The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866 [Hardcover]

Geoffrey Wawro (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0521560594 | ISBN-13: 978-0521560597 | Publication Date: July 13, 1996

This is a new history of the Austro-Prussian-Italian War of 1866, which paved the way for German and Italian unification. Geoffrey Wawro describes Prussia's successful invasion of Habsburg Bohemia, and the wretched collapse of the Austrian army in July 1866. Blending military and social history, he describes the panic that overtook Austria's regiments in each clash with the Prussians. He reveals the blundering of the Austrian commandant who fumbled away key strategic advantages and ultimately lost a war--crucial to the fortunes of the Habsburg Monarchy--that most European pundits had predicted they would win.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 started the modern Hundred Years' War that did not end until 1945. Professor Geoff Wawro's book is the most comprehensive treatment of the subject. Thoughtful and well written, it is a major contribution to an understanding of history." Henry Kissinger

"The Austro-Prussian War is an outstanding work, illustrating once again that operational military history can make important and enjoyable contributions to understanding the past. A must for undergraduate, graduate, and specialist collections." Choice

"Geoffrey Wawro's lively and insightful new study offers the reader a view of the familiar events of the Königgrätz campaign from the relatively unfamiliar perspective of the AustrianFeldzeugmeisterLudwig Benedek's headquarters." German Studies Review

"Wawro's discussion of the strategic plans and dispositions of the three major belligerents and Austria's lesser allies is excellent. The simple maps aid understanding of the deployment and mofvements of widely separated forces on terrain unfamiliar to most American readers." SFC John T. Broom, Military Reviews

"Comprehensive, erudite, balanced, and clearly written, we have here the best work on this war in any language." J. Arden Bucholz, Central European History

"...offers a curious mixture of historical writing. ...Wawro presents excellent campaign history, particularly of the little-covered events in the Italian theater of operations. ...truly valuable for its narrative of events in the Italian theater." Scott W. Lackey, Historian

"This is an extraordinarily luminous book about not only a war but also a continent and a century. Written with verve and wit, The Franco-Prussian War harnesses scholarship and story-telling to wonderful effect. Geoffrey Wawro has given us a magnificent yarn." Rick Atkinson, author of An Army at Dawn and winner of the Pulitzer Prize

"As the author of a history of the Franco-Prussian War that has held the field for some forty years, I was deeply apprehensive when I learned that Dr. Wawro was at work on another. I had good cause to be. His work is magnificent. The research is both wide and deep, the operational analysis masterly, and there is not a dull page in the book. Dr. Wawro has established himself as one of the leading military historians of his generation." Sir Michael Howard

"A lively narrative history, based on an abundance of new research." MacGregor Knox, The London School of Economics

Book Description

This is a new history of the Austro-Prussian-Italian War of 1866, which paved the way for German and Italian unification. Geoffrey Wawro describes Prussia's successful invasion of Habsburg Bohemia, and the wretched collapse of the Austrian army in July 1866. Blending military and social history, he describes the panic that overtook Austria's regiments in each clash with the Prussians. He reveals the blundering of the Austrian commandant who fumbled away key strategic advantages and ultimately lost a war --crucial to the fortunes of the Habsburg Monarchy-- that most European pundits had predicted they would win.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 368 pages
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press (July 13, 1996)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0521560594
• ISBN-13: 978-0521560597
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.3 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (19 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,308,857 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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37 of 37 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An Interesting Revisionist Account, July 5, 2002

By 

R. A Forczyk (MD, USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866 (Paperback)

The Austro-Prussian War, by history professor Dr. Geoffrey Wawro, is a well-written and interesting revisionist account of that oft-neglected conflict in 1866. Dr. Wawro has assembled an impressive amount of existing and new source material that sheds an entirely new light on the brief war of 1866 that brought Prussia to the brink of German unification and presaged a new era of professionalization in war. Wawro's account is particularly strong in its use of Austrian and Italian sources; the Italian role in the war is usually reduced to a few paragraphs but in these pages it is covered in great detail. However, readers should be aware that Dr. Wawro's account is revisionist in intent and tone, which the author does not always make clear. Dr. Wawro's central hypothesis is that both Austria and Prussia were fairly evenly matched opponents but that, "Austria did lose in 1866 for many reasons, but chiefly because...Ludwig Benedek, Austria's supreme commander on the Prussian front, revealed himself to be a supremely incompetent general." While the author also cites the technical superiority of the Prussian needle gun and the poor combat performance of many ethnic minority units in the Austrian army, the main cause the author ascribes for Austrian defeat is the poor generalship of Benedek. The "inferior generalship" hypothesis is a difficult one to prove, particularly given notable lapses in Prussian generalship, but by and large the author succeeds. Overall, the Austro-Prussian War belongs on any bookshelf of anyone seriously interested in the evolution of 19th Century warfare.

