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An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War

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For the student of military logistics this work is essential reading. As a history of the Spanish-American War, it is merely adequate. It is the primary objective of the book to cover the U.S. military's preparedness for, and response to, the Spanish-American War. The ebb and flow of battles are secondary to this logistical leitmotif, and are covered with little detail. Accordingly, there is almost more written on military uniform subcontracting than on the battle of San Juan Hill.

One disquieting aspect of the book is the impression Cosmas gives of his utter determination to absolve the U.S. Army of any wrong doing in its preparation for the war. In a number of areas, such as the performance of the Krag-Jorgensen rifle, Cosmas fails to convince. He too easily dismisses complaints about the military establishment as the products of political jealousies and yellow journalism.

Nonetheless, Cosmas' mastery of logistical detail is exceptional, and will make this book required reading for any historian of the war. However, it is not itself a full history of the war.

"An Army For Empire" is proof of the saying that, in military matters, amateurs speak of tactics while professionals speak of logistics. Much of this book deals with the history of the organization and supply of the U. S. Army during the Spanish American War. Relatively few pages are devoted to narration of the actual combat.

Much of the story of the preparation of the Army dealt with the sometimes stormy relationships between President McKinley, Secretary of War Alger, Commanding General Of The Army Miles, Adjutant General Corbin, General Shafter, Commander in Cuba, and more minor characters. Cosmas points out the challenges confronting the administration which contributed to the disorganization and poor food for which it was criticized. Legal restrictions on the deployment of National Guard units complicated the recruitment of volunteer troops. Problems arose out of the incompatibility of equipment among the state militias. Political tugs of war between regular and state forces complicated staffing. Limited ordnance production capabilities constrained material accumulation. Shifting war aims introduced inefficiencies into the deployment of troops. The post hostility problems with tropical diseases and their stateside ramifications receive in depth analysis. All in all, Cosmas concludes that the War Department succeeded, by war's end, in developing a suitable Army for Empire.

Cosmas does a good job in explaining how the shifting war aims drove changes in invasion plans. Whereas original debate centered over attacks on Havana or Puerto Rico, the discovery of Adm. Cervera's fleet in Santiago Harbor compelled a landing near Santiago. The reader learns that the seemingly irrational departure of the Spanish fleet from Santiago was done under orders. The resulting destruction of the Spanish fleet cut the army off from its sources of supply and condemned it to either starvation or surrender.

Cosmas show how inefficiencies turned up in unexpected places. Despite the longer trip, the expedition to the Philippines was better organized than the one to Cuba. As things turned out, the Army raised about twice as many volunteer troops as it used.

Having read other books about the Spanish American War, "An Army For Empire" supplemented what I already knew. It tied things together and showed the "whys" behind the "whats". For this it was worthwhile. I thought that the extensive verbage about supply and organization may prove boring, but it never did. I would not recommend this as a first book about the Spanish American war. I do recommend it to deepen the understanding of the mature reader.

Mr. Cosmas has put together some fascinating details about the Spanish American War and the campaigns in Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico and even on Guam. His attention to detail is excellent and covers (although not in as much depth as it could have) the various factors involved in this unique conflict. He points out the weakness of the military, the lack of proper medical, supply and weaponry, but he does explain the courage and determination of the common soldier and the terrible problems they faced. The fight for San Juan Hill was done a bit too quickly, but covered the basics. The book is broken down into compact chapters that lets the reader learn about the war in digestible segments. All together, a most readable book for the novice and experienced history buff, but could have been much longer and filled with more information about the various units and relative personalties. In fact, Frederick Funston is only mentioned once and General Henry Lawton needed more ink. A good book to round out one's collection on the dawning of the American colonial period.

Throughout American military history, the interactions and tensions between the regular Army, militia (National Guard) and the civilian politicians in Washington have plagued efficiency in time of war. Nowhere are these tensions more apparent than in Graham A. Cosmas's seminal study. Do not let the title of this book mislead you, however. This is not a beginning-to-end narrative of the Spanish-American War in the conventional sense. Instead, this is an institutional, administrative, and organizational treatise on military policy, that utilises the Spanish-American War as a case study. Cosmas presents a perspective of the Spanish-American War as viewed from the War Department and never deviates far from that standpoint. Only one chapter tells of the land and naval engagements in the Caribbean and the Philippines. Even here, Cosmas prefers to concentrate more on logistics, than battles. Shortages of everything besides manpower, especially equipment and supplies resinates throughout these pages. The chapter "Sickness and Scandal" tells of the malaria, yellow fever, and dysentery epidemics that ravaged the American Army in Cuba, and the shortage of medical personnel and supplies to treat them. Yet, it is Cosmas's handling of all these crucial themes, at a critical turning point not only in American history, but also the shaping and reforming of American military policy, that makes this book a true classic. Briefly, Cosmas concludes the War Department's conduct of the war was not all mismanagement, negligence and corruption as commonly asserted by previous historians. Rather, the War Department's successes far outweigh its failures. The author weaves grand strategy, civil-military in-fighting, and the age-old debate concerning a regular standing versus citizen army beautifully. Cosmas states that the War Department had a good plan for carrying out the war, however, President William McKinley's meddling fouled it up. McKinley undermined the War Department's contingency plans, argues Cosmas, by expanding the Army twice, and bowing to the pressure of the states to call up the National Guard. The author asserts that had McKinley resisted the political sway of the National Guard proponents, the War Department would have been better able to train and equip a small regular force, thus alleviating chaotic logistical nightmares. In short, military strategy should be conducted my generals, not civilians; even if that civilian happens to be the commander-in chief [first published in 1973, this argument could certainly have mirrored current events in Southeast Asia]. This book is indispensable in gaining a perspective to a crucial period in American military policy. The less inclined may want to digest David Trask's _The War With Spain in 1898_ first though.

