Customer Reviews

Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army`s Art of Attack, 1916-18

5 star:		(0)
4 star:		(5)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

Mr Griffith has written an outstanding review of WWI battle tactics that helps restore the fighting reputation of the British Empire forces in the Great War. He also restores the balance of view on the German Army, whose reputation in both wars appears to grow with every new publication (in spite of the fact that they were losers on two occasions!). The only reservation I have of the book is Mr. Griffith makes it difficult for you to agree with his conclusions because he sometimes appears to be pushing a strangely reactionary and conservative military barrow. As a citizen of a nation that suffered as much as any in the 1914-18 holocaust, his belief in the offensive sounds all to much like a justification the semi-mystical cult of the offensive that created that unnecessary disaster. But books are meant to stimulate, and Mr Griffith has created a fine work of well researched and highly readable prose that I would recommend to any history buff.

In 1916 the British Army launched a huge attack which was latter to be called the battle of the Somme. After a three day artillery barrage over 50,000 soldiers emerged from their trenches and in parade ground formation walked slowly towards the German lines. Unfortunately the artillery barrage had used low calibre shells and as a result the German defenders were unharmed. As the British approached the Germans leaped from their dugouts and started to fire using all the modern weapons of war they had available on the slowly advancing British. The slow movement and concentration meant that within a short time 50,000 men were either killed or wounded.

Since that battle most historians writing about the first world war have been little less than contemptuous of the British Military leadership in the first World War. Following the war, memoirs of individual soldiers have described accurately the horror of life in the trenches. Books such as In Flanders Fields and the Donkey's have ridiculed the military ability of Sir Douglas Haig the British Commander in Chief.

This book is an attempt to balance the impression which has been created of the British Officer Class as a number of ill informed Dodo's who had a callous disregard for the lives of their men. It examines in detail the battle tactics of the British at Squad and Battalion level. It shows that instead of the army developing a head in the sand attitude to the disasters which were befalling it that most officers were keen to innovate.

During the war a number of innovations were developed by the British prior to the use of the tank the innovation most people are familiar with. These included the Lewis Gun (a movable light machine gun) trench mortars and Mills bombs (hand grenades). One of the strengths of this book is that it shows that these developments were noted by British Officers and quickly used.

Mortars and Grenades became vital in attacks. The Lewis Gun became important not only in suppressing enemy fire but in holding newly won ground against counter attacks.

In fact if one looks at the first World War it is clear that both sides were innovating all the time. After the initial Somme Battles the Germans rejected the use of defensive trench systems in favour of machine gun posts and pill boxes. They then save there infantry for counter attacks. The British and French in turn had to alter there tactics to using artillery as a means of allowing there troops to approach enemy positions instead of expecting it destroy them. In addition the British succesfully used mines burried under the German positions to considerable effect.

All in all the book is interesting and adds to our understanding of the First World War a conflict which in the past has been over schematised.

Griffith has a clear goal with this book, and that is to demonstrate that the British Infantry was at least as skilled at attacking as the German infantry in WWI. He does a good job of this, but a much less satisfactory job of exploring actual small unit tactics in any depth.

Most of the discussion of infantry tactics is in very general terms that would be familiar to anyone who's read a decent general history of the war. I was hoping for more details and case studies, going down into the nitty gritty of what went on during an attack. How did units advance? How did they coordinate with flank units and supporting arms? How were trench assaults carried out and successes reinforced?

Instead, Griffith looks at the broad scale development of British tactics and shows that the British weren't stuck with hidebound ideas, but were actually rather innovative in important ways. While this does answer some of the criticisms levelled against British generalship, it only sharpens others. If British tactics were so good, then why were the results so miserable? Either some of the tactics weren't as good as Griffith makes out, or the larger strategy was unbelievably incompetant.

I would highly recommend this book for both students of military history and serving military officers. This book provides a good overview of the evolution of tactics, strategies and weapons to meet emerging challenges. It also provides a good account of how the British military evolves and changes to meet those challenges. Both will help military officers who are working with transformation and RMA issues.

Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that the British military has achieved one of the most impressive transformation, evolving from a small professional army to a large army consisting mostly of 'hostilities only' volunteers and conscripts. It is also not an exaggeration to say that the British military achieved a Revolution in Military Affairs within a few short years, not only in the use of new weapons such as the tank and aircraft, but also new tactics and strategies.

It is even more impressive that these transformations were accomplished while the British military was actively engaged in an on-going war with a powerful and capable enemy - the German military. Few military officers nowadays would have to meet such a daunting challenge. Those critical of this book, perhaps being civilians, might not have a good grasp of just how impressive this achievement was.

This knowlegeable account has helped overturn some of the enduring - and now we know - inaccurate myths of the British military in the First World War. It is neither polemical nor a strawman hypothesis, unless one is wedded to certain mythical views of WW1. Indeed, if there is any fault - and this is why I gave it 4 instead of 5 stars - it is presented in a rather dull and academic tone which might put off some casual readers.

But it remains highly recommended for professional readers.

Paddy Griffith, a former lecturer at Sandhurst, challenges the commonly held view that the British army's performance in the First World was a string of tactical disasters. It is Griffith's contention that, "the British army gradually improved its techniques and technology," and it was this improvement that enabled them to win the war. Griffith sees the war as divided into two distinct phases: a prepatory phase in 1914-1916, where the BEF was gradually re-shaped into a large-scale army and the final phase from July 2, 1916 to the armistice. Griffith asserts that the first day of the Battle of the Somme was the dividing line between these two phases. While parts of this book are interesting, there is nothing really new here and the work is far more interested in historiography than tactical detail.

