The US Army in the Vietnam War 1965-73 (Battle Orders) [Paperback]

Gordon Rottman (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: April 22, 2008 | Series: Battle Orders (Book 33)

This book provides detailed information about how US Army units were organized and operated in America's longest war. Special forces veteran Gordon L Rottman examines the different types of infantry battalions and the units that supported them, their training and organization down to platoon level. Aspects of the US Army's conventional and unconventional warfare doctrine are also addressed, along with a discussion of how replacements were trained and integrated into units. Among other areas of the US Army's involvement covered are individual and crew-served weapons, artillery, armored fighting vehicles, transport, logistics, the complex chain of command, and combat operations.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Throughout the book are an excellent selection of photographs and various organizational charts. A very well done book that provides a lot of insight into the hows and whys of seven years of war in Indochina. One of much interest and one that I can recommend to you without reservation."- Scott Van Aken, modelingmadness.com (May 2008)

"Gordon L. Rottman's The US Army in the Vietnam War 1965-73 provides detail on how US Army Units operated during the war and comes from a Special Forces veteran who focuses on infantry strategies and units which supported them." -California Bookwatch (May 2008)

About the Author

Gordon L Rottman entered the US Army in 1967, volunteered for Special Forces and completed training as a weapons specialist. He served in the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam from 1969-70 and subsequently in airborne infantry, long-range patrol, and intelligence assignments until retiring after 26 years. He was a special operations forces scenario writer at the Joint Readiness Training Center for 12 years, and is now a freelance writer. The author lives in Cyprus, TX (near Houston).

Product Details

• Paperback: 96 pages
• Publisher: Osprey Publishing (April 22, 2008)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1846032393
• ISBN-13: 978-1846032394
• Product Dimensions: 9.7 x 7.1 x 0.4 inches
• Shipping Weight: 10.6 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 2.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #881,513 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

4.0 out of 5 stars A Fine Book, January 29, 2012

By 

S. Broumley (Mechanicsburg, PA USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

Amazon Verified Purchase

This review is from: The US Army in the Vietnam War 1965-73 (Battle Orders) (Paperback)

I have read other books by this author, several highly rated and positively reviewed. I take exception to the previous reviewer, after a long rambling diatribe of minutia, accusing Mr. Rottman of plagiarism and jeopardizing the integrity of Osprey Press. Is it possible that very few legitimate historians will provide us with works of popular history about Vietnam because if they "weren't there" they are deemed unworthy and assaulted online by fringe elements of the Vietnam Veteran community? It seems nearly impossible to find a treatment of the Vietnam conflict that IS NOT a first person "there I was" narrative.
That being said, this book was not perfect, but for the length of the work it is a fine quick reference. If you want the full treatment of the Vietnam War, read "Vietnam: A History" by Stanley Karnow. I suggest you stay away from the first person narrative, as most prove that they cannot see the forest for the trees.

6 of 12 people found the following review helpful:

1.0 out of 5 stars THE U.S. ARMY IN THE VIETNAM WAR, 1965-1973, October 23, 2010

By 

Robert A. Lynn "Militaryhistorywriter" (Orlando, Florida) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: The US Army in the Vietnam War 1965-73 (Battle Orders) (Paperback)

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE VIETNAM WAR, 1965-1973
GORDON ROTTMAN
OSPREY PUBLISHING, 2008
QUALITY SOFTCOVER, $25.95, 96 PAGES, BIBLIOGRAPHY, INDEX, CHRONOLOGY, ILLUSTRATIONS, PHOTOGRAPHS

In Gordon's Rottman's book entitled THE U.S. ARMY IN THE VIETNAM WAR, 1965-1973, he has managed to get it wrong again not only in regard to facts but also the terminology and unit designations as well. Some of the corrections are listed below for just one unit, 1st Brigade (Separate), 101st Airborne Division which is on Page 66:

