Customer Reviews

At War at Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century

5 star:		(3)
4 star:		(4)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

At War at Sea is worth five stars simply because Spector pays so much attention to the human element of naval warfare over the past century. His accounts of how the major navies trained both officers and enlisted men, what life was actually like at sea during war, and how the various navies were able to adapt to changes in weapons and technology is quite fascinating. No, this isn't another in-depth account of the major naval battles of the century (he barely mentions Pearl Harbor), but that isn't his intent, as he makes clear from the beginning. But if you're interested in what life at sea was really like, this is a good place to start.

Spector clearly has a deep understanding of the technology of naval warfare, but he's no Tom Clancy, bedazzled by the hardware. His principal interest is how the navies adapted (or quite often failed to adapt) to rapid changes in fighting machines, and how the training the men received and the relationships between officers and enlisted ranks affected how they were able to put new technology to use.

I found the book to be very evenhanded overall, and I thought the sections on the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Royal Navy were fascinating. The post-WW2 section was a bit too exclusively focused on the US Navy - a deeper look at the Soviet Navy would have been useful, and in keeping with the earlier sections. Two other caveats: not enough maps (a generic flaw in recent history books, it seems), and godawful editing and proofreading in the later chapters. Major publishing houses no longer seem to be able to afford spellchecking programs, let alone proofreaders.

The author, Ronald Spector, former Marine and director of naval history for the US Navy, is professor of history and international relations at George Washington University and respected author of naval history. Spector does not cover the spectrum of battles in the 20th century. Rather, he analyzes selective campaigns and battles that he believes illustrate the evolution of naval warfare from ships of sail to modern weapons of mass destruction. He uses well-documented contemporaneous letters and personal journals, as well as records of subsequent interviews of the participants, to provide an insightful description from the perspective of those who fought the battles. John Keegan pioneered this perspective of examining warfare in The Face of Battle (1976). The result is an interesting presentation of how sociological factors, combined with decisions and technological developments shaped naval history.

Spector begins with the 1905 Battle of Tsushima, regarded as the Trafalgar of the 20th century (or Russia's Pearl Harbor), which resulted in Japan emerging as an important military power that could and, ultimately, did threaten the West. He analyzes how the navies of the two unlikely protagonists --Japan and Russia -- adapted to advancements in weapons and technology and presents a compelling view of what life was like for a "fighting sailor."

Spector next analyzes The Battle of Jutland, which was "the largest naval engagement of World War I and the greatest clash of battleships in history." Though out-numbered 30:1,6,000 British died, compared to 2,500 Germans, presenting a new horror.

"In a single afternoon, the British had lost more seamen than were killed in action in the twenty years of war against Napoleon." (pg. 100)
***
"The modern naval battle is different from everything else in the world.... And a single stroke of a single weapon might wipe out a thousand lives. Not for another three decades would land warfare attain this level of destructiveness...."(ibid.)

Superior German technology is often cited for British defeat. Spector, however, argues that the different technologies canceled each other, and that it was the human factor -- the individual sailor -- that determined the outcome.

The book takes the reader through Vietnam and the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Evolution in technology and tactics are discussed, but special emphasis is placed on the observations of the average sailor during each battle.

A major fault of the book is the failure to cover, adequately, the last 25 years of the 20th century. The detailed examination of battles essentially ends with the Vietnam War. This is unfortunate since a variety of new weapons system and tactics were employed after Vietnam. Curiously, there is no coverage at all of Operation Desert Storm where the importance of widespread employment of tactical cruise missiles emerged.

The book is very easy to read and can be appreciated by the general public. The anecdotal passages make the book more enjoyable and present a moving and unsettling account of war in the 20th century. Curiously, the book is not well edited and does not appear to have been proofread, especially towards the end.

I recommend the book up through the close of the Vietnam War, but not for its coverage of subsequent battles.

At War at Sea covers both the main naval engagements of the 20th century which are generally familiar to most naval history readers as well as the minor ones which the author feels had a significant impact on naval history of the period.

