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12 of 13 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Solid Craftsmanship, March 16, 2003
As usual, noted armor export Stephen J Zaloga delivers the goods in Osprey Campaign #115, Battle of the Ardennes (I): St Vith and the Northern Shoulder. The northern sector of the "Battle of the Bulge" generally receives far less coverage than the fighting further south around Bastogne, but Zaloga clearly states that this was in fact, where the battle was decided. Zaloga's thesis - while not particularly original - is solidly crafted in a thorough narrative. Zaloga demonstrates that the German offensive was a poorly planned gamble, executed by marginally trained troops, over adverse terrain in poor weather against an adaptable foe. All these factors added up to rapid German culmination in a matter of days, which is why this volume only covers the period 16-25 December 1944. Battle of the Ardennes (I) begins in standard Osprey format with a short section on the origins of the campaign and a chronology (up to 24 December 1944). There are three sections discussing opposing plans, opposing commanders and opposing armies. The section on opposing plans is quite good and includes a section on weather and terrain, both of which had a decisive impact on the German offensive. Zaloga notes that Patton's G-2 accurately predicted a German counteroffensive in the Ardennes and this gave Third Army a big edge in responding to the attack. The section on opposing commanders, as usual with Zaloga, is the weakest section due to its over-emphasis on high-level commanders at the expense of the junior officers who actually fought the actions discussed in this volume (why is Jochen Peiper not in this section?). The eight-page section on opposing armies is useful and notes the low quality of German replacements in even their supposedly elite Waffen SS and Fallschirmjäger units. Indeed, Zaloga demonstrates that despite better equipment, many of the German units had to employ much less sophisticated tactics than in previous years. On the other hand, the US Army's neglect of cold weather gear and the placement of the corps boundary in the Losheim Gap ("a traditional invasion route") were serious mistakes. The order of battle provided is too bare-bones, listing only division-level units, and in light of Osprey's Order of Battle series on this campaign Zaloga could have listed more of the vital engineer, artillery and tank destroyer units. Battle of the Ardennes (I) has three 3-D maps (Battle for Krinkelt & Rocherath, Kampfgruppe Peiper's route and the Battle at Dom Butgenbach); these maps are only so-so and the one on Peiper is practically useless since it covers too large an area. The five 2-D maps are fine (strategic situation, German planned routes, initial attacks of 6th Panzer Army, destruction of the US 106th Division, and defense of St Vith) but the maps do not fully portray the US defense of the Elsenborn Ridge and even Peiper's route is difficult to follow with these maps. The three battle scenes are: Panzer graveyard at Krinkelt, Kampfgruppe Pieper and the rearguard at St Vith. The photographs throughout the volume, culled primarily from the National Archives, are excellent - particularly if one enjoys photos of burning Panther tanks. The photographs of the American 99th Infantry Division's reinforced log bunkers with overhead cover are impressive examples of fieldworks. Zaloga is particularly adept at demonstrating the relative combat efficiency of the American and German forces at this time. In one notable action on the first day of the German offensive, an American scout platoon from the 1/394th Infantry held off the German 5th Fallschirmjäger Regiment at the village of Lanzerath for the bulk of a day. Zaloga notes that both regiments of this worn-out airborne division mounted repeated frontal attacks across open ground in broad daylight and were mown down by US machine guns, which speaks volumes for the decline of German tactical competence. Although the US scout platoon was eventually overwhelmed and captured, this rearguard action unhinged the German timetable for the 1st SS Panzer Division's intended exploitation to the Meuse River, and this platoon became the most decorated American unit of the war. Zaloga also notes the huge difference in artillery capabilities. While the German preliminary artillery bombardment was relatively ineffective, time and again the Americans were able to mass huge amounts of artillery fire to smash or disrupt German forces preparing to attack (many accounts tend to portray US ground forces as helpless with air support - this was the German perception of US forces - which ignores the vital, all-weather contributions of US artillery). On the other hand, the loss of most of the US 106th Division - the biggest American surrender in the ETO - was due to a combination of inexperience and bad luck. Zaloga does not delve deeply enough into the personal factors involved at St Vith, including the relationship between MGN Alan Jones of the 106th Division and BGN Bruce Clarke of the 7th Armored Division, which go a long way toward explaining the situation there. Zaloga does cover the German special operations Grief and Stosser, but his coverage of the defense of St Vith is rather brief. In conclusion, Zaloga points to many factors for the failure of the German operation: (1) Dietrich, commander of the 6th Panzer Army, under-estimated the US defenses, (2) the preliminary German artillery barrage was ineffective but alerted the US troops of imminent attack, (3) the German infantry units in the first wave assaulting units lacked sufficient armor support and (4) the Germans tried to push too many units down a few main roads, without using the numerous forest trails. These points are all valid, but they only explain how the Germans lost the battle, not how the Americans won it. In short, the US Army won in the Ardennes due to increased tactical competence, which enabled US forces to adapt and improvise ad hoc defenses with whatever was at hand, until overwhelming reinforcements arrived from the northern and southern flanks.
