Customer Reviews

Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War

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This is a historic book, which anyone interested in the history and practice of espionage will appreciate. LeCarre it is not; while there is some bit of cloak and dagger (Murphy relates the story of the KGB attempting to capture him in a Vienna) for the most part the book is a set of essays addressing the questions of what each side did and knew. The strength of the book comes from the first hand of Murphy and Kondrashev as station chiefs in Berlin of the CIA and KGB respectively, and from the fact that Murphy and Kondrashev had unprecedented access to CIA and KGB files to document their conclusions.

These essays are loosely organized and the chronology is often repetitive: in the chronology of events, and in the apparent structure of Murphy and Kondrashev writing contrasting points of view sounds good in theory but repetitive in practice: the book does not have the clear argumentative flow that a book by a single author would have, and it lacks clear headings identifying section author.

Last week, Murphy and Kondrashev were in New York at a panel discussion sponsored by the Harriman Institute and the Yale University Press, held at the Yale Club. The questions from the audience were appalling, but there were two points made on the panel that might be of interest here.

The first concerns a claim made by the book that in looking into the effects of intelligence on the leaders consuming it, there was a pattern: the CIA had limited resources and limited penetration of the east; this meant that information was sketchy; however, analysis was thorough and objective and well-considered by the Western leaders. In contrast, the KGB had spectacular assets: high level penetration of French and British intelligence that produced immediate and insight into the Western positions. However, as the Soviet intelligence moved up the chain toward Stalin, fear and organizational dynamics led the analysts to spin the data to suit Stalin preconceptions and socialist ideology. The KGB intelligence, in other words, was ideologically pure but as a consequence it was misleading. This led Stalin, for example, to believe that the Western countries could be budged from Berlin by the blockade, even when Western leaders had agreed among themselves that they would not be budged.

At the Press panel, this book assertion was challenged: the Historian on the panel claimed that there was evidence in the book that the CIA intelligence was just as ideologically driven. Little evidence was given to support this challenge, but as you read the book, you might keep your eyes open for it.

The second point raised at the panel was to highlight one of the book's most novel claims: that 1) the KGB knew about the Berlin tunnel even before it had been built and 2) even so, they considered the source of their knowledge -- George Blake, a mole in british intelligence -- so precious an asset that they couldn't risk his discovery by putting disinformation onto the line. At the panel, Kondrashev asserted that he knew this to be so, because he was Blake's case officer, and he knew how limited was the distribution of the knowledge within the KGB.

The book examines these assertions effectively; the details of this analysis (which went beyond the simple rehearsed denial by Kondrashev at the panel) include examination of disinformation that continued after the discovery of the tunnell, and a detailed inventory of the information that the west gained by tapping the soviet telephones through the tunnel.

I'd enjoy chatting about the book more if you read it; feel free to email me.

This is the first time a thorough review of post war Berlin intelligence activities has been published. For the professional this is a good compilation of operations (collection, defection, analysis, etc.). For the novice the book is a difficult read - chock full of details but not written in captivating language. Students of history need to add this to their collection of books to keep and use as reference.

Only the collapse of the Soviet Union could have opened a "window" in history which would allow two men, adversaries in the most arctic period of the Cold War, to tell the full story of what really went on in the epicenter of intelligence warfare, divided Berlin. Even more extraordinary is that David Murphy and Sergei Kondraschev were able, thirty years after they served leading roles in this clash of armies of the night, to break down residual barriers of this conflict and collaborate on this book. They supplement first-hand accounts with documents and interviews that complete an unparalleled picture of the real world on which novels like THE SPY WHO CAME IN FROM THE COLD andFUNERAL IN BERLIN were based. This brilliant account is not merely more compelling than any novel; it is more compelling than any novel CAN be

The most interesting aspect of the book may be the insight it gives on the interworkings of the Soviet State. While some passages go into detail much beyond what the general reader will want to know, it is worth trudging through the slow passages.

While there were some stories and information of interest, the book is very often dry to the point that it's unreadable. I skipped some sections.

There's also a tendency to self-aggrandize. Several time, the authors take a few moments to criticize other works, and then say "here for the first time" is the real story. While undoubtedly they do have some never before seen information, I think they spend a little too much time beating their chests.

