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The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866

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The Austro-Prussian War, by history professor Dr. Geoffrey Wawro, is a well-written and interesting revisionist account of that oft-neglected conflict in 1866. Dr. Wawro has assembled an impressive amount of existing and new source material that sheds an entirely new light on the brief war of 1866 that brought Prussia to the brink of German unification and presaged a new era of professionalization in war. Wawro's account is particularly strong in its use of Austrian and Italian sources; the Italian role in the war is usually reduced to a few paragraphs but in these pages it is covered in great detail. However, readers should be aware that Dr. Wawro's account is revisionist in intent and tone, which the author does not always make clear. Dr. Wawro's central hypothesis is that both Austria and Prussia were fairly evenly matched opponents but that, "Austria did lose in 1866 for many reasons, but chiefly because...Ludwig Benedek, Austria's supreme commander on the Prussian front, revealed himself to be a supremely incompetent general." While the author also cites the technical superiority of the Prussian needle gun and the poor combat performance of many ethnic minority units in the Austrian army, the main cause the author ascribes for Austrian defeat is the poor generalship of Benedek. The "inferior generalship" hypothesis is a difficult one to prove, particularly given notable lapses in Prussian generalship, but by and large the author succeeds. Overall, the Austro-Prussian War belongs on any bookshelf of anyone seriously interested in the evolution of 19th Century warfare.

The Austro-Prussian War consists of 11 chapters, beginning with strategy and tactics in 1866 and origins of the war. Two more chapters cover opposing war plans and Italian involvement in the conflict. The fifth chapter covers the Battle of Custoza and the rout of the Italian Mincio Army. The next three chapters cover the covering force battles that preceded the decisive battle of Königgrätz, and then the next two chapters cover the battle itself. A final chapter covers the aftermath of the battle, which does an excellent job discussing the results and implications of the war. The author has included many sketch maps in the book, which while useful, are rather crude and incomplete. None of the maps have scales or depict railroad lines, or even depict tactical movements. I found it necessary to consult another source on the war that had better maps, to follow the author's narrative. There are also a number of photographs, mostly of Austrian generals (note, other than one photo of Moltke, there are no photos or illustrations from the Prussian side). The author includes excellent footnotes and a detailed bibliography, but no appendices. An appendix listing rival orders of battle and casualties in the war would have been useful.

For military professionals, the author's discussion of the development of Austrian "fire tactics" and the needle gun will be an interesting evolutionary study. While the author notes that not all Prussian commanders subscribed to these tactics, the superiority of the tactics in themselves are not so clear because the author tends to ascribe too much importance to the needle gun. The author ignores the importance of combined arms tactics in favor of over-emphasis of one weapon system. While the needle gun was revolutionary as the first mass-produced breech-loading rifle and conferred firepower advantages to the Prussian infantry, the rest of the Prussian combined arms team was pretty weak. Prussian artillery was obsolescent, Prussian cavalry was timid and poorly trained and the vital support services were not up to supplying a fast-moving campaign. On the Austrian side, the retention of column assaults bordered on reactionary but such tactics did not become truly obsolete until the introduction of the machinegun. Austrian artillery and cavalry was superior, but these arms were improperly used. Two interesting areas of modern military technology that the author fails to address in detail are the use of telegraph and railroads. While the author does mention that the Austrians foolishly shunned the use of telegraphs, they do not seemed to have suffered badly for it, but the Prussians who did use telegraphs were often out of communications and suffered badly from lack of adequate command and control. The military use of the railroad is hardy mentioned, and one wonders why Benedek - who enjoyed an excellent rail net in Bohemia and Moravia - was constantly marching his troops to and fro instead of using rail lines to transfer troops rapidly.

