Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War [Hardcover]

Mr. David E. Murphy (Author), Mr. Sergei A. Kondrashev (Author), Mr. George Bailey (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0300072333 | ISBN-13: 978-0300072334 | Publication Date: August 19, 1997

This text is an insider's account of the espionage warfare in Berlin between CIA and KGB from 1945 to the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Two intelligence veterans - major players on opposite sides of the Cold War - have joined in a collaboration to tell the story. Basing their narrative on personal recollections, interviews with other CIA and KGB officers, and documents never before made public, the authors provide a vast number of details of CIA's infiltration of the new East German intelligence service, the construction, operation, and uncovering of the Berlin tunnel, and many other initiatives and countermoves dealing with the series of crises that racked Berlin and jeopardized an uneasy world peace during this period. The book illuminates some of the most compelling mysteries of the Cold War, including: what really happened the night the Soviets "discovered" the Berlin tunnel; who ordered the building of the Berlin Wall - and why did the west seem so ill prepared; how did infighting among Soviet leaders affect decision-making during the most critical moments of the Berlin crisis; how did power struggles between KGB and its protege, the East German security service, shape the political landscape of East Germany and heighten tension in West Berlin; and how much did the famous defector Otto John reveal to KGB - and why is he still unable to clear his name. The book, an operational and organizational history of the world's two most important secret service organizations during a critical time, unveils the vital connection between intelligence gathering and political decision-making as the highest levels.

Editorial Reviews

Amazon.com Review

Battleground Berlin is the product of an unprecedented collaboration between two veteran intelligence officers--one with the CIA, the other with the KGB--who worked on opposite sides in postwar Berlin. With the help of journalist George Bailey, they have told what will likely stand as the definitive account of those remarkable years. The KGB had the advantage of existing, in one form or another, since the Russian Revolution, while the CIA was a fledgling agency. But KGB agents and analysts were under chronic pressure to twist their intelligence reports for political reasons, which evened the scales somewhat.

Armed with information from numerous interviews, access to previously secret documents (many reproduced in the book), extensive research, and their own recollections, the authors roam the existing Cold War literature, correcting lies and false conclusions, putting rumors to rest, and exposing ignorance--in short, setting the record straight. They provide definitive accounts of many key episodes, including the double defection of Otto John, the head of West German counterespionage, and the famous tunnel incident of 1955-56, in which an American tunnel into the Soviet sector was exposed by a highly placed informant and then "discovered" in an elaborate ploy to protect the agent. Battleground Berlin is a remarkable amalgam. It is a fascinating, sometimes gripping spy story, complete with safe houses, forged identities, double agents, and street-corner rendezvous; it is also a scrupulously researched piece of historical scholarship and analysis.

From Kirkus Reviews

A troika of erstwhile adversaries team up to deliver an absorbing and authoritative inside view of how American and Soviet- bloc intelligence agencies plied their offbeat trade in divided Berlin during the first 15 years of the Cold War. Drawing on newly available archival material and their own experiences, Murphy (a sometime chief of the CIA's Berlin station), Kondrashev (who headed the KGB's German Section), and Bailey (a former director of Radio Liberty) offer an essentially chronological account of who was spying on whom in Berlin and to what avail, from V-E Day through the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Before getting down to business, however, they provide brief rundowns on the major services, including the fledgling CIA, the thoroughly professional KGB, and East Germany's Stasi. Having set the scene, the authors recount the facts behind convulsive events that produced headlines throughout the world. Cases in point range from the 1953 uprisings in the German Democratic Republic, the tunnel the CIA dug to eavesdrop on supposedly secure phone conversations originating in the Eastern Sector, the cover- organization games played by both sides, counterintelligence as well as disinformation efforts and propaganda campaigns (e.g., Nikita Khrushchev's threat to sign a separate peace agreement with the GDR), and, of course, the Wall. Covered as well are the stories of high-profile defectors (Pyotr Popov, Otto John, et al.), interservice rivalries (notably, between the KGB and the Stasi). Both Moscow and Washington, the authors point out, ignored some crucial, first-rate intelligence gathered by their operatives in the field. Eye-opening detail on cloak-and-dagger operations in a conquered capital city that once threatened to alter the balance of world power and breach the world's hard-won peace. (illustrations, not seen) (Author tour) -- Copyright ©1997, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 556 pages
• Publisher: Yale University Press (August 19, 1997)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0300072333
• ISBN-13: 978-0300072334
• Product Dimensions: 9.6 x 6.5 x 1.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2.2 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 3.9 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (8 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #566,509 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

