Customer Reviews

On Artillery

5 star:		(2)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

I don't know if there is a military thinker who writes quite as lucidly and insightfully as Bruce Gudmundsson. In a perfectly blunt, colloquial and slightly ironic manner of speaking, he rocks the house with this one.

It was Napoleon himself who noted that, "It is with artillery that war is made." This fact is amply born out by the casualty statistics of the last 100 years of warfare. Artillery has been, and is likely to remin, the great killer on the battlefield.

With this in mind, Gudmundsson proceeds to brilliantly illustrate the evolution of artillery tactics and equipment in this century. From the howitzer versus infantry gun debate, to counter-battery fire, to the great storms of steel unleashed over the battlefields of the two world wars, a vast array of topics are adeptly covered and analyzed. The unusual artillery tactics of the Vietnam War are also covered in detail.

Only by understanding how artillery has arrived at this point can we begin to understand where it is going. Gudmundsson expertly guides his reader along that evolutionary path. For the military historian, this book gives one a much better apppreciation of artillery's role in the great battles of history. For the career soldier, Gudmundsson provides new insight into the likely place of artillery on the battlefields of the future.

When I was going through a Marine Corps artillery refresher course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma in 1990 en route to an artillery assignment in the 2d Marine Division, the author of this interesting volume gave a few classes on artillery 'tactics' to the officer students, a good portion of whom had already commanded artillery batteries.

As I recall, the author is not an artilleryman, and while his 'lectures' were interesting, it was readily apparent to me that he was not 'fluent' in his subject matter. Unfortunately, the same goes for his treatment of the artillery arm in this volume.

The book is an overall disappointment. It has excellent material on the Germans, for both in War I and War II, and a definite effort has been made to understand what artillery is and how it should be employed. Additionally, the chapter on Bruchmuller is well worth the read. That being the case, the book should have been titled, On German Artillery.

However, what is most interesting about this volume is what isn't here. The few photographs used as illustrations are not helpful. What would have been very helpful to better undertstand the subject, as the types of World War I artillery are covered, would have been to research and find the technical drawings of the artillery pieces he is describing. This would have greatly increased the value of the book. What you merely have now is a primer, and one that covers the subject in bullet fashion, and not in depth.

The little material on American artillery during War II and it's employment is not explained well, and it is the opinion of this reviewer that it isn't completely understood. One of the things the Germans respected and feared about American arms in World War II was the artillery arm. The US Army's artillery was accurate, timely, well-organized, and the material was excellent, as was the technical and tactical fire direction.

What isn't covered about the German artillery of World War II was the general lack of it in many cases, caused by prewar planning. The Germans, as they did in War I, planned for a short war, and much of the artillery role was to be assumed by the Luftwaffe, which was a tactical vice a strategic, weapon. The war dragging on and being fought literally on three fronts by the Germans overstretched the German artillery arm which was both outnumbered by the almost overwhelming numbers of Russian guns and outmatched by that of the United States.

Further, the handicap of much of the German artillery, and its support system, being horse drawn put it at a distinct disadvantage against the American artillery which was at least all motorized and much of it being self-propelled.

The last chapter of the book is utter nonsense which really hurts the volume immeasurably.

The author is to be commended for a gallant effort. It is just too bad that more research wasn't done to make it an outstanding contribution to military history. What is present is merely inadequate, with a few outstanding highlights.

I gave this book four stars. Why? I'm an artillery officer and grade my profession much harder than general books on the subject. Bruce I Gudmundsson writes clearly, his book is easy to follow, and he gets the three points of artillery to people: the guns must be breach loading, must have a recoil mechanism, and has to have a modern aiming system. Just as important, the guns should have good shells with point detonating fuses.

Bruce breaks his book down into easy to follow chapters. The first part of the book covers the early development up to the Napoleonic/Civil War period. Lets look at the guns prior to 1800. The calibers were non-standard. The guns didn't have dedicated teams of animals for movements of the pieces. The gunnery was extremely primitive.

Bruce writes that Napoleon starts to standardize the guns. The guns are simplified and ornaments, such as the old dolphins (basically, fancy metal rope holders), are left off the guns. Napoleon uses the guns either in direct support or in defence. It was Napoleon who defined "It is with artillery that was is made".