Battle Tactics of the Western Front consists of ten chapters beginning with an introduction and the tactical dilemma of trench warfare. The main sections of the book consist of sections on infantry tactics and heavier weapons (automatic weapons, artillery and tanks). Griffith finishes with a chapter on the BEF's tactical achievement and three appendices. The extensive notes and bibliography provided indicate breadth of research, if not depth of insight.

The fundamental flaw in this book is that Griffith's main hypothesis is a straw man theory. Don't most armies improve after 3-4 years of warfare? Even the losers, the Germans, Russians and Austrians, achieved tactical improvements over time. Since it is hard to see how the BEF could not have improved tactically over the course of the war, it is really difficult to see the unique value of the author's thesis or conclusions. Indeed, how could Griffith be wrong? Actually, the question should not be whether the British army improved over time, but did it improve as quickly as other armies? Griffith lambasts the Germans, slights the Americans and ignores the French, so this study makes little effort at comparison. While there are some useful sections on how the British improved their artillery tactics, there is very little effort to actually quantify the British improvement.

Another fundamental problem with Battle Tactics of the Western Front is that the author uses a very poor methodology to make his case. Ideally, the author would have detailed the 100-150 corps-size battles that the British fought in 1916-1918 and then attempted to use statistics to analyze the question of improved tactical efficiency. While there are selected efforts in regard to artillery tactics, these examples are too narrow to validate a theory. Indeed, since there is no real effort at analysis or comparison, the work becomes rather polemical and makes no real effort to objectively validate the thesis. Instead of focusing on operational-level details, the author continually veers toward condemning alternate historiographical approaches that differs from his (petty axe-grinding).

In addition to a rather tautological hypothesis and poor methodology, the author constantly confuses the scope of this work by inter-mixing discussions of operational-level and strategic-level issues (there is really very little discussion of the tactical level). There are also a number of other troubling issues concerning the author's objectivity, or lack of same. According to Griffith, some 10-14 of the 66 British Divisions in France were "elite," despite the lack of special selection, training or equipment. How could 15-20% of any mass-based army be considered elite? The reader may also become incredulous when Griffith describes disasters like 3rd Ypres in 1917 as a "partial success." How British (just like Dunkirk was a "victory"). Griffith is also extremely bigoted against the Tank Corps and one of his objectives appears to be to refute the idea that tanks contributed in any significant way to the final victory. Griffith denigrates tanks by claiming that they were essentially "disposable" weapons, good for only eight hours of combat, but this is sheer nonsense. At Cambrai, Griffith ignores the fact that British tanks fought for ten days straight. Griffith also lays into other pundits, such as Liddell Hart. Indeed, Griffith wastes a great deal of space on silly subjects, such as the distribution of typewriters in the BEF. What Griffith does not provide - but should have - is an analysis of the basic tactical "battlefield operating systems" (maneuver, intelligence, fire support, mobility/counter mobility, C2, logistics, medical, and air defense). While Griffith could claim that he addresses maneuver and fire support, with some mention of engineers, the other factors are all ignored. The exclusion of tactical intelligence and logistics are particularly egregious.

In sum, this is an immaculately researched but poorly crafted effort that does little to enhance our knowledge of tactical doctrine or operations in the First World War. The author set a low bar for himself but then failed to achieve even that, preferring to grind axes instead. While there is no doubt that the British enjoyed some significant tactical successes in the First World War (Arras 1917, Cambrai 1917), the evidence of 1914-1918 indicates that the British were generally solid on the defense but unspectacular on the offense. While the BEF certainly learned some lessons after four years, they were learned at high cost and it is doubtful that the BEF's learning curve was ahead of anybody else's. Griffith's work is unlikely to alter anybody's impression that that the BEF tasted of failure and frustration far more than it did of success.

This book is an attempt at justifying the extraordinary British casualties suffered on the Western Front. He focuses on the British as tactical innovators, which he does a splendid job at. Paddy also does much to debunk the myth of German tactical dominance.

I realize he is trying to prove his thesis, which is why he rarely acknowledges the failures of the BEF. The 60,000+ casualties suffered at the First Day of the Somme is little more than a footnote in this book. He especially touts the successes of Hundred Days, but I think he forgets that the Hundred Days were in fact the last HUNDRED DAYS of the war, and ignores many of the disasters and incompetent leadership of the previous 4 years.

His research is well backed up, and is worth reading if you are into this sort of military history- and this book is pure military history.
This is not a "war and society" book. The focus is on the generals, field manuals, doctrinal analysis and the innovators themselves- Tommy in the trenches.

If you are looking for a counter point to this book, try "The Myth of the Great War" by John Mosier. I know that recommendation is going to raise the ire of many who are familiar with it ;-)

This book signalled something of a watershed in the way we think about World War I, and does indeed challenge the 'stupid' theory of British tactics. Some hate such a notion - others love it, so explaining some of the very divergent opinions seen in reviews. The book's points of excellence include copious use of contemporary manuals and documents, readability, and a strong notion of the changes over time.

This would have been a five star rating - bar some modest quibbles regarding the arbitary notional start date in 1916, and a personal wish to see more comparative material on other nations (this would give more of a yardstick against which to judge the British efforts). Nevertheless I would strongly urge anyone with an interest in the subject to read this book: it will give you lots to think about, will challenge received opinions, and provide more than satisfaction in terms of production values, notes and references.

Griffith's exercise, meant to restore the glory of an eviscerated British military, is a shallow intellectual trip, decidely slanted with an agenda in mind that targets lesser-informed audiences such as wargamers rather than serious students of history. Mr Griffith's book will probably be used accordingly.