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40 of 42 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Briskly told, May 7, 2002
This review is from: The Battle of Savo Island: The Harrowing Account of the Disastrous Night Battle Off Guadalcanal that Nearly Destroyed the Pacific Fleet in August 1942 (Paperback)
Just finished this work. I have not read any other books dedicated to this battle alone; my searches indicate, however, that this is still the definitive account of the battle, 60 years later. Plusses: Clear, lucid style. Prominent featuring of eyewitness accounts. Strikes balanced level of detail, rendering the work readable and valuable to readers of varying familiarity with naval terminology. And perhaps biggest plus of all; if you want to read something specifically about Savo, well, this is pretty much all there is (to my knowledge). Minuses: "Ship by Ship" narrative style sometimes leads to repeating relatively minor anecdotes, without apparent need. After a superb introduction, detailing Japanese operations up to the first salvo, the author almost completely ignores the Japanese perspective during the battle itself. Newcomb obviously had access to Japanese participants in order to write the opening chapters; why did he not include their accounts of what happened during the battle? Overall, well worth reading. Newcomb repeatedly emphasizes the shortcoming of a fractured chain of command, and divided forces (so too, did the investigating admiral after the fact). I would wholly agree that these were deep shortcomings in the Allied force. I suspect, however, that these specific factors may not have been decisive. ALL ELSE BEING EQUAL, if all 6 cruisers had been together in one group, under positive command of one flag officer, I personally believe that the outcome would have been similar. Horrifically poor long-range reconnaissance, poor communications, superior Japanese night tactics and weapon (an outstanding torpedo), and an early-war complacent atmosphere were more pertinent to the case at hand. The biggest SINGLE factor, I believe, was the complete breakdown of reconnaissance. These guys simply had no situational awareness. The most ably led, superbly trained force will still get bushwacked if they simply don't know what their environment is.
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21 of 23 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
The 2nd Greatest Disaster in the History of the U.S. Navy, November 14, 2004
This review is from: The Battle of Savo Island: The Harrowing Account of the Disastrous Night Battle Off Guadalcanal that Nearly Destroyed the Pacific Fleet in August 1942 (Paperback)
On the evening of August 9, 1942, a Japanese force of cruisers and destroyers steamed down "the slot" toward the American beachhead at Guadalcanal. Despite being spotted on four different occasions by Allied forces, these Japanese ships managed to achieve complete surprise on the unsuspecting Allied forces covering the entrance to Savo Sound. In the span of eight minutes, four Allied heavy cruisers (USS Astoria, USS Vincennes, USS Quincy, and HMAS Canberra) were sunk by the Japanese, whose expertise at night fighting and the use of torpedoes became painfully clear to the Allies on this night.
Why were the Japanese so successful and why were the Allies caught so completely by surprise? There are several factors. First, the Japanese cruisers carried torpedo tubes while the Allied cruisers did not. The Japanese used their torpedoes with deadly accuracy, while the Allies had to rely on guns alone. Second, the ultimate failure of the command structure of the Allied forces played a large part in the defeat. The Japanese force was spotted on its approach at least four times. Each time, the sughting was inaccurately described, or the message never reached those in charge of the ships. Also, the overall commander of the Allied forces, Admiral Crutchley, failed to notify the commanders of the other ships that he was removing his flagship, the HMAS Australia, from the group. This left no one in overall command. The cruiser captains were forced to fend for themselves. These factors, plus an overwhelming desire by the Japanese to succeed, led to the disaster at Savo Island. Had the Japanese continued the fight and attacked the American transports which were unloading off of Guadalcanal, the disaster would have been much worse for the Allies.
Author Richard F. Newcomb does a very good job describing this great loss for the Allies. He describes the intrepid Japanese Admiral Mikawa, who decided to attack the Americans, as well as all of the sightings of his force by the Allies. Perhaps his best work in this book is how he describes the action on each Allied cruiser, devoting a separate chapter to the Astoria, Vincennes, Quincy, and Canberra. A good follow-up to the battle is also provided at the end of the book.
I recommend this book. It does a good job of describing one of the darkest days of the United States Navy and the lessons which were learned from the defeat. These lessons led ultimaely to the defeat of Japan.
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3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Review of Battle of Savo Island, June 7, 2010
This review is from: The Battle of Savo Island: The Harrowing Account of the Disastrous Night Battle Off Guadalcanal that Nearly Destroyed the Pacific Fleet in August 1942 (Paperback)
The Battle of Savo Island by Richard F. Newcomb is a fine book with a wealth of background material, details, human-interest stories, and official assessments (including the findings of the post-event examinations of the breakdowns in the U.S. Navy's failures in this early defeat). The book is constructive in that it does not simply castigate the Navy for its ineptitudes, but discusses the positive lessons that were learned from this defeat that had positive effect later one in the war. It is a timely book to help understand the battle that occurred as part of the first major U.S. offensive at Guadalcanal in the summer of 1942. It is well written and is informative to those who are interested in learning more about this aspect of the war in the Pacific. The one negative criticism I would offer is that the map (pp. 112-113) is poorly done. First of all it is not completely drawn (for example, the outline of the northern coast of Guadalcanal is missing as are parts of some words) and it is not dynamic in character (showing the progress of the battle with ship log times and fates). It would have been far better to have included a map similar to another one on p.192 or the Savo Island battle map shown in Samuel Eliot Morison's The Two Ocean Navy, Holt, New York, 1963: pp 170-171. Such a detailed map would greatly facilitate understanding of what occurred in that engagement, beyond the verbal descriptions.
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