Zhukov of the Soviet Union, whom Hastings calls simply "the most effective military commander of the second world war."

That Zhukov lived to conquer Berlin is amazing, considering that Stalin was his boss.

Stalin had learned to defer to his military leaders, writes Hastings. "Stalin's resentment of Zhukov's celebrity and popularity had grown, however, eating into what passed for his soul. All his life, the ruler of Russia displayed towards able comrades a blend of admiration and envy which impelled him to murder most of them sooner or later."

Much of this has been covered extensively elsewhere. But Hastings tried to focus when possible on new material and interviews with eyewitnesses now well into old age.

After reading "Armageddon," however, I didn't come away pointing fingers at Allied inefficiency. Considering the iron resolve of the Germans, we were lucky to end it in 1945.

From one of Britain's Best Military Historians.

I have always admired the work of Max Hastings, whether it be his combat reportage from the Falkland Islands or his masterful tome on D-Day "Overlord" where he first challenged the optimism and the skill of the Allied Armies facing the Germans on the Normandy Beaches.

In "Armageddon" Hastings further challenges the myths of the superiority of the Western Allies over the Nazi armies, and whether one agrees with him or not, his findings are cause for serious thought and re-evaluation, especially in regards to the way we fight our wars today.

Some of his findings aren't new - but more novel in the way that he presented and flushed them out. For example, Hastings rips Bernard Montgomery, a fellow Brit across the coals for his twin failures to open up Antwerp Port in September 1944, and for blithely sending in three Allied Airborne divisions without adequate armor or infantry support in the ill-fated Operation Market Garden in Holland. In the first case, Montgomery chose to do a "Farragut at Mobile Bay" in reverse. Whereas the Union Admiral chose to take out the harbor forts at Mobile and neutralize the Confederate fleet before assault the city, Montgomery chose to take the city without moving on the port facilities with the utmost urgency. That cost the allies almost two months of supplies - and perhaps the drive to move into Germany in the fall of 1944. Furthermore, by destroying the 1st British Airborne Division at Arnhem, Hastings shows that even if Arnhem had been successful, Allied forces still would have lack the necessary punch to move in force across the Rhine and into the heart of Nazi Germany simply because there weren't enough supplies. Antwerp was the key to ending the war in the west, and Monty blew it badly.

But Eisenhower also deserves his fair share of criticism. Hastings points out that Patton should have been the commander of the U.S. forces in the Ruhr, and had he been in command, would have possessed the fire, drive and imagination to move in force into the German heartland. To put in opposite Alsace-Lorraine was a waste. Furthermore, Hastings finds it unbelieveable that Ike, knowing Monty's weaknesses and his spite towards Americans, would let Montgomery take charge of the major operations designed to end the war in the fall of 1944 and fail completely!

The British soldiers were tired, their officers while courageous lacked skill and imagination. By contrast, the U.S. Army had some wonderful elite forces, i.e., the 82nd and 101st Airborne, and the 3rd and 4rd Armored Divisions to name a few, but outside of Patton and a few unorthodox officers, were either too slow or too hesitant to take the necessary initative.

By contrast Hastings gives the Wehrmacht, fighting desperately on its own soil very high marks for tenacity, and also to the Red Army for smashing through the thick German defenses from the Vistula to the Oder. He also notes that the totalitarian armies were the worst when it came to respecting human rights and lives; but better in mortal combat than the humane Allied soldiers. He also notes that Stalin had clear-cut goals whereas the sick Roosevelt vacillated to the dismay of a worn and pessimistic Churchill.

The chapter on the Soviet push into East Prussia is not for the faint of heart or to be read on a full stomach. Even those of us who cheered the destruction of the Third Reich and of the Nazi killing machine will have very little to cheer over the rapes, tortures and murders committed by the Red Army, no matter the justification, including the martyred Six Million and the countless Russians and Slavs slaughtered and starved by Hitler. In fact, much of our distrust of Russia stems from those days when the reality that Stalin was no better than Hitler finally hit home after Yalta. Hastings is not the first to chronicle the murderous rampage in Prussia, Jurgen Thorwald and James Lucas have preceded him. But he is the first to write of this in relatively unemotional and non-partisan tones.

This is one incredible history of the final 9 months of World War II in Europe. The savagery of the battlefield, the atrocities committed by Germans and Russians, the weaknesses of the West in contrast to the bloodthirsty determination of the Soviets, and accounts by the fighting men themselves (Hastings, like Ambrose and Brokaw wanted to capture the true voices of "The Greatest Generation" before they passed on, and did so with flying colors)...it is all here in "Armageddon".

Hastings, like Jay Winik in his treatment of the last month of the Civil War in "April 1864" has captured the depth and the scope of the killing fields in Europe at the end of World War II.

The reviews on this history are the highest.

Hastings hands out praise, but glorifies no one; Ike as a superb mediator but not a strategist, Patton as a fine strategist but a selfish, preening egotist who needed to be reined in by Ike, Bradley as a plodder, Montgomery as a fool [along with Ike] in the Battle of Arnhem and in failing to timely capture Antwerp. He praises the German soldier and is critical of the British and American soldiers.

Set against the glorified jingoism of Stephen Ambroise/Tom Brokaw, it is sobering and enlightening to see one's own nation through Hastings' focused prism at this time of war. Credit is given when credit is due but war is hell and Hastings makes the case more effectively than others.

