The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It (Paperback)

~ (Author)
Key Phrases: operations against irregular forces, political dau tranh, division advisor, South Vietnamese, Department of the Army, Department of State (more...)

Editorial Reviews

Review

“[a] worthy contribution to the literature on the war.”–Infantry

“David M. Toczek, a serving U.S. Army major, has produced the most detailed account of the battle of Ap Bac, and its presumed antecedents, that we are likely to get for a good long time.”–Army History

“A new generation of Army officers is evaluating the lessons of America's most divisive foreign war, and both the Army and the nation will benefit. Toczek's book deserves a wide audience.”–Military Review

“Toczek has covered all the bases here. It is unlikely that anyone need write another book about the battle of Ap Bac.”–The Journal of Military History

“Recommended”–Indochina Chronology

“This is above all a first-rate operational analysis of the 1963 Battle of Ap Bac, where the South Vietnamese defeat was a crucial signpost to the escalation and Americanization of the Vietnam War. In wider contexts the book shows that the Diem government of South Vietnam did have a strategy of its own, and at least the beginnings of an operational doctrine to implement that strategy. South Vietnam's immediate problems were at the tactical level. The army's force-to-mission ratios were low given its poor training and command, in that context, Toczek makes a point too often overlooked. The U.S. initiated a `technowar' at this period less from abstract confidence in machines than to provide some of the force multipliers that were necessary to give ARVN a chance against an enemy with superior `fighting power.'”–Dennis E. Showalter, Ph.D. Professor of History Colorado College

“Toczek's examination of the battle and his critique of its aftermath constitute a first-rate contribution to the literature of the war. The work is fresh, imaginative, revisionist. It is one of a new generation of works that will redefine our understanding of the Vietnam War.”–James R. Reckner, Ph.D. Director, The Vietnam Center Texas Tech University

“Major Toczek has produced the definitive study and analysis of the battle of Ap Bac. In doing so, he has made a signal contribution to the record of American involvement in Vietnam during the 1950-1965 time frame. The Battle of Ap Bac supplies an opportunity to rethink, relearn and, when appropriate, to act on the lessons provided by the battle.”–Gen. W.B. Rosson, U.S. Army (Retired) Deputy Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (1969-1970)

“The battle of Ap Bac turned out to be the first of the `big ones' in the Vietnam War. It was not so recognized at the time. Worse, for historical purposes, it was reported by trio of young journalists, (rather than war correspondents) who applied a domestic political spin largely unrelated to what had taken place on the battlefield. There it lay, encrusted in myth, for 25 years. Then David Toczek unearthed battle events and gave Ap Bac a true scholarly examination. The result is a fine piece of military history writing.”–Douglas Pike Associate Director of Research, The Vietnam Center

“In Toczek's capable narrative of the 1963 fight at Ap Bac the reader will find all of the reasons for the failure of the United States military policy of advice and support in South Vietnam, and thus for South Vietnam's failure to eliminate the Communist insurgency. His signal accomplishments are to place the battle in its historical and operational context, to properly stress the role of the advisory team in relation to the unit advised, and to illuminate the formidable situational constraints endured by American advisors. Toczek's book should be read by military professionals and all others who wish to separate the pitfalls from the potential when they study how to fight insurgents, guerrillas, and irregular forces in the post Cold War world.”–John M. Carland, Ph.D. author of Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966, a volume in the U.S. Army in Vietnam series. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

Product Description

On January 2, 1963, the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) and its American advisors were soundly defeated by Viet Cong guerrilla forces at Ap Pac. The loss should have caused U.S. policy makers to question the value of their efforts to train and equip the ARVN troops, but they failed to perceive the battle's significance. In this book, a longtime U.S. Army officer and history professor at West Point provides the most comprehensive treatment of the battle in print. David Toczek not only analyzes the operation in detail but places it in the larger context of the war to better evaluate the meaning of what happened. He shows that U.S. civilian and military leadership missed an opportunity early on to learn from their mistakes when they failed to draw any connection between the ARVN's dismal performance at Ap Bac and American policies toward South Vietnam. Toczek notes that while a few tactical changes resulted from the battle, no policy changes were made, not even to the structure of the advisory system. The author also takes a look at the actions of John Paul Vann, the outspoken U.S. Army advisor at Ap Bac that Neil Sheehan wrote about in his Pulitzer Prize-winning book A Bright Shining Lie. Such a careful examination of a battle seen as a metaphor of the entire Vietnam War will prove useful to readers today eager to avoid the pitfalls of the past as they consider how best to fight insurgents of the 21st century.

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Product Details

• Paperback: 224 pages
• Publisher: Naval Institute Press (September 15, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1591148537
• ISBN-13: 978-1591148531
• Product Dimensions: 8.9 x 5.8 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 10.4 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #853,168 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Well written,clear,just excellent., July 28, 2008

By	Douglas Mccrary "bugs" (usa) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

Toczek, who is now a Lt. Col., wrote this fine book as a project back in 2001 when, I assume, he was at command school at Ft. Levenworth. Ap Bac was never delved too deeply in to until Sheehan's treatment in " A Bright Shinning Lie." Toczek takes it to a better level and leaves the reader with a much clearer picture of what went wrong with a sound battle plan. The battle failed on important levels. South Vietnamese resentment of American advice and support, fear of sucess and failure as a part of the Diem regime, lack of treatment for wounds inflicted during fighting, all contibuted to the culture that created a weak ARVN. Of course they cowered behind the dikes all day long.....wouldn't you if your own govt. refused you treatment for wounds incured? Officers above the NCO level were afaid to fail, of course, but were even more reluctant to succeed, as they could be perceived as a threat to Diem and removed from their post.

On the tactical level, Toczek explains the fight clearly from conception to finish. He is, as a writer, a bit dry like David Glantz...but that is a complement. Toczek's most astute observation, however, is of the South Vietnamese psyche which subtly effected the troops throught the war and ultimately led to their downfall.

2 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars The age old axiom of those who fail to understand history are doomed to repeat it., September 2, 2007

By	Midwest Book Review (Oregon, WI USA) - See all my reviews

"The Battle of AP BAC Vietnam" by David M. Toczek (Assistant Professor of History, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York), is aptly subtitled 'They Did Everything But Learn From It'. On January 2, 1963, the South Vietnamese Army (known by the acronym ARVN) and its American advisers were soundly defeated by Viet Cong Guerrilla forces at Ap Bac. A true military disaster, the American military and civilian leadership failed to perceive its significance and continued to pursue the ultimately unsuccessful policy of equipping and training ARVN troops. A military officer, historian, and academician, David Toczek aptly analyzes the AP BAC operation in detail, while properly placing it within the broader context of the Vietnam War. Toczck persuasively contents that American civilian and military leadership missed a vital opportunity to learn from their mistakes, that not even the structure of the American military advisory system was changed. More than just a superbly researched and written history of a battle in a war now more than 40 years ago, "The Battle of AP BAC Vietnam" needs to be read carefully by today's military and civilian leadership as we are once again engaged in combats in Iraq and Afghanistan against urban and rural guerrilla forces. Otherwise the age old axiom of those who fail to understand history are doomed to repeat it.