Customer Reviews

The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Algeria 1955-1957

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I believe many of those who wrote reviews of this book are writing from their hearts as opposed to cooly assessing this excellent work. Afterall, it is hard for one to embrace the author's premise that physical torture and summary executions were the only way to effectively deal with Algerian insurgents.

Although one may not want to accept this methodology, many influential members in French military and political circles accepted this as the price to pay to keep Algeria French. Because these senior leaders were able to get men like Paul Aussaresses to do their dirty work for them does not make their hands any cleaner. Aussaresses obviously could not have done what he did for so long without the approval of his chain of command.

I commend the author for having the moral courage to admit his own actions when everyone else involved has taken the different approach of sweeping it under the rug. Admitting to crimes against humanity is nothing to be proud of, but Aussaresses was certainly the implementer of French political will just as Adolf Eichmann was for Germany.

This is an important work for understanding to what extent nations will go to, to secure their empires. It is also important for understanding counterinsurgency and the limits of violence. Whatever your political/moral take on the author, this is an interesting, unique book and well worth the time spent reading it.

This is a fascinating but brutal account of a desperate period in history: France's effort to preserve its overseas "departement" from takeover by the main Algerian revolutionary organization, the ultra-violent FLN. The author, then a captain, was the secret counter-insurgency commander in the then-regional capital, Algiers. Essentially, he met terrorism with terror, and justifies his brutal absolutism with grim historical facts that are excluded from Pontecorvo's historically-inaccurate propaganda film, "The Battle of Algiers." Although France was ultimately to lose the war, Aussaresses (as confirmed even by his opponents) won the battle!

It puzzles me that so many reviewers refer to Aussaresses as cold-blooded and unfeeling. The book owes its many stylistic faults to the passion and obvious defensiveness of a very emotional man. This gives the brutal story moments of unintentional humour, as in the bizarre anecdote of the Franco-Algerian farmer, his head "split in half" by a radicalized Moslem, who goes home to bed to die, first relating his experience to the local police chief!!!

The claim has been made that Aussaresses' methods had a major political impact on the war's outcome, but I doubt it. As in America's war in Vietnam, France's war was chiefly fought by draftees in the countryside, and it was the growing bodycount amoung the children of native Frenchmen, fighting for the privileges of a colonial population that was not ethnically French, that lost the war politically. Likewise the issue for the local native population was the cruel reality both of second-class citizenship and of FLN terrorism, as anyone whose political stance was not in accord with theirs was murdered, often with unspeakable brutality. Anyone examining this book in terms of other counter-insurgency operations, like America in Iraq, must bear these facts in mind. The appropriate context in which to weigh Aussaresses' account is the thorny question of whether order is more important than law or vice versa!

As this book focusses almost exclusively on Aussaresses' experiences in and around Algiers it needs to be read with more comprehensive works on the Franco-Algerian war such as Alastair Horne's "A Savage War of Peace." As other reviewers have pointed out, however, it makes for an excellent counterpoint to the rose-colored romanticizations of Pontecorvo, and I strongly recommend it. Aussaresses must be applauded for speaking with a frankness that has eluded his opponents.

The author served as the lead military intelligence officer for the French Army unit fighting in Algiers in 1957. The matter-of-fact, unapologetic tone of the atrocities he committed to win the battle struck me as one of the most chilling accounts I've ever read. By his own admission, he and the organization he led killed 3000 and tortured 25000 during the Battle of Algiers.

Those who tout this book as a tactical manual for winning the war on terror clearly overlook several major problems. First, the FLN, while it had tens of thousands of supporters in Algiers, had nowhere close to 25000 operatives in Algiers. That means that for every terrorist captured, the French tortured a handful of fence-sitters, passive supporters, or non-participants. Secondly, though they were poorly treated, the Arabs were, in fact, French citizens and Algeria was deemed an integral part of France -- just as Michigan with its large Arab population is part of the United States. The actions of the French Army almost completely alienated the very population they were trying to pacify and include in their empire. I would hope that if Al Qaeda established cells in Detroit, we would not employ the same tactics there that the French did in Algiers. Thirdly, while the author may have the psychological make-up of a Nazi Prison guard, most soldiers do not. Many of them struggled to come to grips with their actions for the rest of their lives. It's hard enough to deal with killing without also becoming a torturer.

Most importantly, the French lost the war. While you would never guess it by the outcome, French society initially almost unanimously supported retention of Algeria in the empire-- even some of the Communists. Torture completely fractured support for the war in France and around the world. Those same torturers, confronted with the fact that they might lose the war after leaping into a moral abyss, mutinied not once but twice. DeGaulle ultimately decided he had to get the French Army out of Algeria before it destroyed itself and all of France.

That said, the book provides valuable insight into the mindset of one particular school of counterinsurgency doctrine -- a failed school. This isn't to suggest that terrorists should be coddled; ultimately, we will have to kill most. As the fallout from Abu Gharab suggests, however, this isn't the way.

