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The Battle of Kursk

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"The Battle of Kursk" is a must-read for anyone seriously interested in "operational" (i.e. batallion units and above) level warfare in the context of the pivotal 1943 World War II Eastern Front Battle of Kursk. If Stalingrad was the end of the beginning, Kursk was the beginning of the end for the Wehrmacht in Russia. What makes this book unique is the expert authors' access to and translations of crucial Soviet recently de-classified battle accounts. These provide an essential correlary (and, in some cases, corrective) to previously published German accounts of the battle. The mythical July 12 tank battle at Prokhorovka is critically examined and placed in a proper context. This book also does an excellent job of placing the entire Kursk battle in its larger context, from Manstein's early 1943 "Miracle" counteroffensive on the Don, to the subsequent Soviet summer offensive that resulted in the capture of Kharkov. The maps and index are excellent, and the many appendices contain a treasure trove of statistical information. The few minor errors re German forces (e.g. calling Rudolf von Ribbentrop a Tiger Company commander, when his 6th Company of the Leibstandarte division's Panzer Regiment actually consisted of less powerful Mark IVs) are trivial. No other book on the battle of Kursk presents so thorough and convincing an explanation of how and why Operation Zitadelle failed, especially pages 138-147 on the "fateful decisions" made on July 9. The technical information and tank photos provided by Steven Zaloga are the icing on the cake. At last, the battle of Kursk laid bare, with supreme diligence.

It is perhaps a considerable understatement to argue that history has not been kind in interpreting the German conduct of the war against the Russians along the Eastern front. Nowhere was their conduct more self-defeating or more disastrous than at Kursk, in one of the most epochal battles in the war. In this book, authors David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, noted authors of other such singular tomes about Operation Barbarossa and the later Russian campaigns into Germany as "When Titans Clashed", concentrate provocatively on the particulars of the epic exchanges at Kursk that changed the calculus of the Second World War, not only for the Russian front of the war, but for the entire Allied war effort in Europe. In this regard, if Stalingrad was the point at which the fortunes of the Wehrmacht were first so fatefully reversed, then Kursk was the point of no return, where the unavoidable destiny of the eventual defeat and horrific destruction of the Nazi regime was all that lay ahead.

The Battle of Kursk was one of the most pivotal and epochal struggles in the Allied war against the Germans. It was one of the largest tank engagements in military history, and through its devastating destruction in terms of the number of functional and operating armored vehicles left for the Wehrmacht to continue their prosecution of the war, it was the turning point in the war, the catastrophic defeat the Nazis could no longer afford to absorb. In this regard, considerable controversy has revolved around the extent to which Hitler himself was to blame, given his fabled micromanagement of the Eastern campaign in general and the battle at Kursk in particular. In this book the authors meet this controversy head on, and while many readers may not agree with the interpretations and conclusions of the authors, they will certainly appreciate the verve, scope, and details contained in their overview of the events at Kursk, and their import for subsequent events all along the Eastern front as well.

Too many Americans familiar only with the Cold War aspects of Russian history tend to be ignorant of the critical contribution the Soviets made in winning a war so essential to the survival of democracy. It is an uneasy truth that without the Russian contribution in battling up to 200 divisions of German Wehrmacht troops for over four years, our entry onto the continent in France would not have been possible in 1944. Indeed, risking such a large sea borne assault would have been problematic against a force of the numbers of troops who would have been available had they not been otherwise preoccupied and engaged in an epic effort attempting to stem the terrible onslaught they were receiving at the hands of a resurgent Soviet Army. This isn't to claim the Russians could (or would) have won the war themselves, although there are serious and scholarly arguments forwarding such propositions.

Rather, my point is that the Russians single-handedly repeatedly smashed (and cumulatively diminished) the vast and critically important war-fighting capabilities the Wehrmacht continued to thrust against them, and that in doing so they changed the course of the war both along the Eastern front and for the war against the Allies in general. The evidence of just how formidable, ferocious, and inexhaustible opponents they had become in the two short years since the inauguration of Operation Barbarossa is detailed and documented in this terrific book, which shows how the series of hasty, chaotic, and disastrous German attacks at Kursk led into the largest armored confrontation in the war and precipitated the devolution of the Wehrmacht into a fragmented, fractious, and mortally wounded fighting force that soon was compelled to retreat, step by tortuous step, all the painful way back to Berlin, losing millions of soldiers along the way. This is an authoritative, scrupulously documented, and quite entertaining account of one of the most important battles of WWII, and I highly recommend it. Enjoy.