The American Civil War guns are overrated. Bruce correctly states that American cannons during the Civil War were in a transitory stage. They were more advanced than the previous Napoleonic era guns. However, the higher velocities and accuracy do not make them better fighting weapons. Basically, primitive shells and the fact the higher velocities tend to shoot the shells deep into the ground before the explosive bursts the shell. Generally, if a soldier was not hit directly by a 3" Ordnance rifle or 2.9" Parrot rifle they stood little chance of becoming casualties by these weapons unless they were firing cannister shot. General Robert E. Lee said that he would rather have the old fashioned smooth bore 12 pound shell firing Napoleonic gun in his army than any other type of weapon. However, since most of his guns were captured Union artillery he had little to say about the affair. Indeed, the Union and Confederate armies ended the war with generally the same type of artillery they started with.

The true war that signals the beginning of the change in artillery is the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. This is the war in which the Prussian Krupp 75 mm gun is introduced to the world. This gun is a light year ahead of any other artillery. The Krupp gun fires a shell from a breech. The shell itself has a super quick fuze. Last, the Germans use the artillery correctly as a direct support weapon, basically a battering ram against the French army. It is good German artillery that allows the Prussian Army to defeat the French Army that is armed with a superior infantry rifle.

Bruce correctly documents how the French learned the lessons of the German Krupp gun and invent the modern artillery piece, the "Fabulous Seventy Five". This gun is the father of all modern artillery. It combines a modern high explosive shell, a modern sight system, a fast working breech, and a full working recoil system that returns the gun into battery (firing position) after every shot. Indeed, the French 75 is still one of the best artillery pieces ever made. A crack American gun crew was able to shoot one round every second with the 75 mm gun. No modern non-auto cannon can match that rate of fire.

Bruce give a good detailed account of WWI, the great artillery war. He tells of the use of rail way guns that have battleship caliber guns of about 11 inches and higher. Most of the people killed in WWI were killed by artillery.

Bruce does a good job of going over the interwar years of 1919 to 1939 of Artillery development. The artillery does not rest on its laurels. It develops artillery into a science. Also, the science of communication is perfected. The Germans and Americans concentrate on getting radios to their forward observers. The allies make mechanized mobil artillery that can keep up with the armor and mechanized infantry to support the manoeuver forces.

Bruce's last chapters focus on both WWII and Vietnam. WWII is mostly a manoeuver war and the artillery goes from crude, in the cases of the Japanese, to very advanced, such as the extremely good communication systems the US Army enjoys. Also, Bruce touches on the future. He introduces the readers to both the German and Russian rocket artillery of WWII, such as the extremely effective "Stalin Organ". In Vietnam Bruce introduces the reader to the coming of the computerized fire control systems. Conversely, Bruce does not cover a problem of the US Army: monopoly of a division fire control elements. Generally the US Army Artillery did a fantastic job of giving fire to the manoeuver commanders. But even the great General Patton did not iron out the corps and army problems of massed fires. Yes, the US Army had good massed volleys, but any army could do that. What problem the US Army had was to be able to effectively shift artillery fires within an army among its various divisions. The US Army never got good at that in Europe. The Germans were the best at it. The Russian did not have the problem of shifting artillery fires from division to division because it was not in their doctrine.

Where Bruce's book falls short is there is no update to the book. Artillery is in the middle of another great change. First, the true guided shell is just starting to really enter artillery service. The technological change are the introduction of GPS, global positing system, advanced communications, and very advanced computerized gunnery. Also, another problem that will effect modern artillery is the ammunition supply restricted. The days of shooting a ration of 1000 rounds per gun per day are gone. Indeed, modern artillery might start following the lead of the American civil war where there might be a set amount of ammo per gun in the combat trains for a campaign. The brigade or division manoeuver commander will always have ammunition supply constraints in the back of his mind. Conversely, when the ammunition is expended then the commander is virtually guaranteed a hit with the new ammunition guided by GPS.

New artillery in the future will be extremely accurate, ultra mobile, and some what frugal in the amount of ammunition expended. Rocket and mortars will eventually comprise over 60% of the artillery mix. It's a fact that the 120 mm mortar will eventually replace most of the Army's 105 mm gun howitzers. The reasons are the modern mortars with GPS are more accurate than the 105s, longer ranged, and much more mobile. Last, the logistics of moving a mortar shell are about one third of the cost of moving an howitzer shell.

