Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda (Hardcover)

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Editorial Reviews

Review

"With his rare combination of wit and meticulous scholarship, John Mueller diagnoses that America is paralyzed by atomaphobia and prescribes a fifteen-chapter treatment to help us recognize that we have blown reasonable concerns about weapons of mass destruction and terrorism out of proportion and that many of our policy responses actually make things worse. Atomic Obsession is recommended bed-time reading for nervous Nellies both inside and outside of government."--Michael C. Desch, author of Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism
"John Mueller's argument will almost certainly change your interpretation of some significant events of the past half-century, and llikely of some expected in the next. It did with mine."--Thomas C. Schelling, 2005 Nobel Prize Laureate in Economics and author of Arms and Influence

"With clear-eyed logic and characteristic wit, John Mueller provides an antidote for the fear-mongering delusions that have shaped nuclear weapons policy for over fifty years. Atomic Obsession casts a skeptical eye on the nuclear mythology purveyed by hawks, doves, realists, and alarmists alike, and shows why nuclear weapons deserve a minor role in national security policymaking and virtually no role in our nightmares. It is the most reassuring book ever written about nuclear weapons, and one of the most enjoyable to read."--Stephen M. Walt, author of Taming American Power
"How much should we worry about nuclear terrorism? How far should we go to stop Iran (or North Korea) from acquiring nuclear weapons? In this fascinating and provocative book, John Mueller addresses such questions. Policymakers, scholars, students--indeed all Americans who are concerned about threats and the allocation of scarce resources--must read this volume, ponder its conclusions, and debate what now needs to be done."--Melvyn P. Leffler, author of For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War
"...the book will certainly make you think. Added bonus: It's immensely fun to read." -- Stephen M. Walt, ForeignPolicy.com
"Mueller's achievement deserves admiration even by those inclined to resist his central thesis. The book is meticulously researched and punctuated with a dry wit that seems the perfect riposte to the pomposity of security experts who have so far tyrannized debate. Although by no means the last word on nuclear weapons, Mueller deserves praise for having the guts to shout that the atomic emperor has no clothes... the book should nevertheless be packaged up and sent to Presidents Barack Obama and Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister Gordon Brown with a simple message: 'Please calm down.'" Arms Control Today

Product Description

Since the end of World War Two, the use of nuclear weapons has been America's-and the world's-worst nightmare. But they have never actually been used, despite the fact that an ever-increasing number of countries have obtained them. Our fear levels remain as high as ever today, but are they justified? Eminent international relations scholar John Mueller thinks not, and this highly provocative work, he contends that our overriding concern about nuclear weapons borders on an obsession unsupported by either history or logic. Drawing on the history of the entire atomic era, Mueller argues that nuclear weapons have never represented much of a threat given states' fundamental unwillingness to use them. After the focus shifted away from "mutual assured destruction" to the terrorist threat following 9/11, alarmists had a new cause. Yet analysts have consistently overestimated the destructive capabilities of the devices we worry about the most now: suitcase nukes and dirty bombs. Moreover, our current worries about terrorists obtaining such weapons are essentially baseless. As Mueller points out, there is a multitude of reasons why terrorists will not be able to obtain weapons, much less build them themselves and successfully transport them to targets. Mueller goes even further, maintaining that our efforts to prevent the spread of WMDs have produced much more suffering and violence than would have been the case if we took a more realistic view of such weapons. This controversial thesis cuts against the received wisdom promulgated by America's enormously powerful military-industrial complex. But given how wrong that establishment has been on so many crucial issues over the course of the entire post-World War II era, Mueller's argument is one that deserves a wide public hearing.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 336 pages
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA (November 5, 2009)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 019538136X
• ISBN-13: 978-0195381368
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.3 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.9 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (18 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #49,714 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

8 of 10 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars Don't worry be happy! The best 3 star book you will ever buy!, October 27, 2009

By	Peter Ingemi (Worcester County, Massachusetts United States) - See all my reviews (TOP 1000 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)

Atomic Obsession is a book that produces contradictions. It manages to both make its case and miss its mark at the same time.

