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Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power

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So said Jack Nicholson's character in the film, "A Few Good Men," and so says Mr. Alperovitz to his prosecutors in the reviews below. One reviewer in particular took great lengths - with little evidence - to state the book's conclusions were based on statements taken out of context. This can be refuted by just one statement that Admiral Nimitz made to author James Michener in 1944, referring to the blockade: "We have the Japs beat." And as the only effective fighting force the "Japs" possessed at this time was the Kwantung Army, cut off and then subsequently bottled up in Manchuria by Soviet occupation, the notion that US forces would have had to turn Tokyo into Stalingrad becomes even more preposterous.

There is no doubt that the desire to use the Bomb on the "Japs" is in direct proportion to the widespread use of said racist term itself. I cannot imagine the US testing this device on Berlin (though Hitler would have used it on the tip of a rocket if he'd had it in time.) Mr. Alperovitz does an excellent job debunking the patriotic propaganda that has wrapped a major war crime in the Stars and Stripes, proving that the "values of Nuremurg" were indeed but a display of victors' justice.

"Atomic Diplomacy" describes how the atomic bomb seduced the United States government in 1945 into the fantasy that it could intimidate the Russians into abandoning their strategic objectives after World War II. To convey this message to the Kremlin, approximately 200,000 Japanese were dispatched in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. "Atomic Diplomacy" tells the beginning of a sad story of hubris on a world historical scale. It is a tragic irony that a weapon which in the end we did not need to win the war ended up bewitching our leaders into losing the peace

My father was present at these events. He was drafted out of Graduate School at Harvard, selected by virtue of performance on IQ tests given there and was directly involved in the code breaking and analysis in the far east. He reported to a Lt General in the US Army for the wartime effort he was officially an officer in Army Intelligence. He read the cables at this time and performed analysis for the Army high command. The story he has related to me is essentially identical to the story this book relates. The bulk of the upper echelon's of the US armed forces realized that Japan was done and was sending out feelers for peace. Japan realized that she was cooked before the Atomic bomb was dropped. My father's specific recollection is that Japan was only requesting that the Emperor not be treated as a war criminal, a condition that was fulfilled anyway. Hence my father has never believed that the dropping of the bomb was required. This book fills in many details of what was going on inside the US government at that time but it basically is entirely consistent with what my father has said since I was old enough to understand.

It is mystifying to me why some people react violently and negatively to the story related in this book. The book is not alleging some grand conspiracy just the normal pushing and pulling inside the government which is typical of decision making in a democracy. The book is well documented.

All indications from the secret negotiations between the Americans and the Japanese and, retrospectively, from the complete devastation of Japan point to Dr. Alperovitz's claim: The atomic bombs were unnecessary for the war's conclusion.

Given the fact that more than 200K civilians were specifically targeted and instantaneously incinerated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this book leaves me the following thought: What a dreadful sin we have committed ...

I read this regular book, here in Brazil.
This book was writen about fifty years ago,in a very different world.
Then, countries with atomic powers weren't islamic and Soviet Union not only existed, but also had big military power.
Today, with atomic Pakisthan(and Iran, the reality is very different.
How green and atomic was my valley, when this book was writen.

Atomic Diplomacy was originally a doctoral dissertation arguing that American leaders saw the atomic bomb as a powerful "master card" that would strengthen their hand against the Soviets and thereby help advance American interests during the summer and early fall of 1945. Although there is a great deal of information contradicting its conclusions, the paper somehow received a passing grade.

At its core, the book is merely a small addition to the academic literature on one aspect of the use of the atomic bomb. The implications drawn from it, however are sensational: Namely that the bomb was dropped for political, not military reasons and that its use is therefore the equivalent of a war crime. In addition, blame for the Cold War can largely be placed at America's feet.

We are informed by way of a ridiculous consipiracy theory that there was no military necessity to drop the bombs. This theory relies on speculation and gross distortion of the historical record. It is said that Japan was ready and willing to surrender but that Truman did not want to allow this to happen out of fear that the opportunity to demonstrate the bomb's power would be lost. Tentative Japanese efforts to enlist the Soviets' help in negotiating highly lenient peace terms are misinterpreted and inflated to the level of Japan's waving a white flag. Post-war opinions by various authorities stating that winning the war without the bomb would have been a snap are presented as fact. Reports about Japan's deteriorating position and other issues that were written before the bombs were dropped are quoted selectively and taken out of context. For example there is no mention of the appalling U.S. casualties suffered during the battle of Okinawa. This cost was one of the key considerations in the decision to drop the bomb. Such rhetorical tricks run rampant through the book and far from clearing up misconceptions that might occur about the book as the author hopes, they instead cast a shadow over its veracity.

