Customer Reviews

Armament And History: The Influence Of Armament On History From The Dawn Of Classical Warfare To The End Of The Second World War

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There are a lot of good books on the relationship between technology and warfare, and if you're interested enough in the subject to read several of them, Fuller is a good choice for #2 or #3. It misses being a good choice for #1 for several reasons:

1) Time Frame. Fuller wrote in 1945, and so his treatment of the nuclear age is speculative rather than retrospective. The speculations are nearly all interesting, but they focus on nuclear weapons to the exclusion of conventional arms with which post-1945 wars were actually fought.

2) Depth. Fuller is exhaustive on land warfare in the 1800-1945 era, but often sketchy on the pre-industrial era(s) and on anything connected with the sea. The things he does have to say are interesting and well supported, but the background to make sense of them is often lacking.

3) Perspective. Fuller was a career military officer and one of the people who developed the tactics (in 1917-1919) for what became (in 1939-45) modern, highly mobile land warfare. His view of history is (reasonably and properly) shaped by that experience, and it helps to have some sense of Fuller the military thinker *before* you approach Fuller the historian.

None of these faults keeps _Armarments and History_ from succeeding on its own terms. It's a thoughtful and well-documented argument. Readers interested in military history and military technology will find a lot of valuable insights and ideas in it. BUT if you're looking for a first (or only) book to read on the subject, try Martin Van Creveld's _Technology and War_ or Robert O'Connell's _Arms and Men_ or Bernard and Fawn Brodie's _From Crossbow to H-Bomb_ (roughly in that order of preference).

JFC Fuller could have invented RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs)/Transformation. He did not because he did not do the historical "due diligence" done by the real RMA community in the 1950's and 1980's. This book is his best effort in that direction, however. He believes that war is "99 percent technology", and this book advocates that view to the exclusion of any contrary information. That makes this a useful "balancing read" for any serious student of RMA. On the surface, he makes a compelling argument; certainly good enough for the casual reader. Any level of digging, however, will quickly shred most of his arguments & examples. If you think war is all about tanks, airplanes, ships and their weapons, this book is for you. If you think strategy, tactics, morale, national finances or logistics might have some influence on war, you might find this book frustrating.