Customer Reviews

The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action (Twentieth-Century Battles)

5 star:		(4)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

After reading two previous books on this battle, I didn't think that I would learn anything new on the Battle of Leyte Gulf by reading this book, but I did. This book covers it all from the strategic context of the battle to the destroyer actions at Samar - the Hoel and Johnston. Some of the things that I learned in this book, was a peek into the decision making of Halsey and Kurita. Why did they make the decisions that they did? Also, I learned that the air attacks on the Kurita ships off Samar were more damaging than I previously knew. The Japanese lost a number of heavy cruisers to air attack on that day. Also, the Japanese were low on fuel. The courage of the destroyer crews is depicted in detail. What a beautiful story of courage. I highly recommend this book for these and a number of other reasons - this is the best book out there on the most important fleet action of WWII and the last fleet action ever fought.

Wilmont has written a fascinating account of American and Japanese decision making before, during, and after the battle of Leyte Gulf, but his style is off putting to say the least. At times this book reads like a poor translation from another language. Consider the following quote from pp. 71-72 which is typical of his style:

" Some pages ago there was reference to the fact that amid various Japanese claims of victory 'five matters are worthy of note'. In fact, however, only three were then considered, hence the need to draw this chapter to a close by reference to the remaining two- this being quite deliberate and not a case of belated improvisation as a result of a sudden awareness of unintended negligence".

This book would have benefited greatly by a clear statement of his main theses upfront, defense of those theses, and a final summary. It would also have benefited from better use of maps and graphs or charts through out. There is not one reference to maps hidden in the back of the book, nor any charts of tonnage lost. Rather the author chooses to ramble on in obtuse text about such matters. This book's text could have been reduced by at least one-third by a good editor. It's a shame that someone with such knowledge can't write a decent English sentence!

Haven't finished it yet, but I am thoroughly enjoying what I am reading of it so far. From the areas I have read, he is sharply critical of the conduct of IJN Admiral Kurita Takeo (or, for people like me who grew up with the Japanese names reversed, Takeo Kurita). I have enough books on World War II dealing with what happened when and where. What I desperately want is tactical analysis and critical thinking, a rarity in books not strictly for military personnel and I'm seeing that in Willmott's book.

Willmott is <em>very</em> hard on Kurita, the Japanee admiral who, for reasons that are still at best unclear, turned his large force of battleships, cruisers and destroyers around when he had a tiny force of American escort carriers and their escorting destroyers by the throat off of Samar. Harder than anyone I've ever seen, for that matter, but justifiably so. This was not the first time Kurita had done this.

Kurita would never have been in position to have this small American carrier force by the throat if not for a gross mistake by Admiral William Halsey in leaving the door open, so to speak, for Kurita's force to come in. History has not been a kind judge to Halsey, in this regard, and Willmott is no exception, but he does analyze Halsey's decision here to place it in a little more perspective that may be kinder to Halsey.

So far, I'm likin' this book and I highly recommend it to any serious student of World War II.

I spend a lot of time reading history, the majority (at least as of now) regarding the WWII era. Therefore, I was surprised when I found this book to be rather tough going. The book is a first class work of non-fiction, no doubt about that, but I must say that the writer's style is difficult. Certainly, the writing is not what I would call fluid or elegant, or enjoyable, or even just plain easy reading. Buy if you're interested in the Pacific War, but be warned that it will take a while to get through the book.

Let me first caution any would be reader of this book that this is NOT a combat narrative. This book is an academic study of the political and strategic events leading up to, during, and after the battle of Leyte Gulf. The purpose of the book is for the author to give his critical analysis of the tactics and decisions of the various commanders and the American effort in the Pacific itself. To those ends, and for only the most serious of scholars, I believe the author is successful. However, as an entertaining read for the lay history buff, this book fails miserably.

It is unfortunate, as this is easily one of the most compelling of all the naval battles of the Pacific theater of World War II. Other authors present the action in vivid and personal detail, but not Willmott. Here the actual combat is rendered in dry - I would go as far to say boring - and technical fashion. The author writes from a vantage point that does not put you in the middle of the battle; he write as if he is above it, looking down from his ivory tower. But perhaps that is what academic studies are all about. All I know is I found this to make for very tedious reading.

That said, if you're looking for someone to armchair quarterback the entire battle in an analytical fashion, all the while feeding you endless dates, times, facts, figures, and of course harsh critiques of everyone from Halsey to MacArthur, then this book is for you. But if you're looking for something that's actually enjoyable to read then I would suggest the following: for an overall picture of the battle and its ramifications, yet still with tactical detail, check out Afternoon of the Rising Sun by Kenneth Friedman. For a gripping and moving account of the action that reaches down to the level of individual sailors and pilots, check out Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors by James Hornfischer.

If you are looking for a blood and guts history of this enormous naval battle, then read one of the earlier studies of the subject. This is a sophisticated analysis of not only what happened but why it happened. The author does a great job of delineating the command decisions on both sides, separating fact from legend, and putting controversial events into perspective. He pulls no punches in his comments on individual leaders but his conclusions are solid, well-researched, trenchant...and often entertaining. This book is not suitable for the reader seeking a general introduction to the event. However, if you already have a basic knowledge of this battle, this may be the last book you will need to read on the subject.