Like Alperovitz's later work on the subject, Atomic Diplomacy is rarely coherent or believable in the light of the complete facts. True, there is much evidence that some American leaders hoped that the bomb might yield benefits beyond ending the war with Japan. These hopes were soon proven false, however, and were not the main reason the bombs were used. Despite this, Alperovitz still caims that the bomb didn't just influence American foreign policy - it determined policy.

Truman's various attempts to engage the Soviet Union during mid-1945 are portrayed as being part of a dark conspiracy of intimidation. Alperovitz says that Truman had no intention of reaching any agreements with the Soviets at Potsdam, for example, because he believed that the use of the atomic bomb on Japan would put the U.S. in a better position to negotiate later. This argument is supported by a letter from Truman complaining that the trip to Potsdam was a chore that he would rather avoid. Alperovitz chopped out the part of this statement that makes its real meaning clear - Truman was venting frustration to his Mother about having to wear tails.

Considering that the atomic bomb was used against Japan, it is surprising that only one chapter of the book deals specifically with Asia. This chapter tries to make the case that the war in the Pacific hardly counted for anything to American policy makers because it was obvious to all that Japan was defeated by this time. It's never mentioned that the Japanese government did not recognize this reality and was in fact implementing plans to repel the expected American invasion. It is implied that American leaders had clairvoyant power that allowed them to foresee that Japan would surrender before an invasion was to take place. Truman is said to have determined that the war would have to end by August 8th, solely in order to keep the Soviets out of Asia. This moronic claim can only be accepted if one believes that the war with Japan represented nothing more to Turman than an opportunity to give a "battle demonstration" of the atomic bomb's power to the Soviets.

Much of the book deals with the early post-war situation in Europe. Its purpose is to show how the West attempted to bully the perfectly reasonable Soviets once they decided the atomic bomb would give them an advantage. A sinister face is put on Western attempts to prevent what would be fifty years of tyranny in Eastern Europe. Secretary of State Frank Byrnes's statement that the bomb would allow the U.S. to "dictate our own terms" is taken out of context repeatedly as though it applied to the Soviets when it actually referred to the Japanese. Many other sources are similarly mangled in a constatnt effort to make the facts conform to preordained conclusions. Endless footnotes and appendices are used both to hedge the book's conclusions and to attack other books that provide contradictory information.

Alperovitz awards himself a large amount of credit for originating the belief that the atomic bomb was used as a warning to the Soviets. In fact, the famously paranoid Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin was the first to make this assertion only a few days after the bombs were dropped, and by the end of this book you actually feel sorry for the dictator. His opinion was echoed in the West as early as 1946, and the use of the bomb was called "the first shot of the Cold War" well before Atomic Diplomacy was written.

Prompt and Utter Destruction by Samuel Walker, however, provides an excellent overview of these issues. It is unbiased, highly informative and concise. These qualitites stand in sharp contrast to Atomic Diplomacy's long and misleading attempt to inflate a molehill of truth into a mountain of exaggeration.

Atomic Diplomacy argues that the atomic bomb was dropped on Japan in order to intimidate the Soviet Union, not end the war. This belief is sacred to many left wing historians but based on a fictional reading of history. As a result it is no surprise to see such a sharp divergence of opinion in the reviews here. But there is overwhelming evidence documenting the ridiculous distortions contained in this book.

While attempting to show that Truman had no real intention of reaching an agreement with the Soviets at Potsdam (because the atomic bomb would allow him to "dictate our own terms" later) Alperovitz writes that "Truman made no attempt to hide his feelings: 'I am getting ready to go see Stalin and Churchill, and it is a chore...Wish I didn't have to go, but I do, and it can't be stopped now.'" The use of a hiatus produces the most serious distortion, eliminating "I have to take my tuxedo, tails, preacher coat, high hat, low hat and hard hat as well as sundry other things," and another sentence in the same vein. What Alperovitz presents as the words of President Truman, global strategist looking to "delay a confrontation with Stalin" until the bomb would give him the upper hand, turns out to be Ol' Cap'n Harry, complaining to "Momma and Mary" about the formalities he would have to endure.

