Customer Reviews

The Battle for Leningrad, 1941-1944 (Modern War Studies)

5 star:		(6)
4 star:		(7)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

The opening chapters of the Battle for Leningrad describe the desperate counterattacks that the Russians made against the German invaders. According to Glantz these attacks stalled the advance of the German armies and prevented Leningrad and Moscow from capture. The second part of the book descibes the failed Soviet counteratttacks to relieve the city. Glantz believes that these attacks failed because they were dispersed and the Russians falied to combined artillery,air, and infantry effectively. The final section of the book details the lifting of the seige of Leningrad and how the Russians managed to operate more effectively by using deception and cordinating with other fronts in conducting offensive operations. However the Russian adavnce was slow because the terrain around Leningrad does not favor the massive tank armies that Russians usually employed on their offensives, but rather they had to rely upon the infantry to achieve a breakthrough. Glantz concludes his book by stating that although the Leningrad Front was a minor front it made the Germans commit ground forces to Leningrad that could have used to capture Moscow and Stalingrad. This is a book is a detailed military history of the battle and I would reccomend this book to military history buffs, but not your average reader since he or she might get bored and confused with the different army groups and fronts. This book emphasizes the military operations and glosses over the civilian suffering during the seige of Leningrad. If one is interested in the civilian view of the seige of Leningrad. I would reccomend "The People's War," edited by Robert W.Thurston.

David Glantz has achieved a reputation as a foremost scholar on the Soviet Red Army and its operations during World War II. He has achieved this reputation because of his meticulous research of the once unreachable Soviet archives and the use of his findings in those archives to write a number of books on the famous (and not so famous) campaigns of the Eastern Front. Glantz's heavy use of Soviet research materials to write his books results in their emphasizing the Soviet viewpoint. Thus, his books often contrast greatly with the East Front works of other western historians who often based their research almost entirely on the much more accessible German sources, which Glantz believes are as tainted by self-service and selective memory as the official Soviet account were by communist propaganda. By delving into the Soviet archives and developing a picture of how the Soviets really viewed "The Great Patriotic War," Glantz has been able to present a much clearer view of that struggle than was possible before the fall of the USSR.

Glantz is a thorough researcher and his books often show that a lot of what we knew about the East Front just wasn't true because much of it was tainted by German apologia and Soviet propaganda. By cutting through the myths, Glantz has made his mark as one of the preeminent historians on the East Front. However, unfortunately, he is a dull, dull, DULL writer!

"The Battle of Leningrad" has all of Glantz's trademarks: detailed research, a straight narrative of the campaign told mainly from the Soviet viewpoint, and a mindnumbing writing style. I don't consider myself a either a lightweight military history buff or someone who can't handle dry text, but "The Battle of Leningrad" with its page after page of unit number designations and Russian place names just made my eyes glaze over everytime I started to read it. Yes, I know campaign studies deal with unit designations and geographic features, but "The Battle of Leningrad" seems to be nothing but those elements related in a colorless prose. There is little about the personalities of the commanders, the differences in equipment, and although Glantz does draw upon some first hand accounts of those involved in the action he just isn't very good at blending those into the narrative.

I've enjoyed some of Glantz's books such as his single volume history of the Eastern Front, "When Titans Clashed," and his "The Battle of Kursk." However, those books were co-written by Jonathan House. I don't know exactly how House contributes to these joint efforts, but I have a suspicion that he is a much more polished writer than Glantz and thus he is the reason why those books are much more readable than the ones written just by Glantz himself.

If you're a specialist on the Leningrad campaign then "The Battle of Leningrad" will be an invaluable reference tool. However, if you're looking for a good read on an important campaign of WW II then either skip this book or have plenty of caffeine at hand when trying to tackle it.

David M. Glantz is a retired army officer who spent most of the latter part of his career studying the Soviet army. He founded and then headed the army's study group that concentrated on the Soviet army (with the fall of Communism the center now devotes itself to the Russian army, and associated armed forces of nearby countries). He's now retired, and has been producing a book every two or three years on the Soviet army during the Second World War. The present volume is in many ways his most ambitious, an attempt to retell the whole of the battle of Leningrad, from the initial German attempts to capture the city through the lifting of the blockade almost three years later.

Glantz has several strengths as a historian, and a few weaknesses. His principal strength, and this can't be overstated, is his access to Soviet archives that no one else has gotten into since the war ended. One of his previous books, Zhukov's Greatest Defeat, recounts a large battle on the Eastern front in late 1942 that doesn't appear in many histories of World War II, because the Soviets successfully suppressed knowledge of it. There aren't any whoppers of that magnitude here, but there is a wealth of detail concerning operations, intentions, and forces that hasn't appeared elsewhere.