The author's conclusions about the implications of the war are also striking, "the complete triumph of Prussian grand strategy in 1866 served to tighten the political connection between the Prusso-German state and army. After 1866, the example of Königgrätz suggested that Prussia-Germany could extend its influence and make vast annexations against any rival if only it struck fast and hard enough. This thinking, which originated with Clausewitz and Moltke, would be the basis of Prusso-German military strategy in 1870, 1914 and 1939." The author notes that other armies attempted to copy the Prussian military professional standards after Königgrätz, but none fully succeeded. Indeed, the Austrians failed to learn much from their defeat and in fact their military capabilities declined. However, one interesting question that the author does not ask is that given the demonstrated military incompetence of the Austrian and Italian armies in 1866, why did Prussia choose to later ally itself with such second-rate powers? In choice of weapons and tactics the Germans clearly excelled, but in choice of allies they were clearly inferior.

Vivid descriptions of the battles in this war enliven this historical work and make it very enjoyable reading. In addition, the author provides insightful information on the weapons and tactics of the period. This is especially true for the Austrian army and Wawro fully explains why the Austrians were so successful against the Italians while failing so miserably against the Prussians. The battle scenes are detailed and quite lively and unlike many other military works provide detail without confusion. So often when writing about the maneuvers of divisions, authors frequently become so mired in detail that the reader is easily lost and has considerable difficulty determing what was going on where without undue effort. Here the maps ably assist understanding. Although the maps do not provide a scale, an unfortunate reality for most current historical works, this problem can be overcome by referring to more detailed auto maps. As for referencing the written material to the maps I found no difficulty. However, for the military simulation enthusiast you will not find beautifully outlined and detailed orders of battle for each side. What you will find is adequate infomation in the text to simulate each battle as long as you know what the composition of say a Prussian division or an Austrian brigade. More detailed information is available from other sources. I only hope that this is not the last work by Wawro for after reading this book I would glady purchase any of his works.

This really is a great book. The author gices only the breifest description of the political events that preceded the war, but does go into a detailed description of the difference between the Prussian staff system and the Austrian old style system. The book concludes by showing how the Prussian staff system influenced the Germans in makeing their decisions through WW II. The only problem is that the maps were not clearly prepared. I found that this made the book somewhat hard to follow. In the paperback version that I have, the type size was somewhat small and hard to read. As the author was only able to use the Austrian achives, the Prussian archives were destroyed in WW II, he was able to go into more depth on the Austrian side of the war than the Prussian side.

People introduce Geoffrey Wawro?s The Austro-Prussian War as the first major work on the subject in twenty years. Well maybe I?m more unfamiliar with the field than I thought, but I don?t recall any book on the subject for a very long time. Wawo works to dispel myths regarding Prussian military efficiency and attribute Prussian?s victory in 1866 to the total ineptitude of Austria.

This is an important point, for by 1866 Austria was a great power in name only. The polyglot empire of a dozen languages and little common cultural heritage struggled with its own vastness and its failure to develop an industrial base that would support a military. Chapter by chapter, Wawro illustrates how unable Austria?s military commanders were (except when they faced the Italians, who were even less capable that themselves).

The book is not long, but at times Wawro belabors his point too much. He always finds new ways to describe Austrian bungling, whether it be appointing the wrong field generals or naming the wholly inept Benedek as the overall military leader. Prussia had its own detractors leading individual forces, but Moltke and Bismarck were fully capable as military/political leaders. Their plans worked in spite of those given the task of carrying them out.

The Austro-Prussian War is an important work that really sets the stage for Warwo?s most recent work on the Franco-Prussian War, which, presumably, he will carry forth the same thesis and apply it to other nations and personnel.

