The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality [Hardcover]

Richard Overy (Author), R. J. Overy (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: April 2001

June 1940: France has fallen to German forces in a mere six weeks, joining eight other European states in German occupation. British forces have suffered severe losses in the defeat. Hitler is confident of reaching a political settlement that will end hostilities with Britain. There is sentiment for peace with Hitler among the British leadership, but Churchill and his supporters have no intention of surrender. In July Hitler orders his armed forces to begin preparations for an invasion of England. In Churchill's words, "the Battle of France is over. I expect the battle of Britain is about to begin." Through the summer of 1940 the German Air Force waged an assault on Fighter Command, attacking its forces in the air and on the ground, bombing airfields and cities. But Fighter Command withstood the blow and returned battle in what became an extended, deadly war of attrition. In September Hitler announced that the German Air Force would concentrate the attack on British cities, especially London. From September 7, bombs fell on London day and night, but the Blitz was the turning point. Fighter Command attacked the overstretched German bombers relentlessly, causing them unsustainable losses. Although the nighttime bombing of British cities continued, popular morale proved strong. The German leadership realized that there would be no knockout blow, no early settlement with Britain. The Battle of Britain marked the end of Germany's string of victories. The Royal Air Force had forestalled a German invasion, kept Britain in the war, and strengthened the determination of the people to fight. In his account, Richard Overy analyzes every element of the battle on both sides, from the men and machines who fought and the tactics they employed to the leadership and their strategies and clarifies the significance of this pivotal moment for Britain and the world.

Editorial Reviews

Amazon.com Review

The Battle of Britain, Winston Churchill famously remarked, was the "finest hour" of the Royal Air Force, which battled Hitler's Luftwaffe in the skies above England for a few tense weeks. That storied episode, which historian Richard Overy deems a stalemate rather than a decisive triumph, has been layered with legends, one being that the RAF's determined resistance was the key factor in repelling an impending Nazi invasion. It now appears that that was never a real possibility. Another legend was that the RAF was badly outnumbered and outgunned. In fact, as Overy details, the German and British air forces were fairly evenly matched, and the RAF sustained fewer losses than it delivered.

Overy's slender, well-written study of the Battle of Britain celebrates the very real accomplishments of the RAF and, its revisionism aside, acknowledges that the Battle of Britain was a true turning point in the history of World War II. Overy holds that one of its most important results was to lead influential Americans to urge that the United States take Britain's side, a fact that would soon be realized. More important, though, the Battle of Britain kept England in the war at a time when many politicians and citizens sought some accommodation with the Nazi regime. It galvanized popular opposition to Hitler, replacing uncertainties and disagreements with "a greater sense of purpose and a more united people." --Gregory McNamee

From Library Journal

Do we really need yet another book about the Battle of Britain? Probably the most hashed-over episode of the war, it is a favorite of armchair historians for its heroic elements. But instead of offering yet another dramatic narrative, Overy analyzes the popular myths of the battle. Starting with the difficulties in determining the start and finish dates, he examines critically the things people think they know. Was Britain running out of planes and pilots? Just how badly was Fighter Command outnumbered? Did Goering really make a dramatic decision to call off the assault just before the RAF broke? Without question, the battle prevented a cross-Channel invasion, kept Britain in the war, and turned Hitler's attention eastward. Overy's insightful analyses hold important lessons on how that happened. However, his book does not stand alone. Libraries should purchase it where there are substantial related materials, as Overy assumes considerable familiarity with previous writers. Recommended for subject collections. Edwin B. Burgess, U.S. Army Combined Arms Research Lib., Fort Leavenworth, KS
Copyright 2001 Reed Business Information, Inc.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 192 pages
• Publisher: W. W. Norton & Company; 1st American ed edition (April 2001)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0393020088
• ISBN-13: 978-0393020083
• Product Dimensions: 8.3 x 5.7 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 12 ounces
• Average Customer Review: 4.1 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (14 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #585,837 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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52 of 52 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Terrific Exploration of The History of TheBattle Of Britain, April 12, 2001

By 

Barron Laycock "Labradorman" (Temple, New Hampshire United States) - See all my reviews
(HALL OF FAME REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)   

This review is from: The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality (Hardcover)

One of the most controversial and yet simply disarming facts about the short-lived but furiously fought air battle over the skies of England in the summer and early fall of 1940 , according to famed British historian Richard Overy in this diverting and captivating study of the now-fabled Battle Of Britain is that it was in reality not so much the marvelous and unequivocal victory as it is now regarded much as it was a stalemate. A wondrous, unlikely and fateful stalemate, to be sure, one on which the future of the so-called free world hung in the balance, but in reality it was also much more a war of perceptions and brinksmanship than has been commonly acknowledged or understood.

