Customer Reviews

The Battle of Dienbienphu

5 star:		(3)
4 star:		(3)
3 star:		(3)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

This book recounts in vivid detail how Viet General Giap defeated
French General Navarre in the game of grand strategy played out in the jungles of Southeast Asia. The author contrasts the intense patriotism and self sacrifice of the Vietminh soldiers against the professionalism and devotion to honor of the French units. Maybe the book deserves 4 stars instead of the three I gave it but I thought the writers style left a little to be desired. All around though a very good book and worthy to sit in any history buffs collection. Note: I had to comment on the previous persons review who ignorantly badmouthed the French army while not even offering a review of the books merits. It takes more than watching a couple of History Channel specials to understand a nations motivations and willingness to fight. The heroism displayed by the French soldiers at Dienbienphu was just one more example of their well known devotion to duty. Ever heard of Camerone, Verdun, Birhacheim or the great victory at Austerlitz? Make sure you get your facts straight before insulting a nations military achievements.

Only having limited exposure to the battle of Dien Bien Phu, I looked forward to learning about this decisive battle. Mr. Roy has written a saddening, gripping account of sufferings and heroism displayed by the French troops. Of course, I wish he had given more time to the VienMihn, but since he is French... he had to place more emphasis on the French experience. Without doubt, this book is not for arm-chair generals who wish to learn about battles to debate with others. This book is for those who wish to learn everything about the war: Horrors, deaths, sadness, defeat, struggles, honor, disgrace.

If you want to know what actually happened and why and how at Dien Bien Phu, then the definitive text is Windrow's The Last Valley. Read this work - actually by Jules Roy - for more insight into the personalities on the French side, and how they reacted as the pressure and the stress increased.

El libro esta muy bien escrito en cuanto a como el autor va introduciendo al lector en una de las historias bélicas mas sufridas del siglo XX, de la posguerra Mundial. Vale la pena leerlo, y es imprescindible tenerlo junto a la no muy extensa colección de libros acerca de la Batalla de DBP y el entorno de la Guerra de Indochina francesa. Escrito en forma parcial respecto a los dos grandes bandos, pero mostrando las rigideces de sus Internas Políticas. El libro tiene pocas fotografías y mapas pero una buena cronología de los in-sucesos.

Ademas, quiero agradecer y felicitar el excelente servicio que Amazon.com tiene para comprar por correo. Adelante!

Ever wondered how could the Vietnamese defeat the French and then the USA in order to gain their independence? this is a good book to examine the reasons. I guess that at the end it can all be summarized into this: they were fighthing for a cause they considered worth dying for (and dying they did by the thousands).

What I liked about this book is the objectivity of its author (a French), and the fact that it's focus on the human element of the battle. I would have been nice if the book had had more maps.

Overall a very educational book.

Fortunately the answer is "Yes!" Though there were various moments that I had my doubts. I was once in a similar situation, despite the admonitions encompassed in a famous Chinese military principle; that one should "...never fight on a battlefield that resembles an inverted turtle..." (p 364); principles that I'm sure my commanders were totally unaware of. The message was metaphorically the same, but not as literal-- the 122mm rockets that destroyed the metal runway at Polei Klang did not leave the message written by the Vietminh commandos who destroyed the runway at Dien Bien Phu, written in French and German: "Dien Bien Phu will be your grave."(p 205)

For the English-speaking world the classic account of the battle is Hell In A Very Small Place: The Siege Of Dien Bien Phu written by another Frenchman who subsequently became an American citizen, and was to die in Vietnam covering the American war, in 1967. Bernard Fall's account is excellent, so too is Roy's, whose erudition may exceed Fall's, placing the battle in a better historical context. Roy's account transcends Fall's strictly military and political account, and includes painful dollops of moral observations.

Jules Roy led a remarkable life, which is passionately described in his autobiography, Memoires Barbares (Critiques, Analyses, Biographies Et Histoire Litteraire) (French Edition) He was born a "pied-noir," an Algerian of French extraction, in Mitidja, in 1907, and was a friend of his fellow pied-noir, Albert Camus. In his autobiography, he describes his transition from Petainist to DeGaullist in the Second War World, joining the RAF as a bombardier, surviving one of the most dangerous jobs of the war, and writing an account Vallee Heureuse (La) (Romans, Nouvelles, Recits (Domaine Francais)) (French Edition) a sardonically named account of the bombing raids over Germany, including the fire-bombing of Dresden. The awakened moral sense displayed in this book carries over into his account of the battle at Dien Bien Phu. He quotes the American journalist, David Schoenbrun, who "...denounced the original sin of the colonial era: the absolute rights of France, forgetting the lesson of its Revolution, recognized Vietnamese liberty only in terms of their own interests." (p 27). More damning are Roy's own words: "...that the imperialism the most detestable in the world, which disguises its refusal to loose its markets and dividends as a crusade against communism." (p 353).