Normally revisionist historians bore me and I can generally not control my gag reflex long enough to wade through their drivel. But nearly all revisionists are lightweight leftist intellectuals who try to cast the United States as the penultimate villain.

Max Hastings, on the other hand, is a revisionist, but his revisions have to do with correcting some of the propagandist lies that arose after the end of war in Europe in 1945.

The politics of the time demanded that the American, English and other western "allies" be accorded great credit for the military victory while the newly re-demonized Soviet Union's part be minimized.

Hastings has performed a heroic deed in "Armageddon" by reminding the world once again that the Soviet Union, as evil as its government was, played the grand role in destoying the German war machine.

The American military is accurately depicted as a miracle of rapid organization and promiscuous user of technology. The British come off as a plodding, ultimately poorly led and rapidly diminishing army. The Poles, Canadians and few French barely count. Overall Hastings carefully explains how the democracies built war time armies that reflected their peoples: war was a job to be done, something to be finished as quickly as possible so soldiers could return home to their normal lives. The approach hampered military operations for the western allies since no American or British soldier wanted to be the last to die. Thus, Hastings argues, the advance of the allies east into Germany was constantly hampered by delays. None of the American, British or Canadian generals come off particularly well in Hasting's estimation . . . and as most students of history would tell you, he is right.

The German army, according to Hastings, was the finest of the WWII armies, perhaps the finest in history. And as you read Hasting's account how the Germans staved off defeat with ad hoc forces, often brilliant improvisation on the battlefield and a ruthless disdain for human life and western morality, you breathe a sigh of relief that Germany was once again defeated (though it would have been so much better if Germany's aggression had been forcefully addresse earlier).

It is the Soviet military that comes off as the true engineer of victory of WWII in Europe and this is, as almost any student of military history will tell you, true. The Soviet Union ruled by Lenin and then Stalin is seeped in more blood and outright evil than Hitler's Germany, yet it was capable of creating a military machine that killed 2 million German soldiers before the western allies set foot in France. The Soviet generals (and Stalin) proved far more adaptable than the Americans and British in devising strategic and tactical approaches to defeating the Germans. This is all the more amazing when, as Hastings does, Soviet society is considered. A truly repressed people in peace and war, the Soviets were able to organize not only manpower, but industrial production as well. Soviet losses were apalling: German behavior toward conquered Soviets even more appalling. Yet out of some spirit of patriotism for Mother Russia, ordinary Soviet citizens endured tremendous sacrifices on every level to roll back the Germans.

Personally I felt no pity for Hastings' recounting of the disaster that befell German civilians. Germany brought upon itself the destruction it so freely visited upon others. Hastings makes the point that far too many Germans who should have been executed as war criminals were never brought to justice because of post-war politics. That is a great shame.

Every self-proclaimed pacifist should read this book simply to learn how fragile freedom is and what happens when well intentioned, but thoroughly ignorant people, allow evil to flourish. Students of history, on the other hand, will find "Armageddon" satisfying because it is one of the few WWII histories free of political bias.

Max Hastings has proven himself to be one of the very best military historians of the 20th Century's greatest and hopefully last "world war."

Jerry

It's been a long time coming, but what is effectively the sequal to "Overlord" manages to overshadow even that masterpiece.

To anyone under 50, the sheer scale of World War Two is staggering. The size of the armies, the number of dead and wounded, and the scale of the general suffering is so great as to be difficult to imagine. Hastings manages the very difficult trick of sustaining a narrative overview while never allowing us to forget that every event involved individuals.

Amongst the many shocking facts he exposes:

The treatment of the Soviet Union's own soldiers who had been captured was horrific. Stalin was worried that in captivity they had somehow become "exposed" to the West and possibly "contaminated." On liberation thousands were shot, while thousands more were sent to the GULAG or internal exile.

The evacuation of East Prussia (now Poland) meant that about two million German civilians lost their lives, whilst the survivors suffered rape, destitution, and abuse at the hands of a maddened Red Army.

The stupidity of the Nazi leadership when they continued to defend the Western front long after any hope of victory or negotiated settlement had passed. This lead to the occupation of Berlin and the East by the Soviet Union, with all the suffering and cruelty that ensued.

The naivety of President Roosvelt, in assuming he could trust Stalin, despite Churchill's misgivings. To be fair, nobody knew the President was terminally ill during much of 1944.

Finally, (yes finally!) a historian is candid enough to critisise "Market Garden" and correctly speculate that even if the operation had succeded, the Allies would have surely been halted and defeated or exhausted to a standstill somewhere else long before reaching Berlin in the winter of 1944.

The list goes on.

Buy this book, read it, and prepare to be amazed and unsettled at what human beings, many of whom considered themselves educated and civilised, are capable of. It's also the perfect antidote to the rancid guff the late Stephen Ambrose plagerised in his "greatest generation" works which often glorify this cruelest and most horrible of all wars.

This is a very refreshing "revision" of some well trodden WWII events. Hastings is blunt in his presentation about how the Allies fumbled their way to victory over outnumbered but superior German forces. He is sharply critical of the many lost opportunities to seize vital port cities and bridges, and of the Allies reluctance to press the initiative once a battle has been won. He is also lavish in his praise of the Soviet armed forces, and insightful of how societies like Germany and Russia could produce ruthless, miserable human beings who made for great generals. It is a very untraditional look at WWII.