For instance, he explains the changeover from battleship dominance to submarine and carrier dominance in naval warfare but brings in the earliest instances where both submarines and carriers were perceived to be effective; not just the better known instances where the shift in effect was recognized by many.

The coverage of large battle situations is generally superficial but he writes in some length about the buildup and background to these well known naval events. A number of his miscellaneous anecdotes have not normally been made known in many of the more familiar historys of major naval events and thus are interesting to the reader.

A good half of the book concentrates on the background and reasons for significant changes in naval operations, procedures, etc.. This brings in the "depth" or analysis in the writing. Of particular interest is how the author looks at the way naval personnel procedures and attitudes come into play with the changes in strategy.

All in all, a good review of the naval century for the more serious naval history reader.

First off, this is neither a comprehensive history of twentieth century naval warfare nor an oral history. The book aims to describe the evolution of world navies from ships of sail to modern high-tech platforms and the technological and social revolutions that fueled this evolution. At that level, this work is fundamentally successful, though sometimes tedious.

The book's ultimate failure is in the extremely cursory coverage given the last twenty-five years of the twentieth century. All meaningful coverage of naval warfare ceases at the close of the Vietnam War. Oddly, the most detail given after that relates several naval skirmishes between Israel and her Syrian and Egyption foes in the Yom Kippur War. The only other detailed coverage of US naval operations concerns the USS Vincennes tragic shoot-down of an Iranian passenger jet at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war, though Mr. Spector does go to some length to describe the mitigating factors which led to that tragedy.

The Falklands War is given relatively light coverage, considering that it constituted an important proving ground for a variety of modern naval tactics and weapons systems. Similarly, no coverage at all is given the several engagements between US and Libyan forces in the 1980s, despite the fact that this constituted the first use of the Harpoon antiship missile in combat. Likewise, Operation Earnest Will, in which US naval vessels escorted reflagged Kuwaiti tankers during the Iran-Iraq War is also given slim coverage. The attack on the USS Stark is never mentioned and the damage control lessons learned in that incident and in the USS Samuel B. Roberts attack is completely ignored, despite the fact that those two incidents brought about radical changes in both shipboard firefighting tactics and equipment. No mention is made of the close interservice cooperation in this operation, nor the use of US Army Special Forces operating from US Navy ships in an naval interdiction role.

Operation Desert Storm is totally neglected, despite the first wide-scale employment of tactical cruise missiles and their importance in the war. No mention is made of the use or importance of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft in attack roles in Operation Desert Storm, nor the damage to a US cruiser and amphibious ship by Iraqi mines.

If you want a reasonable assessment of the causes and effects of the evolution of the navy through Vietnam, this book is adequate. If you want an assessment of the modern navy, you should look elsewhere.

The author takes an interesting approach to describing the evolution of naval warfare during the twentieth century. He describes the development of technologies in conjunction with the training and treatment of the men in different navies at different times and shows the ramifications in selected battles. One aspect that make this book particularly interesting is that the author discusses the inner machinations of the Tsarist, WWI German and British, WWII Japanese, and post-WWII Soviet navies; material that has not been comprehensively and collectively covered in other books. Another aspect is the author's selection of the battles to show how naval warfare occurred in practice. Instead of focusing only on the battles that were strategic turning points, the author uses examples that show the problems of changing technology and organization presented to navies and the adjustments that were made. For example, the rapid evolution of aviation in naval warfare during WWII is shown in the battles of Crete, Santa Cruz (Solomon Islands), the Mariannas, and Okinawa. The book does not purport to be an extensive documentary of naval history but rather shows how and why it changed. It is particularly recommended for readers who want a better understanding of the practical effects of the human element in naval warfare.

The author, Ronald Spector, former Marine and director of naval history for the US Navy, is professor of history and international relations at George Washington University and respected author of naval history. Spector does not cover the spectrum of battles in the 20th century. Rather, he analyzes selective campaigns and battles that he believes illustrate the evolution of naval warfare from ships of sail to modern weapons of mass destruction. He uses well-documented contemporaneous letters and personal journals, as well as records of subsequent interviews of the participants, to provide an insightful description from the perspective of those who fought the battles. John Keegan pioneered this perspective of examining warfare in The Face of Battle (1976). The result is an interesting presentation of how sociological factors, combined with decisions and technological developments shaped naval history.