The strongest points of the book are the scientific, the evaluation of the actual damage the atomic bomb. In terms of quantitative terms he is right on the money. His evaluation of the kinds of damage an actual terrorist attack would do to the country is also pretty sober and should be required reading for those seized in panic.

His evaluation of the actual difficulties involved for either a rogue nation or a terrorist organization is also pretty good. In particular his 20 tasks that a terrorist has to accomplish in order to deliver the bomb is first rate and I certainly hope our foes ignore his cost benefit analysis on some of these issues.

The book gets weaker when it deals with certain historical and political situations. He tends toward historical revisionism in dealing with Japan and WW II and this points on the fallacy of panic over nuclear war and the soviet threat during the cold war comes chiefly through hindsight, yet he fails to notes the failures in hindsight of those who assured us that the Soviets were strong and here to stay.

His ignorance of the Soviet Unions involvement "Nuclear Freeze" movement is horrifying. Yet his information on Chemical and biological war in history are again must reads, as he soberly takes a look at them in their historical context. He gives both Reagan and Cheney some of their due and he does correctly state that rouge nations will often use the "nuclear" threat to get financial and political advantage, yet he also totally discounts the religious motivation that makes some actors less than rational today.

What I think he really undersells however is the truth that a lot of the reason why these things have failed has been the "obsessive" efforts to prevent them. The attention and the training that this threat, however small, has been given has not only discouraged those who would attempt it but has also led to the capture and neutralization of lesser deadly threats.

In short his book could just as surely be an advice book to our foes against the allure of Nuclear attack as it is warning us of panic and a poor use of resources. As we have more resources the status quo would seem to be better as their resources represent a larger percentage of what they can spare than ours ever will.

To sum up on basic facts he is excellent, on political points and historical revision not so well. The odd thing is I don't think the author was trying to be ideological at all, in fact reading the book it is impossible to think that it was deliberate.

I've never had such a hard time rating a book. The book is so well written and the parts that are correct are SO good that it is a must read, but the parts that are wrong are just so wrong I can't believe the same author wrote them! I think this author should go on the road with his critics debating these issues a lot of good would come of it.

My judgment: There are too many issues with this book to give it more than 3 starts, but it is worth buying due to the important arguments that should not be ignored.

6 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Don't worry about nuclear terrorism, be happy?, November 3, 2009

By	Tung Yin (Portland, OR) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

Ohio State professor John Mueller has his work cut out for him: in the post-9/11 world, with North Korea and Iran working toward developing nuclear weapons, and with al Qaeda's Osama bin laden and Ayman al-Zawahari still hiding in Afghanistan or Pakistan somewhere, no doubt plotting against us, Mueller argues in "Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to al-Qaeda" that nuclear weapons are expensive, largely useless, and virtually impossible for terrorists to steal or build.

He develops his analysis in three parts. Part 1 looks at the actual effect of nuclear weapons and, along the way, points out that the casual lumping of chemical and biological weapons with nuclear ones into a category of "weapons of mass destruction" is something of a hysterical overreaction; conventional weapons (bullets, bombs) are far more effective at killing than chemical or biological weapons, and thus it doesn't really make sense to classify the latter with nuclear weapons. He's very persuasive on this point. As for nuclear weapons, they're bad, but Mueller explains why the detonation of one or even two atomic bombs wouldn't destroy the country. In short, we shouldn't overestimate the damage that a nuclear weapon would cause.

In Part 2, he turns his attention to history and suggests that nuclear weapons have played very little role in international politics and diplomacy, apart from wasting colossal resources and talent. He suggests that Japan would have surrendered even without the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, points out that Argentina had no qualms about starting the Falkland Islands war with Britain despite the latter's nuclear arsenal, and argues that anti-proliferation efforts have largely failed (and if anything, pushed rogue nations toward developing nuclear weapons). Since nukes are generally useless and expensive, he finds it not surprising that countries like Canada, Japan, and others -- which could easily have them if they wanted -- haven't bothered with them.

