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At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor

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While science is my area of expertise, I have a continuing interest in history. That interest lead me to pick up Prange's book. Gordon Prange has devoted years to accumulating information about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. That information includes interviews and military and government information from the USA and Japan. That accumulated information was then boiled down into this final work -- completed after Prange's death.

While there have been many books and theories proposed about why and how the debacle at Pearl Harbor took place, Prange's approach is well documented, and includes details of the pre-attack politics of the USA and of Japan. His book also includes detailed information about the attack itself, gleaned from interviews with those on both sides who actually participated in the event. But, even with that level of detail, I must admit that the most compelling part of the book for me is the section that follows the actual attack -- when the US government and the military were trying to figure out what actually happened, and who was to blame.

The final series of chapters of the book provide insight into the thoughts and tactics of Adm. Kimmell (CincPAC) and Gen Short (Commanding General of army at Hawaii), the two primary "interested parties" in the event.

Before reading the book, I had a tendency to believe that there may have been something of a conspiracy by the Roosevelt administration to get us into WWII, but after reading this account of Pearl Harbor, I am more likely to believe that the great success, including complete surprise by Japanese naval aviation was the result of a series of ill-advised decisions by the commanders at Hawaii rather than by any entity in Wash DC.

The sticky point in the whole affair was "magic" the US's code-breaking machine that allowed us to monitor coded diplomatic messages sent between Tokyo and some of its embassies. While "magic" was the source of a great deal of information that may have resulted in a different outcome at Pearl Harbor if the commanders there had access to it, we will never really know.

If you are interested in looking in repurcussions from the attack at Pearl Harbor, or if you have an interest in thinking about the whys and hows of the US entry into WWII, I urge you to read this book.

The writing is passable, though sometimes quite dry. The information is well documented, and is believable. This is not, however, a quick read -- there is a lot of meat in this book to be digested as you go along.

All in all an outstanding contribution to the telling of a sensitive piece of American history.

5 stars for content and believability.

Alan Holyoak

Gordon W. Prange, et al does a superb job of collecting interview and documentary data to examine the entire aspects of the attack (he examines the inquiries in a later book) from American and Japanese perspectives. This is the single most detailed, objective and comprehensive account of the attack on Pearl Harbor ever written. The U.S. military did believe an attack was coming but assumed it would be only in the Phillipines and Southeast Asia. The assumption was made that Japan could not do both, attack in Asia and strike our fleet. We were wrong to assume and Japan made us pay a severe penalty but not one nearly so severe as it could have been, especially as our carriers were at sea and the sub base and fuel farm were unhit. History now shows it is more vital to hit bases than ships. If Pearl Harbor itself had been more damaged, the Pacific Fleet would have had to relocate back to the West Coast and being short of tankers, would have been unable to intervene in any decisive way for some months. As it was, with the base intact, our carriers were able to strike back and within six months won a miracle victory at Midway. For a complementary study, I would recommend Cpt. Homer N. Wallin's, Pearl Harbor, Why? How? Fleet Salvage and Appraisal especially for the details of the huge salvage effort.

At Dawn We Slept is probably the best book yet written or likely to written on this always compelling subject. I've read most of John Toland's pacific theater histories and "The Pacific War" by John Costello and Samuel Elliot Morrison's quite good "History of United States Naval Operations in World War II : The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942" and Gordon Prange's work is quite simply the best.

Being in a unique position to really acquire first hand information from the participants and yet retain objectivity in viewing a subject that always arouses passion, Gordon Prange dissects and reveals the path to the war and to the attack on Pearl. While not directly addressing the revisionist view on Roosevelt's "knowledge" of the attack, he easily displays the implausibility of such a view.

The level of detail that he brings to this work reveals his clear orientation as an academic resident, but don't let that deter you from getting this book. It is accessible to anyone with an interest in the subject and the one book that I can wholeheartedly recommend on a complex subject that is faithful to the history and to the reader.

I cannot see how any other writer can approach this subject with out stepping though Gordon Prange's tracks.

