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41 of 50 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars The creation of the arms race and how it changed the world
Pulitzer Prize winning author Richard Rhodes jumps back into the fire of nuclear physics with his latest book "Arsenals of Folly: The Making of The Nuclear Arms Race". Here Rhodes tackles the history of the nuclear arms race from the explosion of "Joe" the first Soviet atomic bomb to the arms escalation and he documents how close we have come on a number of occasions to...
Published on October 21, 2007 by Wayne Klein

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36 of 44 people found the following review helpful
2.0 out of 5 stars Dissapointing conclusion to an excellent series
I was very interested in reading this book and when I saw the title I must admit I was very excited and looked forward to what I expected would be a history of the development of the nuclear arms race. Where this book went wrong in my opinion, was that it focused exclusively on the end of the Cold War. That would have been fine but the book spoke of the making of the...
Published on January 8, 2008 by R. C Sheehy


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41 of 50 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars The creation of the arms race and how it changed the world, October 21, 2007
Pulitzer Prize winning author Richard Rhodes jumps back into the fire of nuclear physics with his latest book "Arsenals of Folly: The Making of The Nuclear Arms Race". Here Rhodes tackles the history of the nuclear arms race from the explosion of "Joe" the first Soviet atomic bomb to the arms escalation and he documents how close we have come on a number of occasions to use these weapons of mass destruction. To give a better overview of the time Rhodes also focuses on the various peace treaties, the development of "Star Wars" (no, not the movie)and Reagan's obsession with trying to engage Gorbachov in trying to defuse the arms race.

Beginning with the accident at Chernobyl in 1986 and covering the history of both the United States and Russia as they became involved in their nuclear war dance throughout the latter part of the 20th century, Rhodes uses information demonstrating that the disinformation that we've seen within government recently to shape public opinion has been going on for the last 40 years (big surprise!) creating circumstances that allowed the arms race to escalate out of control. Rhodes begins with Chernobyl (later covering the history of detente and the roles of various presidents before Reagan and Gorbachov sat down to try and rid the world of nuclear arms)because the plant itself was designed to do dual duty as both a reactor and a source of plutonium for weapons. The accident changed Gorbachov's perspective on the destruction that could result from a nuclear device simply because the damage to the environment and human life from Chernobyl was life a small nuclear device going off. This opened the way for more open and honest discussion on how to reduce the world's nuclear arsenal.

Rhodes also provides a fair balanced look at various leaders, government officals and scientists who have shifted public policy for their own political ends and agendas. It's a fascinating and involving book that you'll have a hard time putting down. For example, he gives a brief biography for each of the major players to help reader's understand what motivated those involved in both escalating and easing the arms race.

He also documents what motivated Reagan to approach Gorbachov (who had already seen the damage that could be done), dispells the "myth" that Reagan brought the Soviet government to its knees by outspending them on defense(the economy of the Soviet giant was already in deep trouble)and discusses why Reagan became obsessed with "Star Wars" (or the SDI)sticking to his guns (pardon the pun)about developing the technology. With a deft analysis of Reagan's personality he points out that SDI and the concept of eliminating the threat of nuclear war truly began after the assassination attempt on the President. It caused him to have an epiphany abandoning the idea that nuclear war and the end of the world was something that couldn't be avoided.

The book concludes with a discussion about the fragmenting of the USSR into individual countries and the concerns that the Bush administration had about the safety of the nuclear devices overseas. Finally Rhodes starkly points out what the arms race truly has cost us as a society.

Rhodes who wrote the terrific "The Making of the Atomic Bomb" and "Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb" both of which documented the various attempts crack the atom and create the first atomic and, later, hydrogen bombs at Los Alamos, provides a fascinating glimpse into the politics, science and mindset that influence policy on the arms race. Both are exhaustive and authorative books that take us behind-the-scenes focusing on the politics within the science that nudged along the unleasing of the most destructive force on Earth and the destruction/creation of careers of those involved.

Be aware that at the end of the book Rhodes does put on his editorial hat and comments about the cost of the arms race to society and the individual. So while the book is pretty fair balanced at the end he states his opinions. You may or may not agree with him but either way his comments are thought provoking.