Finally, in Part 3, Mueller suggests that we spend far too much time obsessing about what will happen if/when al Qaeda gets a hold of a nuke, and far little time thinking about how unlikely this is. Getting a nuclear nation to give up a nuke is pretty unrealistic, he argues, because no one is going to want to be identified as the nation that armed terrorists. His argument here depends critically on what he calls "nuclear forensics" -- the ability to identify where a nuclear weapon that has exploded came from. Expecting terrorists to build their own atomic bomb while hiding out in caves is silly, he contends as well.

I found this a VERY comforting book to read, for obvious reasons. It's well-argued and written with a bit of wit (example: "There is something decidedly worse than being a disgruntled Russian scientist, and that is being a dead disgruntled Russian scientist."), so that it's a fast read despite the weight of the ideas. At the same time, while this book *should* be persuasive, it didn't quite close the deal for me. First, I'll admit that it's hard to feel at ease about nuclear terrorism, because even if it's a very small chance, it seems like a really bad outcome; Mueller can argue effectively that it's virtually zero probability, but still, it's not zero. Now, his point is that we shouldn't let near zero probabilities dictate our policies, and that at least is persuasive.

However, Mueller also relies on the nuclear forensics, yet says that this field is still developing. If it doesn't develop enough -- or if nuclear states don't know about it or don't believe it -- or worse yet, simply aren't rational, then there's no guarantee that deterrence will continue to work.

So, the upshot is, this is a very important book to read, as it's swimming against the tides. You'll feel better, even if, like me, you aren't fully persuaded.

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars A Well-Researched Evaluation of the Importance of Nuclear Weapons Turns Out to Be a Dud, November 19, 2009

By	Kyle Slayzar (Bismarck, ND) - See all my reviews (TOP 1000 REVIEWER)

In Cold War history, one cannot discount the mass influence of nuclear weapons. As inanimate objects used only once in combat, they shaped American foreign policy as well as redesigned military strategy for both the United States and the Soviet Union. They were the crux of most historical events between the two countries as both feared the use of such weapons would lead to the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD theory) of each other if not an outright annihilation of the human race itself. These bleak aspects of a nuclear exchange are rarely disputed within the historical community, however, it is the subject of debate in "Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda" ("Obsession") by Ohio State political science professor John Mueller (Author of "Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them").

Mueller challenges the assertion of a nuclear exchange signaling the end of humanity or an outright collapse of the United States and their overall influence in history. As a former graduate student in American history, specializing in US military and diplomatic history, I knew coming into reading Obsession that I was either gonna learn something new or rip the book a six-pack of new ones. After reading Obsession for a week and writing down notes in my trusty notebook I find myself admiring Mueller for his excellent research and political analysis but am going to have a field day with his historical analysis.

In the tradition of historical analysis of a book the first thing I analyzed was Mueller's bibliography, chapter notes, and citations. Indeed, Mueller has done an excellent job gathering both primary sources in the form of interviews and speeches as well as secondary analysis conducted by prominent historians such as John Lewis Gaddis (who is one of my favorite Cold War historians).

However, it would seem as though nearly all of Mueller's research and analysis comes from public sources (interviews, speeches, and articles) and few, if any, from actual government reports whether stuff obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, the declassified Soviet archives, or even original interviews with officials or scientists. Unless I missed something, the vast majority of information researched comes from the public domain most prominently open statements to the public and secondary analysis from others, which begs the question, "what is Mueller missing?" Forget the discussion on scholarly research and discipline to conduct original research beyond a Google or JSTOR search, Mueller is missing a lot research material here to make the case on whether or not his thesis on nuclear weapons is plausible. Where are Air Force nuclear weapons test reports? The CDC reports on the effects of radiation? DHS action plans for nuclear attack? Memos of dissenting scientists within the US and Soviet government?

To cite an example of this trend, the first chapter addresses the allegedly overly exaggerated effects of nuclear weapons themselves. Mueller brings up EPA and United Nations reports on both the alleged lethal dose of radiation (EPA) and the actual effects of high levels of radiation (UN) (p. 6-8), but doesn't actually cite the sources. Instead, Mueller cites the reports from secondary sources most notably an article by Peter Zimmerman in Foreign Policy's quarterly journal. The only real citation of a primary source in chapter one is by the Office of Technological Assessment, an alleged neutral scientific analysis group funded by congress until 1995. OK, that sounds like an objective source to me but, are there any others? Correlation of the facts requires triangulation from more than one source beyond journal articles, especially if the fields (foreign policy to particle science) are unrelated.