This book is the definite account of the japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and is especially good on providing us with the Japanese point of view. However, the book is not without its flaws. The authors have a point of view - and slant the material in that direction. They demolish the idea that FDR " betrayed" anyone or knew beforehand of the Japanese attack. However, they place too much blame on Kimmel and Short and not enough on FDR and the military men in Washington. Finally, the book could have been better edited and the prose tightened-up therebye dropping the wieght of the book to under five pounds.

How to Transcend the Present and Record the Past for the Future Or, Prange's Present toPosterity Seth Hieronymus History of PearlHarbor Abroad November 22, 1997 Principia College, Elsah, IL, 62028 At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, by Gordon W. Prange, manages to break new ground in history writing. Although the manuscript in this form was authored primarily by two of Prange's ex-students Dr. Donald Goldstein and CWO (USAF Ret.) Katherine V. Dillon, due to Prange's enormous contribution, At Dawn We Slept is truly his tale. Prange endeavored to write the most complete work on the subject extant, an inside look from both the Japanese and American points of view. In his own words, "I [Prange's italics] am the only individual who has come to grips with the entire Pearl Harbor problem and conducted extensive research and interviews on both sides of the Pacific." Prange, through his research and his use of both the Japanese and American perspectives, has succeeded brilliantly in writing this unbiased look at Japanese / American relations leading up to, and immediately following the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. Prange's story starts in Japan, New Year's Day, 1941, with its 2601st birthday, and ends in 1946, with the conclusion of the Joint Congressional Committee Investigation into the attack at Pearl Harbor. , , Even though At Dawn We Slept contains several historical references outside this timeframe; for instance, Commodore Mathew Perry's expedition in 1895 that normalized Japanese-American relations, they serve mainly as background information that support the main story. Similarly, although the book briefly mentions the Atlantic theatre and events in Washington, it does not try to expand its focus beyond its original purpose, the Pacific, from Japan to Pearl Harbor. What makes this book great are not the dry facts about who was involved, and where or when it happened, but rather how it tells the events. It is arranged much like two trains, one Japanese and one American, that stop every so often to trade passengers, but inexorably race on to a truculent collision on December 7, 1941, at Pearl Harbor. The language of the book lets the reader look through the eyes of the characters, lets him feel their emotions, and gives him a first-hand look at the events. For instance, speaking of Japanese ships, "[Abukuma] led nine of the newest and best destroyers under the Rising Sun flag... Nagumo's trouble-shooters... could spring to battle at a moment's notice," and later: On Nagumo's shoulders rested a responsibility and a burden such as few commanders had ever borne in the history of naval warfare. The venture ripped out all the pages of Japanese naval tradition, violated their basic rules of strategy, and tossed into the classified waste the plans which Japan had long formulated to fight the U. S. Navy. , The word pictures that At Dawn We Slept paint personalize the history, and make it more accessible and enjoyable. Furthermore, the pictures, although rather sparse, give a visual perspective that speaks out from the past, for instance Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's stately demeanor and Lt. Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki's smug confidence. As with any historical work, research forms its backbone and determines its credibility. The contribution of Prange's own history should not be forgotten, because his background determines the skills and opportunities that he brought to the investigation. Born in Iowa, on July 16, 1910, Prange taught history at the University of Maryland from 1937 to 1980, when he died. Beyond that, he was Douglas MacArthur's chief historian from 1946 to 1951, and had a chance to talk to the participants first-hand. How often are people in the right places at the right times that they are able to record the events of history for posterity? Prange was. Because he spent 37 years of his life gathering first- hand, eye-witness accounts for this book, Prange forces us not only to trust him, but to actually relive the events, as they happened. His hundreds of interviews consisted of individuals who actually participated in the history, from the lowest ranks of the military to the highest, and many of the civilians. The sheer magnitude of his work is an essential element in this book's appeal. For example, Prange met with Commander Minoru Genda -- the main author of the Japanese attack -- a total of 72 times, and Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, the flight leader, 50 times. , Prange's original plan was to write a book solely from the Japanese perspective. Consequently, a bias could have been introduced as Prange did not interview many of the American participants until much later. In one case, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt. General Walter C. Short, whom the Inquiry Board found partially responsible for the attack, died on September 3, 1949, before Prange even had a chance to interrogate him. However, the magnitude of Prange's research and interviews enabled him to find the germane facts in people's otherwise embellished tellings. In this way, Prange minimized distortion of the actual events, and thereby minimized any bias introduced. This is not to say the book falls short of placing both blame and praise for the attack. Of Short, and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, "Both Kimmel and Short exercised poor judgment in this crisis." And about Genda, and Commander Mitsuo Fuchida: From the moment Genda explained his assignment, Fuchida brought a new dimension to the Pearl Harbor picture. Henceforth he and Genda formed a unique team - Genda the creative genius supplying the original ideas, Fuchida the aggressive activist hammering them into reality. At Dawn We Slept essentially becomes Prange's thesis about the how historical events leading up to Pearl Harbor occurred - on both sides of the Atlantic. However, the book does more: It goes beyond dates and places, and instead brings the history alive. This book, in doing so, becomes a model for its contemporaries and a benchmark for the future. End Notes Gaddis Smith, "Remembering Pearl Harbor," The New York Times Book Review 29 November 1981: 3. Donald Goldstein, Telephone Interview, November 20, 1997. Goldstein Interview. Gordon W. Prange, Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon, ed. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York: Penguin, 1991) 814. Prange 3. Prange 722. Prange 842. Prange 392. Prange 395. Prange 1st Picture Set. Prange Cover. Goldstein Interview. Prange 821-825. Prange 827. Prange 829. Prange 728-729. Prange 410. END

