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At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War

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This is an interesting, and surprising book. I was expecting a critique of the first Bush presidency's foreign policy, given author Talbott's credentials (he's a lifelong friend of Clinton and served as Deputy Secretary of State under him). Instead, it's a detailed recounting of the diplomatic negotiations during the last three years of the Soviet Union, culminating with Gorbachev's dissolution of the U.S.S.R.

The book focuses, to a large extent, on the relationships between the men (and women) on both sides, and their negotiations. It spends a good deal of time on the positions they take, the ideals they followed, and the tactics they tried. There is detailed discussion of the personalities of the various men involved, the issues they had to deal with domestically, and the things they feared the other side might do. I have to say I was impressed with the way the book was structured, and with the opinions it expressed. Academics here in the U.S.A. tended, at the time, to be exasperatingly infatuated with Gorbachev, and blind to his shortcomings. The authors are smart enough not to fall into these traps, and are refreshingly perceptive of the last General Secretary and his personality quirks, both positive and negative. Even more surprising, given that Talbott is so close to Bill Clinton, the assessment of the elder George Bush is pretty fair, too. The authors spend a good deal of time praising his attitude and intelligence, and while they do criticize some of his decisions and maneuvers, they also praise many of the things he did.

The book is written in the Woodward style, with extensive interviews with people who participated in the various discussions and negotiations. Those interviews are sealed for a serious length of time, and in the meanwhile we have to take the authors at their word. There are extensive discussions of the various negotiations, and they're fascinating. I enjoyed this book a great deal, but thought that it was a bit focused on the narrow subject, and somewhat isolated in narrative as a result.

Beschloss and Talbott spin a tremendously absorbing narrative about the collapse of communism. They describe in detail the summits, conversations and debates that took place between Gorbachev and his foreign minister on one side and George Bush on the other. Their main focus is the foreign policy of the Bush administration. Their prose flows well, their anecdotes are interesting their characters are engaging. They only rarely fall into the trap of overly-journalistic prose. Their description of George Bush and his role is a bit under-stated; they focus more on George Schlutz and James Baker. The book is surprisingly straightfoward concerning the opionions of the power elite and their concerns about creating a "culture of compliance." The best part in the book describes the Malta Summit of '89, where Bush and Gorbachev meet on a ship off the Island of Malta amidst a violent storm. This book, while good, misses a couple of crucial areas of the Cold War. There is not a single reference to formerly-communist Yugoslavia, a country whose war in the early 1990's was both bloody and protracted. References to Gorbachev's frustration with the World Bank and the GATT/WTO deserve better examination. The book is at its best describing the spirited jargon and one-liners of the wonks, politicos and statesmen.

Maybe it's because I prefer a revisionist analysis of history in general and specifically when it comes to international relations that I felt this book had some significant shortcomings.

Summary of book and thesis

The main thesis of the authors is that the Cold War came to a (almost entirely) peaceful end because the world was fortunate to have two experienced, cautious, and most of all open minded leaders in both the USA and the Soviet Union during the last phase of the Cold War. This last phase was the crucial years between 1988-1991. Bush and Gorbachev were also of a somewhat similar mindset (and perhaps character) so that they could fairly easily work together. Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is the one where readers are told that in December 1987 when Gorbachev was visiting the USA (and finalizing the INF Treaty) Bush, then as Vice-President, told him to take a ride in his limo. He then told the driver to slow down, so that he could have more intimate time with the Soviet leader. Bush told him that he believed in the importance of Glasnost and Perestroika, and that Gorbachev could count on him, supporting Gorbachev's programs, in the future, since he was sure that he would be the next President of the USA. This candid and unexpected positive moment impressed Gorbachev and he told his trusted aids and advisors back in the S.U. about Bush's "pledge" to support him and his policies in the future, esp. once he'd be President. It was this special "pledge" that kept Gorbachev "afloat" in times of crisis in the S.U. (of which there were certainly many to come). But there was the (great) "pausa" meaning pause in Russian, which refers to the fact that once Bush became US President in Jan. 1989 he continued with the business as usual policies toward the Soviets for 1 ½ years before he would actually become more accommodating and open towards Gorbachev and the S.U. Although Bush had described the necessity of this pause to Gorbachev back in Dec. 1987 in the limo, with references to political pressure from the right in the US, meaning that his opponents would gladly try to depict him as soft and thus weak on communism if they could. Bush had thus told him he would have to wait sometime during which he would use the usual, direct, and apparently hard language towards the Soviets including Gorbachev in order to placate the right wing of his party and any democratic opposition. This pause, however, caused even Gorbachev at times get close to losing faith in Bush. Not without reason, Gorbachev would sometimes think that maybe Bush had just tied to fool him back in Dec. 1987. It was perhaps the greatest strain and test for their relationship. But when it finally came to the Malta meeting in May 1989, amid a severe storm when they met secretly on board a Soviet ship, Gorbachev was reassured of Bush's sincerity. Perhaps, this is where the authors overestimate the impact of Bush on Gorbachev! Because they increasingly argued just how important Bush's support was for Gorbachev, this is cetainly true, to whatever extent is of course always debatable, but even more important must have been the fact that Gorbachev regardless of Bush or any other Western leader had to make sure that his policies would succeed in the S.U. Without the success of Perestroika - the restructuring of the Soviet economy along more capitalistic means- everything else would be lost (as it turned out to be).

