Customer Reviews

The Battle for Hunger Hill: The 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment at the Joint Readiness Training Cente r

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"Hunger Hill" starts by showing how the "book solution" fails to deal with a guerilla warfare, just as it did in Viet-Nam. The second half of the book deals with a return to sound basics, and the discarding of much of the foolishness fostered upon us by Field Manuals. I took many valuable lessons from this book to apply when I go to JRTC, or, God forbid, when we fight for real.

Bolger's techniques eleminate many ways we make the enemy's job easier, and make us far more effective in killing them. His well-defined focus on interacting with the local populace is reminiscent of Mao (remember, Mao won).

The book's most valuable lesson is the thinking process and analysis Bolger applies to the problems he encounters, and the way he evaluates his tools, techniques, and doctrine, keeping and modifying some, casting away others, and adopting new ideas where necessary. This book is required reading for all officers in my light infantry battalion. I see why.

The Battle for Hunger Hill is a battle for training that works. 1/327 Infantry Regiment visited the Joint Readiness Training Centre in Fort Polk Louisiana twice in the space of nine months. The first time they have their training blood sprayed liberally around the training area as they fight and die according to doctrine. On the second visit they have used the doctrine as the basis for a more effective way of fighting. As a consequence they are more effective than any unit to visit the facility up to that time.

Few units get the luxury of visiting Fort Polk twice with the same commander and similar orders of battle. Experience in professional military units is condemned to a short half life as individual careers and military bureaucracy cycle soldiers through units. The key lesson in this book is what you take away from 1/327's first visit. The second visit is verification that something was learned from the first. Appropriately the bulk of the book is devoted to the first visit.

Why is it not for general consumption? This book is a jargon and military concept rich environment. Check any page and it flies - 94-10, MILES, OPFOR, JRTC, "always a 90-degree bold flank", Cmd. Sgt. Maj., CLF... If you are not comfortable within this environment I suggest that this is not a book you will enjoy. To be honest I doubt that you will even be interested in it. If you are comfortable it is highly likely that you are serving or have served in the recent past. The book is written for serving soldiers.

Col Bolger's lessons will save lives if they are learnt by his target audience. That makes his book valuable in the library of any soldier.

If Col. Bolger is a member of the US Army's brain trust, we're in pretty good shape. As an officer in a Light Infantry battalion, I have taken the Colonel's lessons to heart, and those lessons have enhanced my knowledge of Low Intensity Conflict. All officers assigned to light units, no matter their branch of assignment, should read his books, Hunger Hill especially.

This is another good book by COL Daniel Bolger, this time about his battalion's (101st ABN) rotations to JRTC in 1994 and 1995. Lots of great details and observations about JRTC and the OPFOR. Bolger's battalion was badly abused in its 1994 rotation and he decided to get even the next time, which was fortunately less than a year later. Bolger criticizes the Deliberate Decision Making Process (DDMP), big Tactical Operation Centers and suggests alternatives. Thought-provoking as always but I don't agree with everything he says. There is no doubt that the US Army's cumbersome DDMP is geared toward set-piece, short-term battles but Bolger's approach combines common sense with anti-staff bias to try and just avoid all that messy staff work. From the intelligence viewpoint, he is dead wrong because Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) does save lives and it does take time to do it right. Bolger's command instincts are good, particularly about nitty gritty items like reducing soldier loads, but there is bias here that detracts from his message. For example, sometimes he says erroneous things, like the S-2 (intelligence officer) is on the S-3's staff (the S-2 works for the commander, not the S-3). Maps are poor.

Colonel Dan Bolger's "The Battle for Hunger Hill" is an Army battalion commander sitting down with a fellow professional and sharing his mistakes and how he got it right. He is hard hitting, open and honest. This work is best read by an Army or Marine officer or senior NCO who will likely lead soldiers or marines in battle.