The crux of this volume is new Soviet archival material on STAVKA decision-making but there is actually little new here. At less than 300 pages, this is somewhat short-shrift to a major battle. There is no discussion of air operations or partisans. Very limited profile of commanders and their forces, but excellent order of battle information. The Germans placed their faith in the 407 heavy tanks available (102 Tigers, 200 Panther and 105 Ferdinands) but they split them up too much; they should have massed their best weaponry in one sector. It is no surprise that ArmeeGruppe South made much better progress; they had much more artillery support (Center relied mostly on assault guns in direct fire mode), and much better engineer support (South had about eight corps-level engineer battalions but Center had no corps-level engineers). Glantz asks and answers several key questions: did Hitler really push Zitadelle (no, Zeitzler, Kluge and others pushed it beforehand but then blamed Hitler later), could the attack have succeeded in May (unlikely, given the weather and the disparity in forces) and what if the Germans had eschewed the attack and opted for a mobile defense (this would have bought them time, but there was no consensus for this strategy so it was highly unlikely to be adopted. It would also have required Hitler to relinquish command in the east to a CinC). Maps ok but uses cumbersome abbreviations. No terrain analysis.

David Glantz writing the definitive assessment of the Battle for Kursk? Sounded like a dream come true. After all, colonel Glantz is the leading authority (along with the now much less active John Erickson) on the Eastern Front topic. After all, he wrote such amazing in-depth analysis on several EF campaign (from a much needed Soviet perspective) like "From Don To Donets" or "When Titans Clashed" - this one probably the best one-volume general history of the Russia's war. After all, Glantz did a wonderful job on demolishing (hard numbers at hand) a lot of Cold War fabricated myths on how good (and unlucky) were Nazi Generals, and how dumb (and lucky and faceless) where the Soviets. So, when "The Battle of Kursk" landed in my hands, I felt a comprehensible shiver of anticipation. The first thing I must say consider is that - probably following many complaints for the very dry style (someone called it a "syntactical slog") of his previous work - col. Glantz finally decided to team with someone providing him with a much needed editing work. Not to say that Mr. House's collaboration solved all the problems: we're treated here and there with repetitions and convoluted passages, and, yes, the style is still a bit on the dry side. For instance, nearly every quote from a primary source describing the actual firefight is preceded by the same "A quote for a (German/Soviet) account vividly depict the intensity of the battle", or a variation of the same. And the maps - ok, a bit more time spent on polishing and editing them would have helped immensely. But these are really minor issues. As far as the content goes, "The Battle Of Kursk" is (nearly) the definitive thing. Glantz manages to put order in the former chaos, and gives us a perspective that, if not new as the dust jacket's notes would make us believe, is possibily the current state-of-art on the subject. Ten years ago, the battle for the Kursk salient (fought between July 5th and 16th 1943) was, thank to the then mandatory uncritical reading of German literature on the subject and a complete disregard for Soviet sources, alternatively known as a footnote at the Stalingrad campaign, as the last significant German offensive effort in the East, as the largest tank battle ever fought, as another evidence of Hitler's strategical ineptitude, the demonstration that if Germany's military brains had free hands they could have won., an Herculean effort almost doomed from the beginning by Soviet espionage, bad timing and many other things. So, Kursk became another lost opportunity for the ubermenshen to revert the Stalingrad disaster and win the war. Also, the whole battle ended up focused on the Prokorovkha maelstrom, giving to that single episode a bigger importance of what was in reality. Not really a battle, but rather a confused collation of events that historians seemed uneasy to define as the turning point of WWII or just another "big" battle.. "The Battle Of Kursk" convincingly demonstrates that Kursk was a Soviet victory AND a German defeat - because Soviet strategy was more sound (even if their execution of the same was often flawed) and German strategy was wrong - based on a very rigid framework of incorrect assumptions, and leading to some big operational mistakes. It shows also that, if the southern portion of the German assault pushed deep in the Soviet defensive belt, its management was faulty at least, especially after the crucial 10th July decision to shift the axis of the attack from North (towards Oboyan) to NE (towards Prokorovkha), a huge mistake that was NOT a pre-planned move (as German memoirs made us believe in the past), but the result of an incorrect assessment of Soviet forces position and conditions. Also, it somehow manages to de-emphasizes the importance of Prokorovkha itself: if the 12th July battle was indecisive (Soviet Guards 5th Tank Army failed its mission to destroy the II SS Pzkrp, but made any further German dream of "operational freedom" unrealistic), continuous combat on the 13th, 14th and 15th show us that Manstein was 1) overestimating the real effect the 12th July battle had on the Soviets and 2) continuing operations in spite of Hitler (correct) belief that Citadel had failed. So - here goes the big deal - Hitler DIDN'T called off Citadel prematurely against Manstein's will (another much discussed myth), but the 16th July ends of the southern offensive was inevitable, facing mounting losses, Soviet pressure on the flanks and Soviet operations in the north. Just a couple of days more, and 4th Pz Army would have been crushed beyond recovery. The bottom line is that German generals lost Kursk most in their own - and not because of Hitler's meddling. It must be said that, beyond this, Glantz simply confirm what was known in the past by anyone serious in the subject, and there's no shocking revelation based on some untapped primary source. Even the "numbers" issue it's a bit of an anticlimax: Glantz chooses a conservative approach taking for granted archival numbers for both sides. But, if we're now confident about Soviet initial numbers and losses, the same cannot be said for the Germany's, especially as far as the SS corps is concerned. In my humble opinion, the numbers here should be drastically increased, but, as they said, who am I to contradict colonel Glantz? Also, a bit more courage underlining German troubles at the command level would have been welcome..