On the other hand, Glantz isn't Hemingway, or even Harrison Salisbury. His prose is rather wooden, and workmanlike, fine for retelling a story of a battle, but not much as literature. It's OK for the first 300 pages, but this book stretches to 470 pages of text, and it gets a little wearing. In other words, if you aren't *very* interested in the subject, I would recommend going elsewhere. On the flip side, if you *are* interested, there's more information here than you'll find anywhere else, and it's clearly presented and intelligently analyzed.

As an aside, you'll notice that all of the references above are to Glantz as a historian of the Soviet side of things. There are (of course) references to the Germans here, and to their dilemmas and opportunities, but the emphasis is on the Soviets. In most instances, the book only tells you what the Germans are doing to provide context for the actions of the Soviet army. He does provide a brief history of the city prior to the war, and some account of the privations of the citizens of the city during the war, but this has been done elsewhere, and better. I suppose if he didn't provide anything like this, he'd be criticized for its absence, but frankly it seemed a bit out of place.

Given that, this is one of the best books on the Eastern Front to appear in a good long while, and if you're as interested in this field as I am, it's a worthwhile addition to your library.

This is a detailed account of the offensive and defensive battles fought between Army Group North and several Soviet armies from June 22nd, 1941 until mid-1944. In spite of the title, this is really a book about the fighting between the Soviets and AGN, not just a narrow discusion of the fighting around Leningrad, or of the siege of Leningrad. Glantz starts with a brief introduction into the history of Leningrad, then traces the fighting from Barbarossa in 1941 until the retreat of AGN to the Panther line (more or less the Baltic states) in mid-1944. This is a strategic level overview primarily at the corps/army level. There are some diversions into issues like logistics, the horrors of the siege of Leningrad on the population (particularly during the first brutal winter), etc., but 90% of the book describes (in great detail) the high level military operations of both combatants.

There are several points I would like to make about this book that may be of interest to potential buyers/readers. First, this is a dense book, definitely not a light read. Second, the interested reader can see how that military capabilities of the Soviets progressed throughout the war. The large (and on paper powerful) Soviet army of 1941 was smashed by the Germans in 1941, fought them to a standstill in '42 and '43, then thrashed them in '44. Third, it is also interesting to see how effective the Wehrmacht was on defense in '43 and (to a lesser degree) in '44. Mountains have been written about the efficiency of the German war machine, blitzkrieg, etc., but I was impressed at how efficiently the Germans used their central position to blunt one Soviet offensive after another by rapidly moving troops around. Finally, when one thinks of the Eastern front, the common image is that of large tank battles. I was surprised at how few tanks were engaged on either side in and around Leningrad, particularly by the Wehrmacht later in the war. This may well have been due in part to the swampy terrain, but this was largely a war of the infantryman and artillerist.

The reason that I give this massive work only four stars is that there are several significant drawbacks. First, like everything Glantz writes, this is clearly pro-Soviet. It is written from the Soviet perspective and describes the successes and viscisitudes largely from the Soviet point of view. Such a blatant lack of balance is reminiscent of the pre-WWII historians (I couldn't stop thinking about Charles Oman and his pro-British/hagiography of Wellington `History of the Peninsular War' while reading this book). For example, virtually every Soviet division and brigade commander is mentioned by named, German divisions are only mentioned by number. Second, the eighteen maps included in this volume are woefully insufficient. I really like what Glantz did in his later work on Operation Mars (`Zhukov's Greatest Defeat'). In that volume, there were maps that zoomed in on the main action under discussion, with a small window showing where on the larger battlefield the zoomed in piece was located. I constantly found myself turning back to maps several chapters previous to try to find out what was happening where.

Third, I think that there are several topics that Glantz chose not to cover that could have made this work a masterpiece (albeit at the price of adding several hundred pages - perhaps better left for another book!). In particular, there was almost no analysis of why some of the Soviet attacks succeeded and some failed. Glantz often quotes various Soviet after-action reports, but the reasons for failure are always the same (bad weather, difficult terrain, poor coordination, etc.). Glantz offers no insight or analysis of his own, just the facts. In particular, it was not entirely clear to me after reading this book why the Soviet offensive in January 1944 (and later) was successful and the previous ones were not. The Germans had been outnumbered (and had lost the initiative in the north) for more than a year, and Army Group North really hadn't had any significant mobile, armoured reserves since 1941. The entire book is written at the strategic level, but Glantz could have chosen a few specific instances for study at the operational (i.e. battalion/regimental) level to demonstrate how the Soviet army was evolving. Finally, there is very little discussion of the Finns. They appear at the beginning as Leningrad is being surrounded and at the end as the Soviet knock them out of the war, but then disappear for over 400 pages. There may not have been much action north of Leningrad during most of this period, but the simple fact of Finnish involvement played a crucial role during the siege.

