Customer Reviews

The Battle of Britain: New Perspectives : Behind the Scenes of the Great Air War

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John Ray's book is in keeping with the excitement and suspense of other accounts of this fascinating battle (the only one in history to be fought completely in the air), but he takes the point of view of Britain's Sir Hugh Dowding, Commander-in-chief of RAF Fighter Command. Ray tells of the inner workings of the RAF, the political battles and clashes of personality that were happening as the battle was being fought and eventually won. It isn't a hagiography of Dowding, but defends his positions and points out his weaknesses. The details on the battle are given as they relate to Dowding's story, without a rigid historical chronology, but containing some terrific anecdotes (such as Dowding's visit to the French Armie de L'Aire headquarters in March of 1940, which helped him make up his mind not to send any more of his fighters to be destroyed in what was obviously a lost cause.

This is a book for those who already know the Battle of Britain and wish to delve deeper into the personalities involed, rather than a complete record of events during the Summer of 1940. It is an intellectual and entertaining look at the Battle from behind the desk of its most tenacious leader.

For those fascinated by the Battle of Britain and who wish to read more this book is for you. I guarantee you will learn more. Mr. Ray is not a professional historian yet he has created a fair analysis of the many strands that are background to the familiar controversies. In this regard, reviewer "Siriam" has written a thoughtful and concise assessment of the book and I would but repeat his comments. So I will add what the previous reviewers have not written.

The author seems to have carefully studied the published and unpublished sources. His bibliography is very thorough. In a few sections I found the writing not as "polished" as it might have been, nonetheless it is quite readable. What I liked best about the book is that it is a thoughtful and careful analysis that is meticulously documented -- the author lays out the evidence, evaluates it, and develops his conclusions. For example, by this process the author was led to conclude that the RAF and Luftwaffe had a rough parity in fighters in July 1940. Similarly, during those critical months in 1940 the RAF more than made good its losses in fighter planes while the Luftwaffe did not. These points are correct. If you already know about Air Chief Marshal Dowding, his battles, and the course of the Battle of Britain in 1940 then this book will definitely stimulate your thinking. All in all, an enjoyable book to read.

The Battle of Britain will always be an emotive event in UK history given it represented the tipping point for Churchill and the UK in surviving to fight on and for Hitler in attacking Russia after failing to extract a negotiated peace out of the UK.

This well researched book is not about the battle per se but instead its leading figure Hugh Dowding, C in C of Fighter Command and the issue of command and leadership in the RAF that saw the personal style of the architect of the fighter strategy that had won the battle by September 1940 also lead to his dismissal in November 1940 for failing to respond to changed circumstances.

The book's approach is chronological taking the key events from July to November 1940 but because of the sheer volumes of data and records to be covered, which can make for pretty dense reading at times, follows within each chapter an approach of interlocking sub chapters on the key issues and events in play in that specific period. Details of the actual fighting become largely peripheral with the emphasis being on how the RAF command structure including the Air Ministry and the War Cabinet under Churchill interacted.

What makes the book so effective is its explanation and understanding of the different forces at play. As Dowding entered the Summer of 1940 he was facing constant attempts because of his age and period in position to be moved on, plus a reputation for being aloof as shown by his nickname "Stuffy". Yet despite this personal pressure together with his loyal No 2 Keith Park, in charge of No. 11 Group that took the main brunt of the battle, he was following a strategy he had developed and implemented over many years of the defensive use of limited fighter resources and an emphasis on stopping the bombers getting through. This caused unacceptable losses on a poorly executed German air offensive where the disconnection with ground forces that had existed under the prior successful blitzkriegs proved fatal. However this also replayed a long standing internal RAF conflict on differing views over bombers that had existed since pre-WWII, when Dowding had developed his views.

This leads into the much debated Big Wing theory proposed in the summer by Douglas Bader and his No. 12 Group commander Leigh Mallory and never accepted as practically feasible at the time by Dowding or Park. The author shows how it has been both misunderstood and misinterpreted (plus relied on questionable data as to its potential success) but had in fact become largely irrelevant by Autumn 1940 with the move towards night bombing by the Luftwaffe. Alongside this Dowding's lack of effective leadership over the tension between Park and Leigh Mallory (who felt his resources were not being adequately used during the summer conflict) simply prepared the ground for others to attack his subsequent failure to understand and react in a convincing and pragmatic way as the levels of night bombing and high civilian casualties across the UK increased as the Blitz commenced. The simple fact that at the time most German bombers could only carry a light tonnage of bombs can now be seen as an unappreciated blessing.

It seems clear that the long held Air Ministry view that Dowding would never listen to alternative viewpoints was fully reinforced as they with older RAF leadership who actively worked to remove Dowding, took ownership of this issue and under the ambitious but very able Douglas isolated Dowding as he lost the support by the end of October of his two biggest supporters Churchill and Beaverbrook, but only after his intransigent approach had been seen firsthand by Churchill.

However what transforms this book from being good to great is that its detailed analysis of why certain actions were needed, in turn demystifies the various conspiracy theories that have developed since 1940. Dowding's subsequent incorrect recollection of events and a defensive biography on him written by Robert Wright a former PA to Dowding, plus Len Deighton's popular book and the late 1960s UK movie on the subject offset by the official subsequent treatment of Dowding until after his death, are all shown to have been accepted uncritically by too many.

If this book goes to a reprint one simple plea is that a simple chart of the RAF command structure so that the relative positions of the characters can be better understood by a non-RAF reader would assist greatly what is despite that a very thoughtful and provoking read!