Customer Reviews

On Armor (Military Profession)

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There are a large number of books available that describe every conceivable type of armored vehicle. Comparisons can be made of the size, armament, speed, weight, etc. of the German Mark IV and the Russian T-34 or of any other.

Much less common is discussion on what the various armies did with not only their tanks, but how they interfaced with armored cars, infantry, self propelled artillery, etc. This is a book on the ideas, problems and opportunities that armor made possible for 20th century armies. The abilities of the generals to organize their armies to get the most out of the equipment was as important a story as the speed, size, etc.

From this it is a logical extension to make some predictions as to what armored forces will look like in the future battlefield.

A very enjoyable book that looks at history in a slightly different way.

The content of book is unbalanced. Too little on post WWII period. The three chapters on German armored organization is excellent and enable us know deeply on German panzer division and remove some traditional but incorrect view e.g. The reduction of one tank regiment in Panzer division is bad thing in traditional view but author adjust this. But during the cold war, only some about Middle East or Korean armored warfare but nothing on US armored division or Soviet tank/motor rifle divisional organization.It is disappointing.

Another excellent work by Bruce Gudmundsson. This is an excellent work, not on tanks and armored vehicles exclusively, but on the *doctrinal* thinking processes that produced different types of armored vehicles and their application. This work should be seen from that standpoint.

Gudmundsson covers the unique and often odd beginnings of armored warfare. For example, most early armored fighting vehicles in WWI were developed and crewed (by varying degree) by *naval* personnel! Mr. Gudmundsson explains the phenomena from a doctrinal standpoint.

He covers not simply the Germans in the interwar period, but also the French and the Soviets - in most works, these are usually ignored or overshadowed by discussion of the Germans. Yet, operationally speaking, people such as Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the USSR were probably ahead of the Germans in the use of armor and mobile units.

Mr. Gudmundsson does an excellent job of touching on armored vehicles other than tanks such as armored cars and assault guns, as well as other forms of accompanying mobile forces using half-tracks, motorcycles, trucks, etc.

Some may wonder why post WWII armor isn't covered as well as that during WWII. The answer is that nothing *doctrinally* had changed. In the Arab-Israeli wars, for example, nothing was done that hadn't been seen in WWII. If one wanted to, one could look at the 1967 conflict with Israelis as Germans and the Arab forces as the French in May 1940 and the comparison wouldn't be too far off the mark!

I would have liked for Mr. Gudmundsson to have expanded his last chapter on the future of armor. I personally think that armored vehicles must become lighter and go back to wheels in order to stay relevant in the future. This is a good work and it should be in the library of every serious student of armor of warfare in the 20th century.

Not a complete study--it fills holes in the record

Bruce I. Gudmundsson's "On Armor" is not a complete study on the subject. Instead, as the author states in the preface, "On Armor" fills in the holes in the historical record on the development and use of the armored fighting vehicle. That record, Gudmundsson writes, exceeds the writings of any other 20th Century land warfare weapon system.

I really liked the parts covering the armored car in combat during the first and final stages of World War One. If more of America's policy makers would read this section, perhaps we wouldn't keep repeating the mistakes America keeps making with its light armor vehicle forces.

And it is a weapon system--not a stand-alone weapon. I'm a combined-arms fanatic, preferring the synergetic effects from diverse combat systems to the simplicity of pure tank, infantry, artillery, aviation, or police force operations. So, apparently, is Gudmundsson. "On Armor" illustrates how infantry, motor transport, and other arms and services were integrated into tank battles--and what happened when these combat systems were used on their own. I found the information on early armored car use quite interesting because we are once again re-inventing the wheel on armored car doctrine in Iraq. Folks, "hillbilly armor plate" on the HMMWV is better than unarmored HMMWV's in contested zones, but proper armored cars backed up by tanks hurt the enemy more and cost us less in lives. The effect that personalities have on the force mix and equipment selected and on the strategy, operational art, tactics and techniques used are clearly described. The author ends his book with "The age of the tank is over. The age of tanks has begun." This summary is explained fully in the text.

It seems to me that the modern American Army is trying to get a deployable combat unit that can be sent to the battlefield in an 8-ounce FedEx overnight envelope! And that is behind the times--just e-mail it! A combat brigade is a large, heavy, hungry, destructive beast with several hundred combat troops--and even more support troops. Gudmundsson praises the M1A2 Abrams main battle tank as the most-survivable and most lethal armored fighting vehicle on the battlefield, and condemns it for being big, heavy, operationally "immobile," and consuming a lot of fuel. All true. There's more--the Bradley Fighting Vehicle was developed because the Abrams had some shortcomings that the Bradley was the fix for: the 25mm Bushmaster automatic cannon was intended to suppress enemy anti-tank guided missiles. In some National Guard tank units the Abrams is being swapped out for soft-skinned HMMWV's - at a time when the National Guard Military Police is being issued armored HMMWV's! Worse, the tank unit missions are still the same. Oh, these tank units are supposed to draw armored HMMWV's, but due to shortages, Cavalry and Armor units will roar into battle protected by rubberized canvas rather than the advance composite armor. "On Armor" can stimulate debate on both sides of the Transitional Force issue. State governors like the lower fuel and maintenance costs of the HMMWV compared to the Abrams--and simply giving soldiers a credit card to rent cars would be cheaper, still. Most of the time, the full capabilities of tactical military vehicles are not utilized. No matter what, the butcher's bill comes due--either you pay through the nose for expensive fuel hogs and the system to move and support them in combat, or you accept the higher death rates among your Soldiers and Marines, and possibly inability to project force in support of political objectives. "On Armor" shows these costs.