The Battle for Hunger Hill is a great book to read; a real must for small unit light infantry unit commanders who must prepare for war in the modern era. I commanded a rifle company in the 1-327th Infantry Regiment long before Dan Bolger and it's reassuring to read some of the ideas that I thought of being used in training with the regiment. Bogler reminds combat unit leaders that they must not just be tough, but they must also be smart in order to suceed in modern light infantry combat. These new leaders must be able to adapt, overcome and improvise (to paraphrase Clint Eastwood in "Heartbreak Ridge") and Bogler epitomize this new, tough and thoughtful leader who first learns then applies the harsh lessons learned after his first and unsuccessful tour of the JRTC. The end result is success not just in his next trip to the JRTC, but in the real world of modern combat missions, like Haiti, where American soldiers are sent to keep or make peace. I wish that I had the opportunity to serve with Bogler rather the leaders whom I did serve.

LTC Bolger has done it again! His first book became a primer for company & battalion armored operations . . . this new book is destined to be the same for the light forces. LTC Bolgar writes in a manner for those professionals who seek to perfect their profession. His analysis and ability to cut through the "fog of AAR" helps to make the lessons learned a reality instead of doctrinal jargon. While some may be critical of his findings and his motives, he is THE ONLY professional soldier on active who dares to write on the subject for public consumption. LTC Bolgar adds re-freshing openess to the often closed door society of the combat arms officer. While I do not agreed to all the concepts & changes in tactics he proposes, LTC Bolgar provides an intelligent point for all those who are combat leaders to begin thinking & discussing their profession. I dare to say LTC Bolgar is the modern day equal to S. L. Marshall. Recommended reading for ROTC Cadets & company grade officers.

First off, Col. Bolger was a great battalion commander who gave NCOs and Officers who screwed up second chances, something that was unheard of in the 101st Airborne Division at the time. What we learned at JRTC is, a leader must adapt his training to the environment and this case, the environment is MILES or laser warfare. You can't tell me the OPFOR would run around behind small bushes when a rifle Platoons SAW's and 60's are blazing, it just wouldn't happen. The enemy would break contact if the weren't cut down in a wall of lead. But we learned to be effective in an environment where small groups of soldiers who carry butt packs, wear boonie caps, and spend every waking minute zeroing their MILES lasers is, you have to do the same...that's what good leaders do. So we spent months perfecting the art of MILES warfare and honed our call for fire skills and essentially turned the tables on the OPFOR. We coined the "system" earth pigs!

I've been through JRTC six times and the most effective units are the units who spread their units out, spend a lot of time zeroing their MILES, and have good casevac plans.

I was a team leader in Bravo Company and during the first rotation and like SSG Eric Bitzer said, the Company commander showed his incompetence by leaving our platoon in the open on the side of the hill after the initial assault. In leadership theory you learn about the emotional competency known as self regulation. I saw a company commander have a virtual breakdown on the objective after our platoon leader LIED on the radio about our location. Self regulation basically refers to your ability to regulate your own behaviour, speech, and emotions.

I served in units after where this kind of mistake would have led to the automatic relief of duty on the spot. Something the comapny commander in question liked to do with the soldiers under his charge. Didn't have your PVS7 on when it got dark? Automatic article 15, even if they didn't work. Great way to look out for your soldiers?

I think not.

If you want to see the deatils of a unit preparing for combat and the training involved, I recommend this book. Col. Bolger was one smart officer.

Daniel Bolger has done an excellent job explaining not only what goes on at the Joint Readiness Training Center, but he does much to explain how and why his first experience there was a bust and more importantly how he corrected his mistakes and performed outstandingly in a later opportunity. Excellent book on what goes into battlion level command.

I disagree with the reviewer complaining about jargon.If you are afraid of learning a little military jargon then you shouldn't be reading books about command and control. The small amount of jargon used in this book is easy to keep track of.

I am SSG Eric Bitzer I was there during this battle I was the Point Man for Bco 1/327inf when we hit the opfor the problem is not army doctrine but was in a decision that was made by the company commander of Bco 1/327 inf to stay on the objective after taking it instead of moving off the objective that all light units do. If we would have moved off the objective this battle would have been a total success. Remember that this book is from a Battialion commanders veiw not from a soldier that fought the battle Col. Bolger makes some great points and was also a great commander but the fault is not his it was with one of his company commanders.