Don't be intimiated by the fact that this is a history book. It is as fascinating as any novel. Rhodes breezy style and thoughtful observations make "Arsenals of Folly" an essential book to undertstand the arms race and its impact on the post 9/11 world we live in today.
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36 of 44 people found the following review helpful
2.0 out of 5 stars Dissapointing conclusion to an excellent series, January 8, 2008
I was very interested in reading this book and when I saw the title I must admit I was very excited and looked forward to what I expected would be a history of the development of the nuclear arms race. Where this book went wrong in my opinion, was that it focused exclusively on the end of the Cold War. That would have been fine but the book spoke of the making of the arms race and instead focused on its conclusion.

The book begins promisingly enough with a compelling account of the Chernobyl disaster, but then it becomes a repeat of various memoirs from various members of the Regan administration and Mikhail Gorbachev. Unlike the two previous book, Rhodes does not do a great job of synthesizing the information and presenting it as its own. This seems to be nothing more than reheated left overs.

The far more promising concept and what Rhodes fans were expecting was a history of the development of Nuclear Weapons, far more history on the SALT and START talks and the development of delivery vehicles. The background history of the poor state of the Soviet economy was very good and more attention should have been placed on it, but sadly that was focused on details of the Geneva meeting place.

All in all this was a tough read and for certain is the third of Richard Rhodes three books on the development of the nuclear arms race.
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45 of 57 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars How rational thinking led to insanity, October 21, 2007
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Richard Rhodes is perhaps the foremost nuclear historian of our time. His past two books (among many others on extremely varied subjects) on the making of the atomic and hydrogen bombs are landmark historical studies. But as readers of those books would know, they were much more than nuclear histories. They were riveting epic chronicles of war and peace, science and politics in the twentieth century and human nature. In both books, Rhodes discussed in detail other issues, such as the Soviet bomb effort and Soviet espionage in the US.

In this book which can be considered the third installment in his nuclear histories (a fourth and final one is also due), Rhodes takes a step further and covers the arms race from the 1950s onwards. He essentially proceeds where he left off, and discusses the maddening arms buildups of the 60s, 70s and 80s. One of the questions our future generations are going to ask is; why do we have such a monstrous legacy of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, enough to destroy the earth many times over? The answer cannot be deterrence because much fewer would have sufficed for that. How did we inherit this evil of our times?

Much of the book is devoted to answering this question, and the answer is complex. It involves a combination of paranoia generated by ignorance of what the other side was doing, but more importantly threat inflation engendered by hawks in government who used the Soviet threat as a political selling point in part to further their own aims and careers. It is also depressing to realise how in the 50s, when the Soviet atomic bomb programs were still relatively in their beginning stage and the US had already amassed an impressive fleet of weapons, opportunity was lost forever for negotiating peace and preventing the future nuclear arms debacle that we now are stuck with. Rhodes details a very interesting and disconcerting fact; every US president since Truman wanted to avoid nuclear war and was uncomfortable about nuclear weapons, yet every one of them had no qualms about increasing defense spending and encouraging the development of new and more powerful weapons. It was as if a perpetual motion wheel had been set in motion, oiled by paranoia and deep mistrust, not to mention the clever manipulation of ambitious Cold Warriors. In the 50s, hawks like Edward Teller influenced policy and exggerated the threat posed by the Soviets, when in fact Stalin never wanted any kind of war with the US.

Later, this role was taken up by people such as Paul Nitze who admittedly was the "father of threat inflation". His job and that of others was to exploit the uncertainty and fear and turn it into a potent force for justifying the arms race. Into the 60s and 70s, Nitze gathered around him a cohort of like-minded people who included today's neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld. They wrote reports that tried to argue against detente, and advocated further and more powerful arms buildups. In the middle of this politicking, it seems a wonder that presidents could negotiate treaties such as the anti-ballistic missile treaty and the NPT. Reading accounts of these people and their clever spin-doctoring and manipulation of the threat, one cannot help but feel a sense of deja vu, since it's largely the same people who inflated the threat of WMDs in the Bush administration, as well as much else. What can we say but that public memory is unfortunately short-lived. Reading Rhodes's accounts gives us a glimpse of the birth of today's neocons, who have wrought so much destruction and led the country down the wrong path. Rhodes deftly recounts the workings of key officials in both governments, and how they influenced policy and reacted to that of the other side. He also has concurrent accounts of economic and military developments in the Soviet Union, and how channeling of funds towards defense spending created major problems for the country's growth and development.

