The widely hailed behind-the-scenes history of the Cold War endgame--a book that brilliantly brings to life the private conversations and secret understandings that changed history. "A highly fluent narrative with the heft and density of history and the emotional resonance of fiction."--New York Times.
--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
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Book Description
Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
This revelatory, startling and important book is a rewriting of the history of the Cold War's endgame. The authors show that George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev maintained an unusually close, confidential relationship, beginning with their shipboard meeting in Malta in December 1989 and extending through 1991. Relying on secret understandings reached in consultation with only their very closest advisers, the two leaders developed what they dubbed a "partnership" that helped transform East-West rivalry into cooperation. Bush, by this account, coaxed the Soviet Union to end the Cold War by convincing Gorbachev that the West would not exploit its vulnerability. Beschloss ( Kennedy and Roosevelt ) and Time foreign affairs correspondent Talbott ( Deadly Gambits ) disclose that Bush cajoled Gorbachev to agree to a reunified Germany's membership in NATO; that former Secretary of State James Baker frantically attempted to warn Gorbachev of the right-wing coup against him. The authors also reveal details of the unprecedented collaboration between Moscow and Washington in the Persian Gulf war, by which Soviet emissaries quietly conveyed Baker's demands to the Iraqi regime. When Russian troops massacred Baltic protesters in Riga and Vilnius, Bush wrote Gorbachev a private letter threatening to cut off all economic assistance, the authors maintain. This highly personal statecraft had its downside for both leaders, assert the authors: Gorbachev, basking in Bush's support, adopted a complacent attitude toward his rival Boris Yeltsin and grossly underestimated the Soviet people's discontent. And Bush was so intent on shoring up Gorbachev that he was slow to perceive that by mid-1991 the Soviet leader was largely a spent force. Critics no doubt will attack this expose since its authors, while using dozens of named sources, also use a raft of unnamed high-level informants from Washington, Moscow and Europe. Their research notes and interview records are under time-seal at the Williams College library in Massachusetts for use by future scholars.
Copyright 1993 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Copyright 1993 Reed Business Information, Inc.
From Library Journal
Authors separately of several books on foreign affairs, journalists Beschloss and Talbott have collaborated on a fascinating insider's account of the various negotiations between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev from 1989 to 1991. At the outset, the authors indicate that they will not reveal many of their sources, although they have placed their notes under time seal at the Williams College Library for the use of future scholars. Thus, in the fashion of All the President's Men ( LJ 5/15/74), the book offers remarkable accounts of meetings and conversations--at which sometimes only Bush, Gorbachev, and the interpreters were in attendance--with no sources cited; the reader must simply trust the veracity of the authors. Of particular interest is their account of how the Bush administration came to grips with Gorbachev's vastly different style, seeking to work with him while not appearing soft on communism. For general collections.
- Ed Goedeken, Iowa State Univ., Ames
Copyright 1993 Reed Business Information, Inc.
- Ed Goedeken, Iowa State Univ., Ames
Copyright 1993 Reed Business Information, Inc.
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
The end of the Soviet Union, and the Cold War,
By
This review is from: At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Paperback)
This is an interesting, and surprising book. I was expecting a critique of the first Bush presidency's foreign policy, given author Talbott's credentials (he's a lifelong friend of Clinton and served as Deputy Secretary of State under him). Instead, it's a detailed recounting of the diplomatic negotiations during the last three years of the Soviet Union, culminating with Gorbachev's dissolution of the U.S.S.R.The book focuses, to a large extent, on the relationships between the men (and women) on both sides, and their negotiations. It spends a good deal of time on the positions they take, the ideals they followed, and the tactics they tried. There is detailed discussion of the personalities of the various men involved, the issues they had to deal with domestically, and the things they feared the other side might do. I have to say I was impressed with the way the book was structured, and with the opinions it expressed. Academics here in the U.S.A. tended, at the time, to be exasperatingly infatuated with Gorbachev, and blind to his shortcomings. The authors are smart enough not to fall into these traps, and are refreshingly perceptive of the last General Secretary and his personality quirks, both positive and negative. Even more surprising, given that Talbott is so close to Bill Clinton, the assessment of the elder George Bush is pretty fair, too. The authors spend a good deal of time praising his attitude and intelligence, and while they do criticize some of his decisions and maneuvers, they also praise many of the things he did. The book is written in the Woodward style, with extensive interviews with people who participated in the various discussions and negotiations. Those interviews are sealed for a serious length of time, and in the meanwhile we have to take the authors at their word. There are extensive discussions of the various negotiations, and they're fascinating. I enjoyed this book a great deal, but thought that it was a bit focused on the narrow subject, and somewhat isolated in narrative as a result.