An Army for Empire: The United States American the Spanish-American War, by Graham A. Cosmas. University of Missouri Press, Columbia, Missouri.1971.

This book is a look at the United States Military actions throughout the course of the Spanish-American War. It is not a history of the war itself, but an attempt by the author to reconstruct the military history of the war through the official records. The author uses these records to give the reader a detailed account of the progress of the war from the beginning to the end. Cosmas gives the reader an inside look at the interactions between: the War Department, President McKinley, the Army and Congress. It is the author's intent to show how the United States Military had transformed itself into an Empirical force not to be reckoned with. The majority of this book deals with the preparation of the Army leading up to the war and the changes in strategy throughout the war. Cosmas points out the mistakes made throughout the war and how they were dealt with. He goes on to explain how the solutions eventually led to a better, more organized military by the end of the war.

The author used both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources used include: manuscripts, government documents, newspapers, books, and articles. The Newspapers used in this book include: Detroit Free Press, 1892, The New York Times, 1897-1898, The Washington Post, 1898. There is a short list of newspapers used for this book, but there were several articles used from those newspapers. Some of the books used include: Lodge, Henry Cabot, ed. Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 18884-1918. 2 vols. New York and London, 1925, Miles, Nelson A. Serving the Republic, New York and London, 1911. These are just some of the many books used as sources.

The organization of this book is of a topical manner. The chapters are of a reasonable length and are broken down into sub sections. The organization is an easy way for readers to follow the subject matter without getting too bogged down into details. It is an easy read for a college student or someone who is interested in Military history. There are some photos used in this book that help the reader place a face with the names in the book. There is one map used and is again, useful for the reader to understand what the author discussing in the book.

This book is a short history of the Spanish-American War through the lens of the military. It offers a detailed account of military actions throughout this brief war. It is not a full history of the war itself, but offers a decent account of the war. The reader is allowed by the author a unique, inside look at the military and how it functioned in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. It also examines the transition of the military from an outdated Army of the Civil War era to a more organized modern Army that would be constantly transformed in World War I, World War II, and future wars. It is this transition that was crucial for the United States to compete globally with other countries which were practicing Imperialism at the time.
The author begins his book with an Army that is split in what it wants for the future. War has not broken out yet, but some Generals are pounding their chests and beating the drums of war. Their arrogance and self righteousness leads them to believe that the American military might is an indestructible force. It would seem they are itching for a fight. Other Generals had been around long enough and were wise enough to know that the Army and Navy needed to be reformed. The American military had not fought in a fully fledged war since the Civil War; three decades earlier, except fighting Indians on the plains and the South-West. It became clear that the military was in need of modernization.

Cosmas also maintains the need for modernization came from outside forces as well. The finance industrial capitalists of the late nineteenth century had a need for expansion in order to move into foreign markets. This was a need to colonize underdeveloped countries in order to strip them of their resources. In order to carry that out, the United States had to have a large standing Army and a sea faring Navy. The American government looked to the Pacific, the Caribbean and South America for colonization, as it seemed to be the most natural course. In the Caribbean, Cuba was selected as the most likely target. Spain was losing control over its colonies and this was the perfect opportunity to free the Cubans and make them economic allies. The United States supported a guerrilla war against Spain and gave support to the Cubans. With the destruction of the USS Maine, a rallying cry towards war by use of "yellow journalism" was enough to get the support of the people to go to war.

No sooner than war broke out, that the War Department began to have problems. The author maintains that some of those problems that occurred were outside of the War Departments control and, "disruptive changes in McKinley's war strategy accounts for most of the mistakes and misfortunes that ensued." (101) It is Cosmas' belief that President McKinley's interference in war strategy caused most problems because the War Department was hesitant in their actions due to fear of what McKinley would do. Often times they would rush plans and constantly stay unorganized. The military was able to eventually work out the kinks with the help of Secretary Algers; the large standing Army was organized and able to easily defeat the Spanish. The war quickly ended within four months.

In the final analysis, this book is a little too short if you are a military history buff since it does not include detailed battle accounts, but it is fine for someone who is a mild history buff and wants a short read. The information provided is detailed and accurate. It is a different take on writing a historical account. If anyone who is interested in military strategy and wants to get an inside look at nineteenth century strategy and politics, then this is a good book for that purpose.