However, the major focus of Rhodes's book concerns the two principal characters of the endgame of the Cold War and their lives and times; Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. Rhodes paints a sensitive and insightful portrait of Gorbachev, as a man who was a reformist since the very beginning when he was a minister of agriculture. Rising to high positions from humble and trying beginnings, Gorbachev realised early on the looming menace of the arms race and its impact on his country's development. He tried sensibly to negotiate with Reagan's administration to cut back on nuclear arms. He could be compassionate and sympathetic, but also a very good politician. Rhodes's portrait of Reagan is less favourable, and Reagan appears to be a complex man who harbored complex and sometimes puzzling ambitions. On one hand, he was a man who wanted to abolish nuclear weapons and end the threat of nuclear war. On the other hand, he was a naive idealist who sometimes thought of himself in messianic terms, thinking that God had a special role for him in the Cold War. Rhodes rightly compares some of Reagan's thinking to religious thinking. Reagan quite bizarrely encouraged tremendous defense spending (more than the earlier three presidents combined) and massive and dangerous weapons developments and military exercises. Rhodes's account of the NATO military exercise named Able Archer in 1983 which almost spurred the Soviets to ready a nuclear strike speaks volumes about Reagan's belligerent policies, particularly strange given his "other side", which eschewed nuclear conflict. An intelligent but not particularly intellectually sophisticated president, Reagan liked to hear about policy more in the form of stories than reports, and because of his relatively poor and unsophisticated background in issues of national security had to depend on his advisors for insight into these issues.

These advisors, especially Richard Perle and others, persuaded Reagan to stall negotiations with the Soviets, whose main insistence was that that he give up his dreams of SDI or "Star Wars", a costly space-based weapons system that was clearly going to engender more animosity and arms buildups. This system was not just threatening and unnecessary, but would not have even been technically effective. Again, one cannot help but think of the Bush administration's flawed insistence on missile defense systems. Reagan refused to back down on this central point in negotiations with the Soviets in Geneva and Iceland, mainly advised by Perle and others. Egged on by false hopes of security through SDI, he squandered important opportunities for arms reduction. In the pantheon of presidents trying to reduce Cold War nuclear threats and curtail weapons development, Reagan is surely the biggest offender. However, it is also not fair to blame him completely; clearly his hawkish advisors played a key role in policy making, even while his more moderate advisors struggled to find a way out of the madness. Ronald Reagan was a complex character, and a comment by Gorbachev, if perhaps a little too critical, accurately captures his personality; Gorbachev once said that he would love Reagan as a dacha neighbor, but not as president of the US.

In the end, it was largely inevitability that ended the Cold War. In this context, Rhodes also dispels some myths about it. One of them, cleverly used by conservatives these days, is that it was Reagan who was the principal instrument in ending the Cold War. Rhodes makes it clear that it was Gorbachev who was instrumental. Allied with this myth is another one, that the US drove the Soviet Union into the ground essentially by bankrupting them, as if that somehow almost points to a clever strategic decision by Reagan to increase his own arms spending to induce the Soviets to increase theirs. But this myth is also not true. The Soviet Union carried the seeds of its downfall inside itself since the beginning, and the fruits of those seeds were beginning to show since the 1970s. Gorbachev recognised this, and it was largely the economic situation in his country and his own actions and realisation of the inevitability of affairs that ended the Cold War. Reagan in fact may have slightly prolonged the Cold War, and he certainly made it more dangerous towards the end with his idealistic visions of more security through wondrous weapons building. He also made negotiations much more difficult by constantly casting Soviet-US relations under the rubric of good and evil, piety and godlessness, and by smooth talking rhetoric and debate. Robert McNamara has said that our immense nuclear legacy arose from actions, every one of which seemed rational at the time, but which ultimately led to an insane result. Ronald Reagan is perhaps the epitome of a US president who had his own remarkable but largely flawed internal rational logic for justifying enormous nuclear arms accumulation.