According to the book, Bush Sr. and Gorbachev were rather compatible persons and were thus able to quickly find a stable working relationship that even led to a type of friendship between them. This is certainly some surprising information, although at times one does get the impression that the word friendship is perhaps not really right. Especially, when the authors narrate how at different occasions both Bush and Gorbachev would tell their aids joyfully "I really hit him over the head with that one"! These are not exactly phrases friends would use in a happy tone when talking about each other. Nonetheless, the working or professional relationship that Bush and Gorbachev had was a very solid and good one. The book, for instance, points out briefly how Gorbachev had a rather difficult time establishing a good relationship with Reagan, since Reagan had the habit of resorting to old platitudes about the Soviet Union and its government, but perhaps this was more due to Reagan's Alzheimer disease that made him easily forget things.

The Negative Aspects

At any rate the narration is well done, and keeps the reader engaged. But it should be mentioned that the style is anything but academic or theoretical. This is ever so the work of two journalists and once active policy advisors. Thus, there is no mentioning of any I.R. theories, of even the most basic aspects of power politics (realism) and traditional diplomatic agendas or concepts. Even when it comes to the national interest of the USA, the authors only sparingly and vaguely tell the reader platitudes, for example, that the Bush Administration wanted to bring democracy and capitalism to the Soviet Union or was trying to avoid a disaster, esp. if the S.U. should disintegrate, because its huge nuclear arsenal could have been ceased by another former republic or worse an extremist/terrorist group. It is therefore a book that assumes the reader will already have a basic and essential background in terms of the history of the Cold War, and esp. when it comes to USA-S.U. relations.

I find that the authors' representation of the US interests, during the end of the Cold War, is far too narrowly and vaguely described. Of course, the Bush Administration wanted to make sure, that relations between the USA and S.U. would not escalate into a worst-case scenario, where Gorbachev would be ousted and hardliners in Moscow would take his place and then reverse Perestroika and Glasnost, with the result that the old traditional and rather confrontational relationship would be reestablished. And it was also fairly clear that the USA would want and demand (esp. as the S.U. was in a severe crisis toward the end of the 1980s and early 1990s) that a reunified Germany would remain in NATO.

Especially, with the benefit of hindsight one can see that authors painted a far too rosy picture of US intentions and goals. Apart from the inevitable and (mostly) rhetorical U.S. position on democracy and capitalistic market economy, which was obviously constantly demanded from the Soviets and Gorbachev, the events of primarily 9/11 have shown just how many ulterior motives Washington has. This becomes glaringly evident when the diplomatic bargaining about giving Easter Europe independence from Moscow and the terminating the Warsaw Pact are considered. Perhaps the only or at least the main reason why Gorbachev chose to go along with this risky gamble was because Bush reassured him that neither the USA nor the West would take advantage of an Easter Europe that was no longer part of the Warsaw Pact. It was definitely risky for Gorbachev because, among other things, his opponents in Moscow would certainly blame him for massively selling out to the USA and the West by giving away what the Soviets had so desperately fought for during the entire 2nd World War, which was having secure borders via buffer states, and that meant Easter Europe under Soviet control. The most glaring and blatant example of a violation of Gorbachev's trust came undoubtedly in 1994 when the USA pushed for the eastward expansion of NATO into even former Soviet republics (Poland, Hungary, Czech republic joined NATO in 1997). This was a clear violation of the promises that Bush had given Gorbachev, according to several sources there was also a document to the effect the USA and the West would not move NATO into former Soviet republics that both parties signed. This flouting and reneging is to blame that Russia to this day is suspicious of the West and esp. the USA and NATO with regard to its security.

It is in this sense that I believe the authors adopted a far too typical and cozy American attitude toward Washington's intentions, giving us the moralistic cliché of the good guy (USA) wanting to change an evil world ( the S.U. & communism until Gorbachev changed Soviet foreign policy). Here more "self" criticism and thus a more critical attitude and analysis would really have brought a refreshing style into the book. But instead, everything, including every major myth and cliché of apparently benign US intentions, in terms of US foreign policy, is simply taken for granted by the authors. This is not only quite convenient since they are American but also naïve!

Another problem is that the narrative style of the authors is heavily based on interviews between the major political actors, which means that the whole story is derived from such talks with the protagonists. This is on the one hand good, since those actors were obviously important in what they did, but at the same time leaves out what the conceptual strategy of Washington really was. For all the multitudes of interviews that the authors conducted there is a conspicuous lack of any such interviews with say high ranking Pentagon official, or officials from the intelligence agencies, and of course there is no interview with Bush himself of whether or not he tried to take advantage of the Soviet weakness during this crucial juncture that ended not only the Cold War but also the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and Moscow's satellite empire in Eastern Europe.