Just as Cornelius Ryan's three major works about World War II (The Longest Day, The Last Battle, and A Bridge Too Far) focus on the last 11 months of the conflict in Europe, the late Gordon W. Prange and his collaborators Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon zeroed in on the Pearl Harbor saga and its aftermath. No less than five major books by Prange and Co. deal with the series of events that occurred before, during, and after. Of these, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor is the first and most important volume.

At Dawn We Slept covers nearly the entire 12-month period leading up to the "day of infamy" that marked America's entry into World War II. It provides amazing insights into both the Japanese and American mindsets, and, most important, explodes the revisionists' myth that Japan's attack succeeded because President Franklin D. Roosevelt withheld critical information from Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii.

Prange researched the Pearl Harbor affair for 37 years until his death in 1980, and his posthumous books paint a tragic picture of two great Pacific nations reluctantly yet inexorably moving in a collision course. Japan doesn't necessarily hate the United States, yet since the 1920s sees it as its main rival for supremacy in the Pacific. Japan's war in China causes the rift between it and America to grow, and U.S. economic sanctions intended to end Japanese aggression against its neighbors have exactly the opposite effect on the military-dominated government in Tokyo. What once was just an abstract idea in Japan's military academies -- a transoceanic war with Britain and America -- slowly but surely comes closer to reality after Tokyo joins the Axis in 1940. It becomes inevitable after Japan moves troops into French Indochina as a precursor to Japan's strike to conquer the resource-rich Southern area (the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Singapore, and the U.S.-controlled Philippine Islands).

On the Japanese side, the book shows the intense planning and preparation for the attack. Although not flawless (the midget submarines were rather superfluous and almost gave the attack away), it was brilliant. Driven by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's steely determination, a powerful strike force is gathered, pilots are painstakingly trained, and every resource - from innovations in ordnance (adapting torpedoes to run in very shallow waters) to a spy network on Oahu - is devoted to make the strike more effective.

At Dawn We Slept also paints a sobering picture of American complacency, ignorance, and even incompetence during the months before the attack. Readers will learn, for instance, that Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short never truly understood his mission, which was to defend the Pacific Fleet when it was in port. Short failed to grasp the danger of aerial attack, focusing instead on an imaginary threat from Hawaii's 125,000 Japanese-Americans. (This mistaken notion actually caused more loss of American airpower rather than preventing it; Short ordered all planes to be lined up in the middle of their air bases so they could be more easily guarded. This just made it easier for Japanese planes to destroy or disable most of the Hawaiian Air Force.)