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6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Good book, poor layout, November 19, 2005
Zaloga gives the reader, as usual, a concise, educated analysis of the fighting in the northern part of the Ardennes offensive. Particularly useful is the accurate and sobering description of the deficiencies in the German fighting man, even the vaunted SS troops, and in the leadership of the Waffen SS.
The problem with the book is in the poor layout. Zaloga describes the battles by naming villages and axes of advance, but the maps frequently do not show these at all, or if they are there, they are pages and pages away from the text. This undermines an excellent narrative. Likewise, the color illustrations were prepared with evident lack of forethought -- the focus of the illustration is frequently planted square in the center of the page, and this is disastrous in a two-page illustration, as the binding runs right down the middle of the item (usually, a vehicle) being illustrated.
I'd rate Zaloga's neat summary a 4-star job, and the book's poor layout by Osprey a 2, and that's being nice. I'll rate the book a 3 overall.
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10 of 12 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Another Great Volume from Zaloga, January 20, 2005
This review is from: Battle of the Bulge 1944 (2): Bastogne (Campaign) (Paperback)
The Battle of the Bulge is one of those subjects in military history that has been so over-covered that readers must be wary of new volumes on this subject, many of which only repackage what other writers did earlier. Fortunately, Steven Zaloga's second volume in the Osprey Campaign series is a well-written narrative that can stand on its own merits. This second volume focuses the southern half of the Ardennes front, including the fighting around Bastogne. Zaloga's writing style is in fine fettle in this volume and although much of the material is familiar, it is presented with incisive comment and penetrating analysis. Even if you have other "Bulge" books on your shelf already, this volume and its companion are well worth having.
Zaloga's opening sections on the strategic situation, opposing plans, opposing leaders and opposing armies are a bit shorter than usual since much of this material was also covered in the first volume. The order of battle provided is a bit overly succinct since it lists only division-level units; certainly the German Volks artillery corps and the US engineer units at Bastogne should have been listed. The elements of Patton's 3rd Army that broke through to Bastogne as well as the 101st Airborne Division are omitted. Zaloga provides five 2-D maps (German objectives in the southern sector, 5th Panzer army vs. 28th Division, 7th Army vs. XII Corps, Patton's Relief of Bastogne, Eliminating the Bulge) and three 3-D maps (Bastogne Encircled, Battle for the road junctions, Blunting the Spearhead). The three color battle scenes by Peter Dennis and Howard Gerrard are: Christmas in Bastogne, Operation Bodenplatte and Spearhead to the Meuse.
The author's description of the 5th Panzer Army's attack on the 28th Infantry Division is excellent, although I wish he had given some mention of what was left of the "Bloody Bucket" after this 2-day epic fight. As Zaloga describes it, the German Panzer Lehr Division had a brief opportunity to get into Bastogne on the third day of the offensive (December 18) but squandered the chance due to over-caution. Although Bastogne was the major intermediate objective for 5th Panzer Army, it is clear that the Germans never allocated sufficient forces to deal with this thorn in their side. Zaloga also briefly covers air operations over the Ardennes, although much of the focus is on Operation Bodenplatte, the surprise German air attack on New Years day.
Zaloga also covers the futile attack of the German 7th Army on the southern flank (which is usually ignored in many accounts), the final German effort to push 2nd Panzer Division and Panzer Lehr toward the Meuse and the Allied counterattack. Zaloga also includes some of the controversies of the campaign, such as Field Marshal Montgomery's temporary command over US forces near the Meuse and his unwillingness to counterattack the over-extended Germans. Like most authors, Zaloga also believes that the Allied failure to cut off the German salient in a pincer operation was overly-cautious and allowed more Germans to escape to fight again. In sum, this volume provides an excellent operational summary of a hard-fought and close-run campaign.
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