Customer Reviews

Basic Instinct: The Genesis of Behavior

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This book is a must-read for all broadly interested in the origins of behavior and specifically for those interested the long-standing controversy of nature vs. nurture. In the book thoughtful arguments are made against the idea of inborn behaviors and each arguement is presented with examples that help to unravel what at face value seem to be prime examples of instincts. Nativists beware.

Nativism is the view that many complex behaviors are direct developmental expressions of the organism's genetic constitution, provided the organism experiences a normal environment. Anti-nativism is the view that complex behaviors are virtually always the product of complex epigenetic dynamics. Stephen Pinker is a prime example of a nativist, and Blumberg of a passionate anti-nativist.

The debate between these two positions has a long intellectual lineage, and there is no sign of a let-up, despite the huge increase in our understanding of the brain and of developmental processes in the past quarter century. Each side has executed seeming deadly thrusts against the other, only to see the other bounce back, better armed then ever.

When a scientific dispute such as this leads such an extended existence, one suspects that there is a reinterpretation in which each is correct. Such was the case, for instance, in the ancient debate about the wave vs. particle nature of light.

Blumberg's strongest anti-nativist thrust in this book is the story of several dramatic claims by nativists that human infants, without experience, are primed to mimic facial movements, to understand basic physical laws, and to have the concept of number. Blumberg's account of the evidence against these nativist views is quite persuasive.

Blumberg does not closely analyze what is perhaps the most compelling case for a nativist behavior in humans: the structure of language. This nativist argument that human language as genetically encoded, a view that goes back to Chomsky in the mid-Twentieth century, is treated by Blumberg in a perfunctory and uncompelling manner. Blumberg explains the evidence that there is a "universal grammar" (UG) exhibited by all known languages and learned rapidly by children in all but the most deprived environments, by saying that all current languages are offshoots of a single "primordial" language spoken by our common ancestors. There is certainly no evidence of such a primordial language, and to assert this is the sort of "just-so" reasoning that Blumberg rightly criticizes. Blumberg claims that language creates linguistic capability developmentally, which would be at least plausible were the primordial language argument correct. But, it is not. Moreover, Blumberg does not even mention the many cases in which societies without language (e.g., deaf children who never learned sign language, or a mixture of ethnicities that use a pidgin discourse that does not conform to the UG, and is indeed much more primitive) develop a UG-conformant language within a generation. There are certainly linguists who agree with Blumberg's anti-nativist position on language, but I believe Blumberg sides with this minority view simply to present a united anti-nativist position.

A possible way to adjudicate the differences between nativists and their opponents is to assert that the nativist's "normal environment" may itself be a complex product of interaction between developing individuals and the epigenetic structures they face as well as create. A close, fine-grained look at the emergence of complex behaviors thus follows the epigenetic models, while a coarser look fits the nativist preconception. This view is very likely in the case of language, and may apply in many other cases. Nativists should be comfortable with this adjudication, and it appears to me to satisfy the criticism of the anti-nativists.

The nail in the coffin of nativism would be the verification that in many or most cases, there are novel environments that allow organisms to develop extremely novel, yet fitness-enhancing behaviors, through learning and/or adjustment of population gene frequencies. I believe this probably false for most species, but is the case for some complex human traits, and perhaps for some traits in non-human primates (behavior in captivity, for instance, may be very different that in the wild for some species).

One of the most dramatic applications of nativism to humans is the Evolutionary Psychology notion, promoted by Pinker, David Buss, and many others, that contemporary humans have an advanced technological environment, but are still possessed of a "stone-age mind" that prevents us from achieving our most cherished ethical ideals. While there may be some complex human behaviors that fit this description, mostly likely most do not. This does not mean, however, that the "blank slate" view of the human mind, bitterly criticized by Lida Cosmides, John Tooby, Stephen Pinker, and other evolutionary psychologists, is in the least bit plausible. It is not. The fact that there may be different environments that elicit (through a dynamic exchange of genetic and epigenetic forces) novel behaviors does not mean that for every behavior, there is an environment that will elicit that behavior.

To this outsider (I am an economist, not a psychologist), the extremely primitive level at which this debate is carried out is indicative of the primitive state of modern cognitive psychology. The brain is an exceedingly complex piece of nature and modern psychology has an exceedingly primitive understanding of its functioning. Studying modern psychology, one learns many facts and gains many insights. But, there is no theory there, and there is no theory on the horizon at the present moment, despite fMRI and other new techniques for probing the physiology of thought. In the absence of a common theory to which we all adhere by force of its explanatory value, we have the sort of tempests in a teapot exhibited by the nativist/anti-nativist controversy.

The debate over the origins of behavior, nature vs. nurture, genes vs. environment, has occupied the scientific community for many decades. In this book, Blumberg manages to navigate the rough waters of the debate by using well-thought-out examples to illustrate the roles of both genes and the environment at all stages of development. While this book may not provide a definitive definition of the word instinct, it will certainly allow the reader to understand the terms of the debate, give valuable background on why the word alone raises such passions on all sides, and, by the end the reader will understand why a simple explanation of instinct is impossible to give.

More and more, we read and hear about the claims made by some scientists who espouse that our behaviors are fully mature at birth. But as clearly discussed in this highly engaging and well-written book, these claims simply aren't true. The author gives many fine examples of the science that disputes these assertions, but I'll discuss just one.

Nativists (people like Steven Pinker who think that animals do not develop "instincts" but are born with them) believe that newborn infants can imitate. For example: a baby sticks out his tongue after an adult does the same thing. The fact is, babies do this a lot, but not because they are born with the ability to imitate. Rather, the author explains, it has been proven that babies stick out their tongues for a much simpler reason: before a baby is developmentally able to reach for things with his hands, he explores the world with his tongue.

