Customer Reviews

Backwater War: The Allied Campaign in Italy, 1943-45 (Stackpole Military History Series)

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Mr.Hoyt's book is a welcome and needed history of the conflict in Italy. Discussion of the motives,tactics,and deployment are thourough. What is of great interest to me is the enormous amount of discord regarding this operation among the allies-- Churchill was for it, Ike was at best lukewarm, the british generals wanted to run it as did the americans. Ultimately, the allies proceeded with it because of Italy's collapse and the perception of an easy victory, plus the inability to open a front in the west in 1943. What occured, unfortunately, was a very long war of attrition against a worthy opponent -- Field Marshall Kesselring and some of the better components of the wehrmacht. The germans were able to contain the allies in superb defensive positions at Cassino and also at Anzio, where inadequate numbers and lackluster leadership led to bloody stalemate. Despite winning the war elsewhere, Italy was indeed the "backwater" of the war with more troops and munitions going to the war in the west as well as public attention--the capture of Rome becoming a historical footnote on the day before D-day. General Clark's portrayal as a glory hound and someone more than willing to use his soldiers in the pursuit of this[Rapido River is a good, but not the only example ] is evident in this book. The campaign remained costly in human lives and suffering for objectives increasingly of questionable strategic value until the end of the war. It would appear in retrospect the campaign was the product of misguided British ambition and American indecision and naievity, a quagmire that once entered, they could not extricate themselves from. In addition, one has to wonder if the men and material expended could not have been used more judisciously elsewhere in the ETO. That is what I think Mr. Hoyt conveyed in this landmark work on the war in Italy. It should be in every military historians' armamentarium without a doubt. I might add that the individual heroism of american and other allied soldiers is not questioned - quite the contrary - only their use by allied leaders in Italy.

Backwater War: The Allied Campaign in Italy, 1943-1945 by independent historian and author Edwin P. Hoyt is a meticulous and exacting survey and analysis of the campaign waged by Allied forces in Sicily and Italy. Combining extensive detail and military theory, Hoyt forcefully contends that the Normandy campaign was both unduly costly and ultimately unnecessary, and that in the final analysis it lengthened an already devastating war. An intriguing analysis, Backwater War is an impressive and welcome contribution to personal reading lists and Military History collections.

This book appears to be somewhat interesting but proves largely disappointing. Its sources are mainly the standard official histories and memoirs of generals. Most of it consists of describing the movements of various military units, with almost no discussion of the experience of individual soldiers, and actually very little description of the feelings of the commanders. The various high-ranking officers and political leaders who directed the campaign are introduced without any information as to their character and background, apparently on the assumption that readers are already familiar with those details.
There are many indications that this book was thrown together hastily and with little review. It is loaded with misspellings, poor word division, repetition and the flat, perfunctory writing that reveals that it is essentially a condensation of official military histories. The most glaring evidence of the shoddy way this book was assembled is the total lack of maps. There is no map of the overall theater, showing general features such as terrain, cities and the various defensive lines; nor are there any detailed maps illustrating particular battles, although the text lists a multitude of rivers and hills that figured in the fighting. For this reason alone the book cannot be recommended.
The author makes occasional but inadequate gestures toward linking the Italian campaign with developments elsewhere in the war. Because of this, it is sometimes difficult to understand the larger strategic considerations that influenced events in Italy. On the other hand, he is almost obsessive in stressing differences of opinion between the British and Americans. Probably this becomes exaggerated, though it is a topic that remains debatable. Hoyt often acknowledges fundamental questions as to whether the Italian campaign (and for that matter the Cross-Channel invasion and a projected attack in the Balkans) were ultimately necessary or beneficial; but he seems to come down on all sides of these issues.
Also largely lacking is a discussion of German strategy and objectives. In essence, their strategy was defensive during the entire campaign. Though they often conducted it effectively, it is hard to see how this could ever accomplish more than delaying the end. How could it become a strategy of victory? One of the interesting factors brought out in this book is that, until the closing months of the war, the Allies seldom enjoyed great numerical superiority in Italy; nor did they generally deploy overwhelming material superiority. Command of the air was undoubtedly an important factor. Nevertheless, from Sicily onward, the Allies always retained the strategic initiative. German counter-thrusts were always essentially defensive and limited in nature; they did not represent an effort to reverse the course of the campaign. We see the same situation on the Eastern Front, where after the Kursk battle the Soviets gained and never lost the strategic initiative, although they did not always possess the overwhelming numerical advantage that is commonly assumed. The supposed greater experience and combat skill of the Wehrmacht was apparently not decisive.
Questions of this kind require a book that is more than a hasty compilation. Backwater War seems appealing at first because it covers an entire complex campaign of more than two years, but it falls far short of its promise.