Finally, Glantz has done a great job conveying the sense of the magnitude of the fighting on the Eastern Front. Most Americans view WWII through the eyes of D-Day and authors like Stephen Ambrose. The AGN sector was a relatively minor front for most of the war, but even here, you will get a sense of the massive and catastrophic nature of the fighting. Tens or hundreds of thousands killed or wounded in one battle (on both sides!), entire corps and armies routinely surrounded and anihilated.

Overall, this is a dense, scholarly book and probably will not be worthwhile to those who only have a passing interest in the subject. For the serious student, however, this is a must have. I've written at length about what I feel this book is lacking, but for the serious student of the war, don't let this turn you off. The fifth battle of Siniavino may not be as famous as Kursk or Stalingrad, but the events around Leningrad were as important to the war as these epic battles. This is an interesting, well-written, and informative book.

David Glantz's Battle for Leningrad proves to be an interesting book about this massive battle and siege that lasted for nearly three years. The book isn't for the casual reader, it would really helped if you have some background to the subject material already. The book is basically written from the Russian point of view which proves to be quite unique and interesting since many of the stuff on the Eastern Front always have a German slant to it.

The book appears to be well researched. Its obvious that the author had access to many Soviet material not available to previous historians on the subject. But as other reviewers before me have written, this book is not very exciting nor is it written with a lot of grace. The author can present the researched material well but he can't put it into a historical story. The book read like a dry textbook, there is no feeling to events at hand and to be honest, the book get rather dull after a bit. If I could jest, this would be a type of book Mr. Spock (of Star Trek fame) would write, all facts, no spirit. It would really helped if you have a great interest in the subject matter since if you do not, the book might go unfinished.

But the book do get high marks due to the fact that it revealed in great details (boring as it may be at times), the Soviet efforts surrounding this famous siege and battle of Leningrad. Russian story of their war against Germany is one of the great unexplored territories in our studies of World War II. Its will amazed many Americans how dwarf our efforts were against the Germans compared to the efforts of the Russian military.

Since 1969, the only major book available in English on the siege of Leningrad during the Second World War was Harrison Salisbury's The 900 Days, which mostly focused on the effects of starvation within the city. Salisbury's book was the first to benefit from a lifting of some the wartime Soviet censorship, but it provided only the barest details on the actual military operations around Leningrad. It was not until 2002, when David M Glantz wrote The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944, that a decent military history of the siege of Leningrad was available in English. As usual in his prodigious trail-blazing research on the Eastern Front, Glantz relies upon Soviet records, orders and post-war studies to compile an account of Soviet military operations on this front. Much of this information has not been available in English before, which makes this an invaluable reference source in itself. However, the book is relatively weak whenever it covers the German side of the campaign and the author's narrative is undermined by a rather pedestrian writing style and a failure to analyze outcomes. Nor is the book comprehensive - although it may appear so to superficial readers - since there is virtually no detail on `quiet' periods of the siege such as November-December 1942, 2 April to 22 July 1943 or November-December 1943. Indeed, there are a number of significant combat actions (often German counterattacks) that occurred around Leningrad that are either skimmed over or omitted altogether. Nor does Glantz cover the air battles or naval operations around Leningrad in any kind of detail. In sum, this book opened the door and exposed a great deal that was previously unknown in the West, but it is only a start in the right direction.

The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944 consists of three parts (Barbarossa, Blockade and Victory), comprising 13 sequential chapters. The book also has 18 maps (some of which depict down to brigade/division level but others just show armies), five tables (mostly on Soviet losses) and seven appendices, including detailed orders of battle for both sides. The book is very well researched and extensively footnoted, but after reading this book three times now, I've found that there are a number of factual errors and omissions, both on the German and Soviet side. For example, on page 83 Glantz writes that Zhukov's First Siniavino Offensive in 1941 forced the Germans to transfer the 72nd Infantry Division from Western Europe but this unit was actually serving with the 11th Army in the Crimea. On page 75, he writes that Zhukov arrived in Leningrad on 9 September - but it was actually 13 September (which has impact on assessing Zhukov's role in this critical phase of the battle). Somehow, the author also managed to miss the presence of the German III Luftwaffe Field Corps, which served on the Leningrad Front for a year in 1942-43. Sometimes the author also accepts Soviet war-time claims without comment. On page 129, he identifies Leningrad as "one of the most important centers for weapons production in the Soviet Union" but aside from KV-1 tanks and warships, no other major weapons were built there (no aircraft or artillery). On page 159. he includes a ludicrous Soviet claim that "the enemy's 8th Motorized Regiment was destroyed" without comment, even though the Red Army never destroyed a complete German unit during the entire siege.