Somewhat interesting, but certainly not spellbinding. Reads like a textbook.

If one were to pick the "ideal author" to narrate a history of the CIA or KGB, the choices usually end with a decision between a former operative in one of the agencies, a historian, or a journalist. In Battleground Berlin, Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey have managed to find the merging of two of the three. The first two are former operatives - one in the CIA and one in the KGB. The latter, is a reporter. It is an important distinction to make from the beginning, because the tone and language used in their book is often that of the first-person, and it is always narrated with a vested interest, first-hand accounts, and material that may seem overzealous.

Luckily for the three, the Cold War remains a fertile topic of examination for historians. In terms of uniqueness, Battleground Berlin represents one of the first times in the post-Cold War era that former CIA and KGB officers have come together to write about the history of American and Soviet intelligence operations. The work is not simply the memoirs of David Murphy, former chief of the CIA's Berlin Operations Base, and Sergei Kondrashev, former head of the KGB's German department and active measures department, but relies to a considerable extent on a vast array of sources from both Soviet and American archives. To be sure, much of the story is based on the recollections of the co-authors, but these are tempered by supporting evidence.

In this work, the reader is treated to a sober and balanced account of major Cold War events in Germany as interpreted by the American and Soviet intelligence services. The authors' smooth narrative touches on the primary events that will be familiar to most historians of post-war Europe: the Berlin Blockade, the Korean War (and its effect on Germany), the June 1953 uprising in East Germany, the Otto John case, the Berlin Tunnel, and the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961 which culminated in the building of the Berlin Wall.

The authors portray in an interesting manner the intelligence organizations in Germany in the initial postwar years. The view put forth is not necessarily a unique one, but it is put forth in a dynamic manor: The fledgling CIA was naive and unprepared compared to the seasoned opponent in the KGB. The authors point out, for example, that the CIA did not receive its first Russian speaker until 1947 (p. 23). In contrast, the Soviets in Germany were preparing for intelligence operations in the West "as the fronts advanced into Germany (p. 33)." The authors attribute this contrast in preparation to the deep-seated paranoia which characterized Soviet Russia (p. 26), as personified in Joseph Stalin.

Battleground Berlin sets out to describe in detail the major Cold War events in Germany, and specifically Berlin, as they related to intelligence. The account of the Berlin Blockade makes clear that the Soviets had reliable information on the position of the Western governments, but that this information was not translated into useful knowledge because the Soviet leaders rejected intelligence that did not conform to their preconceptions. As a result, Soviet intelligence officers often "appropriately" adjusted negative intelligence before distributing it to higher levels of the Communist Party, or simply did not distribute discouraging intelligence. On the other hand, the authors argue, the West opted to continue the Airlift in part because of reassurance by CIA reports that the Soviets did not intend to take military action against the West for continuing the Airlift (p. 62). This analysis of the effect of CIA intelligence on American policy during the Berlin Airlift is provocative, but the evidence to support it is disappointing. The authors cite an interview with Gordon Stewart, the head of the German mission in Heidelberg, as their primary evidence that "senior policymakers in Germany and Washington" were making extensive use of CIA reporting (p. 62). This may be insufficient evidence to support the authors' claim that, "Information obtained by CIA's Berlin Operations Base had a significant and immediate effect on US decisions about West Berlin and West Germany (p. 78)." Furthermore, the reader might have expected mention of the Western counter-blockade, and other events, as contributing to the Soviet decision to lift the Berlin Blockade.

What the authors are truly doing, in their work, is attempting to provide the greatest detail presently available on American and Soviet intelligence organizations during a number of significant Cold War events. Their book successfully untangles the numerous Soviet bureaucratic agencies and departments involved in foreign espionage from one another. Its main strength, however, lies in its portrayal of the inner workings of the Soviet system which effectively hindered reliable intelligence from becoming a useful product in policy-making. Stalin's Soviet Union by its very nature broke the intelligence cycle.