To say Edwin Hoyt's history of the Italian campaign was an interesting read would be quite an overstatement. While the book is accurate and informative, the writing style is very dry and often monotonous. That said, it still provides a concise history of the war on Italian soil from 1943 to 1945. Though there is little in the way of embellishment or focus on specific events, a clear picture of the strategies, politics and battles that made up the campaign is created.

Titled "Backwater War," Hoyt's contends that Italy was relatively unimportant in the overall scheme of the war. In many ways, the title is apt considering the British and American armies were undersupplied and undermanned for most of the war due to the invasion of France that would come in 1944. The Allied forces on Italy suffered as a result of the cross channel invasion, and as a result were quite slow in making any progress on the peninsula.

Hoyt begins his work with a typically quick explanation of Allied policy and planning that went into the Italian war. His first theme, which reappears time and again, is the infighting that occurred between the British and American high commands prior to the invasion of Sicily. The British and Churchill in particular were adamant upon a strike against Italy prior to the invasion of France. Eisenhower and General Marshall were very reluctant to accede to the British insistence. They believed the campaign would accomplish little and drain resources away from the main portion of their army.

After reading Hoyt's history, I would have to agree with the British. No one knows how the invasion would have turned out if Italy have never been attacked, but the campaign provided the Allies with a few key strategic victories. Following the fall of Sicily and the surrender of most of the Italian army there, Italy deposed Mussolini and became a chaotic state. With the country in disarray, Hitler was forced to divert men and materiels meant for the Eastern and Western Fronts to Italy, and effectively take over the country. This is exactly what the British meant when they referred to the "soft underbelly of the axis." The resulting confusion was quite a hindrance to the Nazi regime, so in effect, the British were proven right. The Allies also gained valuable experience in the field, learning how to coordinate their armies together.

After a brief but hard fight on Sicily, Allied forces landed in Italy across the strait of Messina, at Taranto and Salerno. After a link up of American and British forces, the Germans pulled back to a series of defensive lines anchored in the rugged mountains, the most formidable and long lasting being the Gustav line. Allied forces bogged down from November of 1943 until May of the following year, unable to move past the formidable Monte Cassino, which held the entrance to the critical Liri Valley. Following the landing at Anzio north of the Gustav line, and the link up with the surrounded beachhead, the American Fifth Army took Rome on June 5. The Germans pulled back to the next defensive position north of Florence, the Gothic Line. Operation Olive broke the line before it could be consolidated in late August, with the British 8th Army driving up the Adriatic coast, but the Germans quickly regrouped, and the Allies decided to hold their position for the winter. By the following Spring, the war was all but over; the Gothic line broke at the end of April and three weeks later, the war in Italy, and the rest of Europe was finished. The War in Italy was a bitter fight, often reverting back to trench warfare of World War I, but the strategic victories won by the allies spread the Germans too thin, and helped hasten the end of the war through a faster invasion of France and Germany.

Mr Hoyt has written a concise, informative summary that is so engaging that if you have any interest in the subject, you'll find it hard to put it down. The book starts in Dec 1941, right after the Pearl Harbor disaster, when Churchill travels to Washington and convinces FDR to go against his military advisers and go with the Germany first policy. From that point on, the two countries will argue and try to manipulate the other on strategy for the rest of the war.
The author will continue his story past the Sicily landings, Salerno, the Anzio / Rapido debacle, the liberation of Rome to the very end of the war. In his unique way, the author renders history of this campaign in its unvarnished reality with its many snafus and few highlights.