The Navy fares no better in its pre-Pearl Harbor activities, either. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel wasn't a meek and incompetent officer, and he did have an offensive-minded posture. Nevertheless, his failure to fully coordinate intelligence gathering, patrols, or even contingency plans with Short were factors which contributed to the success of the Japanese attack.

The book devotes much attention to the twists and turns that made December 7th, 1941 such a momentous day. As someone once said, it's all in the small details. Who knew just what impact would the typing speed of a Japanese diplomat would have on the course of history? What would have happened if Adm. Kimmel had been immediately notified of the sinking of an unknown sub in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor? What if Adm. Nagumo had launched a third wave that day?

While there have been many books written on the story of Pearl Harbor, this is by far one of the most detailed accounts. The book portrays fair and accurate detail from all sides and all perspectives. Gordon Prange's analysis from pre-attack to aftermath is thorough and complete, leaving the reader with much to comtemplate and digest. I certainly found the book to be presented in an objective and analytic manner. The writing style is rather wordy and scattered; however, the content more than compensates for the lack of quality editing skills. If you are an avid war buff or have a personal interest in Pearl Harbour, you will want to read this book. It is, however, quite lengthy and thought-provoking; therefore, the type of book one wants to peruse and digest slowly.

My father was stationed at Camp Malakole on Barber's Point when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941. We were walking to our car to drive to the Camp for a dedication of the Chapel when we saw planes flying low over Waikiki, and a Navy wife who lived in an apt. over the garage ran out to tell us the Japanese were attacking Pearl Harbor. Dad ran back into the house to get his gun, told Mother where his Will and important papers were, told her to cover the windows,fill the tub with water, listen to the radio, and to "get the hell inside" the house; He'd contact us when he could. It was three days later before Mother heard from him. Schools were closed, we carried gas masks, we had a bomb shelter built in the back yard, we lived in a house with crated furniture until our evacuation the following April.

Gordon Prange captures the unbelievable horror of those days, and carefully details the events leading up to the surprise attack--intentionally planned by the Japanese for a Sunday morning after servicemen and women had returned to base to "sleep off" their weekend binges. How warnings from President Roosevelt via Cable and Western Union were delayed and finally delivered by a messenger on a bicycle from Honolulu--hours after the attack started.

To read his book is to relive that period, which so vividly remains in the minds of anyone who was on Oahu that Sunday. To recall, every Dec. 7, my Dad driving our family out to see the destruction at Pearl and Hickham Field weeks later is sobering.

This is a long book, but so worth the read. You know the ending, so read it slowly. And then think about Korea, Viet Nam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and several mini-conflicts since 1945. Is WAR the normal condition rather than PEACE?

I highly recommend this book.

I. Subject and Thesis

At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor attempts to give the reader, through 800 pages of exhaustive research, an objective view of the forces leading up to, what happened at, and the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. Indeed, this book is the culmination of thirty years of work by its primary author, Gordon W. Prange, and the dedication of two of his students, Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon. This book not only gives a full and unflinching look at what happened on the American side of the equation, but goes to great length to cover the concurrent events on the opposite side of the Pacific.

While the authors state no direct thesis (they, instead, hope to "raise more question than provide answers" (xiii)) they certainly do draw some pointed conclusions. There is no shortage of scapegoats to be had at Pearl Harbor, blame can be laid everywhere from Washington to the Hawaiian department. Special care is given by the authors to refute the dubious claims of Pearl Harbor's revisionist historians. According to the authors, the revisionist school of thought on Pearl Harbor is one that wishes to look at the incident in a completely political sense, drag FDR's name through the mud, and rely on secondary and tertiary sources and baseless assumptions.

The significance of this book is threefold: first, it offers a substaintial body of evidence with which to refute revisionist historians' claims; second, this account is significant in that it devotes a substantial portion to the Japanese role in this event due to Prange's personal history with Japan; third, it is a well-founded military history in its own right that deserves study. From top to bottom, this book covers every aspect of December 7th, 1941 in careful detail.