Throughout the book, Rhodes's trademark style shines through; meticulous research that envelops the reader, remarkable attention to detail and internal logic, a novelist's sense of character development and the retelling of key events,- such as his gripping account at the beginning of the book of the Chernobyl tragedy that exposed many of the Soviet Union's weaknesses and contradictions- cautious and yet revealing speculation, and narration that instills in the reader a rousing sense of history and human nature. He gives sometimes minute-by-minute accounts of the deliberations and meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev. As in his other books, he liberally sprinkles all accounts with extended quotes and conversations between key participants, thus giving the reader a sense of being present at key moments in history. I have to say that this book, while very good, is not as engaging as his first two books, but it nonetheless is solid history and storytelling, and a chronicle of one of the important periods of the century, a period that influences the world to this day.
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29 of 37 people found the following review helpful
1.0 out of 5 stars Disappointed, February 29, 2008
I learned much from Rhodes's "The Making of the Atomic Bomb" and "Dark Sun", and my learning (and enjoyment, despite the subject matter) continued through the first part of the book, discussing Chernobyl. The it stopped. Rhodes served up a recap of the excellent early Cold War history from "Dark Sun" and then, rather suddenly, switched to a bone-dry diplomatic history of arms control that was neither comprehensive nor novel. At times, pages on end seemed to be little more than a transcript of Gorbachev - Reagan meetings. Riveting as those were, I'd lived through that history and can get this from the academic literature. I'd hoped for more from this great popular historian.
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9 of 10 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars The end of the Cold War, December 4, 2007
Richard Rhodes' Arsenals of Folly is a thoughtful book that will leave many readers very unsettled. Rhodes examines America's and Soviet Russia's nuclear weapons policies with special emphasis on the Reagan-Gorbachev negotiations that along with their aftermaths greatly assisted Gorbachev in successfully unwinding the Cold War. The root policy for both nations, from the beginning of the Cold War until its end, was to bluster, threaten, and temporize. Politicians in both nations framed their policy to suit their times and to yield to dominant opinions. Obscurantic discussions of nuclear war bored most post-World War II presidents, leaving the development of policy, its supervision, and its auditing to others. It was only when Reagan and Gorbachev came to power both with the idea arrived at separately, that the two nations needed to terminate nuclear weapons and the Cold War that progress was possible.
Rhodes hammers hard on several important themes. The foremost is that politicians and analysts in both nations after Hiroshima continued to frame nuclear policy as if nuclear arms might be practical weapons, or at least necessary for deterrence. Neither thought, Rhodes argues, provides sound support for the accumulation of nuclear weapons. Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a still lingering remnant of this logic.
In his effort to write a compelling history, Rhodes dresses the players in black hats and white hats (or perhaps shades of gray) and leaves off the complicating Shakespearian irony of the tale. To wit: It is unlikely that a president perceived as "left-leaning" could have effectively participated in initiating the end of the Cold War. The Committee on the Present Danger and its neocom allies would have moved to persuade Congress to impeach a man who was engaged in negotiations to reduce American nuclear weapons and delivery systems by 50 per cent and more. Reykjavik needed the neocoms.
Rhodes separates his telling of the end of the Cold War from a discussion of the context of American politics. The choice leads, perhaps, to an oversimplified tale, but it is very much in keeping with the root views of Gorbachev and Reagan that this was a straightforward problem for which a solution was dangerously overdue.
Doug Wilson
Boston, MA
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22 of 28 people found the following review helpful
2.0 out of 5 stars Who are these Soviets of whom Rhodes writes?, July 17, 2009
By 
J. Green (Los Angeles, California) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race (Vintage) (Paperback)
At turns both fascinating and mind-numbingly dull. Rhodes describes the ascent of Gorbachev, including the Stalin purges that took his grandfather and the pathetic living conditions of the people, but otherwise portrays Soviet leaders as simple and honest guys just trying to do their jobs. By contrast, American leaders are portrayed as ideological, paranoid, and manipulative, and American presidents as too bored by discussions of arms control treaties to even look at them. According to Rhodes, all of this American paranoia was entirely without cause; any change in Soviet missiles was simply routine maintenance or small and simple upgrades, whereas American modifications were threatening provocations, continually upping the ante. He repeatedly says that American arms far outnumbered the Soviets by several magnitudes. All of this made for a bunch of nervous and jittery Soviet leaders - whose rhetoric was never fiery in contrast to American leaders - who lost a lot of sleep at night worrying and were forced into an arms race instead of just being able to feed their people and put a man on the moon. What? That doesn't sound like the USSR you thought you knew? Me neither.