Spector begins with the 1905 Battle of Tsushima, regarded as the Trafalgar of the 20th century (or Russia's Pearl Harbor), which resulted in Japan emerging as an important military power that could and, ultimately, did threaten the West. He analyzes how the navies of the two unlikely protagonists --Japan and Russia -- adapted to advancements in weapons and technology and presents a compelling view of what life was like for a "fighting sailor."

Spector next analyzes The Battle of Jutland, which was "the largest naval engagement of World War I and the greatest clash of battleships in history." Though out-numbered 30:1,6,000 British died, compared to 2,500 Germans, presenting a new horror.

"In a single afternoon, the British had lost more seamen than were killed in action in the twenty years of war against Napoleon." (pg. 100)
***
"The modern naval battle is different from everything else in the world.... And a single stroke of a single weapon might wipe out a thousand lives. Not for another three decades would land warfare attain this level of destructiveness...."(ibid.)

Superior German technology is often cited for British defeat. Spector, however, argues that the different technologies canceled each other, and that it was the human factor -- the individual sailor -- that determined the outcome.

The book takes the reader through Vietnam and the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Evolution in technology and tactics are discussed, but special emphasis is placed on the observations of the average sailor during each battle.

A major fault of the book is the failure to cover, adequately, the last 25 years of the 20th century. The detailed examination of battles essentially ends with the Vietnam War. This is unfortunate since a variety of new weapons system and tactics were employed after Vietnam. Curiously, there is no coverage at all of Operation Desert Storm where the importance of widespread employment of tactical cruise missiles emerged.

The book is very easy to read and can be appreciated by the general public. The anecdotal passages make the book more enjoyable and present a moving and unsettling account of war in the 20th century. Curiously, the book is not well edited and does not appear to have been proofread, especially towards the end.

I recommend the book up through the close of the Vietnam War, but not for its coverage of subsequent battles.

Winston Churchill once said he read only for pleasure or profit. Professor Spector's "War at Sea" can be read for both, and more. It can be read straight through, from start to finish, with pleasure and profit, but it can also be picked up and, with some sorting out, read piecemeal, one era or conflict at a time. The work would serve admirably as a text in an upper division college course on the history of sea power and navies, and it would also serve well as a foundation for naval planners looking to the future. What sets "War at Sea" apart from other books that survey naval conflict is the author's attention to the sociological forces at work in shaping navies and their effect on the results produced by those navies. He is able to do so without ever lapsing into the psychobabble preferred by sociologists and psychologists, which contributes greatly to the pleasure to be drawn from the book.

Two very minor annoyances need mentioning: "War at Sea" was carelessly proofread, with the result that typographical errors occasionally bring the reader up short. The other is more disconcerting. For reasons known only to himself, Professor Spector has inverted the names of Japanese personalities, and because Japan was not only a major 20th Century naval power but was involved in three major 20th Century wars, much attention is paid to that nation.

Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto becomes Admiral Yamamoto Isoruku, in Spector's work, and Admiral Chuichi Nagamo becomes Admiral Nagumo Chuichi, and so on. Morison didn't do this in his 15-volume "History of United States Naval Operations in World War II." Karig, et al, didn't do it in their "Battle Report," a four-volume history of that war produced under the direction of wartime Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. Potter didn't do it in his biographies of Chester W. Nimitz, Arleigh Burke and William F. Halsey. The Wall Street Journal doesn't do it in its coverage of Japanese business.

Spector is alone in this aberration, and for the reader who is already comfortable with the conventional presentation of Japanese names, it is a bother.

But not enough of a bother to dim the pleasure or dilute the profit to be gained by reading "War at Sea."

Gave this gift to a history buff who really liked it because it covered more than one war. A good gift to anyone interested in seafaring battles. Good condition, prompt delivery.