Customer Reviews

Battle Tactics of the Civil War (Yale Nota Bene)

5 star:		(5)
4 star:		(5)
3 star:		(4)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(3)

 

 

Griffith's book certainly makes some good points, but there's plenty of bad mixed in. Since so many have discussed what they believe is good about this book, I'll list my reservations. In addition to others who did a review of this book, I also suggest reading Archer Jones's "Civil War Command And Strategy" as a complementary book, since the latter breaks down the campaigns tactically while this book breaks down the battles.

Field Fortifications - Griffith essentially concludes that field fortifications were a psychological deterrent more than a physical one. Often Griffith states that fieldworks didn't create a big advantage, and in doing this he cites figures on how many people were hit per minute or per shot fired. In other parts of this chapter, he claims that armies were too quick to dig in, even if they were on the offensive. With Jones pointing out how invaluable counter attacks were, and with Shiloh proving that point, I disagree with Griffith there as well. Finally, Griffith seems to ignore that multiple lines of fieldwork were generally put up at places like Gettysburg and Chancellorsville. To sustain big losses to take one set of works doesn't automatically grant a side the strategic or even tactical victory, as the Confederates proved on Culp's Hill on 2 July 1863.

Cavalry - Griffith seems to take others to task for their "romantic lore" over how they view the CW. I wholeheartedly disagree with his conclusion that Civil War cavalry should have been used on the battlefield in condensed charges more often. In making his point, he often hearkens back to Napoleonic times, yet he conveniently omits any mention of how devestated the Grande Armee was at Waterloo by using that tactic. Griffith disregards the obstacle that fieldworks would have made on a cavalry charge by saying horses could jump them. I'd suggest to Griffith that he reads Keegan's chapters on cavalry in "The Face Of Battle."

Finally there were just minor inconsistencies peppered throughout the book, whether negating the importance of Union raiding that mostly commenced in 1864, or suggesting Lee was "hardly surprised" by Hooker's Grand Plan when both Lee and Stuart corresponded in the beginning stages of the Chancellorsville campaign that they didn't know what Hooker was up to.

I'm not going to pretend that these faults were made simply because the guy was British, or that he's either subjectively or objectively biased. I think he simply jumps to conclusions before he can ably prove them.

Paddy Griffith's thesis is essentially that from a weapons and tactics point of view the Civil War was the last Napoleonic War rather than the first modern war. He points to the similarity in weapons, tactics, and similarities between how battles were fought and wars were conducted. In Griffith's eyes, both Union and Confederate leaders were rather inferior to their Napoleonic counterparts, being too addicted to defensive entrenchments and not nearly aggressive enough (he frequently uses the term "tyranny of the engineers"). Needless to say his conclusions are controversial but his book is worth reading because it is an "outsider's" view of "our" war and because some of his insights are dead on. His chapter on the evolution of drill manuals and their reliance on French authors is particularly insightful.

On the other hand, some of his ideas are insane. He believes that the rifled musket made little to no difference in how battles were bought, that soldiers who refused to attack entrenchments later in the war were cowardly, and that few generals on either side were worth their weight in brass, and that railroads and telegraphs made little difference in the way the war was conducted, and that the side on the offense usually won, among other thoughts.

This is a good book to read along with McWhitney and Jamieson's Attack and Die, which reaches exactly the opposite conclusion: that the South lost the war primarily because it was so addicted to the attack. Both books contain good research and thoughts but make sweeping generalizations that render their research and insights all but useless. Go figure.