I won't dispute that the number of nuclear missiles pointed at each other wasn't ridiculous. I won't dispute that a LOT of money and resources was wasted. I won't even dispute that American politicians are generally a sleazy lot. But I do dispute his characterizations of the Soviet leaders as peaceful and merely reacting to threats and provocations by the Americans.

A few other points Rhodes makes which I dispute:
- He blames the Reagan Administration for the tragedy when the Soviets shot down a Korean air liner with 260 passengers!
- He describes the American bombers in the 50s as a superior delivery system to that of the Soviets missiles, ignoring the fact that nuclear missiles would arrive in a matter of minutes whereas bombers would take hours to deliver their payload (never mind that bombers could be shot down).
- Gorbachev comes off as a peaceful genius with an agricultural background, whereas Reagan is a dim-witted religious fanatic. He mocks Reagan's surprise that the Soviets thought his rhetoric was serious (while calling Soviet leaders "candid"), and his hopes for SDI. He says Reagan did nothing to contribute to the fall of the Soviet Union - it was either happening on it's own or because of prior US persecution.
- He infers that Soviet intervention in countries that fell to communism was merely aiding well-meaning and like-minded people, whereas Americans were being "interventionist."
- Many of his quotes and citations are from people who were low level or outsiders, including many journalists and even an American defector. Quotes are selective and do not give a balanced perspective.

I found his discussion at the beginning of Soviet history fascinating. But his discussions of the United States were so one-sided and seemingly agenda driven as to ruin all credibility. He continually vilifies everything the Americans did, while painting the Soviets as unwillingly caught up in the arms race. I've heard great things about prior books by Rhodes, but this one has so soured me that I'm not sure I'll bother. I finally gave up about 3/4 through - what a waste of time. (I listened to the audiobook and the reader was fine, although he read with such a monotone voice that it certainly didn't help to make the material any more interesting).
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9 of 11 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars Fairly Good; 3.5 Stars, February 17, 2008
By 
R. Albin (Ann Arbor, Michigan United States) - See all my reviews
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This is the third in a series of books on the nuclear age written by Richard Rhodes. The first was his excellent The Making of the Atomic Bomb and the second was the very good Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb. I wish I could report that Arsenals of Folly is as good as the prior books, but it isn't. One of the defects of Arsenals is that Rhodes is attempting to cover too large a topic in a relatively short book. He is attempting to look not only at the genesis of the nuclear arms race but also at its conclusion at the end of the Cold War. Putting all this into a 300 page book is simply too difficult. Where The Making... and Dark Sun had the advantage of central narratives, Arsenals.. reads more as a series of connected essays on the theme of the book. Rhodes attempts to give the book some narrative coherence by concentrating on the life and accomplishments of Mikhail Gorbachev but the focus on Gorbachev is only partially successful in unifying the book.

Rhodes demonstrates a number of basic points. The nuclear arms race was driven by factors that had little to do with establishing security. The nuclear arms race was extraordinarily wasteful in terms of resources and that in some important aspects it produced mirror effects in the principal protagonists, the USA and Soviet Union. Powerful ideological and political forces within each nation promoted the nuclear arms race, producing dangerous situations. Perhaps because of available documentation, Rhodes concentrates particularly on the largely negative role of nuclear hawks within the USA. Threat inflation, interservice rivalry, and crude ideological constructs seem to have been more important that clear eyed examination of the facts. The historian Richard Pipes and Richard Perle come in for particularly stringent treatments. Its clear as well that these individuals had Soviet counterparts.