II. Summary

This book was written through the tireless research of Gordon Prange that led to a manuscript consisting of thousands of pages! Goldstein and Dillion edited the manuscript down to its present form of about 800 pages. The authors split this work into three main subdivisions: prelude, action and aftermath. Each of these divisions are works in and of themselves, and could stand as separate volumes.

The first of these sections, prelude, begins with introducing the inevitiability of the U.S./Japanese war. The U.S. Navy, particularly the fleet that was moved to Pearl Harbor, stood in the way of Japan's own manifest destiny to conquer the lands of the South Pacific. The Japanese had a name for this situation, Taiheiyo-no-gan or Cancer of the Pacific.

One is now introduced to the commander in chief of Japan's combined fleet, Isoroku Yamamoto. It was Yamamoto's duty to carry out for his country her desire to rule the Pacific. Yamamoto never believed that Japan could win a sustained war with the U.S., but if they could knock out the strength of the U.S. fleet in one stroke the balance of power in the Pacific would shift. Yamamoto began to formulate a plan for attacking the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor and decided to send the plan to the rest of the Japanese Naval brass to see if his idea had some merit. This is where Prange brings the reader to whom he feels is the true genius behind the strategies of the Pearl Harbor attack. Indeed, Commander Minuru Genda may have been the most brilliant of any officer, Japanese or American, that took part in the Pacific Campaign. It was Genda that drew up the first plan for Yamamoto's idea.

As the section progresses, one is introduced to the American counterparts of the Japanese: Kimmel, the commander of the U.S. Pacific fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor, and Short, the commander of the army base charged with the protection of Oahu. If one were to look at the training the Japanese troops went through in preparation for Pearl Harbor under the direction of Genda, Fuchido, and Nagumo, and the training that took place under Kimmel and Short (knowing, as they did, that tensions between the U.S. and Japanese were as high as they possibly could be short of a war declaration) one would find the latter severely lacking. In fact, this becomes a common theme through the book. When one looks at any aspect of American preparation for the even with Japanese preparation for the aforementioned event, one finds the Americans lacking in every category.

The authors best demonstrate this salient point in the chapters in which they cover Japanese espionage and American counter-espionage tactics. The Japanese used their consulate office in Honolulu as a base for their spying on Oahu, specifically U.S. ship positions and defensive capabilities in Pearl Harbor. This effort by the Japanese succeeded wonderfully; in fact, they rarely even had to break the law to do their spy work. On the American side there is a complete mishandling of the information they do have. Kimmel and Short repeatedly had intercepts from Honolulu to Tokyo that were decoded using the Magic machine withheld from them. Whoever is responsible for the withholding of these intercepts is at least partly to blame for the Pearl Harbor attacks.

One might ask, after reading the first section of this book, why the U.S. continually left itself unprepared for the Pearl Harbor strike. In fact, in the Martin-Bellinger and Farthing reports U.S. war planners have uncanny accuracy in assessing how the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor. But, both of these reports have the fatal flaw of the American reports of the time: they are predicated on the belief that war would be declared before the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor. Along with this, no American actually believed the Japanese would be foolish enough to attack an American territory and certainly not "the most impregnable fortress in the world."

The second section, Action, details the events from the acceptance of Yamamoto's plan to the decision of Nagumo not to make a 2nd fatal strike at Pearl Harbor. In preparation for the attack it is prudent to note that the Japanese had to devise a new torpedo, one that could be dropped in a shallow depth of water. By the time of the attack, the Japanese, through their extensive research and training, were able to achieve an 82% success rate with their shallow water torpedoes.