So - how's "The Battle Of Kursk"? An absolute must for any WWII enthusiast, an enjoyable work of scholarship even if somehow flawed style-wise, and a much needed ray of light in a still confused topics. Buy it!

The battle of Kursk by David M. Glantz & Jonathan M. House is the latest installment of a series of books and studies presenting Soviet archival writings of their war with Axis powers 1941-1945. Original after-action reports to the Soviet high command and to Stalin himself are finally available to military historians to compare and to supplement existing information on this massive confrontation, the decisive theater of World War II.

The information presented in this book details the Soviet army's actions in this battle to a level not before presented to readers, the overall picture of this battle is little changed from what was known before by writers as Erickson, Ziemke, and Jukes. The day-to-day action of the July 43 battle draws primarily from the Soviet side, details small unit actions and commanders perceptions and decisions affecting the ultimate outcome of this battle. The informational maps and unit's Order of Battle are excellent and help the reader follow the chain of events in a most detailed manner.

While detail and image of this battle are masterfully portrayed, the conclusions reached by the author(s)? leave the realm of historical fact and lead the reader into conjecture and 'revisionist' wanderings. The current theory that the German generals changed their insights and recollections of the events of the war after the defeat of Germany, to appear somehow less odious and sympathetic in their actions is something strongly grasped by the author(s). That they (the German generals) planned and walked hand-in-hand with Hitler regarding the operations of the German army is historical nonsense. The author(s) cast doubt on the German generals ability to retreat without routing their own forces, that mobile defensive operations were somehow beyond the grasp of the generals at this time. The author(s) somehow forget that Hitler relieved dozens upon dozens high ranking generals not because they were following 'his' orders, rather disobeying them to save their commands. Hitler would have no need to relieve a general who followed 'his' orders, 'that' general would have been captured or destroyed with his units.

This is a very important work in a readers understanding of this landmark battle of the eastern front. The information contained seems to round out the knowledge of this battle between German and Soviet sources. In that it is useful and necessary addition to anyone's works on this very complex and important theater of war. However the dubious conclusions of German strategy and operational abilities should have been left to future endeavors with collaborative historical facts.

There is no denying that this account of Kursk by David Glantz and Jonathan House is extremely well researched. The amount of detail is awe inspiring with 165 pages in the appendixes dedicated to OB's, strengths & losses, comparative armour strengths and key German & Soviet documents. The maps, some 32 in all, are very detailed however I must admit that at time they were still hard to read due to the amount of detail. The book itself was well presented and the photos were excellent. The only fault that I could find with the book was that at times it dragged. With the amount of detail being presented you need to catch your breath and close the book. It was not the type of book that had a free flowing narrative that kept you glued to the story, well not for me at least. Beside that however this would rank as the definitive account of this major Eastern Front battle and well worth the effort to read. No decent WW2 library would be complete without this book.

