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4.0 out of 5 stars
Excellent summary of early Islamic Military History, March 26, 2005
This review is from: The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State (Warfare and History) (Paperback)
Few people realize that the vast extent of Islamization in the Middle East and North Africa today is a direct consequence of the conquest of these regions by Arab armies during the seventh and eighth centuries AD. The success of these conquests, struggles, and the establishment of Arab and Muslim control strongly depended on military organization and success. As a result, it is rather surprising that there has been relatively little study of the military aspects of the conquests and the development of the armies during the first three centuries of the Caliphate-a period crucial to the formation and spread of Islam. Professor Hugh Kennedy's The Armies of the Caliphs aims to fill this void claiming to be the first major study of the relationship between army and society in the early Islamic period, and concordantly, the role of military in politics.
Armies of the Caliphs (although quite dense) does present a comprehensive and balanced discussion of items such as weaponry, tactics, lines of command, methods of payment, and the changing social and ethnic composition of Muslim armies throughout the first three centuries of the Caliphate. The book is based heavily on narrative sources by historians of the ninth and tenth centuries such as al-Baladhuri and especially, al-Tabari. Since these works focus greatly on individuals and groups of individuals rather than institutions, they are extremely prosopographical. Directly, the sources refer only sporadically to tactics and methods of paying soldiers. Kennedy however uses this prosopography to his advantage. For example, using al-Tabari as a source, Kennedy cites an anecdote in which the Umayyads under al-Hajjaj defeated the Kharijis when they tried to attack Kufa. In doing so, he effectively demonstrates the importance of the infantry spear-wall defense. To reinforce this view, he cites another anecdote (once again using al-Tabari) about how the `Abbasid troops used the exact same technique at the Battle of Tell Kushaf to defeat Marwan II's army. Similarly, Kennedy argues convincingly that soldiers were generally paid in cash thus reflecting upon the importance of commerce and monetary exchange in the economy. This contrasts with the system in medieval Europe at the time, whereby troops were paid by grants of land or by tax farms-what started as a stipend for the Caliph's soldiers, ultimately became a true salary for work done.
Compared to his discussion on payment, Kennedy provides only a cursory glance composed of two chapters in regards to weapons, equipment, fortification, and siege warfare (a mere twenty-seven pages in a book of well over two hundred). This however is understandable because apart from the stirrup, there were no major technical advances in military equipment during the first three Islamic centuries. Regarding the stirrup, Kennedy argues that although there is no reason to suppose that the Arabs used them, the Muslims began to adopt it around the end of the seventh century. His discussion takes into account Lynn White's theory that the introduction of stirrups lead to the development of the heavily armoured horseman and ultimately to the social structures designed to support such specialized warriors. On the other hand, siege warfare played a small role in Islamic military history because there was a general dislike for static and restricted forms of warfare. Furthermore, no evidence remains for organised siegecraft. Even when cities, citadels, and individual buildings were fortified, they were more for display purposes than for defense.
Kennedy's discussion of the changing social and ethnic composition is quite comprehensive. In the years around 700 AD, largely in response to the challenge of revolts and civil wars, the Caliph Abd al-Malik began to have his army dominated by units from Syria because of their supposed superiority. With the fall of the Umayyads in 750 AD, Syrian domination gave way to men from the province of Khurasan (where the revolt which gave the Abbasids control of the Caliphate began). When the Khurasanis were no longer reliable, the Caliphs began to increasingly recruit Turks from Central Asia. Historians usually refer to these troops as slave soldiers, but Kennedy argues that we cannot be sure of their legal status. This is because in some ways it was irrelevant: the result of this new source of recruitment was the growing isolation of the Caliphs and the usurpation of real power by the soldiers, who themselves were cut off in their garrisons and in frequent conflict with the indigenous dwellers of Iraq.
Kennedy's book is part of a series, Warfare and History, intended for historians and related specialists. He wastes no time with a background for introductory purposes, and delves right into the content. It seems therefore quite lacking that the glossary does not include many of the Arabic terms for weapons, armour, and other similar words which occur frequently in the text. An appendix providing a brief introduction to some of the important Caliphs, commanders, and generals would have been helpful as well. Although there are three maps provided in the book, they are not sufficient for a book of such a large scope. More illustrations would have been helpful, of not only paintings and artefacts that provide evidence, but reconstructions of weapons and army formations, which are difficult to visualize simply from verbal descriptions. Overall, Kennedy succeeds in doing what he set out for: analyzing the relationship between army and society in the early Islamic period, thus offering an excellent reassessment of the early Islamic state.
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