*The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division didn't arrive in Vietnam on 29 July 1965 because the 101st Airborne Division didn't have a 1st Brigade in July, 1965. The 1st Brigade (Separate), 101st Airborne Division arrived at Cam Ranh Bay, South Vietnam on July 29, 1965. The 1st Brigade (Separate), which came to be known as the "Nomads of Vietnam" (not the Eagle Brigade), wasn't comprised of "troops being drawn from other divisional units" as the author asserts. All of the brigades of the 101st Airborne Division were under-strength at that time and a number of replacements were added to the brigade prior to deployment. This was, and is, a standard procedure within the U.S. Army, as it is with most armies. The authorized strength of a battalion in the 101st Airborne Division in 1966 was 792 but by 1968, that was increased to 920. This is indicative as to just how thin the long green line within the 1st Brigade (Separate) really was-short one maneuver battalion, several support units, and 128 men in each infantry battalion by the U.S. Army's own subsequent reckoning.

*Rottman fails to mention that the 173rd Airborne Brigade "Sky Soldiers" was comprised of four maneuver infantry battalions and was commanded by a brigadier general. The 1st Brigade (Separate) was commanded by a colonel (later a brigadier general) and had only three maneuver battalions. This made the 1st Brigade (Separate) very maneuverable, which is why General Westmoreland used it as his "fire brigade." It never failed him, no matter how outnumbered. The brigade was always under-manned, under-equipped, and under-supported. Despite this, by January, 1966, the "Nomads of Vietnam" had the highest operational tempo of any U.S. Army or U.S. Marine Corps unit in country, and that included the larger 173rd Airborne Brigade and the much, much larger 1st Air Cavalry Division.

*Rottman makes the mistake of implying that the 1st Brigade (Separate) was physically where the base camp was according to the official records. In point of fact, the "Nomads of Vietnam" arrived on 29 July 1965 and didn't even establish a base camp until November, 1965. This was due to the pace of the 1st Brigade (Separate)'s combat operations which allowed no one to spare for such a frivolity as a base camp, unlike every other combat unit in South Vietnam over the duration of the war.

*Within days of debarking from the USNS General Leroy Eltinge, elements of the 1st Brigade (Separate) began combat operations. Prior to leaving the United States, the then S-3 Operations officer, Major David Hackworth allowed the USNS General Leroy Eltinge to unit load the brigade's equipment, rather than combat load it. This meant that essential supplies, such as water and water tankers ("water buffalos") and ammunition, were on the bottom of the holds, and therefore the last to come off the ship. Being unacclimated to South Vietnam's summer heat and after days of inactivity aboard ship, a large percentage of the 1st Brigade (Separate)'s soldiers wound up as heat casualties.

*On 22-25 August 1965, the "Nomads of Vietnam" descended upon Qui Nhon for Operation HIGHLAND. Lasting from August, 1965 until 1 October 1965, the 1st Brigade (Separate) cleared the passage to and the area of the base camp for the 1st Air Cavalry Division. Unlike the "Nomads of Vietnam" upon their arrival, the 1st Air Cavalry Division arrived to a carefully pre-selected base camp, and a covering force to keep them safe. To do so, the "Nomads of Vietnam" had to clear the infamous Highway 19 and, by heliborne assault, the famous pass wherein French Mobile Group 100 was virtually annihilated. Twenty-three separate company or larger-sized operations were conducted by the "Nomads of Vietnam" during this period, to ensure the safe arrival by the 1st Air Cavalry Division. In the event, there wasn't a single 1st Air Cavalry casualty while under the protection of the 1st Brigade (Separate).