This book, like almost all of Col. Glantz's terrific books, is far better at covering the Soviet/Russian side than the German side. Yet this, like all others of his, is meticulously-researched, clear as crystal and highly-readable. He makes a good case that the Soviets did remarkably well, and were highly-effective, AND that the Nazi Germans lost the battle because of huge mistakes that any strategist worth his pay simply shouldn't have made. But of course when you are talking about Hitler, you are not talking about an experienced, well-schooled strategist, but an amateur! (Not that Stalin was any better). This is a gripping, fascinating book of unbeatable quality.

This book starts off with a brief look at the Eastern front situation and the opposing armies leading up the battle and the reasons it was fought.

The authors then lead us into the preparations taken by both sides and how the Germans continually delayed the offensive. The Russians, well aware of the German plans were able to plan and create an intricate network of defensives and they were defenses of depth that finally frustrated and prevented the Germans from gaining any momentum. The Germans were also forced to continuously probe the Russians for potential weak spots. Unfortunately for the Germans there were none.

The authors make a point that the German High Command placed too much faith in their new technically advanced tanks (Panthers & Tigers) and were continuously forced to divert forces to protect their flanks that were under constant counter attack.

The accounts of the battle are very detailed and at times it is easy to get lost in the description of movements of the vast number of units.

Glantz & House make good use of personal accounts, unit's history accounts and even memoirs of the leading participants such as Mainstein. Their conclusions in regards to the battle are hard to dispute after such a detailed and comprehensive research which brings together both Russian and German sources of information. Recommended reading.

This is the definitive book on the battle of Kursk. It is by far the most complete assessment of the battle that has yet been offered. The authors do an excellent and thorough job of establishing the context of the battle (battlefield events up to the summer of 1943, as well as the situations that both armies were in, and what their leadership was trying to accomplish). Glantz and House offer a very detailed description of the fighting, often identifying regimental or battalion-level units. The description of combat is not particularly vivid or exciting, but if the reader is looking to find out where a particular regiment was and what enemy unit it was fighting on, say, July 12, the book is likely to have the answer. In this sense, the sheer volume of detail and factual material is enough to allow me to judge the book a success; it contains information that could otherwise be gained only by consulting many different sources.

That said, the real value of the book is in its assessment of several important analytical questions. Due to Glantz's unprecedented (at least on this topic) access to Soviet archives, the book is the first real assessment of Soviet troops, tactics, and plans. While Dunn's book on Kursk was able to offer some of this, Glantz and House are able to go much further. They are able to show how the Soviets used their knowledge of German plans to set their own plans. Glantz and House are also able to convincingly demonstrate, with Soviet archival sources, that the German delays did not change the result. Had they attacked earlier (May 1943), they still would have lost. Furthermore, they convincingly show that the initial period of defense against the German attack was but one step in an overarching operational plan to launch an offensive in the late summer of 1943. This defense was cleverly laid out, with deep lines to be defended flexibly, and with powerful reserves located in the rear/center to blunt breakthroughs quickly. It was the classic elastic or mobile defense; the Soviets were good at making war by this time and the authors make this clear. This is juxtaposed against Glantz and House's analysis of German leadership. They demonstrate that Citadel was proposed not by Hitler, but by his generals. The battle was fought and lost by the generals, not by Hitler, although he got the blame after the war. These are important assessments, because the implication is that the Soviets by this time were simply better at making war than the Germans. Finally, Glantz and House go much further than Cross in putting the clash at Prokhorovka in perspective. Through their battle descriptions, it becomes obvious that the "clash" was instead a series of very disjointed, independent, small-unit battles. Caidin's story (and the popular myth) of the epic charge of tanks across the plains resulting in the swirling melee of combat vehicles at point-blank range never appears. Through detailed examination of orders of battle, tables of organization and equipment, and unit strength reports, Glantz and House show that the "clash" is probably best thought of as a draw rather than the Soviet victory that is usually described. The Germans nearly destroyed the 18th and 29th tank corps in front of Prokhorovka, in exchange for negligible losses. Yet, to the Germans this signaled the arrival of the large Soviet reserves at a time when their own divisions were bogging down (due primarily to a lack of infantry divisions). It was also at this time (or shortly before) that the Soviets launched their own offensives on the flanks of the German armies involved at Kursk. Thus, the authors show that the inability to affect a true breakthrough, combined with Soviet attacks of their own, forced the Germans to abandon Citadel. This is essentially the argument offered by authors like Cross, but Glantz and House are much more effective. Further, due to the wealth of Soviet information, their book is much more complete. Skip Cross's book and proceed directly to Glantz and House. If you own but one book on Kursk, it should be this one.