5 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Post-Cold War Foreign Policy,
By
This review is from: At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Hardcover)
Beschloss and Talbott spin a tremendously absorbing narrative about the collapse of communism. They describe in detail the summits, conversations and debates that took place between Gorbachev and his foreign minister on one side and George Bush on the other. Their main focus is the foreign policy of the Bush administration. Their prose flows well, their anecdotes are interesting their characters are engaging. They only rarely fall into the trap of overly-journalistic prose. Their description of George Bush and his role is a bit under-stated; they focus more on George Schlutz and James Baker. The book is surprisingly straightfoward concerning the opionions of the power elite and their concerns about creating a "culture of compliance." The best part in the book describes the Malta Summit of '89, where Bush and Gorbachev meet on a ship off the Island of Malta amidst a violent storm. This book, while good, misses a couple of crucial areas of the Cold War. There is not a single reference to formerly-communist Yugoslavia, a country whose war in the early 1990's was both bloody and protracted. References to Gorbachev's frustration with the World Bank and the GATT/WTO deserve better examination. The book is at its best describing the spirited jargon and one-liners of the wonks, politicos and statesmen.
2 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
2.0 out of 5 stars
A predictable mainstream approach about the end of the Cold War!,
This review is from: At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Paperback)
Maybe it's because I prefer a revisionist analysis of history in general and specifically when it comes to international relations that I felt this book had some significant shortcomings.Summary of book and thesis The main thesis of the authors is that the Cold War came to a (almost entirely) peaceful end because the world was fortunate to have two experienced, cautious, and most of all open minded leaders in both the USA and the Soviet Union during the last phase of the Cold War. This last phase was the crucial years between 1988-1991. Bush and Gorbachev were also of a somewhat similar mindset (and perhaps character) so that they could fairly easily work together. Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is the one where readers are told that in December 1987 when Gorbachev was visiting the USA (and finalizing the INF Treaty) Bush, then as Vice-President, told him to take a ride in his limo. He then told the driver to slow down, so that he could have more intimate time with the Soviet leader. Bush told him that he believed in the importance of Glasnost and Perestroika, and that Gorbachev could count on him, supporting Gorbachev's programs, in the future, since he was sure that he would be the next President of the USA. This candid and unexpected positive moment impressed Gorbachev and he told his trusted aids and advisors back in the S.U. about Bush's "pledge" to support him and his policies in the future, esp. once he'd be President. It was this special "pledge" that kept Gorbachev "afloat" in times of crisis in the S.U. (of which there were certainly many to come). But there was the (great) "pausa" meaning pause in Russian, which refers to the fact that once Bush became US President in Jan. 1989 he continued with the business as usual policies toward the Soviets for 1 ½ years before he would actually become more accommodating and open towards Gorbachev and the S.U. Although Bush had described the necessity of this pause to Gorbachev back in Dec. 1987 in the limo, with references to political pressure from the right in the US, meaning that his opponents would gladly try to depict him as soft and thus weak on communism if they could. Bush had thus told him he would have to wait sometime during which he would use the usual, direct, and apparently hard language towards the Soviets including Gorbachev in order to placate the right wing of his party and any democratic opposition. This pause, however, caused even Gorbachev at times get close to losing faith in Bush. Not without reason, Gorbachev would sometimes think that maybe Bush had just tied to fool him back in Dec. 1987. It was perhaps the greatest strain and test for their relationship. But when it finally came to the Malta meeting in May 1989, amid a severe storm when they met secretly on board a Soviet ship, Gorbachev was reassured of Bush's sincerity. Perhaps, this is where the authors overestimate the impact of Bush on Gorbachev! Because they increasingly argued just how important Bush's support was for Gorbachev, this is cetainly true, to whatever extent is of course always debatable, but even more important must have been the fact that Gorbachev regardless of Bush or any other Western leader had to make sure that his policies would succeed in the S.U. Without the success of Perestroika - the restructuring of the Soviet economy along more capitalistic means- everything else would be lost (as it turned out to be). According to the book, Bush Sr. and Gorbachev were rather compatible persons and were thus able to quickly find a stable working relationship that even led to a type of friendship between them. This is certainly some surprising information, although at times one does get the impression that the word friendship is perhaps not really right. Especially, when the authors narrate how at different occasions both Bush and Gorbachev would tell their aids joyfully "I really hit him over the head with that one"! These are not exactly phrases friends would use in a happy tone when talking about each other. Nonetheless, the working or professional relationship