A Sandhurst Lecturer turns his attention to the ACW - attempting to put this internal war of the former British colonies in the larger perspective of western warfare of the 19th and early 20th centuries. It is always a valuable, interesting exercise when a knowledgeable historian adopts a contrarian approach to debunking generally accepted opinions. Griffith sets his sights on a wide spectrum of targets, including: the ACW was the precursor to trench warfare in WW I; the ACW was one of unusual ferocity because of the development and employment of new technology (e.g. rifled barrels); the ACW was the first "modern" war. Unfortunately, Griffith misses many of his targets. Much insight is provided with regard to the conduct of battles in terms of the ranges at which forces were engaged, tactical and logistical problems encountered, effectiveness of different arms and tactics and percentages of casualties incurred. One point very well made is that ACW armies should have developed shock troops and chase troops for precipitating break-throughs in offensive campaigns and pursuing defeated armies to realize more decisive results. Too many ACW battles realized severe casualties without strategic results. However, when Griffith concludes that the ACW was in every way similar to any four-year period of the Napoleanic wars on the European continent, he betrays his Euro-centric bias. Obviously, the ACW was conducted on the basis of Napoleanic tactics - which was the accepted doctrine of the time, preached by West Point. However, Griffith tailors the facts to suit his own ends. There is not even any mention of Longstreet's developed views on defensive warfare. Griffith would have us believe that field fortifications were of psychological significance only - tell that to the Billy Yanks that made assaults at Fredricksburg and Vicksburg and Cold Harbor! (Another obvious mistake: Griffith would have us believe that N. B. Forrest actually said "fustest with the mostest" - and his &quo! t;reference" for this quote is a criticism of second-hand essays! This type of research would be graded "F" in an undergraduate history course - much less a published professional treatise.) Let the reader beware while enjoying this view from Britain (still looking down with a condescending view of the former colonies).

If you are looking for a book that presents reasoned alternatives to some of the more readily espoused concepts about the tactics employed in American Civil War, then this is a book for you.

The fact that the book is written by an Englishman will no doubt be used by those who disagree with Griffith's position as sufficent excuse to de-bunk his theories. However, Griffith is forthright in expressing his initial opinions in the book's preface and whether you agree with them or not, the author's arguments, presented in the body of the book, makes compelling reading.

Using chapters such as "Command and Control", "Drill", "The Battlefield" and " The Infantry Firefight"; Griffith's argues persuasively that the war was in fact the "The Last Napoleonic War", the civil war battlefields having more in common with that great conflict than with any of the wars that followed - even allowing for rail transportation and the telegraph. He is particularly interested in discussing the use of European (...mainly French) tactical doctrine by the officers of both sides and its effect on the outcome of the major battles.

Griffith is also concerned with how the men on both side reacted upon "seeing the elephant" and discusses why the terrible bloodletting on the battlefields rarely resulted in decisive strategic outcomes.

All in all an interesting and well written book, which will be of benefit to those readers with an interest in Civil War battle tactics and who are prepared to approach the subject with an open and enquiring mind.

A good primer on Civil War battle tactics.
Paddy Griffith's Battle Tactics of the Civil War is a good basic primer on American Civil War tactics. It is not meant to be an in-depth examination of the various tactics or strategies employed by the North or the South, but rather a cursory look and examination of the basics. It further examines whether the American Civil War was the last Napoleonic conflict or the first of the modern day wars. There are cases to be made for either but it appears that the American Civil War was the last of the Napoleonic style conflicts. Mr. Griffith also exposes many civil war battle myths to answer many nagging battlefield questions.
Mr. Griffith analyses all the technical aspects of the Civil War including Command and Control, various weapons, branches of service, the battlefield and its fortifications, and basic tactics and strategies. He uses historical personal observations as well as quotes of real participants. Again, he does not go into deep analysis but rather presents his information as a primer.
Written in an informative style with plenty of footnoting, Mr. Griffith's Battle Tactics of the Civil War will provide the reader with a good general understanding of the more technical aspects of just how the war was fought. OK use of graphs and charts but a few more plus some photographs would have improved this book. A must for the civil war buff beginner and a good review for the old pro.
Recommended for all civil war enthusiasts.

Paddy Griffith's thesis is that the Civil War was, instead of being the first modern war, was in fact the last Napoleonic style conflict. Griffith makes many excellent points along the way, but overall his work reminded me of a doctoral dissertation. Rather than being a truly objective study, he takes a more or less controversial opinion and argues it subjectively, which is what a lot of PhD candidates must do in order to get anywhere with what they are doing.

