Customer Reviews

Art of War in the Middle Ages: A.D. 378-1515

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Oman provides an excellent, well-researched look at the arms, tactics, and strategies of various medieval armies. He covers the rise of the era of heavy calvary, and describes how it was replaced by the English longbow and the Swiss pikeman. His discussion of the various battlefield tactics unique to each army, as illustrated through maps of many of the major battles, proves both informative and entertaining. This is by far the most "readable" and authoritative book on the subject I have read to date.

This is an excellent and fascinating work. I highly recomend it for anyone interested in warfare, the middle ages, or both. It is full of well-researched insights and synthesizes and provides a broad general framework for understanding warfare in this period. Serious scholars or those seeking to use this as a textbook should note that the original version that forms the basis of this book was written a century ago and is probably outdated, despite the rewritten portions. However, the greatest strength of this book is that it is extraordinarily well-written, and a pleasure to read.

An excellent exploration of how people always want to fight the last war. Whenever someone in the Middle Ages would come up with a new tactical innovation, they would dominate for awhile before being swept aside by the next innovation. Everyone thought that their winning method was the end all solution to victory in war and therefore refused to change. The French, British, Swiss, Spanish, Italians, Poles, Hungarians and Bohemians are all shown staying with what has always worked even when it has ceased to work. The Byzantine are held up as the exception to this pattern in that they used tremendous skill and flexibility to preserve their empire against terrible odds for more than 500 years. The book also points out very well that, other than among the Byzantines, the sophistication of tactics sunk to a very low level after the Roman period. Tactical thinking was crude in the extreme (sending a small force around behind the enemy was considered bold and brilliant). Strategy was nonexistent until near the end of the period. First written as an essay in 1885 and later expanded into a book. Was very influential in the early 20th Century. The book is on Patton's reading list.

Excellent introduction to medieval warfare and its origins. If you're a fan of medieval history once you've finished this book your first action will be to reread it immediately. The section of the book that I most enjoyed was the part that dealt with the Swiss military exploits of the fourteen and fifteen centuries. The near total superiority (for over two hundred years) of Swiss pikemen and halberdiers against feudal armies lead by mounted knights was certainly a revelation to me. Coming to medieval warfare from a perspective rooted firmly in the British Isles I had always thought that the only successful answer to heavy feudal cavalry was massed longbow men. This book shows that feudal heavy cavalry died just as effectively on Swiss pikes and halberds as they did on Welsh and English arrows. This is not even to mention the hussites of Bohemia. If you're a student of medieval history you'll not regret purchasing this book.

The Art of War in the Middle Ages was first published in 1885 in Oxford and London. A revised edition was re-published in 1953, with indicators of revisions included in the text. This particular portion is true to the original, using particular terminology. It is part of the section that deals with the "arms, organization and tactics of the Byzantine armies". The 19th century scientist uses the term "Macedonians" as a synonum for "semi-Romanized Slavs" of the early Middle Ages, a proof against the claims of anti-Macedonian propagandists who attempt to portray the Macedonian people as a recent "invention." A quote:

"It would appear that Maurice had intended to break down the barrier which has been imposed in the fourth century between the class which paid the taxes and that which recruited the national army. "We wish," he writes, "that every young Roman of free condition should learn to use the bow, and should be constantly provided with that weapon and with two javelins." If, however, this was intended to be the first step toward the introduction of universal military service, the design was never carried any further. Three hudnred years later Leo is found echoing the same words, as a pious wish rather than as a practical expedient. The rank and file, however, of the imperial forces were now raised almost entirely within the realm, and well-nigh every nation contained in its limits, except the Greeks, furnished a considerable number of soldiers. The Armenians and Isaurians in Asia and the Thracians and Macedonians--or more properly the semi-Romanized Slavs--in Europe were considered the best material by the recruiting officer."

The whole book is enjoyable and provides intelligeble analysis of military matters. The "100 year war" part is especially memorable and well laid-out.

I read this book for a graduate course in medieval history.
Charles Oman's great book "The Art of War in the Middle Ages" is a great introductory work for warfare of the period. It is especially useful for battle descriptions of English wars against the Scottish, and for the Hundred Years War. Oman writes that the lesson of the Battle of Falkirk in 1298, was clear for any competent military commander to follow; cavalry alone could not defeat the Scottish squares, but archers supported by cavalry could easily break them. These tactics would be successfully repeated by Edward III against the Scots at Hallidon Hill in 1333, and Neville's Cross in 1346, not to mention in his invasion of France

Edward I's most important contribution to advancing the war fighting capability of Britain was in the battlefield tactics that he employed. It cannot be stressed enough that his use of mixed cavalry and archery was a monumental leap in battlefield tactics, as well as the precursor in making the longbow a force multiplier during the Hundred Years' War. The military record of Edward II, who reigned from 1307-1327, was abysmal. Charles Oman spoke on behalf of all historians who wrote about Edward II's lack of military prowess, and was justifiably unflattering in his critique of Edward II's military acumen. Most of what Edward I won on the battlefields in Scotland, Edward II ineptly lost.

Edward III's strategic and tactical abilities were on full display during the Hundred Years' War. One of the most important tactical innovations that Edward III instituted to increase the fighting capability of the English army before the start of the Hundred Years' War was the introduction of mounted archers to its ranks. Oman took notice of the importance of Edward III's tactical innovation. Mounted archers rode ponies for quick transport to the battlefield, and then they would dismount to shoot their longbows in battle. Undoubtedly, Edward III learned from the previous one hundred years of his predecessors' fighting the Scottish, that too many times the Scots outmaneuvered the English; thus, they escaped from having to fight a battle advantageous to the English. Edward III was going to do all he could to make sure that this did not happen to his army. Oman's research shows muster records from 1334 listing mounted archers for the first time as part of Edward III's expedition into Scotland. This was Edward III's second largest campaign against an enemy during his reign. The expedition served as an excellent opportunity for Edward III and his army to prove their new tactics, which they would put to good use a dozen years later in France.

Recommended reading for those interested in medieval history, and military history.

Well written and interesting, but very outdated. You're better off with Keen's new _Medieval Warfare_ or Verbruggen or R.C. Smail (Crusading Warfare) or France's new book.

Mr OMAN views are very seriously outdated. This book might serve as an introduction but lacks analysis and accuracy.