Backwater War: The Allied Campaign in Italy, 1943-45 (Stackpole Military History Series) [Paperback]

Edwin P. Hoyt (Author)

Book Description

Series: Stackpole Military History Series | Publication Date: January 15, 2007

A year before the much-heralded second front was opened in Normandy in 1944, the Allies waged a campaign in Sicily and Italy--an assault that was marked by intra-Allied argument and dissent from beginning to end. This is the story of the "backwater war" that resulted: a fierce, drawn-out campaign that began with the invasion of Sicily, continued with the landings at Salerno and Anzio in Italy, and included the controversial bombing of Monte Cassino.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"This sharp-edged, operationally focused narrative, aimed at a general audience, demonstrates the difficulties the Allies faced during the World War II Italian campaign while arguing strongly that the campaign itself was unnecessary, the result of confused strategic planning." -- Dennis Showalter

Book Description

Details the planning, execution, and implications of the Allied landings on the Italian peninsula.

--This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

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Product Details

• Paperback: 272 pages
• Publisher: Stackpole Books (January 15, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0811733823
• ISBN-13: 978-0811733823
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6 x 0.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 15.2 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.4 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (7 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,425,794 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

17 of 19 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars The Costly Mediterranean Diversion, February 14, 2003

By 

john m price, md (monroe, la United States) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Backwater War: The Allied Campaign in Italy, 1943-1945 (Hardcover)

Mr.Hoyt's book is a welcome and needed history of the conflict in Italy. Discussion of the motives,tactics,and deployment are thourough. What is of great interest to me is the enormous amount of discord regarding this operation among the allies-- Churchill was for it, Ike was at best lukewarm, the british generals wanted to run it as did the americans. Ultimately, the allies proceeded with it because of Italy's collapse and the perception of an easy victory, plus the inability to open a front in the west in 1943. What occured, unfortunately, was a very long war of attrition against a worthy opponent -- Field Marshall Kesselring and some of the better components of the wehrmacht. The germans were able to contain the allies in superb defensive positions at Cassino and also at Anzio, where inadequate numbers and lackluster leadership led to bloody stalemate. Despite winning the war elsewhere, Italy was indeed the "backwater" of the war with more troops and munitions going to the war in the west as well as public attention--the capture of Rome becoming a historical footnote on the day before D-day. General Clark's portrayal as a glory hound and someone more than willing to use his soldiers in the pursuit of this[Rapido River is a good, but not the only example ] is evident in this book. The campaign remained costly in human lives and suffering for objectives increasingly of questionable strategic value until the end of the war. It would appear in retrospect the campaign was the product of misguided British ambition and American indecision and naievity, a quagmire that once entered, they could not extricate themselves from. In addition, one has to wonder if the men and material expended could not have been used more judisciously elsewhere in the ETO. That is what I think Mr. Hoyt conveyed in this landmark work on the war in Italy. It should be in every military historians' armamentarium without a doubt. I might add that the individual heroism of american and other allied soldiers is not questioned - quite the contrary - only their use by allied leaders in Italy.

10 of 13 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Contends that the Normandy campaign was unduly costly, November 6, 2002

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Midwest Book Review (Oregon, WI USA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Backwater War: The Allied Campaign in Italy, 1943-1945 (Hardcover)

Backwater War: The Allied Campaign in Italy, 1943-1945 by independent historian and author Edwin P. Hoyt is a meticulous and exacting survey and analysis of the campaign waged by Allied forces in Sicily and Italy. Combining extensive detail and military theory, Hoyt forcefully contends that the Normandy campaign was both unduly costly and ultimately unnecessary, and that in the final analysis it lengthened an already devastating war. An intriguing analysis, Backwater War is an impressive and welcome contribution to personal reading lists and Military History collections.

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars Not Enough Preparation for This Campaign, August 28, 2011

By 

Aglooka (Temperate Zone) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Backwater War: The Allied Campaign in Italy, 1943-45 (Stackpole Military History Series) (Paperback)

This book appears to be somewhat interesting but proves largely disappointing. Its sources are mainly the standard official histories and memoirs of generals. Most of it consists of describing the movements of various military units, with almost no discussion of the experience of individual soldiers, and actually very little description of the feelings of the commanders. The various high-ranking officers and political leaders who directed the campaign are introduced without any information as to their character and background, apparently on the assumption that readers are already familiar with those details.
There are many indications that this book was thrown together hastily and with little review. It is loaded with misspellings, poor word division, repetition and the flat, perfunctory writing that reveals that it is essentially a condensation of official military histories. The most glaring evidence of the shoddy way this book was assembled is the total lack of maps. There is no map of the overall theater, showing general features such as terrain, cities and the various defensive lines; nor are there any detailed maps illustrating particular battles, although the text lists a multitude of rivers and hills that figured in the fighting. For this reason alone the book cannot be recommended.
The author makes occasional but inadequate gestures toward linking the Italian campaign with developments elsewhere in the war. Because of this, it is sometimes difficult to understand the larger strategic considerations that influenced events in Italy. On the other hand, he is almost obsessive in stressing differences of opinion between the British and Americans. Probably this becomes exaggerated, though it is a topic that remains debatable. Hoyt often acknowledges fundamental questions as to whether the Italian campaign (and for that matter the Cross-Channel invasion and a projected attack in the Balkans) were ultimately necessary or beneficial; but he seems to come down on all sides of these issues.
Also largely lacking is a discussion of German strategy and objectives. In essence, their strategy was defensive during the entire campaign. Though they often conducted it effectively, it is hard to see how this could ever accomplish more than delaying the end. How could it become a strategy of victory? One of the interesting factors brought out in this book is that, until the closing months of the war, the Allies seldom enjoyed great numerical superiority in Italy; nor did they generally deploy overwhelming material superiority. Command of the air was undoubtedly an important factor. Nevertheless, from Sicily onward, the Allies always retained the strategic initiative. German counter-thrusts were always essentially defensive and limited in nature; they did not represent an effort to reverse the course of the campaign. We see the same situation on the Eastern Front, where after the Kursk battle the Soviets gained and never lost the strategic initiative, although they did not always possess the overwhelming numerical advantage that is commonly assumed. The supposed greater experience and combat skill of the Wehrmacht was apparently not decisive.
Questions of this kind require a book that is more than a hasty compilation. Backwater War seems appealing at first because it covers an entire complex campaign of more than two years, but it falls far short of its promise.