Having studied in Koniggratz (now Hradec Kralove in Czech Republic) for six years, the Austro Prussian war of 1866 has become my hobby. For a long time the work of Cordon Graig (Battle of Koniggratz) was the fundamental work, being now replaced by the book of Geoffrey Wawro, which I find great, pushing the topic one generation further. This work deserves praise, especially for its highly analytical perception of the campaign as a whole and clear and concise description of major battles. I would however point out some details with which I disagree, the interest might be in the fact that their are seen from local (i.e. Czech ) perspective.
1) The author uses German names for the sites, what is missing is the current Czech version of the names of these places. This makes it difficult to trace the battle in contemporary maps (after the unjust expulsion of 3 millions of Germans after WWII all towns and villages in Bohemia and Moravia are named in Czech only). Even here the author is not consequential enough and sometimes strangely uses Czech names instead of German ones (Jicin - Gitschin, Skalice - Skalitz,...).
2) The poisoning of wells mentioned in the text is very strange, I firmly believe that in that time (1866)this way of passive defence was not used. It was never very favorite in this part of Europe anyway.
3) The repeated allusions to the "good soldier Svejk" are completely misplaced in the context of this book. Svejk is a very popular book in our country, but it refers to another war and another situation. Typically enough, no Czech book about the subject of war of 1866 mentiones good soldier Svejk, as it is completely out of context. The author evidently wanted to give to his narrative some local flavour, unfortunately this one does not work too much.
4) The maps could have been less crude, but to give justice, without being too artistic, they manage to give the right perception about the development of the situation. I think however that a room for improvement in next edition is definitely here.
Summary : I highly recommend the Geoffrey Wawro book to anybody interested in this campaign, which (although a bit forgotten by now) played a crucial role in European history.

There is only one way to describe this book, serviceable. If you are interested in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, this book will appeal to you. Of course the issue of the war was not minor. The decision as to who would dominate the as yet divided states of Germany was decided, and Bismark's design for a united Germany under Prussian domination moved one step closer. The First World War became a little more inevitable with the Prussian victory, and also the fatal weakness of Austria, the ally in the Great War that the Prussia had defeated 38 years earlier, moved closer to becoming an albatross around Germany,s neck. Understand, however, that this book is primarily a military history of the war. You will find material here on the campaign against Prussia's junior ally Italy, the major actions between Austria and Prussia, and a two chapter treatment of Koniggratz. The naval aspects of the war are not covered and you will find no discussion of Lissa here.

"Geoffrey Wawro's meticulous analyses of battle make The Austro-Prussian War an important book; his pungent judgements make it a lively one." (TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, March 1997) "This is a very good book [on the war], perhaps the best that has appeared in any language." (THE JOURNAL OF MILITARY HISTORY, July 1997) "Wawro's treatment of the Austro-Prussian conflict shows how battles in this emerging Age of Firepower were actually fought, as opposed to how they were subsequently reconstructed by staff officers and general staff historians. He never allows his readers to forget the importance of the final 300 yards between the combatants." (INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW, November 1997). "Austria's war with Prussia and Italy in 1866 was arguably the most important six weeks in modern European history ... Unique in its treatment of the war's Italian campaign, usually neglected in other accounts, this work remorselessly catalogs Austria's errors ... It is an outstanding work, illustrating once again that operational military history can make important and enjoyable contributions to understanding the past." (CHOICE, January 1997) A selection of the HISTORY BOOK CLUB

I have no wish to criticise the writer- I moved on to this book after being very impressed by his work on the Franco-Prussian War, but I bought the paperback over the Internet and was shocked when it arrived- the print is very small and I had to struggle to read it with a magnifying glass. Cambridge should be ashamed of producing such a volume.

This is a superb book on a little known (in the US) conflict. Wawro goes into the major reasons why the war happened, and why Austria lost so badly. From Benedek (who disliked reading) to the illiterate conscripts whose main tactic was the bayonet charge, trying to fight well-drilled Prussians with breech loading rifles, Wawro presents a highly readable book. There is one oddity, where he says Benedek uses Jomini's theories, but most of the theories came out after Benedek had given up reading. That flaw is more than made up for by the excellent research and presentation. For people learning about the founding of modern Germany, this is an essential volume.

Taking a little-known topic like the Austro-Prussian (and Italian) War could have been just a futile academic exercise. Wawro turns this little book into a real treasure. Within just the first few pages he does a succinct and brilliant job of analyzing Clausewitz and Jomini and explaining the rise of Prussia to dominate Germany and Europe. The cover art doesn't do the book justice, but I'll be looking forward to Wawro's future work.