The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia [Hardcover]

Donald W. Hamilton (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0275957349 | ISBN-13: 978-0275957346 | Publication Date: January 30, 1998

In his analysis of insurgency war, Donald Hamilton first attempts to provide insight into a strategic concept he believes is little understood today, and to explain its complicated relationship to American policy failures in Southeast Asia during the post-1945 era of containment. The study develops a working model of insurgency, explaining it as both a unique method and type of war-making. Significant findings include the inability of policymakers to perceive a potential insurgency in Vietnam as early as 1946, subsequent American involvement in not one, but three Asian insurgencies during the 1950s, and the ultimate failure of the U.S. military to meet the insurgency challenge in South Vietnam. This inability to eliminate the insurgency led not only to the complete breakdown of the South Vietnamese government, but was the primary reason why further U.S. military action after 1965 would prove ineffectual. This historical narrative also follows the involvement of several key players, including the personalities of Edward Lansdale, Sir Robert Thompson, Archimedes Patti, and Vo Nguyen Giap, who through their life experiences and writings, provide a keen profundity into why insurgencies occur, why they fail, and why they succeed.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"In noteworthy fashion, Hamilton discusses insurgency as a "method" and as a "type" of warfare. His analysis is clearly superior to anything yet written. I have been studying the Viet Nam conflict for 22 years. Without any reservations, I believe this to be the best book I have yet seen on this subject, and I have read most of them."-from the Foreword by Cecil B. Currey, University of South Florida and award-winning author of Victory at Any Cost

Book Description

This account of America's post-1945 experiences with irregular war, coupled with a description of insurgency as both a method and type of war-making, elucidates the strategic military reasons for the American defeat in Vietnam.

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Hardcover: 216 pages
• Publisher: Praeger (January 30, 1998)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0275957349
• ISBN-13: 978-0275957346
• Product Dimensions: 9.6 x 6.4 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,426,043 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars The Art of Insurgency, December 9, 2002

By 

a.s.d. (Washington, D.C.) - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia (Hardcover)

Truly a superb and important work!
This book should be read not only by all those interested in military history and the Vietnam war, but particularly by those interested in understanding better the circumstances facing the United States and its allies today in the war on terrorism. Hamilton's insights on insurgent organizations, terror cells, and strategic design in historical context, can be well applied by policy makers today in understanding the depth of problems now being faced. Lessons learned then would not need to be repeated as mistakes today. This book is not overwhelming in repetitious fact finding, and Hamilton's minimalist writing style is appreciated. Academics will also enjoy the marvelous research and constructed bibliography. Recommended to all readers interested in like subjects related to contemporary military strategic thought and history, and to government officials of the highest rank.

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Artfully Done!, January 7, 2009

By 

Andre Provoncha "life student" - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia (Hardcover)

This treatment of conflict and the clear understanding of insurgency frees true students of warfare from past failed stratagem demons still haunting us today. By explaining, first, what insurgency is not (revolutionary war, extensions of Maoist approaches, etc), Professor Hamilton defines, illustrates, and then analyzes several post WWII conflicts to drive his premise home. This monograph is probably the best blueprint today to transform the US strategy from Global War on Terror to a longer lasting institutional and reasoned Insurgency doctrine. Only when Don's work is inculcated into modern military strategy will the US get it right. Mr. Hamilton's use of the Philippine, Malaysian, and Vietnamese experience are thorough and relevant. They are excellent studies on their own right as military histories and serve well as bulwarks and illustrative of evolutionary military thought. Overall, the Art of Insurgency is an excellent history, superb analysis, and a must manuscript for military institutions world wide.

Lt Col Andre Provoncha, USAF (ret)