The weaknesses of this work, however, detract from its overall contribution to its academic use. Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of this work is that it falls short of its claim in the introduction: "The great story of this book is how information becomes knowledge and how this knowledge gets transmuted into political policy (p. xxv)." While events and motives are discussed, little is illustrated to show the effects that such actions had on policy. There is no demonstration of how policy was created, changed, or affected. The authors provide suggestions of such an effects in the discussion of the Berlin Blockade and of the Berlin Wall, but certainly not sufficient evidence to support the claim in the introduction.

Lastly, the authors appear overly pleased with their own "uniqueness," repeating phrases like "never before revealed," (pg. 38) and, "previously unknown" (pg. 51). While much of the evidence and accounts are compelling and interesting, they are hardly unique in and of themselves. What they do not rely on is perhaps their strongest claim. Their knowledge and information is not solely unique, but their portrayal, their comparison side-by-side, and especially their collaboration between two "sides," are what make the work useful, distinctive, and informative.

Good overview of the CIA (BOB) and the KGB intelligence battles in Germany, specifically Berlin, after WW2.

I am surprized by what was not discussed. Certainly, it must be declassified by now.

For example, a US crypto sergeant defected to East Germany in 1962. He took with him the NATO codes. We told the Italians to change their codes, they had been compromised. The Italians believed that none of their codes could be broken, so refused to change. From that point on, the only intelligence we would share with them was "Classified". Never Secret or Top Secret.

Three years later, a Soviet crypto clerk defected to the West. He brought with him (among other things) the Italian codes. Finally, the Italians changed cyphers. It didn't help. They had a mole in their intelligence.

Gorbachev's 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' made much more harm to Western Intelligence than any ideological campaigns of his predecessors. Only once before, namely during the WWII, did Stalin manage to trick the West into believing in 'comrades in arms' and 'Allied powers' slogans of Soviet politics. It resulted in thousands of people, who hated Bolshevism, to be forcefully returned to the Soviet Union after the war, where they were either shot or sent to Gulags. Simultaneously, Western intelligence services were paralised by many moles successfully operating on all shores of the Atlantic and Pacific. As a result, Stalin was awarded "A Man of the Year" title by the Life magazine twice (1939 and 1942), and Gorbachev became a Noble Prize (for Peace?!) winner in 1990.

What did Mikhail Sergeevich do for this award? Deceiving the West with his 'glasnost' concept, he managed to convince many leaders that the Soviet Union started to move in the direction of the open, democratic society. At the same time, the CIA suffered the heaviest blow of all times duting the 1985 Year of Spy with most of its officers ambushed and expelled, and secret agents arrested and shot. Surprisingly, the number of Soviet moles within the CIA and the US government did not decrease after Senator McCarthy's fierce anti-Communist campaign. Names are well known, but I would like to stress that the most recent case dates back to 2002!

So since the Soviet Union under Gorbachev-Yeltsin-Putin started its ideological attack, the number of officers at the Soviet/Russian desk of many Western intelligence services had been dramatically reduced. The budgets allocated for balancing KGB-SVR operations in Europe and Americas were either cut or withdrawn. RFE/RL was moved to Prague, and its staff now consists of only a fistful of journalists. It is virtually unoperative and is being justfully criticised by both American and Russian politicians.

In 1983 Burton Gerber, then head of the CIA's SE division, started secret cooperation with the KGB, authorised by his bosses. In the 1990s first writers and journalists 8late John Costello, as an example), and then the CIA officers started to queue to be nominated Soviet KGB collaborators in "bashful projects of unseen openness". David Murphy, former head of the CIA's SR division, notoriously known for his multiple faux pas (take Nalivaiko and later Nosenko cases, for example) co-authored this book, which gives no credit at all to American intelligence, but fully acts in the interests of Soviet propaganda. I was very much surprised to see such respectable analysts and archivists as Hayden Peake and Oleg Gordievsky praising the book in their earlier reviews. Maybe, it was fashionable in 1997, but then followed Bearden's production in 2003 (Milton Bearden is another former CIA's Soviet/East European chief), so the suit became dangerous. I guess the only way to stop it will be to publish Rem Krasilnikov's book, recently appeared in Moscow. Former Soviet KGB General claims: 'the Cold War will never be over!'