In developing his thesis that Truman initially seized upon economic leverage to gain his ends in Eastern Europe, Alperovitz again uses words having to do with one subject and applies them to another. He assigns to Averell Harriman, ambassador to Russia, a great deal of influence in converting Truman to this project. In his discussion of alleged debates over curtailing Lend-Lease aid as a primary tool, Alperovitz quotes Harriman as arguing that the U.S. "'should retain current control of...credits (to the Russians) in order to be in a position to protect American vital interests in the formaulative period immediately following the war.'" A look at the source for this remark, however, reveals that Harriman's statement did not pertain to Lend Lease at all, but to postwar dollar credits. Alperovitz's excision of the word "these" ("these credits") gave the sentence a meaning Harriman never intended.

During Alperovitz's analysis of what American leaders believed possession of the bomb would enable them to extract from the Russians, James Byrnes's "new advice" to Truman that "'the bomb might well put us in a position to dictate our own terms..." is said to occur months later than Truman's account states that it actually did. And Alperovitz's omission of the latter part of Byrnes's statement, "at the end of the war," is misleading, to say the least. As Truman's prose makes plain, the statement he ascribed to Byrnes referred to terms with JAPAN "at the end of the war," not terms with the Soviets after it.

Alperovitz burdens words with imports not found in the documents he cites. In his assessment of the "atomic diplomacy" inaugurated after Hiroshima and Nagasaki he writes, "American diplomacy changed so swiftly that few observers have caught the sweep of all the policy decisions unveiled in a few short weeks." As evidence of what he calls "the breath and scope of new diplomatic departures," Alperovitz quotes Byrnes as having written that "those...days...were full of action." In context, however, Byrnes was discussing merely the number of items which had to be dealt with at the war's end, including matters such as the visits of Charles de Gaulle and Georges Bidault, new department appointment, and the like. He makes no mention of any "new diplomatic departures."

Roosevelt is quoted as saying that the British were "perfectly willing" for the U.S. to go to war with Russia, without mentioning that F.D.R. spoke in "a semi-jocular manner."

There are many other examples of this sort of nonsense in Atomic Diplomacy. However Alperovitz is not so deluded as to claim, as in one review below, that the U.S. "intended to drop the bomb on them (Japan) whether they were preparing for a land invasion or eating cotton candy in a large circle." Only a true ideologue could say that Truman would have dropped the atomic bomb even if Japan had accepted the Potsdam terms. Is it so hard to see that Japan's actions might have had something to do with all this? Or must we believe that these cotton candy eaters were merely passive participants in events for which they bear no responsibility?

It was obvious to all at the time that the Soviets intended to enslave Eastern Europe because they were in the process of doing so while the Potsdam conference took place. In direct violation of the Yalta agreements, the Soviets were creating tyrannical regimes and systematically excluding democracy-minded Eastern Europeans from power. Although never mentioned by Alperovitz, this was the problem that Truman and other Western leaders were responding to, not a desire for "money and power" that didn't exist in this war shattered region, and which no one disputed, was in the Soviet sphere of influence.

Anyone with a basic knowledge of the events of World War II will recall the battle of Okinawa - in itself a mountain of evidence contradicting Alperovitz's conclusions. This horror show (ignored in Atomic Diplomacy) gave U.S. officials good reason to believe that Japan intended to fight to the finish at great human cost, ergo, the plan to shock Japan's leadership with the atomic bomb and thereby force them to accept the inevitable and surrender, thus avoiding further bloodshed. This plan was hardly an attempt to "divine the outcome" of the war.

Atomic Diplomacy seeks to obfuscate the simple truth and replace it with a laughable conspiracy theory. It is only of use to those ideologues who have made up their mind that the U.S. can do no right, and are willing to look anywhere for confirmation.

The above reviews suck...Ok, the book if you (with exception to the third review) read the preface jackson, is about "HOW" the bomb was used in dimplomacy...ok, just read the title maybe that will give you a clue..bible of revisionism give me a break.

The Bible of the Revisionists and People who do not know history. This theory has been disproven so many times already.

Atomic Diplomacy is the mistaken belief that the United States did not need to use the atomic bombs on Japan at the end of WWII. Atomic Diplomacy is the belief the bombs were used to scare the Soviets and not to end the war.

This theory is garbage because it ignores the evidence. The evidence is overwhelming that Truman used the bomb to end the war and prevent further casaulties. Truman's memoirs, Truman biographers, WWII historians, all know this to be true. Documentary evidence shows this to be true. Yet, revisionists still believe otherwise.

I am glad this book raised the questions that it did. I enjoy historical debate. But the debate is over. Do not trust this book. It ignores evidence, facts, and history.