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2 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Incomplete study.,
This review is from: Armored Combat in Vietnam (Hardcover)
Yes, we had armor in Vietnam but not nearly enough of it. Here, General Starry details the strategy, equipment, and tactics of the day. He starts by giving a straightforward analysis of the Army's strategic failure to provide adequate armored forces to the field army as planned in the opening years of 1965-66. And then he inadvertently reveals a principal factor in our failure of the entire war. From the Preface: "It was not until 1967, however, when a study titled Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations, Vietnam, conducted by General Arthur L. West, Jr., was sent to the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army, that the potential of armored forces was fully described to the Army's top leaders. Despite the study's findings - that armored cavalry was probably the most cost-effective force on the Vietnam battlefield - there was little that could be done to alter significantly either the structure of forces already sent to Vietnam or those earmarked for deployment."It's not true. There was nothing to keep sufficient armored forces out of Vietnam except a dismal lack of imagination on the part of American Army officers - or they imagined the wrong things. It is said that General William Westmoreland (the Homer Simpson of Vietnam) kept on his nightstand a copy of Bernard Fall's "Street Without Joy," wherein Fall describes the agonizing destruction of the French Army's Groupement Mobile 100 (a regiment-size mobile task force) in Vietnam's Central Highlands in 1954. He was apparently much influenced by the story, from which he drew the entirely incorrect conclusion that armored forces were unsuited to the battlefields of Vietnam. Westmoreland & Co. never understood that GM 100 was not in reality an armored force and that the French experience had to be analyzed in view of their weakness in air power (armor's best friend). They had no excuse. As the teenage gunner on an M-48 tank in Vietnam, I too read Fall's books (also "Hell In A Very Small Place") and came away with a wholly different view of armored combat in Vietnam. Even in my semi-literate ignorance I could see that the French might have pulled off Dien Bien Phu had they been able to deploy a battalion of tanks instead of the ten (each one dismantled, airlifted in and re-assembled on-site) little M-24 Chaffees that served them so well there. There was absolutely nothing to prevent the U.S. Army from replacing any number of dismounted units already in Vietnam with armored ones, thus keeping within the constraints on troop levels set by the Defense Department. There was no lack of tanks: We employed in Vietnam the M-48A3, an obsolete machine that had elsewhere been replaced by the M-60. There was no lack of manpower: Our base camps in Vietnam were teeming with under-employed rear-echelon troops. These men could have easily been trained for armor duty. How would I know this? Well, my tank, through one of those bureaucratic twists that can only happen in the U.S. Army, was assigned to the Americal Division's 26th Engineer Battalion - and was manned by a crew of three young combat engineers with NO armor training, who served under an experienced sergeant of armor. That sergeant applied a good deal of will power and imagination to build a great fighting crew for the ONLY tank in the Division, and quite probably the last American battle tank to serve in Vietnam. So, why didn't the Army utilize its formidable armored strength in Vietnam? I'm not sure. Perhaps the management had preconceived notions about the rules of "counter-insurgency" warfare. Corporate decisions are sometimes burdened by this kind of stifled thinking and General Starry, a good company man, was not anxious to air the dirty laundry. It's worthwhile to note that when the NVA, who did not feel the need to follow the rules, finally over-ran the South they were spearheaded by armored formations. Recommended to anyone interested in this little-known aspect of the Vietnam War. Starry can tell a good war story so this is not as dry as the more scholarly studies. Richard Vidaurri Americal Division, The U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1970-72 Author of: The Gates of the Shadow richvidaurri@gmail.com
5.0 out of 5 stars
Tank Book Review,
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This review is from: Armored Combat in Vietnam (Hardcover)
I happened to see this book online and purchased it for my father (he is mentioned in the book, having commanded an armored squadron in Vietnam). This book is tremendously detailed - a definite must for any military historian types or anyone interested in a very detailed review of the use of armored vehicles during the Vietnam War. I highly recommend it.
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