Throughout much of the book, the Finns are ignored, until the very end, when the author devotes a full chapter to the Soviet Karelian offensive in 1944. This chapter was almost impossible to read because the single map displayed very few of the towns and actions described and the narrative just became choked with details that couldn't be followed. Oftentimes, the author relies on dubious German sources such as Paul Carrell's volumes, which are dated and biased. Some important tactical aspects of the siege, such as the Nevskaya Dubrovka bridgehead or the Kirishi Salient (`Verdun of the Volkhov') are not treated in sufficient detail, given the number of casualties that occurred in these localities. Soviet naval gunfire support also played a larger role in the siege than this book would suggest.

The author's appraisal of Zhukov's sporadic appearances on the Leningrad Front is also difficult to pin down. On the one hand, he writes that "Zhukov's iron will had produced a `Miracle on the Neva' but he never really explains how he got this conclusion and his narrative clearly show that others played equally significant roles in saving the city. He also deals with Stalin's role in relieving the siege, including the endless stream of interfering cronies from Moscow. Glantz does a great service to Western audiences in highlighting the contributions of Meretskov - previously almost unknown in the West - who played the critical role in breaking the siege. As Glantz notes, due to the rough terrain around Leningrad, Meretskov could not rely upon the traditional swarms of T-34s that other front's used but instead, had to leverage his artillery and engineers to break through the tough German defenses.

It is clear after reading through this book that the fight for the Siniavino Heights east of Leningrad, going on for over a year, was one of the great battles of attrition of the Second World War but which is virtually unknown in the West. The author provides a great amount of details about this struggle but then devotes relatively little effort to analyzing Soviet tactics or how they finally managed to achieve a breakthrough. Indeed, it is as if the author was a lumberjack blazing a path through virgin forest, but leaving it for those who follow him to put the fallen timbers to best use. Overall, this book is a tremendous piece of road-breaking research but in itself, not the final word.

Glantz is an expert in Soviet experience of World WarII.This book focusses on Soviet defence of Leningrad ,attempts to defeat German siege.I feel this dimension of war on the Eastern Front has been ignored by Historians.However author's latest study is bound to stimulate interest on this neglected ,long-forgotten theatre of war.

I have to say scale and scope of operations which unfolded on Leningrad axis of eastern front is nothing but stupendous,awesome.Here we see war waged in all its ferocity,ruthlessness.Leningrad,St.Peterburg,Petrograd is the soul of Russia . This magnificent city straddling on the banks of river Neva,founded by Peter the Great, was also cradle of Bolshevik revolution.No Russian with an iota of honour and self respect could hope to see this trampled upon by an alien power.

Soviet miscalculations prelude to German invasion transformed the city within 15 days into a battle zone.Tenacity ,sacrifice of Red Army frustrated German drive to sieze Leningrad. Violent counter-attacks launched by Vatutin at Solt Sy,Staraia Russa in July,August 1941;Zhukov at Krasno selo and Mga in August,September 1941 slowed down German advance. This gave sufficent time to erect fresh defences on the approaches to the city.

However few things stand out.I feel at a critical time when struggle was fast working toward climax Hitler denuded Von Leeb cream of his Panzer Army and switched it toward Moscow axis.In war always form 'strongpoints' as German military philiospher Clausewitz has said.German dictator strove to attain three different objectives at one time.Consequently, he dissipated Wehrmacht's striking power by spreading it across this immense front. Another reason Nazi leader fearing heavy casualties shrank from launching a direct assault on the city.

Succesful Soviet defence of Leningrad was also helped Finns whose attack lacked vigor.Finns undoubtedly were opportunistic.They were prepared to help German cause only to the extent of retrieving territory lost during the winter war against the Russians.So German effort to effect a junction with Finns at Tikhvin failed.

Now brutal phase of war began.Stalin's exhortations,threats Red Army during winter,spring summer of 1942,43 subjected besieging Germans to a wave of unremitting assaults as Russians strove to break the siege at all costs.Leningrad and Volkhov fronts commanded by Govorov,Meretskov assailed relentlessly . Russians launched converging blows from multiple axes.Feature of these attacks was lavish use of material and manpower and a contemptous disregard for life.To be fair the situation inside the city was grim ;people started dying due to malnutrition and hunger.So desperate situation called for desperate remedies.Nazis were implacable foes.

