Customer Reviews

The Barbary Corsairs: Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1480-1580

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While there are many problems with this book, probably the biggest problem of all results from simple academic lethargy. While the author makes extensive use of Western European source, there are NO original Turkish sources used or cited! How can this be? This lack of original sources impacts the book by making it essentially a 'history' of European reaction to the activities of the corsairs, and not really about the corsairs at all. Most of the references and descriptions regarding the the city of Algiers and the other corsair bases are often irrelevant to the issue at hand, especially if that issue is the corsairs themselves, because the corsairs by all accounts constituted very much a separate entity unto themselves. Further, while the period discussed, 1480-1580 certainly involved significant activity, the corsairs were very active right up until the early 19th century, managing to get into active conflict with virtually every major European power, and the Americans as well. In fact, the period covered really doesn't deal with the corsairs as such, but with the activities of the Turkish Navy under orders from the Sultan. Only after the period discussed (post-Barbarossa brothers) do the corsairs begin seriously independent activity. In addition, although this purports to be a book about corsairs, virtually nothing is mentioned about their ships (galleys, xebecs, galliots, and a wide variety of other Mediterranean craft), their advantages, liabilities and uses. What makes this particularly egregious is the fact that there are some excellent sources for this kind of information from several modern French authors (Jean Boudriot comes to mind). As these craft are generally unknown outside of the Mediterranean area, it would be most beneficial for something to be said on this topic. Finally, the conclusions the author comes to vis a' vis the corsairs in comparison with the well-known pirates and privateers of the Caribbean are ludicrous at best! Caribbean pirates were often well-organised and formed fleets for large-scale land operations, just as did the corsairs. A quick look at the sacking of Panama, Cartegena, Maracaibo, Vera Cruz, Bahia, Santiago, Campeche, Portobelo, and many others, and all by large numbers of pirate ships operating in concert should indicate that these were not the actions of a few isolated sociopaths. And certainly there were a number of New World cities based on piracy as a major part of the economy, as well as semi-official collusion with European governments too. In any case, it appears that the definitive work on the subject of the Barbary Corsairs has yet to be written, and will apparently continue to be missing until someone bright spark decides to learn Turkish and go through the extensive records found in Istanbul.

I found this book to be a decent, but rather dry, read about an interesting period. The first thing to note is that this book only covers the period 1480-1580, so those interested in, for instance, the US dealings with the Barbary States in the 18th Century should look elsewhere.

While this book provides decent coverage of the historical events and personages in the relevant period and of the complex relationship between Christian and Muslim of this period, the book suffers from its organization: the first few chapters essentially run through a rather dry history of the period (X did so and so in year Y, etc.) with later chapters dedicated to overall topics such as "The Africa of the Corsairs", "Slavery", and "War and Propaganda." While the material in these final chapters is pretty interesting, the book as a whole would have been much more engrossing if the materials in these chapters would have been woven into the hisorical account instead of simply lumped into seperate chapters.

It is difficult to find in one book, apparently well written, so many crucial historical mistakes.
Just a few examples. The galleys denoted as belonging to Savona, then a small port of no consequence, were actually of the duke of Savoy.
During the war of Cyprus the Turks that landed in the island were at least 100.000 and not 2.000; Nicosia was lost to the Venetian in 1570 and the long siege that lasted until August 1571 was against Famagusta, defended by Marcantonio Bragadin, Astorre Baglioni and Luigi Martinengo.
In that period Sebastiano Venier was Provveditore of the island of Corfù and so he could not have been the commander of the Venetian fleet. Sebastiano Venier, in all his life, was never reluctant to attack, as it was clearly shown later in the battle of Lepanto.
As far as this battle is concerned Heers ignores that the victory, as acknowledged by Don Juan of Austria himself, was mainly due to the six Venetian galleasses.
Without any doubt Jaques Heers is an excellent professor of Medioeval History: not so, at least reading this book, of Modern History.