Kevin Clark
MAJ, US Army
US Mission Iraq

This book makes a lot of people cringe. General Aussaresses is labeled a Nazi and a Fascist by some on here (as if they were the masters of torture and murder, never mind the Marxist murders who made such matters into an artform and killed far more people than Fascism ever did). Especially considering how much of a hero Che Guevara is; both Che and Assaresses used similar methods to get their results and yet we see the Red and black Che T-shirts all over colleges and at various left-wing protests.

Aussaresses provides his perspective. One that is lost on a lot of people who proudly proclaim they could never condone such actions. These proclimation are most likely said from a nice comfortable living room or study in a nice peaceful neighborhood somewhere. People's sense of the righteous tends to fade pretty quickly when they are faced with the brutality that the FLN displayed.

I am not saying torture and executions are the right thing to do but I find it interesting so many are quick to judge. The FLN was not the Red Cross; they were one of the most brutal terrorist organizations in the 20th century. The Algerian War was an ugly war, plain and simple. You cannot condemn one side without condemning the other. If the Algerians had adopted peaceful protests istead of the violent radical measures they adopted, then there would have been no need for torture.

That said, the book is quite blunt. The General does talk casually of killing and torture just as a brutal warlord in the Dark Ages might have.

Aussaresses provides a good concise narrative of the events during that war. Some people want objectivity, which is important but you most also get perspective. So many history books discuss bland facts and figures without delving into the actual people. Narratives and memoirs like this give you that perspective.

Another good product to have or at least rent is "The Battle of Algiers" which provides a more FLN-slant.

This book is an important contribution to the English language literature on the French-Algerian War. However, the book's importance goes beyond adding to the historical record of France's occupation of Algeria. The subject of terrorism and how to deal with it became immeasurably more important for Americans after 9/11. This book provides a glimpse of one possible way to deal with terrorism - the fight fire with fire way. Aussaressess recounts how he helped set up and execute an anti-terrorist operation in Algiers. He unapologetically tells how he used nightly raids, torture, imprisonment and summary executions to break the back of the FLN in Algeirs during 1955-57 (The movie "Battle of Algiers" is a riveting account of this struggle).
In short, this is a good solider's account of the war. As valuable as this perspective is (and it is very valuable), it is narrow and demands some responses. First, the book fails to provide a context for the war (For context, I recommend reading Alistair Horne's "A Savage War of Peace"). Aussaressess begins with the massacre at Phillipeville but there were atrocities on all sides. This war was an [mass] of violence and hatred. Second, there is a number of moral responses I have to Aussaressess's statements in the book. The one I find most appalling is that Aussaressess believes that he and his intelligence officers were restoring "law and order". I guess as an attorney I find this claim most alarming. I might be more accurate to say that Aussaressess was restoring a kind of order but it was hardly lawful. Suspects were picked up in nightly raids, tortured and summarily executed if they were believed to be terrorists. In most thinkers idea of law, there is the concept of equity: fairness and accountability. Our system has rights and procedures to preserve some accuracy in outcomes and prevent the abuse of power. Aussaressess claims he never executed an innocent person. This is just too incredible to accept. Even in our system, innocent people are wrongly convicted and, police and prosecutors allow their judgments to be skewed by their egos or trying to preserve face. One can only imagine how many innocents were picked up and tortured and killed - which in the end probably caused more problems for the French in Algeria. As effective as Aussaressess was in eradicating a network of terrorists in Algeirs in 1957, France still lost Algeria. The Algerians did not lose heart because of the methods Aussressess employed. Moreover, French public opinion concerning the war turned negative upon revelations of torture.

A fantastic book that describes fighting the enemy on their own terms; something rarely done these days. France's struggle to keep Algeria is one of the more interesting moments in its history and the author does not try to minimize any aspect. Also, the book is great in its form. Unlike other Algeria memoirs the book focuses more on the conflict itself rather than the author. The only negative aspect is that the book is rather short.

First, I must admit I've not read the English translation of this book. I read the 2001 Perrin Edition in French (entitled, "Services Speciaux: Algerie 1955-1957). Nonetheless, assuming the translation accurate, here are my perspectives:

Aussaresses wrote this book when he was around 83 years old and with full knowledge of the probable ramifications of it's publication in France, to wit, prosecution for war crimes. Sure enough, that hypocritical action was undertaken by the French government. The General (for that was his final rank) was fined $6500 for "trying to justify war", but not for the acts themselves, as these were previously covered by an amnesty. Perrin Publishing was fined another $13,000. Aussaresses was further barred from wearing his uniform and he was stripped of his Legion d'Honneur.

