Customer Reviews

US Army Tank Crewman 1941-45: European Theater of Operations (ETO) 1944-45 (Warrior)

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Normally, Stephen G. Zaloga, well-known US armor expert, produces volumes for Osprey that are incisive, well-written and on-target. Unfortunately, Zaloga's latest volume - US Army Tank Crewman 1941-45 - does not live up to expectations, primarily due to a single defect: instead of attempting to portray tankers of various ranks and units, Zaloga focuses on a single individual: LTC Creighton Abrams of the 37th Tank Battalion. As soon as I read that this was Zaloga's intent in the introduction, I realized that the volume was in trouble. Essentially, Zaloga focuses on a "celebrity" tanker who went on to four-star rank in the 1970s and had a highly publicized career. While there is no doubt that Abrams made a major contribution in the European Theater of Operations in 1944-45, it is a mistake to try and focus so heavily upon a single battalion commander and portray him as "typical" of the breed. Furthermore, as a former tanker myself, I found that the volume did not adequately portray the feel of platoon and company-level armor operations. Zaloga begins with a short introduction on the US armor force, followed by brief sections on recruiting and enlistment, training for combat and equipment and weapons. The rest of the volume is essentially a campaign narrative of the 37th Tank Battalion in Normandy, Lorraine, the Battle of the Bulge and the Hammelburg Raid. The color plates are: US Army tanker, summer 1944 with helmets and small arms; the turret interior of a Sherman tank; the Battle of Arracourt; organization of B Company/37th Tank Battalion, July 1944; Thunderbolt at Bastogne; interior of a M5A1 turret; US tanker, winter 1944 with main gun rounds; M4 medium tank crew layout. Zaloga does provide some incisive comments, such as noting that the US introduction of FM radios in their tanks gave them an advantage over the German tanks with AM radios (that couldn't transmit on the move). On the other hand, I wonder about some of Zaloga's details, like the gyrostabilizer on the M4 Sherman tank. A few tankers in 1944-45 may have attempted to shoot on the move but the vast majority probably fired only from stationary positions and it was not until the M1 tank appeared in the 1980s that the US armor force had a tank that could really shoot effectively on the move. Readers should note a few facts about Abrams career as a tanker: he started as a general's aide in 1938, transferred to the new armor branch in 1940, served on regimental staff for much of 1941-1942, served eight months as a tank battalion commander in CONUS in 1942-1943, returned to regimental staff and then was given command of the 37th Tank Battalion in late 1943. Just before the end of the war, Abrams took over a combat command [brigade]. Apparently, Abrams never served as a company level officer in a tank unit (platoon leader, company XO or company commander), or even battalion S-3 or XO in a tank battalion. Just where did Abrams learn to maneuver armor units or about maintenance? Starting as a battalion commander, he must have had a very steep learning curve and it might explain some of his "wackier" ideas like putting the battalion S-2 and S-3 in their own tanks (Zaloga might have noted that German armor battalions usually let staff officers do their jobs, instead of trying to command their own tanks). Zaloga makes the claim early in the volume that Abrams may have been one of the highest-scoring US tankers in the war. I find this very suspect, since battalion commanders were supposed to be employing their entire 700+ man task force, not fighting as an individual tank commander. Furthermore, if Abrams was such an "up-front" leader, why was he never wounded or his tank hit, for that was certainly the norm for US tank platoon leaders and company commanders who spent 6-9 months in combat. It is also highly unlikely that Abrams spent much time doing maintenance on his tank, unlike lower ranking tankers. Frankly, Zaloga's account of Abrams wartime exploits - which focuses heavily on the Arracourt and Bastogne fighting - skews this toward a gung-ho account that ignores the daily facets of life in a tank battalion. What was Abrams' relationship with his XO (never mentioned), his S-3 operations) and S-4 (logistics) - all key individuals in a tank battalion? Most of being a tanker is about keeping your beast running, not glorious tank charges as Zaloga seems to suggest. Zaloga does provide a few photos depicting track maintenance, pulling a power pack, vehicle recovery and loading ammunition, but very little of the text is concerned with logistics. I wonder just how many of Abrams' tanks were "deadlined" for parts (and what specific parts were critical shortages - there is always some) or running in "degraded mode?" There is also precious little information here about armor tactics (did they use some type of overwatch?), armor training (did they do individual, section and platoon gunnery?) or armor-infantry-artillery combined arms tactics. Key individuals like the tank company first sergeants, the mechanics and the lowly tank crew drivers and loaders just don't appear much in these pages. What Zaloga delivers is a portrayal of US tank combat through the eyes of a field grade officer, not the typical platoon and company-level tankers who bore the brunt of the fighting.