Most of Russian offensives were catastrophic failures. Still they kept on coming. I think no other army in the world can fight like this.In those dark days Red army displayed tremendous reslience. I also have to admire fighting qualities of German soldiers. Despite defeats Wehrmacht remained a formidable fighting machine.Ultimately Red Army triumphed.Ground comunications were established with Leningrad on winter of 1943 and subsequent winter Germans were completely evicted from the areas adjoining to the city.Wehrmacht began its retreat to the Baltic coast.
For the Russians the victory came at a stiff price. More than 2 million soldiers perished.

This book based on archival material recently de classified by Russian Ministry of Defence must be deemed as most accurate,up-to-date, impartial study on struggle for Leningrad.Author has laboured a lot.Enormous amount of research has gone into its production.In the process Glantz has shed light on defeats suffered by Red Army which Soviet regime cleverly managed to conceal. For instance,Operation Polar Star Marshal Zhukov's ambitious attempt to defeat German Army Group North and totally break Leningrad siege on Feb 1943 which ended in a fiasco.Zhukov too does not say anything about it in his Memoirs: Reminiscences and Reflections.

Finally author's focus exclusively on combat ,he does not say much about individual experiences of Leningraders who withstood German siege.

A lay man will not find this book interesting.

As with most of the David Glantz's books this is a highly detailed analysis of the situation Leningrad found itself in throughout the Second World War on the Eastern Front. At times day by day accounts of unit movements and operations will make it a bit difficult to follow what was happening but it shouldn't take away from the fact that so much was going on from 1941 when the siege of the city began to 1944 when it was finally broken. Interestingly enough on my last visit to Russia (summer of 2005) I was in St. Petersburg and our guide told us that Stalin did not give any help to the city rather letting them hold on with the forces available on hand. Rather odd to think this is true when taking account of the 'Road of Life' over Lake Ladoga and the amount of reinforcements that were being brought in. This book will put that myth to rest. There were countless attempts to relieve the city and keep the Germans pinned, losses were high on both sides and to a large degree much of the front was static warfare. This book is a dense study of practically each and every operation undertaken by the Red Army and the results which they brought. It is given from the Soviet point of view as are all Glantz books but that shouldn't take away from the fact that it is highly factual with many sources including archival to back up everything that is presented. A good companion to this book might be "Hitler's Spanish Legion" which served in the region this book is focused on, that book will the reader a greater understanding of what was happening with individual soldiers on the front line from the German side (although these are Spanish soldiers and the book is somewhat biased for the German side, so a nice rounding out effect to Glantz's work). The reader will understand how devastating round the clock attacks were for the German Army and how eventually the enemy was beaten (to a degree by attrition and to a degree by other means).

"Battle of Leningrad" is one of the most outstanding books written by D. Glantz. Practically, in a single volume Glantz solved all epic battles in the Northern part of Eastern front. The focus is on the City of Leningrad (defense, siege, liberation), but the confrontation between the Finn Army and Soviets is also covered.
After a very short preface, Part I of the book described mostly the German Advance through the Baltic Countries during early stages of Operation Barbarossa. The last chapters of this part dealt with the actual defense of Leningrad, detailing the relentless offensives and counterstrokes of both sides.
Part II is dedicated to the blockade of the city, the actual story of the 900-day siege. During this part, Glantz covered the conditions and horrors within the city, the partisan warfare in the country side surrounding Leningrad (1942-43) but also the Soviet efforts to break the blockade (especially the Siniavino offensives).
Part III, which is the last, treated the liberation of the city and subsequent battles.
As I mentioned earlier Glantz treated the Vyborg offensive against the Finn Forces (10-20 June 1944) and further battles in southern Finland.
The conclusions found at the end of this part detailed the human cost of the military operations and the siege, and also some military lessons learned from operations.
Many detailed and useful appendixes (Orders of battle, planning documents, estimated casualties etc) completed this overwhelming book.
I highly recommend this book, detailed and rich in military history. You will don't need another book about Leningrad!

This is a great historical book but it's a tough read because it's a history of what units did what and what army was where and they dates they did what they were doing this. This means this is not first hand accounts but a stategic analysis of what occured. This is what a military historian can utilize to see exactly what happened, what was the overall picture and other facts. This is not the populist military history with lots of first hand accounts , instead it's straight forward facts with some analysis. This one is informative and will never be done better for basic overall facts but unlike the most popular war books you get little human stories from what was happening , but then that wasn't the point of this book. It's a analysis of the overall unit movements and such. You really have to love this type of military history to be able to read this all at once because it's so crammed with facts that it's seven hundred pages long!. But the author did the research that freed up the facts from the files of history and that's a good thing.