Expositions such as this one fill this very insightful book. Replete with the inquiries and discoveries that have helped to illuminate the origins of development, this book is wonderful for readers who love to learn and get to the bottom of mysteries. Highly recommended!

This book tries to clear away lots of "bedtime stories for adults" and to return the inquiry into the origins of behavior to a scientific basis. Science should have both an empirical basis, and predictive power. The nativists theories, as described by Blumberg, have neither characteristic -- they are based on over-interpretation and extrapolation from poorly designed experiments.

I largely agree with the Publisher's Weekly review. The highlight of this book for me is the contrast the author draws between many well designed experiments whose goal is to gain a detailed mechanistic understanding of the roots of behavior, and the overreaching of the nativist school. The detailed description of experimental design is also one of the highlights of the author's previous book, Body Heat, that I also heartily endorse.

Excellent read on the origins of behavior. This well written treatise is chock full of great examples of how behavior can develop and also how easily we forget about parsimony. Maybe at first glance saying a "complex" behavior is innate or instinctual seems more simple but when you take the next step to understanding it you may as well start looking for Santa. Also, this book couldn't have come at a better time as the intelligent design craze is really taking off. Maybe this should become required reading for public schools too!

When we bandy about such familiar terms as "instinct," "innate" and "inherited behaviors" are we saying anything meaningful, or are we merely using vague catchphrases that give a false semblance of understanding? Blumberg develops his case against nativism in an incisive and cogent way, showing the extent to which research in the fields of developmental psychology, ethology and evolutionary psychology has been an imbroglio of false assumptions, naïve explanations, illogic, and high sounding language, much of it lacking substance. Drawing on eye opening research in animal and human behavior, Blumberg exposes the failings of the nativists and evolutionary psychologists in their search for innate behaviors and neural modules. Blumberg takes us beyond the trappings of language to the intriguing complexity of behavior development and non-genetic modes of inheritance. He shows the falsity of simplistic causal notions such as genes being "programmed for" or "controlling" behavior. He rightly recognizes the wall of opposition he is up against, since the nativist view is a popular sell--we are enamored by easily digested explanations of how our genes determine who we are, our traits, our ability to reason, and our use of language. Contrary to what one reviewer has stated, nowhere does Blumberg suggest that natural selection cannot impact on our genes. What he demonstrates is that the processes are more involved and bidirectional than the naïve conception of organisms as having genes "for" complex behaviors like, for example, a sharp memory or being a good typist. As Blumberg clearly states:

"inheritance does not necessarily implicate genes, and it certainly does not imply genetic determination (unless all one means by this is that genes are somehow involved, which is trivially true of every behavioral trait)."

I am sure Blumberg's ideas will fly over the heads of most nativists emotionally attached to their ideas, but his call for more stringent scientific research and analysis, and his invitation to a deeper appreciation of the complexity of the intersecting events between genes and behavior will be of interest to those who value clear thinking and good science. Every student in psychology and biology, indeed in any discipline, could benefit from this book, for it reveals how easily we can be mesmerized by ideas.

It is so easy to be swept up in the stories being told by evolutionary psychologists and nativists about human behavior. But as a dog lover, it is also easy to think that we know more than we do about why different breeds (for example, herding dogs, pointers) behave in the way that they do. This book blew away my assumptions and opened my eyes to these issues with real stories about real research. Great!

There is some interesting stuff here, and it is worth reading, but the book seems to be organized around a logical fallacy. Several times Blumberg says that because there can be inheritance that is not encoded in the genes, that natural selection cannot act upon genes. This really is a logical fallacy, and one exploded by Dawkins the The Extended Phenotype and elsewhere. Consider an example. "Genes for typing." Imagine there is suddenly a very strong selection pressure in favor of good typists. This could be for all sorts of reasons -- cultural ones. Ones due to non-genetic inheritance. And clearly there where no keyboards on the veldt or in the trees. Does this mean there are no genes "for" typing? No. Natural selection operates on variation. If some genes make one a lousy typist they will be selected against. And those that make typing easier will be selected for. They will become will be genes "for" typing. Blumberg repeatedly misunderstands this, and so misrepresents the "nativist" argument.

I'm no biologist, but I do have some advice for the author. If you want to write that there's a primitive cave painting in Italy of dogs nipping at the heels of a deer, then just write that. Don't waste a page and a half saying that you have seen the painting personally, and that you saw it when you were on vacation with your family and that you made an unplanned trip there one day and you all walked up a hill covered in chestnut trees which have spiky seeds. That stuff has nothing whatsoever to do with the topic.

Worse, the author shows the opposite tendency when writing about opposing viewpoints. It isn't good enough to simply assert that a central point of his argument is "well established" and leave the reader to hunt in the back of the book for a reference which supposedly "establishes" it. That's the kind of thing I'd like to see more detail about, and less about Bessy his border collie who replaced his other dog who died tragically and who used to play with the other dogs and who passers-by used to always comment about how flossy her coat was, etc, etc, etc, etc, etc!!!!

Mark Blumberg, if you are reading this, just adding private babble doesn't make it popular science. Get yourself an editor!

Maybe his arguments are valid, I don't know. All I can say is that he misrepresents the books which I have read on the topic. Pinker (an even bigger windbag than Blumberg, but at least his asides are relevant) did not make the absurd claims Blumberg attributes to him. Nor is Dawkins' The Selfish Gene an "unconstrained metaphor". He doesn't seem to have understood that book.

Anyone wishing to understand the Blumberg's argument needs to be prepared to check his references both for and against. This is not a popular science book. It is a partial critique of a field which he has inadequately presented to his readers.