As with Fall's account, the book is essentially a detailed military history of the battle, with the particulars of the movements of the tactical units, as well as the thoughts of the battle's "big men," primarily those on the French side, de Castries, Navarre, and Cogny. As with similar debacles, hubris played a major part - the French commanders knew the Vietminh could not possible have the artillery to defeat a modern Western army - and like most debacles, there was a distinct lack of willingness to accept responsibility, which may sound a lot like the recent one on Wall Street: "... victory has a 100 fathers, and defeat is an orphan."

Roy's account of Graham Greene's visit to DBP a mere four months before the end is more incisive than Fall's, with de Castries pounding the table in "Shakespearian frenzy," silencing Piroth for raising the issue of the French defeat at Na San under similar circumstances. Roy also covers the proposed plan "Vautour," which would have involved American B-26 strikes against DBP, possibly with nuclear weapons.

Roy's erudition is broad, and is evident in his choice of epigraphs. They range from Florence Nightingale to Shakespeare and Machiavelli. His historical references range from Caesar's Gaul campaigns through Agincourt to Napoleon. Roy met the victorious General Giap in 1963, and Giap said: "...Dien Bien Phu, it is Valmy." (a reference to a raggedy band of French civilians who defeated the professionals of the Prussian Army at Valmy, in 1792, during the French Revolution). Giap knew his French history, and used it against the occupiers, a fact that Fall also relates when he tells the story of the Vietnamese singing "La Chant Partisans" which the French underground used during WWII.

Roy was a man of immense empathy, particularly for those individuals who would became soldiers, "pawns" in the game of concentrated power. He asked the Vietnamese, in 1963, for a memorial for the French fallen in the battle. His brutally frank answer to the Vietnamese question of what would the French have done to Viet dead if the tables had been reversed: "...we would have thrown them in a common grave like dogs..." earned the memorial, a small one, on the battlefield, which I was able to visit in 1995.

Even if you were not at Polei Klang, reading two books on DBP could be worthwhile, simply for the study of the continued hubris that exists today, and to reflect upon how little we know of "them," and how much they know of "us."

Note: the page numbers refer to the French edition by Albin Michel

I think this is a solid analysis of the last battle for French Indochina. Roy was a French Army officer covering the war for a new service. He wrote this book 12 years after the actual battle when many of the French officers were still alive. The forward predicted disaster for the Americans and this was in 1966, when America entered the war in force.

I think this provides a viewpoint of the motivation of the Viet and French Armies. The Viets were fighting for their homeland, while the French were fighting for honor and empire. The French select an armchair general to replace Salan, and he adapts an aggressive strategy to fight the Viet forces. This meant putting 12,000 men in a valley on the North Vietnam border, and this lured Giap to the battle. Giap surrounded this troops, and dragged up 105 mm guns to reduce the strongpoint to nothing. The arrogance of Castries and Navarrane is amazing. They bet their men's lives on luring the Viets into a battle, and when it came, decided that it was someone else's fault.

This is a good read on the first war in Vietnam. Although long and detailed, it stands the test of time and details the arrogance of a western power against an Asian Third World country.

Jules Roy "Battle of Dienbienphu" reaccounts the French's flaw and soon after defeat of the Vietminh. Though wordly and confusing at times, it seemed that Roy nailed all spots in historical context and the emotions released by Navarre as well as the communist Giap. As a Vietnamese H.S. student it seems that this book is for those who want to relieve the battle through the heroism as well as its saddened defeat.

This book might be interesting, but I found it diffucult to read. I think the translation from the original French is awkward. French idioms that have no counterpart in English are clumsily rendered into English, making the reader have to pause to consider what is meant. I could only make it through about 30 pages before giving up.

I've watched the History channel inteviews of the German soldiers being interviewed with questions about "who were your most fiercest enemies"? The German's usually replied either the English or the Americans. No German's mentioned the French. The French as our allies, was always bailed out by the Americans. Some Americans say that the French is only good for surrendering!