"On Artillery" is a four star book. It is actually a five star book on giving the history of the guns and the development up past Vietnam. However, the book is badly in need of an update. Also, another reason for it not getting five stars is because the book has very little diagrams of battery, battalion, or brigade organization. Since a brigade supports an Army (called a divarty) that is a very important piece of information to not include with a book.

The other reviews on this site are essentially correct. On Artillery is readable and interesting and has some good perspectives on historical developments. It is also overly focused on French and German (especially the latter) matters. Gunderson is primarily interested in exploring organization and tactics of field artillery, and displays little interest in technology, institutional analysis, and strategic planning. In particular, the lack of interest in the impact of technology upon tactics is disappointing. I find his omissions more interesting than what he included, such as that he could write upon the subject without discussing logistics beyond a cursory mention of the switch from horse to vehicle traction and in regards to technology to go without mentioning the introduction of the mechanical time fuze.

The title of this book tends to suggest that what the reader is getting is a fairly comprehensive treatment of the subject of artillery. Unfortunately, that's not what you're getting.

First, one should understand that the historical period covered by the book begins with the Franco-Prussian War and runs through to the modern era. The book is not concerned with anything prior to that period. Also, it should be understood that within this period, the author's overwhelming focus is on First and Second World War. Don't buy the book expecting an in-depth treatment of modern artillery because only 21 pages are devoted to the entire post-WWII era. Indeed, the level of discussion of modern artillery is so cursory, it might as well have simply been omitted altogether.

Second, don't expect this book to provide you with a comprehensive survey of comparitive national artillery doctrines. As another reviewer pointed out, the author is overwhelming focused on the German system. The discussion of the German system is good, but it is the only system that is really discussed in satisfying depth. There is a lesser level of discussion of the French and American systems, but virtually no discussion of the British or Soviet systems. The book is simply not as comprehensive as the title "On Artillery" implies.

Frankly, I think that there were some poor editorial choices made in the conceptualization of this project. Had the level of treatment given to the German artillery system been extended to the other major combatants, the book would have been more worthwhile. A more in-depth discussion of modern artillery developments might also have made it more attractive. Given the fact that the book in its present form has only 164 pages of text, it certainly had room for that kind of expansion, and one would normally expect a much longer book given its price tag. As it is, I would argue that this work would have been more appropriately edited down and published as a monograph on the development of First and Second World War German artillery doctrine rather then presenting itself as a book, "On Artillery".

In the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 the French had by far the best infantry weapon. They had a breach loading rifle that had twice the range of the Prussian weapon. It was also much more accurate. The Prussian needle gun was one of the first that had been developed. By 1870 it was around 20 years old. Its mechanism did not seal very well. As a result a soldier firing the rifle might have a blow back of hot gasses coming out of the breach when they fired it. For that reason the gun was usually fired from the hi p rather than being aimed. Yet the Prussians won the war of 1870 quite easily. The reason for that was the development of breach loading steel artillery.



Artillery up to this time was muzzle loading. Loading a gun from the muzzle was a time consuming business. Breach loaders had a much greater rate of fire. In the Franco-Prussian war the Prussians could cover any battlefield with exploding shrapnel shells killing the enemy soldiers and shattering the will of those who survived. The Prussian artillery also had a much greater range than that of a rifle so that the enemy could be exterminated at a distance.



Towards the end of the 19th Century war was becoming a much more deadly business. Up to the First World War the biggest killer in any war was disease. The mobilization and placing of large numbers of people together in un-hygienic army camps led to almost immediate outbreaks of epidemics of all types. Napoleon lost far more men to typhus than he did to Russian gunfire. (It was only in the 1840s that germs were discovered as the cause of disease. This led to measures to protect the health of soldiers and fall in the death rate from disease) Weapons from 1700 to 1860 were slow firing inaccurate and short ranged.



