Arnhem 1944 (Battles & Campaigns) [Paperback]

William F. Buckingham (Author), Hew Strachan (Editor)

Book Description

Publication Date: July 1, 2004 | Series: Battles & Campaigns

On September 17, 1944, over 2,000 transport aircraft lifted off from airfields across England and set a course for Holland. They were the first wave of the largest airborne operation in history, code-named Operation Market Garden. Their task was to open a 60-mile corridor for Allied ground forces from the Belgian border to Arnhem on the Lower Rhine. Nine days later, the remnants of the British 1st Airborne Division were evacuated from a precarious foothold 7 miles west of Arnhem, having failed utterly. William Buckingham’s account, based on new research, unearths the reasons why the attack really failed.

Editorial Reviews

Review

“An excellent read.” -- Hew Strachan

“Reveals the real reason why the daring attack failed” -- The Daily Express

From the Publisher

On Sunday 17 September 1944, over 2,000 transport aircraft lifted off from airfields across England and set a course for Holland. They were the first wave of the largest airborne operation in history, code–named Operation Market Garden. Their task was to open a sixty–mile corridor for Allied ground forces from the Belgian border to Arnhem on the Lower Rhine. Nine days later, the remnants of the British 1st Airborne Division were evacuated from a precarious foothold seven miles west of Arnhem having failed utterly. William Buckingham’s account, based on new research, unearths the reasons why the attack really failed.

William F. Buckingham has recently completed his PhD on the establishment and initial development of a British airborne force. His other books include D–Day: The First 72 Hours, also published by Tempus.

Part of the Battles & Campaigns series, edited by Hew Strachan, Chichele Professor of the History of War at the University of Oxford.

Product Details

• Paperback: 272 pages
• Publisher: Tempus; New edition edition (July 1, 2004)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0752431870
• ISBN-13: 978-0752431871
• Product Dimensions: 7.6 x 5 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 9.9 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.8 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (4 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,033,442 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

4 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Superior Reappraisal of a Fascinating Operation, October 26, 2006

By 

Ross Mallett (Canberra, ACT Australia) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Arnhem 1944 (Battles & Campaigns) (Paperback)

Operation Market-Garden is one of those operations of World War II that fascinate readers and military historians, mainly because it was so unusual, imaginative and daring: a assault by three famous airborne divisions to capture a series of bridges, allowing an armoured thrust into the Germany. That it failed only served to make it seem more heroic. It is the subject two excellent films, Theirs is the Glory (1946) and A Bridge Too Far (1977). The latter was made from the best known and one of the best written of many books about the operation.

So what makes this book stand out above the crowd? It is written in clear and plain language, which makes it an easy read, and is only 200 pages long, yet it goes over the entire operation and the factors which caused the defeat, stripping away much of the myth and misinformation. In doing so, it is as forthright as it is compelling. If you have any interest in the subject at all, this is a book you will want to read.

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars Interesting procedural and organizational insights, but narratively flawed, December 12, 2011

By 

A. Evans - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Arnhem 1944 (Battles & Campaigns) (Paperback)

Mr. Buckingham has done a great deal of research into the planning and organization of British airborne operations in WWII. Had he stuck with that, and pointed out merely the mistakes that these led to, he might have produced an excellent work.

Unfortunately, what he has in fact produced is a screed against General Browning. Browning certainly deserves his fair share of criticism, both with respect to the Market Garden operations and his conduct as a general officer overall. But Buckingham has him exerting a Svengalian influence over everyone he comes in contact with, up and down the chain of command. Buckingham doesn't quite come out and say it, but he strongly suggests that Browning somehow mesmerized Mongomery into defining the operation and selling it to Eisenhower. If something in Market Garden was not Browning's fault, it's only because he wasn't directly involved to make it so.

Of course, for every villain there must be a victim. The British 1st Airborne Division serves nicely as an almost hapless -- and somewhat bumbling -- mark for Browning and the RAF.

This book is a few interesting facts embeded in an agenda. I can only recommend it to someone who has a comprehensive library of Market Garden literature, and then only in the interest of completeness. For the general reader who wants a factual history of the campaign, I cannot recommend it at all.

3.0 out of 5 stars Mixed thoughts, December 18, 2011

By 

Carl (U.K.) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Arnhem 1944 (Battles & Campaigns) (Paperback)

Buckingham's work focuses on the battle of Arnhem during Operation Market Garden, which took place during the Second World War. The book briefly covers all aspects of the operation however its focus is on the efforts of the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem. Buckingham's work is easy to read, and fast paced. However it lacks primary sources (no primary sources are consulted in regards to XXX Corps, who Buckingham launches some scathing attacks upon) and mostly relies on sourcing information from other published secondary sources. This work is not one that has gone back to the primary sources to find out what happened. While the work is not without its flaws, it does provide some interesting insights into the reasons behind the failure of the operation.

Primarily this book feels like a 235 page character assassination of Frederick Browning. This starts in the opening pages when the author lays the blame for the failure mostly on Browning shoulders, and continues throughout the book. Every aspect of Browning is put under doubt, his background and previous achievements in the military are attacked, as is his promotion within the military hierarchy. Browning is depicted as a man who did not care about his men, only his career that would do anything to establish himself as the top airborne man in the British military and within the Allied armies. Buckingham makes some solid arguments about Browning, however his continued attacks feel like they cross the line from being critical observations, to an author with a heavy bias against the man. The continued pounding makes one want to find out more about Browning before accepting Buckingham's opinions on face value.