From my own research (being a professor of I.R.) I've come across several very authentic sources that claim that the cooperation between the Soviet intelligence community (KGB, ect.) and the USA's (CIA, ect.) was very close, and this was all the more so the case during the REAGAN Administration. What this meant was that very high-ranking members of those two intelligence communities would meet secretly on a monthly basis on neutral ground to discuss ways of reducing tension between them. During such meetings, it was typical of the respective agencies to ask what had happened to their agents and spies if they went missing. There would then be a solution in terms of some kind of an exchange. Or they would say to each other aren't we getting to close to each other in some part of the world? (in regard to their respective interests and spheres of influence!) Shouldn't we let things cool down here or there in the world? Milton Bearden, who played a primary role as top CIA agent in coordinating the Afghan resistance to the Soviets during the 1980s and was later CIA station chief in Germany in 1990, admitted to all of this during a conference held in Berlin on the role of intelligence agencies during the Cold War. He also claimed that these secret meetings (at the highest levels) were the reason that the Cold War stayed cold and didn't turn into a hot or real war. And he is not the only source who made such claims. This is another reason why this book has serious shortcomings, namely, that the role of the respective intelligence communities and agencies of the 2 superpowers was almost entirely neglected in "At the Highest Levels". I believe, that without a serious attempt to understand just what roles they actually played, it becomes really uncertain of what transpired during the last phases of the Cold War.

Finally, there's also the vexing question about sources as both authors state that they have for the most part not mentioned them (for understandable reasons of anonymity). This of course forces the reader either to believe in the authenticity of the sources or to disregard them. This take it or leave it choice is obviously unsatisfying, as it gives the reader no chance whatsoever to check on the veracity of the sources. And again I would always urge caution with governmental documents in general, those documents that the authors were able to see, are simply only the ones that the government is willing to let them see; all other potential and possible documents simply remain beyond the reach of most mortals. And even the documents that the authors were allowed to see, have to be examined critically, since who is to say that they are right, truthful, or authentic? When we only look at a case like the Kennedy assassination, we can easily see on how many separate occasions the US government either withheld the truth from its citizens (invoking national security & thus classifying the whole case for decades), or manipulated documents and evidence (Warren Commission, Kennedys corpse, autopsy report, ect.) , downright lied (claiming there was only one assassin, when there were at least 3 separate shots fired in Dallas from 3 different position, thus clearly making it a conspiracy and not the deed of a lone nut assassin), or giving the public half-truths (later on admitting that it was a conspiracy, but never naming the culprits). All of this amounted to a damage control situation that is so prevalent when the government seems to be with their back to the wall. Similar things happened with the Tonkin Gulf Incidence in Aug. 1964, off the coast of North Vietnam that was shamelessly used by President Johnson to claim that the N. Vietnamese Navy had attacked the US Navy in a totally unproved manner. This led directly to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that massively escalated the war in Vietnam. As it turned out not much later, the whole Incident was a big fat lie, perpetrated by the US government (at the highest levels) to have an excuse for a war with Vietnam. One can certainly go on about governmental and executive lies, with Watergate, and CIA operations that were directed against the American people in general (uncovered during 1970s congressional investigations), but I think the point is clear, namely, that governmental sources and documents cannot be taken for granted when it comes to telling the truth or being always right about things. And that is why I always get an uneasy feeling when I hear or read that journalists or researches are apparently proud of the fact that they have looked into tones of governmental documents and used them extensively to draw conclusions.

In closing, I'd like to say that this book has its merits, mostly due to the fact that many interviews were made with many important actors and protagonists in it, but for the mentioned reasons I would always be wary of its cozy and cliché like moralistic approach that it takes toward the Superpower diplomacy toward the end of the Cold War. What also becomes clear is the fact that due to all the narration of what happened when and with whom that this book gives the read almost no clue of the personal opinions and perspectives of its authors. This is perhaps one of the most unfortunate stylistic mistakes or at least shortcomings. The reader is totally left to decide on his own what the authors may have been thinking about the entire era that they are describing in their book. Although there are interjections where they do sometimes tell the reader that they feel that, for instance, Bush was being too easy going with Gorbachev, for the most part, this is clearly the exception and not the rule of the book, which has the effect of leaving the reader mostly clueless of what he is supposed to think. At times, this gives the erroneous impression that this book was only written for policy makers in the field or academic experts. I would have wished a bit more of personal commitment on the authors' part in telling us what they thought about the actors and how they handled things.

Summary

In the end, I find this book to be far too conformist and traditional in its approach. It is basically, what one would expect from such journalists and policy advisors of the establishment, in the sense that the diplomatic history is "safe" and doesn't rock the boat in any way. One could easily imagine, for example, that this type of a book could be made into a History Channel documentary, of say 60-90 minutes duration. This is also evident from the clear delineation of good vs. bad or evil, which appears to be something that American politics simply cannot divorce itself from.