He will clearly show:
The series of Allied arguments in determining if the Med is the correct front to attack.
That the British dominated the Casablanca Conference, installing a completely British staff to freeze Eisenhower from any true authority.
That Churchill and Alexander truly didn't understand the scope of the Med campaign would evolve into.
The distrust by Alexander of the US fighting capability after North Africa and how it will effect his future planning.
The extremely poor Allied planning of Operation Husky that allowed the Germans to escape. Montgomery squashed a fair plan for a poor one so he could control Patton and allow himself the honor of taking Messina. After the changes Tedder and Cunningham became reluctant participants.
That the long delay from defeating the Axis in North Africa and the July invasion gave Kesselring time to reinforce Sicily and Italy.
That the changing of the battle plan by Montgomery on Sicily was at the expense of Patton's 7th Army and the Allied effort.
The unpreparedness of the Allies in negotiating with Italy for it's surrender was extremely costly.
That Churchill was definitely the one to revive Operation Shingle from a slow death.
That at first Clark didn't realize the trouble the Salerno beachhead was in for those first few days.
That it was a constant daily uphill battle to win a few feet of ground at the expense of many casualties.
That it can also be said the Germans were equally successful in tying down the Allied forces in Italy.
That Stalin favored Overlord over Italy not for its win possibilities but for it would keep the bulk of Allied forces away from Eastern Europe.
There is so much more to learn from this book.

There is few personal experiences shared and as an overview there is not much depth to the engagements but there are engagements, rivers, terrain and towns discussed that I haven't found in full length books.
There are photos, an Order of Battle, a modest Notes section, Bibliography and an Index but there are no maps. By studying the Bibliography, you'll know that much of the materials used are from primary US Army records. The few secondary sources are from noted historians. As a summary this is a five star effort but it can't compete with the full length books by D'Este, Blumenson or Atkinson but it would be ideal for new or casual readers to quickly gain the essentials.
If you're looking for a reliable political and operational summary of this important campaign thats brief but highly informative, you should definitely consider this book.

The British (read Churchill) wanted to battle up the Italian boot and then move into both Yugoslavia and Austria to prevent the Russians from turning this area 'red'. But most of the time, the Allies were fighting a determined enemy who had superior numbers and was fighting from prepared defenses. It's a truism of war that you need to outnumber the enemy by 3 to 1 if you are going to attack a fortified position. During most of the second half of the Battle for Italy, the Allies were lucky to be on an even level with the Germans. Any time the Allies looked to make a big 'breakthrough', the Germans fought a rear-guard defense and moved back to the next prepared position.

Even before the capture of Rome (on June 5, 1944) the best troops and equipment were being readied for the Cross-Channel Assault, and then in September a good portion of the armor and artillery were used for the invasion of southern France. The American Fifth Army kept getting smaller and wasn't getting replacements, the French were using North African troops and the British were using Poles, Canadians, Indians, South African, New Zealand and even Palestinian Arabs and Jews.

After Normandy, the only ones who were interested in Italy were Hitler and Churchill. When the British commander asked for additional troops for an attack on one of the formidable German Lines, London told him to recruit Italians. The sad part of this part of the European war was that the Allies kept up the pressure in Italy to ties down German troops that could have been used against the Russian or Allies. Especially egregious was the 'Spring Offensive' of 1945, where an aggressive stance wasn't necessary and men dies for no reason except to keep the Generals busy.

There are two major problems with this book.
1) It is totally mindboggling that there is NOT one map in this book. Hoyt constantly is referring to cities and rivers and lines of defense but not one is ever shown. It's hard to visualize the problems of the troops without seeing the actual areas they fought over. In the area of Northern Italy south of the Po Valley, the Allies crossed multiple rivers (sometimes as many as ten) to get to the next fortified line. It would have made the book much more enjoyable if you could see the terrain they fought over. Totally unacceptable not to have maps.

2) Hoyt shows his bias by constantly following the British and treating the Americans like secondary troops. Considering how poorly the British did with their constant 'set-piece' strategies out of the Great War (though they did succeed in running up the casualties) more attention to the Americans, French, etc. would have made the book more interesting. He also does a terrible (should I say bigoted) job of describing the fighting of the 92nd (colored) Division. If they fought as poorly as Hoyt says, how do you explain that they won 2 CME, 1 DSC, 2 DSM, and over 3500 other medals.

Zeb Kantrowitz

What great difference between from these weaks and partials works of "history" and the memoirs of those who were on (allieds or not) on Italian front, most of these works first printed on 1960's or those made by academics.
Anyway is essential to Anyone who take this subject seriously read many fonts as possible not just wrote by whiteamericans, but black too as japanese descendents and of course from other nationalities involved on the question like Germans, British, Poles, Brazilians, Italians etc etc