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The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It

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Toczek, who is now a Lt. Col., wrote this fine book as a project back in 2001 when, I assume, he was at command school at Ft. Levenworth. Ap Bac was never delved too deeply in to until Sheehan's treatment in " A Bright Shinning Lie." Toczek takes it to a better level and leaves the reader with a much clearer picture of what went wrong with a sound battle plan. The battle failed on important levels. South Vietnamese resentment of American advice and support, fear of sucess and failure as a part of the Diem regime, lack of treatment for wounds inflicted during fighting, all contibuted to the culture that created a weak ARVN. Of course they cowered behind the dikes all day long.....wouldn't you if your own govt. refused you treatment for wounds incured? Officers above the NCO level were afaid to fail, of course, but were even more reluctant to succeed, as they could be perceived as a threat to Diem and removed from their post.

On the tactical level, Toczek explains the fight clearly from conception to finish. He is, as a writer, a bit dry like David Glantz...but that is a complement. Toczek's most astute observation, however, is of the South Vietnamese psyche which subtly effected the troops throught the war and ultimately led to their downfall.

"The Battle of AP BAC Vietnam" by David M. Toczek (Assistant Professor of History, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York), is aptly subtitled 'They Did Everything But Learn From It'. On January 2, 1963, the South Vietnamese Army (known by the acronym ARVN) and its American advisers were soundly defeated by Viet Cong Guerrilla forces at Ap Bac. A true military disaster, the American military and civilian leadership failed to perceive its significance and continued to pursue the ultimately unsuccessful policy of equipping and training ARVN troops. A military officer, historian, and academician, David Toczek aptly analyzes the AP BAC operation in detail, while properly placing it within the broader context of the Vietnam War. Toczck persuasively contents that American civilian and military leadership missed a vital opportunity to learn from their mistakes, that not even the structure of the American military advisory system was changed. More than just a superbly researched and written history of a battle in a war now more than 40 years ago, "The Battle of AP BAC Vietnam" needs to be read carefully by today's military and civilian leadership as we are once again engaged in combats in Iraq and Afghanistan against urban and rural guerrilla forces. Otherwise the age old axiom of those who fail to understand history are doomed to repeat it.