The single most glaring weakness of this book is his statement that mass rifled musketry was not the tactical revolution that the conventional wisdom says it was. To a certain extent he is right, for in the early war years the Springfield or Enfield rifled muskets were not widely available. However, he overstates - indeed, deliberately obfuscates his case. When Griffith makes his point about accuracy, marksmanship, and normal combat ranges, he never brings up that even though most combat took place at a range 100 yards or less, the rifled musket was still dramatically more accurate than the Brown Bess or any other smoothbore. If a regiment armed with Brown Besses fires a volley at a barn at a range of 75 yards, most of those shots are going to miss. If the same regiment fires Enfields at the same barn, most of them will hit. This difference was proven over and over again in ballistics tests made both in the period AND in the modern era, yet Griffith conveniently ignores them in order to make it seem as if nothing had happened to merit a change from Napoleonic infantry assualt tactics.

He is at his strongest when dealing with cavalry. His point that cavalry achieved great results when operating as its own self-contained all-arms component draws a great deal of attention to the Civil War as being fought as mostly an infantry-only affair. The artillery supported and the cavalry made an appearance for the newspapers, but that was about it. All the most effective military forces in history have been effective all-arms formations; two infantry-only forces of similar quality is a recipe for attrition. Yet ironically, that runs contrary to his point. All it did was remind me of an equally infantry-dominated affair, namely the First World War.

There is much food for thought in this book, and Griffith makes many excellent points. Just remember to bring your salt.

The most original Civil War book I've read for a good while...and I read quite a few. Not simply a treatise on tactics, the author attempts to prove that the American Civil War was *not* the first "modern" war that most historians casually credit it as being. Rather, Mr. Griffith takes the stand that although technology had evolved in the 45 years since the Napoleonic age, battle tactics hadn't and wouldn't substantially until the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. His revisionist views on the effect of technology (How could the rifled musket be credited for a military revolution simply by the potential to hit aimed targets farther if its users insisted on closing to within 100 yards or less of each other?), tactical thinking in both armies and the role of the lesser recognised artillery and cavalry arms are backed by a substantial amount of primary-source data. He presents and attempts to prove a good case. Whether you agree with Mr. Griffith's thesis or not, his book gives the reader a new perspective to evaluate other Civil War historian's efforts that I appreciate immensely.

Mr. Griffith provides an important counterpoint to the common assumption that the Civil War was vastly different than the preceding wars of the 19th century. However, he commits the same offense of convenient oversight of those with whom he disagrees.

His argument that the war was the last Napoleonic war rather than the first modern war is extreme. The Civil War was a turning point between the two military eras and, therefore, had elements of both.

Ultimately, the conclusion I drew from his book is that he feels that the Civil War was conducted and fought by fools. One might construct a balanced viewpoint by reading Griffith's book and Archer Jones' "Civil War Command & Strategy". However, I see no adequate resolution to the strongly opposed arguments of the two books.

I'm still looking for a comprehensive and level analysis of Civil War tactics and strategy. In the meantime, despite its flaws, I feel that this book is a worthwhile and important source of information and analysis on the subject.

Griffith makes one big mistake here in not making his point more plain. He assumes that the reader understands the broader context of his critique. American readers are rarely aware that in 1859 (France v. Austira), 1866 (Austira, Hanover, and Bavaria v. Prussia), and 1870 (Prussia v. France) rifle-armed armies won quick, decisive victories by taking the offensive. In fact, the armies of 1870 were much better armed than American Civil War forces. So how can one use the "rifle revolution" to expain the bloody and indecisive nature of the Civil War? Griffith maintains with admirable evidence that organization, training, staff work, and doctrine were the key ingredients in the Civil War bloodbath, not technology. The learning curve was too steep for vast, improvised forces to adjust easily. Ironcially for his detractors, Griffith argues that in the Appomattox Campaign, Sheridan and the Federals developed a combined arms offensive doctrine that lept over European practice, but it came too late to take root. But I think his great crime is not anti-Americanism (of which he shows none), but a lack of fawning sentimentality of the Ken Burns type.

Griffith agrues very persuasively that the Civil War was not the "first modern war," but rather a continuation of the Naploenic tradition. This book details his research and conclusions. If you wan a brief overview, I highly reccommend the 48 page 1986 "Battle in the Civil War: Generalship and Tactics in America" ISBN 1-869871-00-6. You will find many of the same conclusions very succinctly stated. I have found both books invaluable for designing realistic Civil War simulations.