In matter of fact, according to Overy, the air battle over Britain was never likely to have been followed by a Nazi invasion force, for the German forces lacked all the necessary marine transportation and logistics support to prosecute such an attempt to invade Britain. As William Shirer pointed out long ago in "The Rise And Fall Of The Third Reich", Hitler never had much stomach for a cross-channel invasion, and the German General Staff never ordered all the necessary shipbuilding needed to mount a serious invasion attempt. In addition, the forces of the British realm were never so badly outnumbered as was previously believed, and the Royal Air Force (RAF) in fact had superior fighters and better logistics support that did their German opponents, not to mention the limited battle time for German pilots who had to ferry themselves back over the channel after doing battle, which provided the RAF with a key tactical advantage.

Yet Overy's purpose here is clearly not intended to denigrate or downplay the outright heroism, courage, and sacrifice of the RAF in its service to the English people over the skies of Britain that fateful year, but rather to celebrate the actual, fact-based history of those fateful events. Here in the Battle of Britain we find the first signs that the famed "unstoppable" Nazi juggernaut was not infallible, that it could be met on its own terms and defeated, plane by plane, raid by raid, and campaign by campaign, and denied its aggressive objectives by a determined and resourceful opponent. Also, by denying the Nazis the complete victory over its western European rivals it desired, the British forced Hitler into making a fatal blunder by opening up a two-front war with the invasion of the Soviet Union the next spring, forcing him to leave millions of troops along the western wall he could have otherwise used against the Russians in Operation Barbarossa.

Also, as Overy illustrates so convincingly, the British actions in the skies over their homeland convinced many in the American Government to take up Britain's cause, and this too had fateful consequences for the eventual outcome of the war. Finally, he argues that the consequences of turning back the attempts by the Nazis to gain air superiority over the skies of Britain galvanized and energized the British people with a new sense of vigor and purpose, and this was tremendously important in helping them to stay the course during a very difficult and trying period of time following the end of the battle of Britain itself. This is a great addition to the volumes of material already available on the Battle Of Britain, and presents the facts in a new and interesting way that makes it an important work which acts to clarify and modify what we already know about the events of 1940. I recommend this book, and hope you enjoy it as much as I did.

19 of 19 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Short, sweet and to the point., August 6, 2001

By A Customer

This review is from: The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality (Hardcover)

Richard Overy's "The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality" is a truly outstanding and supremely laconic volume. In a mere 177 pages, Overy examines the image of the Battle of Britain as it has been passed down to us today and compares that image to long-available, but commonly widely-scattered facts.

One of Overy's major points centers on the perception of the battle and British public reaction to it. We have been handed down an image of a unified, defiant Britain standing firm before the onslaught. Overy reveals a divided, in some senses baffled and relatively numb British public which gave its Government cause for concern (and not a few flights of irrational fancy).

Of Churchill's famous speech about "The Few" Overy points out the reference was a small and offhand portion of a speech largely devoted to other matters which was not regarded as one of Churchill's better oratories at the time.

Overy also shows how selection of the parameters of the battle in terms of time and geography distort historical perception to reinforce the myth of Fighter Command being severely outnumbered. He shows the British and German single-engine fighter counts (twin-engine fighters having been rapidly proven outclassed and irrelevant to the air superiority battle) started roughly even and subsequently diverged steadily in favor of the British.

Overy illustrates "The Few" were not so few in comparison to their equally few German opponents, and that the numbers of the British "Few" steadily rose through the battle, while those of the Luftwaffe steadily fell.

The idea that Fighter Command was nearly knocked about by attacks on its bases, is dispelled by the revelation of just how few British aircraft were destroyed on the ground, how light casualties on the ground were, and how quickly fields were restored to operation. Overy also reveals that the hardest hit bases were actually forward bases to support the Battle of France, not bases integral to Fighter Command's Air Defense of Great Britain.

Overy also acknowledges the role of ULTRA in the Battle of Britain alongside that of radar, the Observer Corps and radio listening posts in the background of which it is often lost.

As for the role of the battle in preventing an invasion (Operation Sea Lion) Overy raises the important point that even had the Luftwaffe forced Fighter Command back from SE England, it lacked the range to keep pushing it back or to stop the Royal Navy from fatally interfering with any landing attempt. Too many analyses of Sea Lion assume control of the air meant ipso facto control of the sea and forget that control of the air was merely a prelude to contesting control of the sea by air or surface forces. The Luftwaffe's ability to stop a Royal Navy intervention against a German cross-Channel landing attempt was by no means certain, particularly after failing to stop the more-vulnerable Dunkirk exodus.

Overy's book is a quick, five-star, one-afternoon primer for serious students of the Battle of Britain's import. It is not a detailed tactical description of dogfights. Nor is it an effort at debunking everything known about the Battle of Britain. Rather, it is a consolidation of facts usually brought out in isolation into a single coherent tapestry that reveals a somewhat different picture than we're used to seeing.