The attack on Pearl Harbor goes off without a hitch. Taking the Northern route, the Japanese fleet is undetected by American patrols, and is able to launch its airborne assault with complete surprise. The attack is a complete success with Japan suffering minimal casualties, while the U.S. lost 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 4 auxiliary craft. To add to that, the Hawaiian Air Force lost 4 B-17s, 12 B-18s, 2 A-20s, 32 P-40s, 20 P-36s, 4 P-24s, 2 OA-9s, and 1 O-49. The goal of the Japanese mission was to halt the U.S. Pacific Fleet so that it (the Japanese Fleet) could achieve the goals of its Southern Operations without hindrance. Pearl Harbor was indeed a success, but could it have been an even greater one? That is the question the authors pose in chapter 65, "The Chance of a Lifetime." To that question, one can only answer yes. Nagumo was urged by the two men most responsible for the success at Pearl Harbor, Genda and Fuchida, to scout for the U.S. carriers and then attack again. It was Nagumo's decision to bring the fleet back to Japan, and the authors assert that it was the first error that the Japanese make in the entire Pacific conflict. The American defense forces at Oahu were suffering from shock and bewilderment after Fuchida's savage first attack, and they were clearly vulnerable to a second attack. The second attack would have taken out the exposed oil reserves at Oahu, which would have put a huge crimp in the American Pacific Fleet's ability to mount any form of counter offensive against the Japanese.

In the last section, Aftermath, the authors deal with the actions taken after the attack. It starts with Nagumo taking the task force back to Japan. Due to another breakdown in the intelligence sharing between the U.S. Army and Navy, American pilots and ships begin to search for the Japanese Fleet to the south rather than the north where they have gone. By the time U.S. planes begin to scan the Northern sector, the Imperial Fleet is already well on its way back to the land of Nippon. En route to Tokyo the fleet is ordered to take Midway and does so. The First Air Fleet is welcomed back in Japan to great fanfare and the men aboard are celebrated as heroes.

The story now takes the unenviable task on of assigning the blame to the disaster that was the U.S. story of Pearl Harbor. Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, goes to Oahu to see how the forces there could be so surprised. He concludes that neither the Army nor the Navy were on alert for an air attack, and that an investigation must follow to see if (a) there was error in judgment that contributed to the attack and (b) if there was dereliction of duty prior to the attack.

The Roberts Commission's report put most of the blame for the attack on Kimmel and Short, citing dereliction of duty and errors in judgment on both men's part. The report, as the authors note, is a bit too harsh. It came out too near the events of 7 December 1941 to have let a proper historical perspective sink in. Needless to say, the Robert's Commission report would not be enough for the American people, more investigations would have to follow.

Kimmel and Short did eventually get their day in court, and it did not go so well for them as they had thought it would. While the blame for Pearl Harbor could not be squarely placed on their shoulder, it would not be moved to Washington's either. No matter what information was withheld from Kimmel and Short (and there certainly was some of it withheld) they both knew that an attack from Japan could come at any time, and they were both caught unawares when the attack did come.

As the authors conclude this section, they surmise that there was blame to be placed everywhere on the American side. Most of all to blame is Short. He never did truly understand his mission. His mission was to protect the fleet and not vice versa. Bloch, too, is at fault here. It was his duty to make sure the Navy in Pearl Harbor cooperated with the Army. One of the major problems of Pearl Harbor was that the Army and Navy were never on the same page. Of Kimmle's failures, the one that the authors most cite is that he never sent out long range reconnaissance from Oahu during the week preceding the attack. Washington does not escape blame either. Keeping from Hawaiian commanders the "bomb plot" messages from the consulate was a grievous error. As Prange states, "The fact that Washington did not evaluate this information at its real worth is inexcusable" (735). In placing the blame throughout the American side the authors give a fair conclusion to Pearl Harbor.

Professor Gordon Prenge became a specialist on the Pearl Harbor attack. As a child survivor of the attack, I naturally became interested in what I'd lived through, and this is the most comprehensive and reliable book on the subject.

After World War II, Professor Prenge established contacts with the surviving principals on both the American and Japanese involved with the attack, and his book reflects the depth with which he'd conducted the research.

The book covers both the meticulous detail with which the Japanese developed their attack plan, and the tragic consequences those on Oahu reaped from the defensive preparations. Many of the later consipracy theories are effectively debunked in the details Prenge presents. (An appendix addresses some of the revisionist claims that have emerged over the years.)

The book is divided into three parts. The first is the prelude to the attack. The second, the attack itself. The final third of the book consists of Congressional hearings to assign blame as to what went wrong. Of the three sections, mrom my perspective, this is the least interesting.

Highly recommended for those who want a comprehensive coverage of the attack.

Review written on the 67th anniversary of the atteck.