From Publishers Weekly
How can both sides in a dispute avoid the heavy costs of a protracted struggle likely to produce a mutually unsatisfying outcome? The trick, according to the participants in this multidisciplinary symposium, lies in overcoming barriers such as overconfidence, "hardball" bargaining tactics, reluctance to swap concessions, concealing one's true interests and unwarranted inferences about the other party. An outgrowth of a conference held in 1991 at Stanford University (where Arrow directs Stanford's Center on Conflict and Negotiation), this collection of scholarly papers uses examples from labor-management disputes, business deals, arms-control negotiations, environmental treaties and legislative debates, buttressed by game theory, cognitive psychology, economics and behavioral decision theory. One essay looks at how lawyers exacerbate their clients' conflicts and suggests potential areas of cooperation. Another article explores the role of third-party mediators in resolving disputes. Negotiators, policy makers and professionals in many fields will find here useful strategies and insights.
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