Knowing, as he did, the ramifications of these memoirs, why do it? Aussaresses is nothing if not candid. His "confessions" are bare of adornment and self-justification. He embellishes nothing and omits nothing, including self-incriminating statements. However, he also makes quite clear that he was acting under the direct orders of his immediate superior (General Massu) who, in turn, was acting under the direct orders of the French Government, which included Francois Mitterand (Interior Minister). The methods used in the Battle of Algiers were first tried and proven successful in Philippeville, Algeria and were conducted under specific Interior Ministry order: "Des instructions drastiques furent donnees pour ecraser la rebellion..." (Draconian measures were authorized for wiping out the rebellion). Further, "Comme on ne pouvait eradiquer le terrorisme urbain par les voies policieres et judiciares ordinnaires, on demandait aux parachutistes de se substituer tant aux policiers qu'aux juges" (Ordinary police and judicial measures were ineffective against urban terorism, so it was demanded of the parachutistss to substitute such measures as they judged needed). Aussaresses repeatedly confirmed that this "sale boulot" (dirty job) was to be performed under valid orders and, despite his attempts to refuse it (correctly divining that he would ultimately be stuck with the culpability), pressed ahead.

Algeria was an integral department of France. Thus, the counterinsurgency was being undertaken against French citizens (at least de jure citizens, if not de facto). Of course, torture was used and many needlessly suffered. For whatever reasons, the rebellion was militarily crushed, but this tactical victory was Pyrrhic, as the political war was lost, as sympathy amongst elites evaporated and elements of the military (in concert with revanchist pieds-noirs) began acting against the French government as a final act of desperation. De Gaulle began negotiations for independence and Algeria left France.

Whilst some have taken this (and other books, such as Roger Trinquier's work) as "blueprints" for winning against Iraqi counterinsurgents, this is a misplaced emphasis. These wars are won the "hard way": politically, with a firm policing and military component. The French actually used this approach in some sectors, reportedly with good success. The larger enterprise was a failure. The long-term ramifications for France (now with a large population of Algerian Muslim immigrants) are just starting to be felt.

In summary, an outstanding, lucid memoir and integral component of the history of the French-Algerian War: not to be missed by any serious student of the subject.

The author was instrumental in waging France's campaign against terrorism in Algeria. This battle was the last gasp of the French Colonial Empire, following their withdrawal from French Indo China in 1954. In 1952 a group of Egyptian officers led by Col. Nasser overthrew King Farouk. Nasser's ambition was to encourage, support and fund Arab nationalism in the region. He provided weapons and funds to the Algerian FLN which had been founded in October 1954. The FLN attacks against civilians began within a week. The FLN objective was to get rid of the French settlers, French army and kill those Algerians who worked with the French whom they called collaborators. This war was probably the first where terrorist bombings were used on a large scale against the civilian population. Horrific atrocities were committed as well. In fact the French military defeated the FLN by mid 1957. But, like the U.S. experiences in Vietnam and Iraq, French public opinion influenced by the media opposed the war. And ultimately they withdrew in 1962. This book reads like a fast paced novel. The pages turn quickly. It is a valuable historical read.

This book poses many questions. What does a nation do to fight an enemy that will indiscriminately kill innocent civilians (including women and children)? How do intelligence forces get the information they need to prevent further attacks? Do the ends justify the means? General Aussaresses attempts to answer these questions in this book and I think, does so very convincingly.

It's important to understand the context of the situation. French Algeria was a colony populated by a number of ethnicities. Many muslims were pro-French and wanted Algeria to remain a French department. In addition, you had a significant French colonial population, the Pieds Noirs (the black feet) that wanted Algeria to remain French. Additionally, there were groups that wanted independence - those willing to work within a political framework, and those willing to engage in terrorism.

Aussaresses and his methods (as described in the book) were successful in subduing the rebels. France voluntarily left Algeria. De Gualle made the decision to give Algeria its independence in 1962-- the French were not forced out. In fact, many elements of the French army mutinied against De Gualle as a result of his decision -- but that's a different story.

This book describes the means by which information was gathered and applied in order to combat a foe that was willing to bomb civilians, engage in what we now call terrorist acts, and could conceal themselves within the population. The methods included torture and summary executions. But these were not the only methods employed. What Aussaresses established was a process of intelligence gathering and the application of military and police resources to act on that information. He used torture in interrogations in order to gather information. Aussaresses used the information gathered from these interrogations to eliminate operatives, foil terrorist plots, and systematically dismantle the FLN. These methods succeeded.

I think there are tough lessons to be learned from this book. How are our intelligence and military forces fighting the war on terror gathering their information to prevent further attacks? Are America and its allies prepared to do what is necessary to protect our populations? Do the ends justify the means?

What a great book! General Aussaresses lets all the skeletons out of the closet. Too often we talk about wars and the way they should be fought. Aussaresses tells you the way a guerilla war is REALLY fought. It is the people caught in the middle who suffer. What is really scary is that his logic does make some sense. Traditional justice systems are not designed to deal with large scale distrubances. They are designed to deal with crimes commited by individuals or small groups of individuals. In a sense, terrorists are equated with serial killers and the question the reader is left with is Can we afford to make a mistake and let them go free because they will kill innocents again. This book made me glad that I never have to make these types of decisions.