Rhodes' treatment of Gorbachev is particularly sympathetic. Gorbachev emerges as a man of real vision, idealism, and courage who was committed to revolutionizing domestic and international affairs. Rhodes makes also a good case that the Reagan-Bush I era triumphalism about the Cold War was misplaced. Far from being beaten into submission by the Reagan buildup, which Rhodes presents as another example of Cold War irrationalism, Gorbachev and others in the Soviet leadership recognized well before Reagan's accession that their state was imperilled by the rivalry with the USA. Gorbachev, who came of age during the first effort to reform the Soviet State - the Krushchev period - was determined to embark on a path of reform. Rhodes presents Reagan as largely reacting to Gorbachev's actions and Reagan's attachment to the silly idea of SDI as a real obstacle to the end of the nuclear arms race.

Much of this book is written well though parts of it are essentially digests of existing secondary literature. Rhodes' analyses are astute. As Rhodes is aware, though he doesn't trumpet this fact, many of the persons he discusses, like Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Cheney, attained considerable prominence in the Bush II administration, where they participated in another round of similar threat inflation, sloppy thinking, and exagerration of American military power. This is a fine example of inability to learn from experience.
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6 of 7 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Best book about the Cold War I've read, May 25, 2008
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M K A (California) - See all my reviews
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An amazing conclusion to Rhodes' trilogy about the Bomb. As always, riveting and filled with fascinating anecdotes. The reflections at the end of this book about the collapse of the Soviet Union and our own country's current path will stay with you for days. Bravo!
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3 of 3 people found the following review helpful
3.0 out of 5 stars Interesting, pleasantly not what I expected, January 10, 2009
This review is from: Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race (Vintage) (Paperback)
Enjoyable, below his normal average Rhodes book. I thoroughly enjoyed the first half which covered many of the Russian fumblings in the early nuclear era (the US had a couple notable problems though too). Toward the end it moved into a 'he said, she said' political record, mostly between Reagan and Gorbachev, which drones on for a couple hundred of pages. Some of this second half droning is interesting, but most of it is pretty dry. All in all, worth your time, but a little overboard with the details that could have more easily been pieced together in the readers mind, instead of written on the page.
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7 of 9 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Highly Recommended!!!, December 10, 2008
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This review is from: Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race (Vintage) (Paperback)
With the success of his book The Making of the Atomic Bomb, which won a Pulitzer Prize, Richard Rhodes established his reputation as an authority on the nuclear-weapons history of the United States. Arsenals of Folly will strengthen that reputation. It is a superb book: well researched, told with riveting narrative flair, and consistently unsettling in its challenges to common assumptions about U.S. history.

Rhodes skillfully weaves two narrative strands--an account of the Reagan-Gorbachev years and a history of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race--into a story that should be required reading for members of Congress and voting citizens. Readers watch history unfolding as two proud nations push to the brink of bankruptcy and beyond pursuing policies and an arms race that, as Rhodes carefully documents, far too many politicians, military leaders, and diplomats knew were nonsensical.

The only winners in this book are the underappreciated people who injected some sanity into the deliberations, a diverse group that included Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mikhail Gorbachev, George Shultz, Eduard Shevardnadze, and others. Shultz deserves praise for blocking attempts by radicals to derail diplomatic negotiations between Ronald Reagan and Gorbachev, asking his people in front of the Soviets "Are you out of your mind? This is what it's about. The longer they talk, the better it is."

Arsenals of Folly is a devastating critique of what Dwight D. Eisenhower called the "military-industrial complex" and the deeply flawed policies it sustained in the Soviet Union and the United States.

Near the book's end, Rhodes uses business leaders, scholars, and civil engineers to show the negative price the U.S. has paid for the nuclear-arms race and bluntly states his final conclusion: "Far from victory in the Cold War, the superpower nuclear-arms race and the corresponding militarization of the American economy gave us ramshackle cities, broken bridges, failing schools, entrenched poverty, impeded life expectancy, and a menacing and secretive national-security state that held the entire human world hostage."

One year later, with the U.S. economy in the worst shape since World War II, Rhodes' prescient analysis cuts even deeper.

Armchair Interviews says: Arsenals of Folly is highly recommended.
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Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race (Vintage)
Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race (Vintage) by Richard Rhodes (Paperback - November 4, 2008)
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