H.P Willmott is a prolific writer of history, and I've read some other things he's written before this, especially "Battleship." I thought they were tough reads, but this one, um, "beggars belief." (If you've read the book, you know what I mean.)

I think my own views come down to three points:

1) There's nothing new here. I read history to find out something new, something I didn't know before that sheds new light on the subject. I saw nothing here that I couldn't have gotten out of C. Vann Woodward's 1947 narrative. (A 2007 reprint has just become available.)

2) This is a tough read. Really, really tough. As a couple of other reviewers have commented, there's no narrative here. This lack can make it hard to figure out what's going on sometimes, particularly if you're not completely familiar with the flow of the battle. Prof. Willmott tosses in a lot of Latin and French phrases (in British style) that I think unnecessarily breaks up the text. Worse are the run-on sentences, turgid prose, and repetition of tedious and annoying phrases, especially "beggars belief" and "by any careful consideration." Style can be an acquired taste, and I don't like the taste of this one. Apparently, "concise" is not in the cards, and the whole book reads like an outline that got filled in a little bit at a time.

Related to style, I found parts of the book like reading Henry Fielding's Tom Jones: a lot of noise around not much story. It needs SERIOUS tightening up, and a good editor could do that. Example: At one point, Prof. Willmott comments that while Agincourt had a Shakespeare play and Balaclava got a poem, the U.S. Navy didn't bother to finish their official history of the battle (insert derisive sniff). Annoying as that was, it took him half a page to make the point! Where was his editor?

3) There are errors. I'll mention two here. First, Prof. Willmott states that "The Japanese accounts, drawn from survivors, are definite" about the FUSO/YAMASHIRO confusion (p. 150). This is definitely NOT the case--Japanese sources are why there's still confusion about whether FUSO or YAMASHIRO was torpedoed early in the battle and subsequently exploded. If you read SHIGURE's action report, they say YAMASHIRO was torpedoed early, while MOGAMI's report says it was FUSO. (Tony Tully has a good analysis of this at combinedfleet.com.) Second, in the ticky-tack category, Prof. Willmott states that after the battle, a vital shipment of 40mm anti-aircraft ammunition arrived at Brunei (p. 226). This one's a no-brainer--the Japanese didn't develop a light automatic cannon in the 40mm range, like the Swedish Bofors, so there's no way a shipment of 40 mm ammo would do them any good. He probably meant either 25mm or 5 inch 40 cal, but I don't know which.

To sum up, this book is tough to read, somewhat uneven, confusing for the first-timer, has some errors that people familiar with the battle will catch, and has nothing really new. Obviously, some folks appreciate this style, but I don't, and I can't recommend it.

Willmott's fourth or fifth book on the Pacific War is perhaps not as groundbreaking as Empires in the Balance and The Barrier and the Javelin (both fantastic reviews of the early months of the war). And this is not one of those popular history seen and told through the eyes of the participants, like much of the junk popular trash at Borders and Barnes and Noble (Stephen Ambrose was the best known of this type). Instead, Willmott takes a long look at the strategic situation in the fall of 1944 with an especially welcome look from the Japanese side. Willmott does not follow the details of the battles but instead asks how the parties strategic and operational doctrines lead them to the battle, and how did the deal with the battle. Willmott thoroughly analzyes the options available to the decision makers and pulls no punches in criticizing many of the leaders. Willmott's style is not always easy to follow, but that is because many of his sentences are complex, as he tries to explain complex situations. I have over 1000 WWII books in my library and put this in the top 10%. I recommend it, as I do Empires in the Balance and The Barrier and the Javelin.

H.P. Willmott has once again produced an important addition to the literature of the Second World War. His attention to historical detail combined with a compelling narrative - hallmarks of his previous works as well - make this an essential read for anyone interested in military history.

If you watch political pundints for the sheer pleasure of yelling back at the TV, this is the book for you. To call it annoyingly pedantic is overgenerous. The author offers little new research, but lots of new analyses. Unfortunately, he often dances around his analysis so long it becomes difficult to find his conclusion. Occassionally he takes the exact opposite approach by stating a concise conclusion without supporting analyses. Take for example the disembodied statement, that "...Kurita was the only person in the Pacific war able to make Halsey appear intellectually gifted."

The maps are too few and relatively elementrary. The photos you've seen a hundred times elsewhere.

The book does contain useful tables of formation compositions and overall strengths, and provides a solid basis for some points that are othewise vaugely obvious. An example here is the fact that a Japaneese victory at Leyte would not have changed the outcome of the war.

There are 3 good reasons to read this book. First, for the visceral pleasure of yelling back at the book in the middle of a crowded coffee shop. Second, for the intellectual excercise of discerning the author's actual point and then, as appropriate, building your case for why it is nonsense. Third for a few good analytical nuggets.

For these reasons, I found the book entertaining. However, Morison's volume XII, "Lete," is much more informative.