18 of 18 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Setting the Record Straight, September 16, 1997

By A Customer

This review is from: Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (Hardcover)

This is a historic book, which anyone interested in the history and practice of espionage will appreciate. LeCarre it is not; while there is some bit of cloak and dagger (Murphy relates the story of the KGB attempting to capture him in a Vienna) for the most part the book is a set of essays addressing the questions of what each side did and knew. The strength of the book comes from the first hand of Murphy and Kondrashev as station chiefs in Berlin of the CIA and KGB respectively, and from the fact that Murphy and Kondrashev had unprecedented access to CIA and KGB files to document their conclusions.

These essays are loosely organized and the chronology is often repetitive: in the chronology of events, and in the apparent structure of Murphy and Kondrashev writing contrasting points of view sounds good in theory but repetitive in practice: the book does not have the clear argumentative flow that a book by a single author would have, and it lacks clear headings identifying section author.

Last week, Murphy and Kondrashev were in New York at a panel discussion sponsored by the Harriman Institute and the Yale University Press, held at the Yale Club. The questions from the audience were appalling, but there were two points made on the panel that might be of interest here.

The first concerns a claim made by the book that in looking into the effects of intelligence on the leaders consuming it, there was a pattern: the CIA had limited resources and limited penetration of the east; this meant that information was sketchy; however, analysis was thorough and objective and well-considered by the Western leaders. In contrast, the KGB had spectacular assets: high level penetration of French and British intelligence that produced immediate and insight into the Western positions. However, as the Soviet intelligence moved up the chain toward Stalin, fear and organizational dynamics led the analysts to spin the data to suit Stalin preconceptions and socialist ideology. The KGB intelligence, in other words, was ideologically pure but as a consequence it was misleading. This led Stalin, for example, to believe that the Western countries could be budged from Berlin by the blockade, even when Western leaders had agreed among themselves that they would not be budged.

At the Press panel, this book assertion was challenged: the Historian on the panel claimed that there was evidence in the book that the CIA intelligence was just as ideologically driven. Little evidence was given to support this challenge, but as you read the book, you might keep your eyes open for it.

The second point raised at the panel was to highlight one of the book's most novel claims: that 1) the KGB knew about the Berlin tunnel even before it had been built and 2) even so, they considered the source of their knowledge -- George Blake, a mole in british intelligence -- so precious an asset that they couldn't risk his discovery by putting disinformation onto the line. At the panel, Kondrashev asserted that he knew this to be so, because he was Blake's case officer, and he knew how limited was the distribution of the knowledge within the KGB.

The book examines these assertions effectively; the details of this analysis (which went beyond the simple rehearsed denial by Kondrashev at the panel) include examination of disinformation that continued after the discovery of the tunnell, and a detailed inventory of the information that the west gained by tapping the soviet telephones through the tunnel.

I'd enjoy chatting about the book more if you read it; feel free to email me.

16 of 16 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Authoritative and detailed, March 28, 2000

By 

Paul Cooke - See all my reviews

This review is from: Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (Paperback)

This is the first time a thorough review of post war Berlin intelligence activities has been published. For the professional this is a good compilation of operations (collection, defection, analysis, etc.). For the novice the book is a difficult read - chock full of details but not written in captivating language. Students of history need to add this to their collection of books to keep and use as reference.

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars More fascinating than Le Carre or Ludlum, July 27, 1997

By A Customer

This review is from: Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (Hardcover)

Only the collapse of the Soviet Union could have opened a "window" in history which would allow two men, adversaries in the most arctic period of the Cold War, to tell the full story of what really went on in the epicenter of intelligence warfare, divided Berlin. Even more extraordinary is that David Murphy and Sergei Kondraschev were able, thirty years after they served leading roles in this clash of armies of the night, to break down residual barriers of this conflict and collaborate on this book. They supplement first-hand accounts with documents and interviews that complete an unparalleled picture of the real world on which novels like THE SPY WHO CAME IN FROM THE COLD andFUNERAL IN BERLIN were based. This brilliant account is not merely more compelling than any novel; it is more compelling than any novel CAN be