Customer Reviews

The Art Of War

5 star:		(5)
4 star:		(4)
3 star:		(3)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Today, when you mention The Art of War, people refer immediately to the book by Sun Tzu. However, the only works published for the general public during Macchiavelli's life are the Decennale Primo, the Mandragola, and this one. The work being review was published in Florence by Macchiavelli in august 1521 and it had an immediate success and many reprints.
Having completed already The Prince and the Discorsi, and not foreseeing any possibility of returning to public service, Macchiavelli decided to write a book about warfare, in part as a result of his meetings and conversations with a group of young alumni and friends at the Orti Oricellari. Some of these were involved, in 1522, in a conspiracy to kill Cardinal Giulio de'Medici,Master of Florence.
The Art of War is not a textbook, but rather a humanistic treatise on the subject, written under the form of dialogues, divided in seven books. The interlocutors are Fabrizio Colonna, Cosimo Ruccellai and the young men Buondelmonti, della Palla and Alamanni. The first book deals with recruitment, the second with the weapons of infantry and cavalry, the relationship between this corps and military exercises. Colonna and Ruccellai are the protagonists of the dialogues here, while in the III book the role of interlocutor to Colonnais vested upon the younger Alamanni. Alamanni inquires about the role of the artillery and is substance Macchiavelli's judgement (through Colonna's words) is negative. In the IV book Buondelmonti inquires about the importance of military formations and other possible combat formations (different from the traditional roman and others).
The final three books deal with logistics, accommodations, military discipline, fortifications, sieges and defensive tactics.
The language of this opus is the most polished and conventional, opposed to the one in other works by the author. Modern critics, in spite of the original success of the book, have pointed out the wrong perception that Macchiavelli had about the growing importance of artillery and the role of military reforms that were enacted in France at the time. He also wrongly criticized, as a whole, the professional army alongside the mercenaries and Compagnie di Ventura. The admiration of M. regarding roman legions and classic institutions is also questionable, in view of the evolution of warfare at the time. So why was this book so popular, until the anti-M. revisionism took a clearer look at reality, discarding abstract and moralistic propositions about warfare?
Because the treatise provided a clear and fresh (at the time) view about the intimate connection between military art, politics, war and religion, in a global context.

Machiavelli's "The Art of War" is only half the story. To fully understand the point and purpose of these conversations, you must read Machiavelli's other and more important book: "The Prince". Both books are exercises in the logic extending from the premise that the ends justify the means.

You should either obtain both books or the new volume: "The Art of War & The Prince by Machiavelli - Special Edition" which combines both books into one. Both books are important in the history of philosophy, logic, politics and strategy. Reading both helps put them in their proper context.

Machiavelli's vision was always clear that success is all that is important. His detailed insights on the methods and means for achieving success, however clever and convoluted, were always right to the main point: To the victor there is fame and glory and to the loser there is humiliation and oblivion.

-- but I found Macchiavelli's content frankly disappointing. The translation is modern and readable, I have no problem with that. The original was centuries behind Sun Tzu's book of the same name, even though Sun Tzu wrote around 500BC, 2000 years before Macchiavelli. Macchiavelli gives a bit of advice about soldierly temperament and training. There's also a brief checklist, just two pages, of strategic advice, near the end of the book. That's all that really has lasting value.

The bulk of the text is taken up with the right way to position each kind of soldier and arm, rank and file, in marching order. Basically, these were detailed directions for a military parade, suited to the set-piece wars of the time, as much pageant as combat. He also goes on about the right kinds of pennants, flags, and colors to use, proper military music, how to make camp, and proper pillaging and distribution of booty.

Directions on how to make camp are subject to errors, though: a measurement 1360 feet long, minus 100 feet at each end, is said to leave a row 1260 feet long rather than 1160 - perhaps an error introduced by the translator, but I tend to think not. He also takes the "reduction" and sacking of conquered towns for granted. I think Master Sun was a bit more merciful (or prgamatic), on the grounds that the wealth of newly annexed parts of the kingdom should be preserved, and the citizens kept happy enough for easy rule. With a startling lack of foresight, Macchiavelli dismisses serious use of artillery in pitched battles. Instead, he falls back on strategies of the Greeks and Romans, 1000 to 2000 years old even when he wrote. Sun Tzu's warfare had a much more modern look to it, including hit-and-run tactics that the West barely understood until the American revolution.

