Customer Reviews

Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War

5 star:		(2)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

Woodward, a scholar at the Brookings Institution, argues provocatively, but convincingly, that the breakup of Yugoslavia and the resulting ethnic conflict was _not_ inevitable and could have been avoided if the West had given more support to leaders within Yugoslavia (e.g. Ante Markovic) who wanted to promote democracy as well as free-market economic policies. She directly challenges the conventional wisdom articulated by the more readable and widely read "Balkan Ghosts" that history and culture made conflict in Yugoslavia inevitable. The complex and lengthy text of Woodward's book may deter some, but the highly nuanced arguments will prove fertile ground for those who want to better understand the causes of ethnic conflict both in Yugoslavia and more generally

I read this book at the recommendation of a Yugoslav friend who says he agrees with 95% of what the author says, as opposed to agreeing with only about 5% of most other books on the subject. I'm glad I read the book-- she gives you loads of good data-- but she has a lousy writing style and manages to make a fascinating subject pretty dull. You have to be really determined to learn about Yugoslavia, or you won't make it through the book. Also, don't try it unless you already have a good basic grasp of the area's history and the general outline of events in past ten years or so.

The book sometimes hides its thesis behind detail, and is not easy to follow. It was finished for the press before the Croat offensive of Spring 1995, and loses some perspective in consequence. Hence only four stars! It is very thoroughly researched (not just full of footnotes), and it is one of the very few books on the Bosnian war which doesn't simply pick heroes and villains - which has, of course, led to it being denounced as pro-Serb. Woodward's main line is that the basis of conflict was 'the economy, stupid'. Successive blunders in the terms of IMF loans, and misjudged changes in the federal constitution, set the constituent republics against each other. Misunderstanding of the issues (and German/Austrian favouritism to Balkan clients) led the European powers into grossly unprincipled and utopian interventions. The federation was levered apart, while preserving intact the constituent republics. This was a 'solution' to the wrong set of problems. The United States, continually encouraging the Bosnian Muslims to wait for the NATO fairy to rescue them (it didn't), completed the sorry work of war-making - though this last element is better documented elsewhere (e.g. in Rose's _Fighting for Peace_). I don't agree with all of the author's opinions. In particular, I think national allegiances run deeper and history is more relevant than she wants to believe. But it is a serious attempt to rescue this piece of contemporary history from self-indulgent moral one-upmanship and propaganda saturation. If only Woodward could write as well as Ivo Banac!

Excellent, balanced, credible and more importantly- SCHOLARLY analysis of the Balkan conflicts. Woodward's in-depth study blows away the simplistic answers other writers have offered to solving the extremely complex problems in the region. A good critique of current US foreign policy in the former Yugoslavia. Can't wait for her next book!

Although very dated at this point, with no consideration given to the crucial 1995 military operations in Croatia and then Bosnia and the ensuing Dayton Accords in a revised and updated edition, "Balkan Tragedy" is still a somewhat useful source because it provides considerable in-depth analysis of the underlying economic and structural causes of Yugoslavia's break-up. Woodward also tries to broaden the scope of her analysis to consider the ways in which the wider international context influenced events in the former Yugoslavia and even fomented their intensification. However, while this approach does clarify many events that occurred after the wars in Croatia and Bosnia had already begun, Woodward does not quite succeed in providing completely credible explanations for the actual origins of the Yugoslav crisis. Despite the hefty text, extensive research and copious footnotes, one can't escape the feeling that Woodward's approach is at times piecemeal (to paraphrase her former boss, the tragicomical Yasushi Akashi), primarily when dealing with the international players (from the IMF to the EU and U.S. State Department) who she insists bear a great deal of the responsibility for the Yugoslav tragedy. For while she often provides detailed explanations of the political and economic factors and pressures at play within the former Yugoslavia and their impact on decision-making and political events (which often seems to exonerate the various Yugoslav leaders of their culpability for concrete abuses of power and war crimes), she does not similarly analyze the economic/structural aspects and motivations guiding the foreign policies of the various outside powers which could have and eventually did influence Yugoslav events - even though her approach would seem to demand such consideration. Regardless of the degree of complicity of international players in the Yugoslav tragedy (and it was great), the prime responsibility for the political breakdown and course of Yugoslavia's dissolution lies with the various post-Yugoslav leaders (some more than others). After all, they made the decisions on how to respond to and/or manipulate international (primarily economic) pressures and domestic (often nationalistic) tensions, and this is not made sufficiently clear in Woodward's book.

A book with no thesis that fails to offer any new insight into the Balkan War.