*During Operation GIBRALTAR, planned personally by Major David Hackworth, the 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry (Airborne) made a heliborne assault into a landing zone later determined to be a main force Viet Cong battalion command post. Unfortunately, Major Hackworth placed his supporting artillery out of range to support the paratroopers on the ground, who were outnumdered, completely surrounded, and without means of either support or reinforcement. The artillery was placed to fire upon where Major Hackworth expected the enemy to be, and there was a river to deep for fording, between where Major Hackworth positioned them and the closest position from which they could support the paratroopers in the very heated battle. The 1st Brigade (Separate), as small as it was, had no organic aircraft. The U.S. Army aviation company supporting this operation had every one of its aircraft shot down. Only one and a half companies landed in the landing zone, the others being waved off by a captain, who was later killed, as were most of the officers and NCOs. The battle went on for three days and in the end, there were 226 unrecovered enemy bodies on the field of battle. The 1st Brigade (Separate) had given the United States (including both the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps) its first victory over a Viet Cong main force unit in the Vietnam War. (Note: A main force unit was a full-time unit, essentially "regulars", listed in the Viet Cong Order of Battle, but trained and closely advised by, and often under the command and control of, the North Vietnamese Army.) This battle has always been overshadowed by the Ia Drang Valley battle fought shortly thereafter by the 1st Air Cavalry Division and made famous by the book and movie "We Were Soldiers Once....And Young." The only difference between the two battles was the size of the two U.S. Army units involved, the "Nomads of Vietnam" being smaller, and the subsequent publicity given the 1st Air Cavalry Division Ia Drang Valley battle. The two authors of the book even dismiss the battle fought by the 1st Brigade (Separate), to their own discredit.

*On 28 September 1965, the 1st Air Cavalry Division assumed responsibility for their own protection, from the "Nomads of Vietnam" who were now suffering from a severe manpower and logistical shortage. That same day, the 1st Brigade (Separate) began to return to the port of Qui Nhon to perform the same mission in support of the Republic of Korea Tiger Division (as a footnote to military history, after off-loading the 1st Brigade (Separate) and their equipment, the USNS General Leroy Eltinge was ordered to South Korea to embark the Tiger Division and take them to South Vietnam. Prior to the ship's departure, South Korean officials inspected the vessel and informed the U.S. Government that the vessel wasn't fit for such purpose and the South Koreans would just wait until the U.S. Government was able to provide a "proper" transport vessel.)

*Headquarters Headquarters Company, ("Tiger Force") 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry (Airborne) was formed as a task force as a result of Major Hackworth's blunders on Operation GIBRALTAR. After he returned from self-imposed exile in Australia and then New Zealand, to avoid Federal criminal indictment; he re-invented himself as an American "hero" rather than a leading anti-American and anti-nuclear advocate. Hackworth claimed to have created the Tiger Force. That is a lie. Hackworth wasn't yet relieved from the S-3 billet and wasn't even in our battalion. Tiger Force was created by the 1st Battalion commander as a special operations task force, in order to avoid just the type of fiasco that happened to the 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry (Airborne). If anything, Tiger Force was created due to Hackworth, not by him.

*In November, 1965, the "Nomads of Vietnam" rolled into Phang Rang and established a base camp. They set up tents, cots, and retrieved their duffle bags from connexes where they had been stored since their arrival in South Vietnam in July, 1965. Days later, the "Nomads of Vietnam" rolled back on out and were flown down to the base camp of the 173rd Airborne Brigade at Bien Hoa, where they staged before road marching down to Di An, in the area of operations of the 1st Infantry Division ("The Big Red One"). One of the more interesting missions that the Tiger Force participated in was a "box-me-in" fire mission in this area of operations prior to Christmas, 1965. One night, a small Tiger Force patrol was ordered to conduct the above type of mission. As related to this reviewer by a participant in this patrol, he was under his poncho with a red-lens flashlight. Other members of this patrol were strategically positioned when a body of North Vietnamese Army soldiers began to come upon their positions. They were so close, they could smell them and in time, this small patrol was completely surrounded. It was then that the massed artillery of the entire 1st Infantry Division commenced in a "time-on-target" fire mission. Few artillerymen see that done even once in their entire career. The microphone on the Tiger Force patrol's PRC-25 was held up in the air and keyed so the entire 1st Infantry Division artillery could hear the North Vietnamese Army soldiers dying, yards from where the Tiger Force patrol was laying in wait and concealed by their ponchos and the darkness of the night. It was soon after this engagement, that the "Nomads... Read more ›