This trend continues throughout Mueller's book, but does it automatically refute his argument? Absolutely not, but it does bring into question Mueller's method of academic scholarship and discipline since his research appears to be nothing more than public domain and nothing truly original. It suggests his analysis is missing key components.

Moving on to other criticisms, Mueller utilizes some very poor analogies to further his argument. While discussing the social aspect of a terrorist nuclear attack, Mueller states that while 10,000+ deaths from a potential nuclear strike would be tragic, it would hardly unwound the fabric of the US. I agree with this part, actually, but his analogy to explain it is severely flawed. Here is the block quote.

"(The) prediction that the sudden deaths from terrorism of 10,000 Americans would 'do away with our way of life' might be assessed in this regard. As it happens, officials estimated for a while in 2005 that there would be 10,000 deaths from Hurricane Katrina. Although this, of course, was not a terrorist attack, there was no indication s whatsoever that such a disaster, while catastrophic for the hurricane victims themselves, would do away with the way of life of the rest of the nation." (p. 22)

Pending a situation portrayed in films like The Day After Tomorrow, I do not think American citizens living in California, Missouri, or my current state of residence (North Dakota) have to worry about hurricanes. Terrorism is deliberate and malicious while bad weather is a natural force (unless you're a member of the Westboro Baptist Church), to compare the two to further an argument on the social consequences of nuclear terrorism is beyond flawed.

Moving on to the historical significance of nuclear weapons, I think Mueller could have added a few more secondary analysis to his bibliography. It almost seems selective as Mueller, while drawing almost exclusively from secondary sources, seems to have left out some of the most acclaimed analysis from Cold War historians including Water Lafeber, Aleksandr Fursenko ("One Hell of a Gamble"), and even some critical books by John Lewis Gaddis (ie: "Strategies of Containment"). Mueller doesn't even mention Cold War foreign policy giants George Kennan or Paul Nitze and their work from 1945 to the turn of the century. The former three authors framed Cold War history while the latter two policy makers designed America's foreign policy during the Cold War. One would think they deserve a mention or even a paragraph discussing why they were right or wrong in their assumptions on nuclear weapons, which they did have.

Continuing with historical discourse, Mueller makes several historical assertions that can easily be challenged. One example is that the nuclear bomb was not necessary in WWII to end the war. I always found this a silly argument as the Japanese were obviously on their last legs and were on the fast track to be annihilated whether by US firebombs or by Russian invasion, which Mueller asserts is the cause for the Japanese surrender and that the nuclear bomb was little more than "an extension," of that (p. 46). While this is up for historical debate, Mueller spends only two paragraphs 'proving' this notion and the first one is quotes from historians saying, "no, the Japanese did not surrender due to the bomb." The second paragraph discusses Soviet intervention, albeit briefly. To me, this needs to be elaborated on considerably since Hiroshima and Nagasaki are critical to Mueller's overall argument that nuclear weapons have never truly been all that important. Without proving it here, the carpet begins to roll over his argument. He needs to seriously elaborate on this subject beyond one paragraph of historians agreeing and another with an analysis.

I could go on much, much, longer criticizing Mueller's work but lemme end it here by saying that while he makes some good points, I am far from sold. Obsession could be easily over 500 pages that can convince myself and other military historians if he simply took the time to do some original research and spend less time trying to make the book more palatable for The Daily Show. Nuclear weapons, foreign policy, and terrorism are not light subjects and should not be given a casual glance as Mueller seems to do in Obsession. However, I do reserve the right to be proven otherwise so I encourage Mueller to utilize this constructive criticism to go back and make some serious revisions to his work. I think he's on the right track, but I also believe this current edition of Obsession seems little more than a draft albeit with edited grammar and sentence structure.

All in all, a C-.