And despite substantial myth-busting, Overy's conclusion is that the Battle of Britain was a seminal moment in the war...if not in the way and for the reasons we have commonly believed. I highly recommend this very mature and realistic look at the Battle of Britain.

21 of 23 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars The Rest of the Story !, September 13, 2001

By 

E. E Pofahl (HUNTINGTON, WV USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality (Hardcover)

Movies, books and articles have narrated the Battle of Britain. Most limited their narrative to the
heroic efforts of the RAF pilots, crews and commanders. Richard Overy gives the rest of the
story in this book providing insight into the total picture. He notes that for the British people
The Battle meant one thing, the Battle of Britain which was the epic contest between the British
and German air forces in the late summer and autumn of 1940.

Chapter 1 observes that during the 1930s, Britain envisioned Germany delivering an airborne knock-out blow for which there was no defense. In response, between 1937 through 1939,millions were spent on an airborne defensive shield and an expanded Bomber Command if required for retaliation. The German strategy was to use air power in combined operations with the army to impose a decisive defeat of enemy ground forces. Britain was unprepared to meet this type of warfare. Therefore when France was attacked, Britain could supply little effective air support to aid the French. At this point, the British were not united. The author narrates the policy debates over whether to
appease or fight Germany. However, the fall of France and Dunkirk shocked the country and British morale was revived to fight on. Hitler, the author notes, regarded invasion as very
hazardous and hoped for a political settlement. Hitler made a peace offer in a July 1940 speech which Britain promptly rejected in a radio address. Britain now faced the air power type of conflict it had been preparing for since the 1930s.

Chapter 2 evaluates the two forces noting that The military confrontation in the autumn of 1940 became a test of strength between two rival air forces. The text notes both armies trained for the coming battle; but ....none of this mattered as long as the German air Force had not won mastery of the air over southern Britain. Command structures are described noting that Herman Goering was both air minister and air force commander while the British had an Air Minister, Sir Archibald Sinclair, with separate commanders for fighters and for bombers. To Sir Hugh Dowding, of Fighter Command, fell the task of creating an effective defense shield. The author writes Sinclair epitomized that British elite of dignified public servants so much despised and ridiculed in German propaganda. Goering, on the hand, was everything Sinclair was not. The text notes that on 10 August 1940, The German single-engine fighters assigned to the battle over Britain was 1011, slightly fewer than Fighter Command thus destroying an enduring myth of the few against the many. The book compares fighter production, performance and armament noting that early in the battle there was rough parity in fighter number, but in the last weeks the British had the edge. Another myth is the shortage of trained RAF fighter pilots. The number of RAF pilots increased by one third between June and August 1940. The Germans could cope with pilot shortages because of a lower loss rate. The author writes If Fighter command were the few, German pilots were fewer. The British air defense system, set up to counter the enemy bombing offensive, is described and it was adjusted in the summer of 1940 to meet an invasion threat.

Coastal Command played a difficult, costly and critical role twice daily conducting reconnaissance of German controlled ports. Bomber Commands role was to wear down German resistance by
bombardment of vital objectives. The author notes that The one field of battle where British preparations proved at least equal to the task in 1940 was fighter defense and it was for that
reason alone that German air fleets concentrated on destroying Fighter Command using fighter sweeps in a war of attrition. German daylight bombing of London began on 7 September when
350 bombers raided the east dock area and the text notes The air battles in the week between 7 September and 15 September were decisive in turning the tide of the battle. During that week the German Air force lost 298 aircraft. Fighter Command lost 120, against 99 enemy fighters. Another myth that Richard Overy debunks is that Hitler never seriously planned an invasion,writing that There need be no doubt that under the right circumstances Hitler was serious about
invading Britain in 1940.... but that by the end of September Hitler concluded that air superiority had not been achieved and indefinitely postponed an invasion. Lacking daylight bombing success, the Germans shifted to night bombing thereby creating a problem as aircraft were very difficult to shoot down at night from the air or from the ground until new detection equipment was
developed. Overy states that though the Germans never formally adopted terror bombing, the tactics they employed caused widespread civilian casualties resulting in the death of 40,000 people during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz.

The Battle of Britain did not seriously weaken Germany and her allies, but the contest was not a draw. German air fleets did not gain air supremacy over southern Britain. The author observes
that In a great many respects, however, the two forces were remarkably matched. Both commanded a small group of committed, highly trained and courageous pilots, both forces responded with considerable tactical ingenuity to sudden changes of direction in the course of the battle; both exploited fighter aircraft at the cutting edge of aviation technology; both forces fought
the battle with operations commanders of real distinction.

Finally, this was not a traditional battle in that it did not have a clear-cut beginning nor a defined ending. However, the author concludes that like Trafalgar, the Battle of Britain was critical to the British people in that an invasion scare subsided and the nation could now get on with the task of
winning the war.