that Bush and Gorbachev had was a very solid and good one. The book, for instance, points out briefly how Gorbachev had a rather difficult time establishing a good relationship with Reagan, since Reagan had the habit of resorting to old platitudes about the Soviet Union and its government, but perhaps this was more due to Reagan's Alzheimer disease that made him easily forget things. The Negative Aspects At any rate the narration is well done, and keeps the reader engaged. But it should be mentioned that the style is anything but academic or theoretical. This is ever so the work of two journalists and once active policy advisors. Thus, there is no mentioning of any I.R. theories, of even the most basic aspects of power politics (realism) and traditional diplomatic agendas or concepts. Even when it comes to the national interest of the USA, the authors only sparingly and vaguely tell the reader platitudes, for example, that the Bush Administration wanted to bring democracy and capitalism to the Soviet Union or was trying to avoid a disaster, esp. if the S.U. should disintegrate, because its huge nuclear arsenal could have been ceased by another former republic or worse an extremist/terrorist group. It is therefore a book that assumes the reader will already have a basic and essential background in terms of the history of the Cold War, and esp. when it comes to USA-S.U. relations. I find that the authors' representation of the US interests, during the end of the Cold War, is far too narrowly and vaguely described. Of course, the Bush Administration wanted to make sure, that relations between the USA and S.U. would not escalate into a worst-case scenario, where Gorbachev would be ousted and hardliners in Moscow would take his place and then reverse Perestroika and Glasnost, with the result that the old traditional and rather confrontational relationship would be reestablished. And it was also fairly clear that the USA would want and demand (esp. as the S.U. was in a severe crisis toward the end of the 1980s and early 1990s) that a reunified Germany would remain in NATO. Especially, with the benefit of hindsight one can see that authors painted a far too rosy picture of US intentions and goals. Apart from the inevitable and (mostly) rhetorical U.S. position on democracy and capitalistic market economy, which was obviously constantly demanded from the Soviets and Gorbachev, the events of primarily 9/11 have shown just how many ulterior motives Washington has. This becomes glaringly evident when the diplomatic bargaining about giving Easter Europe independence from Moscow and the terminating the Warsaw Pact are considered. Perhaps the only or at least the main reason why Gorbachev chose to go along with this risky gamble was because Bush reassured him that neither the USA nor the West would take advantage of an Easter Europe that was no longer part of the Warsaw Pact. It was definitely risky for Gorbachev because, among other things, his opponents in Moscow would certainly blame him for massively selling out to the USA and the West by giving away what the Soviets had so desperately fought for during the entire 2nd World War, which was having secure borders via buffer states, and that meant Easter Europe under Soviet control. The most glaring and blatant example of a violation of Gorbachev's trust came undoubtedly in 1994 when the USA pushed for the eastward expansion of NATO into even former Soviet republics (Poland, Hungary, Czech republic joined NATO in 1997). This was a clear violation of the promises that Bush had given Gorbachev, according to several sources there was also a document to the effect the USA and the West would not move NATO into former Soviet republics that both parties signed. This flouting and reneging is to blame that Russia to this day is suspicious of the West and esp. the USA and NATO with regard to its security. It is in this sense that I believe the authors adopted a far too typical and cozy American attitude toward Washington's intentions, giving us the moralistic cliché of the good guy (USA) wanting to change an evil world ( the S.U. & communism until Gorbachev changed Soviet foreign policy). Here more "self" criticism and thus a more critical attitude and analysis would really have brought a refreshing style into the book. But instead, everything, including every major myth and cliché of apparently benign US intentions, in terms of US foreign policy, is simply taken for granted by the authors. This is not only quite convenient since they are American but also naïve! Another problem is that the narrative style of the authors is heavily based on interviews between the major political actors, which means that the whole story is derived from such talks with the protagonists. This is on the one hand good, since those actors were obviously important in what they did, but at the same time leaves out what the conceptual strategy of Washington really was. For all the multitudes of interviews that the authors conducted there is a conspicuous lack of any such interviews with say high ranking Pentagon official, or officials from the intelligence agencies, and of course there is no interview with Bush himself of whether or not he tried to take advantage of the Soviet weakness during this crucial juncture that ended not only the Cold War but also the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and Moscow's satellite empire in Eastern Europe. From my own research (being a professor of I.R.) I've come across several very authentic sources that claim that the cooperation between the Soviet intelligence community (KGB, ect.) and the USA's (CIA, ect.) was very close, and this was all the more so the case during the REAGAN... Read more ›
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