Still, this book only fills in the holes in the record on armor history. If you are looking for a single source on armor history, doctrine, tactics, et al, then "On Armor" is the wrong book for you.

This is a great and very interesting book (though I thought it got off to a slow start for me). It talks of the evolution of the Armor force and how it seems to be coming full circle: where the tank was once thought it could do it all--with infantry and other support--now it's looking as if it cannot any longer.

The majority of this book is about how the Germans used armor during WWII and, even if you're not a fan of the German juggernaut and hungry for as much knowledge about it as possible, this is still a book I highly recommend on armor usage. The Germans were on to many things that I thing would have much use even, today: assault guns (especially), tank hunters and the sort. The way the tank/Panzer evolved during WWII is truly brought out in this work, so is, in a sense, how the Germans were able to hold on for so long.

The only real problem I have with this book, though, is the final chapter: 'The Future of Armor'. The author goes through a great deal of enlightened exposition to only come to some conclusions that I find absolutely surprising. He's right about the Abrams being a pig utterly unsuited to operational level warfare (but then find an US officer who understands that anyway): its engine eats up fuel like its going out of style and its weight...well, you tell ME how a 70 ton vehicle is going to be any use in Eurasia where you have a river every 5 to 15 miles and bridges mostly unable to support them(granted, few of the other MBTs out there are any more 'operationally-friendly). But the fact that he promotes the idea that an all-wheeled force would be just as good or even better in many circumstances is, quite frankly, wrong.

I'm sorry, but from all I've researched wheeled vehicles will NEVER out-perform tracks. He speaks of how the US got the idea of using wheeled vehicles by watching how the French used them as their empire fell apart. I agree with the fact that wheeled vehicles are great on roads, but go find lots of those in Iraq or Russia. APCs like M113s are just as good if not better then wheeled vehicles and their cross-country performance (like any tracked vehicle) is FAR better. He talks of arming them with ATGMs (another thing I see becoming more and more obsolete) and that with them they would 'be able to take a terrible toll of the tanks with little lose to' themselves. Now, if the tanks were moving without infantry support (which they should NEVER do!) I could see this happen, but he never clarifies this point.

He also says--and I quote, 'While a heavy tank would be too powerful for the simple task of overpowering wheeled armored vehicles in a direct fire contest, it would be largely impotent against the kind of precision indirect fire produced by the right sort of wheeled vehicle unit.'
What?! Has Bruce Gudmundsson NEVER heard of HE rounds?! You know, the type that DON'T go through things but blow up when they hit them? Shells even OUR TANKS still carry. (And BTW, what the hell is 'precision indirect fire'? Doesn't 'indirect fire' mean that the firing is IMprecise?)

I also find fault with his theory that the 'All-Purpose Tank' is no longer viable, not that the theory itself is wrong, but the example he uses to show it--The Russian tanks in the Chechen Wars of the early nineties--is completely inappropriate. He says, and I again quote, '(T)he design features needed to preserve the operational mobility of the Russian tanks made them extremely vulnerable to the RPGs wielded by the Chechen fighters. (Those design features included relatively light armor, the lack of measures to inhibit internal explosions, the cramped crew compartments, and the limited ability to elevate and depress the main armament.)'
Now, though I can agree with the first 'feature'--light armor, I find the other design features (or flaws, more appropriately) to be completely incompatible with his conclusion. Though these ARE lousy features, NONE of them has anything to do with making a tank operationally mobile, they are simply the products of a badly designed tank that was intended to be built on the cheap. The Russian tanks weren't vulnerable because they were designed for operational mobility, they were vulnerable because they were garbage. This is no different then US forces thinking their new doctrines were proven viable because of the two Iraq wars. They in no way take into account the fact that the people they were fighting had no business being in tanks in the first place. The Iraqis (no offense) were absolutely awful fighters using vehicles and tactics (if they can be called that) in the second war that were no different from the ones they used in the FIRST war, and even THEN they were obsolete.

I think Mr. Gunmundsson has written a great and important book; anyone who wishes to study armor and how to use it PROPERLY must read this work. I do not disagree with ALL of his conclusions though...he is right in the end when he says, 'The age of the tank is over. The age of tanks has begun.'