The quality of the translation worth four or five stars, partly because of helpful notes and diagrams. It's the original work that I found weak.

//wiredweird

First off, The title of my review might be misleading, When i say outdated tactics, i don't mean because this book was written in the early 1500s, and they don't apply today. More simply, i mean that they didn't even apply in the 1500s.

I'll start by saying that Machiavelli thought that superior tactics of war from any period in time were still valuable and practical in his time. He took tactics, strategies and disciplines used by a plethora of empires far before his time. His mentality of "It worked for the Romans in 315 CE, it will work now!" Could lead to a downfall in any sense. Plain and simple, innovation is the key to war. Innovation in concept, principle, weaponry, and idealism. While original in some aspects, his strategies and "art" remain a collection and culmination of outdated military strategies throughout different stages of European history.

However, the detail of this book is uncanny. The layout of the book is genius as participants in a conversation continue to ask questions for clarification and to challenge the strategies presented by Machiavelli. The translation is perfect, and the footnotes / references are extremely helpful. Neal Wood's introduction provides just enough of a history lesson to make even the more esoteric parts of this book a little more comprehensible.

5/5 stars for the translation, references, and introduction.
3/5 stars on the tactics theorized and implemented by Machiavelli (though proven in the test of war, the "it worked then, it'll work now" mentality proves risky to this day.)

Overall: 4/5 stars

When people think of war, they generally think of battles and strategies. Though of course very important parts of war, there are many other parts, just as important. Logistics, morale, intelligence and others.

With this book Machiavelli brought science back into warfare and helped Europe cross from medieval warfare to modern war. Though there are some mistakes in predictions, it is the details to "unimportant matters" like logistics that would make sure this book rightfully would be found on the shelf of any good military commander for centuries.

Niccolo Machiavelli is commonly known as an abstract, political thinker, but this work shows an entirely different side, being a compendium of Renaissance military tactics and equipment.

If you were ever transported in time and place to 16th century Italy, this book would be an excellent guide in how to raise, train, and equip a citizen army that could fight for your city state. He also goes into some depth abvout military fortifications, as well.

Macchiavelli argues in the book for a citizen-army; given the troubles of Italy with roving mercenary armies in his day, one can see why his arguments make sense.

A profound work for a military historian to read, although a casual reader might find it too pedantic.

Great insight into human behavior never changes no matter how much time passes.