This book gives detailed,blow-by-blow account of what is deemed to be the biggest tank battle in World WarII and perhaps history of war itself:Battle of Kursk Bulge.

For a long time Battle of Kursk came to be shrouded in myth,mystery.Soviet historians have given an embellished account of the battle extolling the heroics of Red Army.Soviet books laced with communist dogma make a dull reading.But things have changed with the demise of Soviet power.Perestroika,Glasnost have ushered in availability of hitherto unobtainable Soviet archival material.Authors have used this opportunity to piece together an accurate,impartial,objective account of 'Battle of Kursk Bulge'

It must be noted frenzied fighting in winter 1942-43Red Army failed in its bid to liberate eastern Ukraine.When fighting ceased huge salient formed enclosing the town of Kursk which jutted 75 miles into the German front between towns of Orel and Belgorod.Stavka taking advantage of spring thaw-upon the counsel of Marshals Zhukov,Vassilievsky-started erecting formidable defences along the shoulders of the salient.Wehrmacht too managed to assemble awesome forces along the flanks of the bulge as Germans planned to pinch it in a pincer manoeuvre.

I don't know what made Germans think that they could nip those defences,for Soviets had transformed Kursk into an iron bastion.The place bristled with anti-tank guns,mortars,artillery,dug-in tanks besides being covered by mines.May be overconfidence? If so,Wehrmacht paid dearly for it.

I feel Kursk assault goes agains fundamentals of Blitzkrieg.For the first time in the war Germans used armour as a battering ram and they ran smack into deeply-echeloned Soviet defences .What ensued was a grinding combat.

Assault by Model's Ninth Army in the northern face of the salient was quickly contained.However things in the south where Herman Hoth's Fourth Panzer army launched its thrust appeared bleak.After tense,anxious moments Marshal Vatutin managed to stop German assault.Armoured clash at Prokhorovka was the turning piont of the campaign.It must be said Germans in a brilliant move tried to open a indirect route to Kursk by passing Katukov's First Guards Tank Army at Oboian.However this led to a head-on collision with Pavel Rotmistrov's Fifth Guards Tank army which formed the part of Marshal Ivan Koniev's Steppe front. German intelligence failed to detect its presence east of Kursk bulge.This explains German failure to break through Soviet defences.

Apart from this-in my humble opinion -they were three other reasons which ensured German defeat at Kursk.Firstly, failure of Panzer Detachment Kempf to adequately screen the flank of IInd SS Panzer corps.Kempf's detachment had it kept pace with the advance IInd Panzer Corps could have blocked the approach of Rotmistrov's tanks toward Prokhorovka.

This reminds me what happened to Napoleon when he strove to breach Wellington's defense at waterloo.Marshal Grouchy was assigned to protect Napoleon's right flank,but he failed.Prussian General Bluecher forces suddenly appeared on the scene throwing latter's plans into disarray.

Incessant Soviet counter-attacks meant Germans diverting more and more of their armour to protect vulnerable flanks.This was because Germans lacked sufficent infantry to do the job which considerably whittled down German armour strength and breakthrough attempt lost its punch. Further absence of Strategic Aviation prevented Luftwaffe from bombing Soviet railroad network which would have blocked the movement Red Army reserves.

The above facts does not in any way belittle scale of Soviet victory.For the first time in war Russians showed that German Blitzkrieg could be halted.Stavka accurately determined probable axes of German advance..Soviets went on fortify these routes by building several lines of resistance.Important points were converted into miniature fortress.Besides Soviets concenterated tremendous reserves amounting to 5 Tank Mechanised armies.The immense depth of Soviet defences fully absorbed shock of German attack.After wearing down German assault Red Army swiftly launched massive,sprawling counter-offensive which sent Germans reeling.

The book has exploded number of myths of Kursk battle.Foremost being Germans would have been victorious had they not kept postponing attack.Authors ridicule the claims of German Generals for imputing failure of attack on Hitler.

I feel this book the best written on battle of Kursk Bulge.Essential, must reading for people interested in Eastern Front in World War II.