The Austro-Prussian War consists of 11 chapters, beginning with strategy and tactics in 1866 and origins of the war. Two more chapters cover opposing war plans and Italian involvement in the conflict. The fifth chapter covers the Battle of Custoza and the rout of the Italian Mincio Army. The next three chapters cover the covering force battles that preceded the decisive battle of Königgrätz, and then the next two chapters cover the battle itself. A final chapter covers the aftermath of the battle, which does an excellent job discussing the results and implications of the war. The author has included many sketch maps in the book, which while useful, are rather crude and incomplete. None of the maps have scales or depict railroad lines, or even depict tactical movements. I found it necessary to consult another source on the war that had better maps, to follow the author's narrative. There are also a number of photographs, mostly of Austrian generals (note, other than one photo of Moltke, there are no photos or illustrations from the Prussian side). The author includes excellent footnotes and a detailed bibliography, but no appendices. An appendix listing rival orders of battle and casualties in the war would have been useful.

For military professionals, the author's discussion of the development of Austrian "fire tactics" and the needle gun will be an interesting evolutionary study. While the author notes that not all Prussian commanders subscribed to these tactics, the superiority of the tactics in themselves are not so clear because the author tends to ascribe too much importance to the needle gun. The author ignores the importance of combined arms tactics in favor of over-emphasis of one weapon system. While the needle gun was revolutionary as the first mass-produced breech-loading rifle and conferred firepower advantages to the Prussian infantry, the rest of the Prussian combined arms team was pretty weak. Prussian artillery was obsolescent, Prussian cavalry was timid and poorly trained and the vital support services were not up to supplying a fast-moving campaign. On the Austrian side, the retention of column assaults bordered on reactionary but such tactics did not become truly obsolete until the introduction of the machinegun. Austrian artillery and cavalry was superior, but these arms were improperly used. Two interesting areas of modern military technology that the author fails to address in detail are the use of telegraph and railroads. While the author does mention that the Austrians foolishly shunned the use of telegraphs, they do not seemed to have suffered badly for it, but the Prussians who did use telegraphs were often out of communications and suffered badly from lack of adequate command and control. The military use of the railroad is hardy mentioned, and one wonders why Benedek - who enjoyed an excellent rail net in Bohemia and Moravia - was constantly marching his troops to and fro instead of using rail lines to transfer troops rapidly.

The author's conclusions about the implications of the war are also striking, "the complete triumph of Prussian grand strategy in 1866 served to tighten the political connection between the Prusso-German state and army. After 1866, the example of Königgrätz suggested that Prussia-Germany could extend its influence and make vast annexations against any rival if only it struck fast and hard enough. This thinking, which originated with Clausewitz and Moltke, would be the basis of Prusso-German military strategy in 1870, 1914 and 1939." The author notes that other armies attempted to copy the Prussian military professional standards after Königgrätz, but none fully succeeded. Indeed, the Austrians failed to learn much from their defeat and in fact their military capabilities declined. However, one interesting question that the author does not ask is that given the demonstrated military incompetence of the Austrian and Italian armies in 1866, why did Prussia choose to later ally itself with such second-rate powers? In choice of weapons and tactics the Germans clearly excelled, but in choice of allies they were clearly inferior.

15 of 16 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars The War of 1866: Prussian and Italy vs. Austria, December 22, 2000

By 

Paul G. Cooper (Granite Bay, California United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866 (Paperback)

Vivid descriptions of the battles in this war enliven this historical work and make it very enjoyable reading. In addition, the author provides insightful information on the weapons and tactics of the period. This is especially true for the Austrian army and Wawro fully explains why the Austrians were so successful against the Italians while failing so miserably against the Prussians. The battle scenes are detailed and quite lively and unlike many other military works provide detail without confusion. So often when writing about the maneuvers of divisions, authors frequently become so mired in detail that the reader is easily lost and has considerable difficulty determing what was going on where without undue effort. Here the maps ably assist understanding. Although the maps do not provide a scale, an unfortunate reality for most current historical works, this problem can be overcome by referring to more detailed auto maps. As for referencing the written material to the maps I found no difficulty. However, for the military simulation enthusiast you will not find beautifully outlined and detailed orders of battle for each side. What you will find is adequate infomation in the text to simulate each battle as long as you know what the composition of say a Prussian division or an Austrian brigade. More detailed information is available from other sources. I only hope that this is not the last work by Wawro for after reading this book I would glady purchase any of his works.

8 of 9 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars This is a well written and researched book, November 19, 2000

By 

"ha-mevaker" - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866 (Paperback)

This really is a great book. The author gices only the breifest description of the political events that preceded the war, but does go into a detailed description of the difference between the Prussian staff system and the Austrian old style system. The book concludes by showing how the Prussian staff system influenced the Germans in makeing their decisions through WW II. The only problem is that the maps were not clearly prepared. I found that this made the book somewhat hard to follow. In the paperback version that I have, the type size was somewhat small and hard to read. As the author was only able to use the Austrian achives, the Prussian archives were destroyed in WW II, he was able to go into more depth on the Austrian side of the war than the Prussian side.