Extended Exerpt from my review essay for my military history course of this book:
During the Renaissance, the Italian city states' main motivation for conducting warfare was not to annihilate their rivals, but to achieve security and predominance over a limited, but expanding, field of influence. In an atmosphere of growing economic development, rising civic humanism, and expanding city state authority, the Condottieri, leaders of mercenary companies, became the dominant figures in Italian Renaissance warfare. The predominance of these mercenaries spawned a hotly contested debate over their role and effectiveness in conducting warfare and protecting the city states' interests. In The Art of Warfare, Italian Renaissance humanist Nicollo Machiavelli describes these Condottieri as an extremely negative influence on Italy's military strength. Machiavelli separates his work into seven "books", in which Papal Captain Fabrizio Colonna delivers a virtual monologue on the proper method of conducting warfare. Throughout his book, Machiavelli offers detailed arguments and descriptions to inform modern military leaders on the proper way to recruit, train, arm, and encamp soldiers.
Machiavelli published The Art of War in 1521, and argues that the contemporary state of Italian armies is deplorable in comparison to both Rome's brilliant fighting force and contemporary French and Swiss armies. He argues that the Italian states can save themselves from this miserable situation by removing the vicious, selfish, and treacherous Condottieri. Machiavelli repeatedly claims that, "We shall find many things worthy of imitation" in the military methods of the ancients, and urges Italian city states to use heavily drilled and disciplined soldiers-citizen armies, and to organize these soldiers in a manner almost identical to Roman legions. He argues that such an army would be much more loyal, motivated, and religiously inspired than the ineffective and disloyal Condottieri-led forces.
Machiavelli's does not offer enough evidence to prove much of his thesis. A major reason for this lack of evidence is that Machiavelli's experience with military operations came as a secretary for two Florentine Commissioners of War, and his entire knowledge of Italian Renaissance warfare was limited to Florence. This is extremely problematic because Florence had the least permanent, the most poorly organized, and the least developed Condottieri army in Italy. As a result, Machiavelli's study of fifteenth century Italian warfare is largely unscholarly. He cites virtually no sources or examples to back up his diatribes about the ineffectiveness and backwardness of Italian armies. This lack of evidence leads him to make inaccurate claims, like his contention that contemporary Italians were unaware of many of the great military developments that the French and other European armies employed. This claim is dubious because a high proportion of the Condottieri infantry constables were foreigners, and would have known about European military techniques; and while no major foreign army invaded Italy until 1494, Italian forces clashed with Swiss, French, and Spain foes many times during the fifteenth century.
Machiavelli relies almost exclusively on classical sources for his military recommendations. For example, he copiously cites Livy and Vegetius to detail the ways in which the Romans organized their legions. These Roman sources are not reliable because these scholars wrote their works, in part, to glorify Rome, rather than simply to give an exact account of Roman warfare. Moreover, Machiavelli uses these already flawed sources very poorly. At one point, he claims that Renaissance warriors should emulate a particular model of the Roman legion, but does not take into account the evolution of the legion over the years or the reasons for this evolution. As a result of this mistake, he describes and recommends a legion that never actually excited. Machiavelli does make several astute points about the nature of the rank-in-file mercenaries soldiers, and points out that, "Those who are not your own subjects, but are willing to enter into your pay, are so far from being the best men that they are the generally the worst men in in any state." But he does not bolster these claims with any imperial evidence or research.

FINAL EVALUATION:
The overall quality of Machiavelli's The Art of War as a historical account of Italian Renaissance warfare is poor. Machiavelli is not a soldier, general, or historian, but is a political secretary with very limited first-hand military knowledge. As a result, his book is clearly politically motivated, limited in its evidence, and a product of its time and circumstances. On the other hand, Machiavelli's book is significant as a work of military theory, and as F.L. Taylor writes, Machiavelli "is the first secular writer to attempt to allot the practice of arms its places place among the collective activities of mankind, to define its aims, to regard it as a means to an ends." Machiavelli makes several important and useful recommendations- like the drilling of men, the reliance on infantry rather than cavalry, and the long-term superiority of citizen armies to mercenary armies. As a result, a reader should study the Art of War as a flawed but interesting and important theoretical work, rather than a historical account of the Condottieri and Italian Renaissance warfare.

Niccolo Machiavelli is commonly known as an abstract, political thinker, but this work shows an entirely different side, being a compendium of Renaissance military tactics and equipment.

If you were ever transported in time and place to 16th century Italy, this book would be an excellent guide in how to raise, train, and equip a citizen army that could fight for your city state. He also goes into some depth abvout military fortifications, as well.

Macchiavelli argues in the book for a citizen-army; given the troubles of Italy with roving mercenary armies in his day, one can see why his arguments make sense.

A profound work for a military historian to read, although a casual reader might find it too pedantic.

I like this book, even though, at times it was difficult for me to follow. I like the translation. I have read other translated books where I find it difficult to read the book. First, I want to say that this is the first military instruction book I have read, and second, that I read this book to find out how people fought before there were weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, I thought this book was an excellent tool in describing ancient military tactics. But even if you aren't interested in military tactics as much, this book was also interesting because I enjoy history. I thought it was going to describe how to march, train, and fight, which it did, but it also made numerous references to the actions of past military leaders. I enjoyed reading about the successes and failures of people whose names I recognized from history class. Additionally, I enjoyed the style. Niccolo uses a different style of writing then American authors, and on occasion I like to read something different. It is a good book that I would recommend to anyone who enjoys learning about history.