Customer Reviews

Armament and Disarmament: South Africa's Nuclear Experience

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This little book is one that you can't help but wish that it had enough marketing money behind it to make it a big seller.

The basic subject is the nuclear program of South Africa as it was conducted in the 70's and 80's. South Africa of course has Uranium deposits (it seems to have deposits of everything).

After World War II the UN began passing resolutions calling for embargoes against South Africa. This caused the Govenment there to develop bunker mentality. They were involved with several Soviet Union backed insurgencies on their borders and since weapons were on the embargoed list, they began a weapons development program which produced some excellent conventional weapons such as the G5 and G6 cannons which are still sold on the world market. They also began a nuclear program.

This book has so many excellent points that it is difficult to say just how important it is:

It shows what effect embargoes really have on a country. We live in a time where quite a number of people still think that they should eventually work if applied to Iraq, Iran, North Korea, etc. It seems that embargoes really force the development of locally designed/built weapons rather than buying them outside. Somehow I don't think that the overall plan of an embargo is to tell a country, 'OK, we aren't going to sell you these things, you go develop them yourself.'

It has as short and succinct an explanation of the true usefullness of nuclear weapons I've ever seen. It mimics the work of the original people developing the American theories such as David Brodie and Herman Kahn. The difference is that the theories here apply to a small country rather than a super power.

It describes the organizational effort to set up a nuclear program to provide fuel for commercial reactors and on how to design a bomb. It was a huge effort, even after the Americans proved that it could be done. It then describes how to destroy the program when the need for it no longer exists.

Finally, in 1979 the Vela nuclear test detection satellite detected the characteristic twin peak green flash of a nuclear device going off in the South Atlantic. Most of us felt that this was a nuclear test by South Africa. The authors say 'nope.' At that that time South Africa had built only one nuclear device. It was a test device, extensively instrumented and too heavy for the planes South Africa had to be carried and dropped. Satellite malfunction? A red herring set off by another nuclear power to put world pressure on South Africa?

This book gives excellent insight into the reasons a nation would like to pursue nuclear arms. In South Africa's case it was due its isolation from the rest of the world, plus the fact that it had thousands of Cuban, Russian, East German and Angolan troops on its doorstep. Nuclear weapons seemed to be the only option left open as a deterrent.

It also shows that not all nations pursue this aim due to a fanatical sense of power, but it is usually because they feel threatened, and if needs be they will do all they can to reduce that threat. The sense of responsibility felt by the developers is very impressive, and also their courage to dismantle the awesome power to their disposal.

Policy makers could take some lessons away from this book, and hopefully gain some insight on how to deal with countries such as Iran and South Korea. A worthy addition to the bookshelf.