As the First World War approached all sides struggled to innovate and learn from the past. The French developed quick firing artillery weapons. Between 1870 and 1914 engineers developed recoil mechanisms for artillery. A weapon when it is fired jolts back because of the force of the explosion. Artillery traditionally had to be pushed back into position after each firing and re-aimed. However the newly developed recoil mechanism meant that an artillery place remained in place and could keep firing. The French 75 regarded prior to 1914 could fire over 15 times per minute and had a range of five miles. With a well trained crew it could fire at the rate of 30 shells a minute. The Germans quickly developed a similar rapid fire gun. However the Germans developed an edge because of their procurement of howitzers. The French 75 fired a flat trajectory. It had a reasonably low barrel elevation. A howitzer fires with a lower muzzle velocity in an upward direction. The advantage of a howitzer is that its shells have considerable penetration. In addition they have the ability to fire over hills or other obstacles.



In the first year of the First World War fighting occurred in the open as the Germans tried to defeat the French by outflanking them. The highest losses actually occurred in the first period of the war. As the war settled into a stalemate all sides used fortifications to lessen casualties. As a result on the western front a continuous trench line was established from Belgium to the Swiss border.



France and Britain then set about trying to win the war by attacking the German lines. (The Germans had big issues in the east and tried to stabilize that front. They did not try to establish a serious offensive on the western front to 1916) The problems that the French and British faced was that Germans set up a series of fortifications behind large barbed wire entanglements.



To launch an attack the barbed wire had to be destroyed to allow the advancing infantry to pass. Also machine guns had to be destroyed. The survival of one or two could lead to the defeat of an infantry attack.



The approach of the British was to mass large numbers of artillery weapons in a given place and then fire on the enemy positions for a number of days. The aim being to kill all of the enemy in the attacked positions. This approach was not that successful. Intense barrages over a period of time did not kill all of the opposition. Mostly some machine guns would survive and that would stall the infantry attack. In addition the days of bombardment would alert the Germans as to what was going on and they could reinforce the attacked areas.



The French developed tactics based on suppression. That is that instead of using artillery to kill everyone they would develop a rolling barrage. What that meant is that they would fire on the enemy line. This would force the Germans into bunkers and shelters. Their own infantry would then advance behind the barrage. The barrage would move slowly forward with the infantry following it. The French could then overwhelm the defensive forces as they came out of their bunkers and shelters.



Although the Germans were able to avoid defeat in the initial defensive battles they suffered casualties. They over time changed their defensive tactics. Instead of concentrating all their troops in the front line they manned the front line with machine gun positions. The machine guns would reduce the number of attackers and then the troops kept in reserve would counter assault any lost positions. This approach was known as elastic defense. In 1917 following the British attacks on the Somme the Germans retreated to a newly constructed line known as the Hindenburg line. It had been built to minimize German losses by the use of machine guns and block houses.



Towards the end of the war the Germans started to develop tactics which would carry on to World War 2. These were known as infiltration tactics. Rather than have artillery work as the main player and having infantry occupy trenches cleared by the artillery the infantry would have a much bigger roll. Instead of simply having advancing infantry armed with rifles the Germans developed assault teams. An assault team would have a mix of weapons including sub machine guns, mortars and flame throwers. Each team thus had weapons which it could use to nullify enemy strong points. They were not artillery dependant.



The Germans also developed their own approach to artillery. British barrages generally signaled to the opponent when the attack would begin. At the end of the barrage. The Germans noticed this and they would end their barrage for a period of time and then start again. This would lead to the opponents soldiers coming out of their bunkers and then being killed by the renewed barrage. The Germans would do this four or five times causing massive confusion to the other side. They also mixed up the use of gas and explosive. Gas would be used to disorientate the artillery on the other side.



The book is interesting as it explains a topic which might be a little dull in a way to hold one's interest. It also shows that whilst the First World War was in general something of a fiasco it was not a matter of aged generals trying the same old tactics again and again. Rather then approach of all sides tended to evolve but it was only in the Second World War that the odds favored the offence again instead of the defense.

On Infantry, on Artillery and, finally, on Armour: the latter an interesting, brief survey on tactics and AFV technology improvement.

Focused on the earlier stage of AFV development (e.g. First World War), it can be quite disappointing for anybody looking for an up-to-date in depth weapons & tactics analysis.

The three books overlap a bit, but are anyway an extremely interesting reading.