"Free Trade" has been progressively wrecking America's economy for at least two decades. Meanwhile, economists in our colleges continue, almost without exception, to warn of protectionism while extolling the writings of Adam Smith and David Ricardo - written long before today's gross wage imbalance between Asia and the U.S., instant communications, and fast, economical international transportation. Finally, a Cambridge economist, Ha Joon Chang, brings facts and common sense to the debate - aided considerably by the free-trade ignoring successes of his native country, South Korea - eg. Samsung, and Pohang Iron and Steel. (And then there's Toyota - started out in textiles, was protected by auto tariffs, and now the world's #1 auto manufacturer and teacher of advanced management techniques.)
"Bad Samaritans," as Chalmers Johnson points out, refers to "people in the rich countries who preach free markets and free trade to the poor countries in order to capture larger shares of the latter's markets and preempt the emergence of possible competitors." They are saying "do as we say, not as we did" and take advantage of others who are in trouble. He also points out that all of today's rich countries (INCLUDING the U.S.) used protection and subsidies to encourage their manufacturing industries - anathema in today's economic orthodoxy and contrary to the WTO, IMF, and World Bank. As a result, third-world nations' growth rates have fallen to less than half of that recorded in the 1960s (1.7 percent instead of 4.5 percent).
As for corruption being incompatible with high growth, Chang points to Zaire vs. Indonesia. Both suffered from murderous corruption, yet the former's living standards fell two-thirds while Indonesia's tripled. The difference was that corruption funds in Zaire fled to Swiss banks, while those in Indonesia remained in the country to help create additional jobs.
"Level playing field" rhetoric is often used to justify WTO and IMF prescriptions. Chang, however, reminds us that this is inconsistent with our practice of segregating sports by size and age, and that it is similarly unrealistic to expect eg. Honduras to compete evenly with the U.S.
Capital markets have a bias towards short-term gains, not risky, large-scale projects with long gestations. This is especially pronounced in the earliest stages of development - thus, government support is kick-starting, not replacing capitalism. In France, Renault, Alcatel, Thomson, etc. used to be SOEs. Brazil's EMBRAER was also, and the state (lower Saxony) is VW's largest shareholder. Taiwan began with key industries owned by the state; even after 1996 privatization the government maintains a controlling stake (average = 35%) and appoints 60% of their directors.
Absent government support in developing economies is akin to becoming frozen in the status quo. Break-out requires government intervention, including subsidies, tariffs, regulation (eg. maintain quality), infrastructure, prohibiting exportation of raw materials, exempting imported raw materials from tariffs, currency controls. IMF, WTO, and World Bank decrees associated with loans have been a disaster.
Communists early-on saw private ownership as not just the source of distributive injustice but also economic inefficiency. Too many capitalists routinely invested in the same things because they did not know their competitors' plans, or overestimated future potential. Communism failed as a system, but that does not demonstrate that SOEs don't work. Conservatives argue that the imbalance of information between principals and agents makes it very difficult to appropriately pay/incentive managers. The 'free-rider' problem also essentially eliminates citizen monitoring. 'Soft budget constraints' (mid-year added subsidies) is another problem impeding SOEs, per conservatives. Change, however, contends these same problems confront private enterprise, with the 'soft-budget' issue becoming 'too big to fail,' and the 'Greenspan put.'
China's TVEs are a hybrid ownership form - owned by local authorities but usually operated as if privately owned by powerful political figures.
SOEs can be ideal where 'natural monopolies' exist - utilities, railroads, communications, etc. where the main cost is that of a distribution network. Assuring equity is another reason - eg. mail service in rural areas. Regulation is an alternative, but not always satisfactory - eg. California's electricity deregulation, England's defacto re-nationalization of rail tracks. Corrupt SOEs are difficult to sell off without even greater corruption (eg. Russia); privatization of natural monopolies without appropriate regulation can bring new problems (eg. Bolivia's 1994 sale of a water company to Bechtel brought a tripling of rates, riots, and re-nationalization). SOE performance can often be improved without privatization by simplifying and prioritizing goals. Simplifying regulation by consolidating agencies is another alternative. Requiring SOEs to export and compete internationally or setting up another SOE for competition also are used. There are no hard and fast answers as to when an SOE is best.
Chang also points out the strong agricultural subsidies in Europe (milk), the U.S. (corn), and Japan (rice). The good news is that these subsidies keep farming viable in those areas and the nations involved more independent; the bad news is that U.S. corn is exported to Mexico - making economic survival impossible for their farmers and driving them to illegal immigration into the U.S.
Free-trade reduction of tariff revenues also plays undermines national budgets in poor countries because they lack efficient tax collection capabilities and tariffs are the easiest taxes to collect. Combined with free-trade-caused damage, the struggling nations are left far less able to fund health care and education for their citizens.
Still another Chang insight is his pointing out that pursuit of copyrights and patents are simply a sophisticated form of protectionism that again works against third-world nations by preventing their starting important new industries (eg. drug manufacture) that boost not only their economy but citizens' health as well. (97% of all patents and the vast majority of copyrights are held by rich countries - these are also a special problem for poor countries wanting textbooks. IMF also insists on enforcement mechanisms, further adding costs to poor nations.) Chang sees the U.S. as the worst offender in this area. Chang asserts that self-development of new technology is difficult in third-world nations, using North and South Korea as examples. North Korea has tried to be self-sufficient (and done poorly), while South Korea has assiduously copied wherever possible and is now an industrial powerhouse.
Chang suggests that third-world countries use tariffs to protect their developing industries. However, he does not propose that the U.S. do likewise - perhaps in his next book. Nonetheless, "Bad Samaritans" punches enough holes in free trade thinking to help others rethink America's self-destructive commitment to it.