Buckingham provides substantial information on the British airborne and the background of the 1st Airborne Division, and the division is attacked at every level. He highlights how it was not an "elite" formation and had little combat experience. When the units, that comprised the division, were in action prior to Arnhem, they had never do so on a divisional basis and they had suffered heavy losses resulting in the division actually only having a small cadre of battle-hardened veterans. The training the division undertook during 1944 gets a lot of attention, but Buckingham does leave the reader somewhat confused. He notes how the division was insufficiently trained on the divisional or brigade level, and how the parachute brigades squandered their training time but then notes that the men were adequately to well-trained on the tactical level, it is not really explained why the lack of higher level training was a problem. Buckingham supports his points well, on the brigades squandering training time and seems to be echoing the argument made by David Fraser in `And we shall shock them' of ill-trained formations being committed to battle and thus lost. The discipline of the division also comes under attack, with Buckingham noting there were major low-level issues however the accusation is less well supported than his previous points, relaying on only a few sources that for me does not give a complete picture of the entire division. Buckingham claims that Urquhart, the divisional commander, was unqualified to lead the division into combat because he did not have a parachute background rather an infantry one. While it becomes clear that Urquhart made some poor decisions once on the ground, Buckingham notes that he led the battle to the best of his ability was he resumed command of the division and doesn't really make the case that Urquhart should not have took the division into Arnhem (the comparison Buckingham makes to the modern British Army, having a commander without a parachute regiment background lead the 16th Air Assault Brigade at the time of him writing, makes one feel that perhaps the professionals know what they are doing compared Buckingham's conclusion on Urquhart). In essence Buckingham claims that the division was an ill-trained, inexperienced formation, with serious command issues and committed to battle with poor chances of success; his arguments present mixed-messages but he does make some good points and supports them, generally, well making one re-evaluate the state of the division prior to its commitment to battle.

Buckingham is highly critical of the actions of XXX Corps, in particular the Guards Armoured Division. Every move the Guards Armour makes comes under attack. Buckingham's accusations that the Guards were tardy in all their actions might have been more of a solid argument had he presented primary source evidence to support this; primary sources, relating to the Guards exist (such as the war diary of the divisional units) that presents contrary evidence to the claims Buckingham makes. Buckingham rather, relies on German sources (via other secondary sources) to inform the reader of what the division was up to. It is not explained why the latter is more reliable over the primary sources relating to the Guards Armoured Division, nor is the issue of the different time zones in use by the British and Germans mentioned which leads to the question of are the times, mentioned by these sources, two hours out or have they been adjusted to the British time zone to allow accurate comparison? Buckingham repeatedly attacks the Guards for playing by the book, showing no urgency, rigid behaviour, no initiative, the evidence being simply they are Guardsmen, that is what they do. While Buckingham provides substantial background information on British airborne forces, he does not provide any depth to the Guards Armour Division. To fully support his position, background information is required. Did they display these attributes, he prescribes to them, during the Normandy campaign, the advance across France, and the fighting prior to Market Garden. Some expansion and further research would either validate his position or put his attacks on the character of the division into serious question. I believe in order to validate his position, this expansion is sorely needed otherwise it is character assassination to lend weak support to his conclusions on the actions of the division, that feel pretty one sided. In a moment of irony, after lambasting the dropping of the Poles south of the Rhine as reinforcing failure, Buckingham attacks 43rdDivision and XXX Corps for not doing the same. He criticises both formations for not providing sufficient equipment, nor in a speedy manner, to ferry the Poles or British troops into the perimeter that Buckingham, in the previous pages, had essentially called unsustainable. Finally as an example of the hyperbole displayed throughout the book, Buckingham jumps to the conclusion that because XXX Corps commander was sick, during the period of the operation, that explains the `shoddy' performance of the whole Corps.

The well-made argument, made through several chapters, for the failure of the operation is one of planning. Every level that was charged with the air plan is attacked, and sound arguments are produced that support the accusations: Browning for various planning flaws; Brereton, commanding the Airborne Army, for poor planning and not taking new intelligence into account; the transport wing commander for refusing to fly multiple lifts; the RAF for not taking army considerations into effect and wanting to save their plane numbers at the expense of the paratroopers; and Gavin and Urquhart for not making a stand and demanding a change to the proposed use of their forces and their landing zones. Yet on the other hand the work is littered with speculation, and hyperbole. Buckingham remarks at several points that the British had a reputation for throwing the lives away of Australian and Canadian troops during the Second World War, stating they were considered "cannon fodder". This shocking accusation seems out of place and downright unjustified by how allied forces were, on the whole, operationally handled under British command in the desert and Normandy. Buckingham would have done well to have read the likes of Colossal Cracks to see that the British approach to the war was more sophisticated than he lets on. In places Buckingham criticises other authors for stating, with hindsight, what should have been done, yet does the same himself in many places.

The final pages of the book are mix of hyperbole and jumping to conclusions. Buckingham points out the obvious that a decision on evacuation should have been taken earlier but then concludes that the sound conclusion is that it was delayed while various commanders attempted to find a way out of being blamed for the failure of the operation. Buckingham spends some time in these final pages, as well as elsewhere in the book, stating that the British command attempted to use the Poles as scapegoats for the failure of the operation; other than detailing what happened to the brigade and its commander following the operation, Buckingham doesn't actually detail how the Brits attempted to blame the Poles for the operations failure.

In conclusion, Buckingham makes a solid argument that poor planning played the decisive role in the failure of the operation, although he does conceded that regardless of the poor planning it was still a close run thing. Many valid points are excellently argued that makes one re-evaluate the operation and the units involved however much of the work is mired with hyperbole, shoddy arguments, an apparent lack of research, bias, and jumping to conclusions by the author that hinders this work from being an excellent study of the operation.