Battles of the Thirty Years War: From White Mountain to Nordlingen, 1618-1635 (Contributions in Military Studies) [Hardcover]

William P. Guthrie (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0313320284 | ISBN-13: 978-0313320286 | Publication Date: October 30, 2001

This is the first complete detailed study of the military aspects of the first half of this important conflict (1618-1635). Each chapter deals with a particular battle, but Guthrie also examines wider questions of strategy, leadership, armaments, organization, logistics, and war finances. The main emphasis is on the unique character and aspects of the Thirty Years War, with attention to the evolution of warfare and weapons, the impact of this evolution on actual operations, and the replacement of the previously dominant "tercio" style of warfare by the nascent linear system. The Thirty Years War is considered within its own context, rather than merely as a poor relation to the linear or Napoleonic periods. The campaigns covered in this volume include the defeat of the Bohemian and German Protestants (1618-1623), the Danish War (1625-1629), the victories of the Swedes under Gustavus Adolphus (1630-1632), and the final defeat of the Swedes at Nordlingen in 1634. Guthrie also pays particular notice to the important battle of Breitenfeld. With the inclusion of many secondary theaters and minor actions, the whole of this work constitutes a complete military history of the German War.

Editorial Reviews

Review

“William Guthrie has performed a splendid service by writing a book that describes each of the major engagements of the Thirty Year War from its outbreak to the entry of France, at which point it expanded into a pan-European conflict.”–Arquebusier

“Guthrie's Battles of the Thirty Years War attempts to fill this gap, and it does so in solid if formulaic style, laying out the strengths of the opposing forces, the abilities and personalities of the commanders, and the tactical details of the actions... Without this book one is forced to glean this kind of detail from a myriad of obscure works written in several languages. Nor does Guthrie simply summarize these older works; he also provides intelligent, original analysis-both tactical and strategic-of his own. Scholars will also find Guthrie's brief but effective intorduction useful, for it provides a detailed explanation of military technology, tactical organization, and military practice of the period, something that is lacking in anglophone historiography...this is a well-researched and unique reference work that should find favor with scholars of the Thirty Years' War or early modern warfare.”–The Journal of Military History

“...an immensely handy reference to military operations during the first 17 years of the war, with a focus on the actual engagements. There are numerous tables discussing the apportionment of personnel among the arms, mini-biographies of commanders notable and not so notable, and much more. Well worth reading--and having--for anyone with a serious interest in the conduct of war during the early seventeenth century.”–The New York Military Affairs Newsletter

About the Author

WILLIAM P. GUTHRIE is an independent researcher. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science. This is his first book. He is currently working on a follow-up volume, covering the second half of the Thirty Years War.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 352 pages
• Publisher: Greenwood Press (October 30, 2001)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0313320284
• ISBN-13: 978-0313320286
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.4 x 1.3 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.5 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.7 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,205,061 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

10 of 10 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Must Have Despite Some Flaws, July 17, 2005

By 

Steven Larsen (Philadelphia, USA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Battles of the Thirty Years War: From White Mountain to Nordlingen, 1618-1635 (Contributions in Military Studies) (Hardcover)

On the one hand, this book fills a gaping hole in the literature of English language military history, something that those who study this period know all too well. Guthrie has provided us with orders of battle for major and minor acions, as well as descriptions of battles presented in a level of detail previously unheard of.

On the other hand, it is not the scholarly presentation some might hope for. The author makes statements, many controversial, that are not even footnoted. In fact, the footnotes, when they are there, are explanatory, and cite no source. This is most regretable as many of the authors, assertions, besides being most interesting, have been challenged or questioned by scholars on the subject, yet we have no way of understanding what led the author to his views. A fairly extensive, multi-language bibliography is however, included in the back.

I was especially disappointed with Guthrie's failure to take into account some of the latest research, especially that of Richard Brzezinski, concerning the tactics and quality of the Swedish and League cavalry. Guthrie persists in repeating the outdated, IMO, view that the League/Imperial cavalry used the caracole as their primary method of attack, while the Swedes charged with swords drawn.

This book has received some mixed reviews on internet discussion boards. For all its flaws it is still a must have, mainly because nothing like it exists in the English language. Primary source material is lacking on the Thirty Years War anyway, and controversy is inevitable. I prefer to welcome this effort by Guthrie and look foreward to his future works.

5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An essential "Wargamers' Guide", July 6, 2011

By 

G. Simon (London, England) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Battles of the Thirty Years War: From White Mountain to Nordlingen, 1618-1635 (Contributions in Military Studies) (Hardcover)

This is an excellent `Wargamers Guide' to the first half of the Thirty Years' War. The chapters are:
P001: Breitenfeld and the Thirty Years War
P047: The Battle of the White Mountain: First Battle of the Thirty Years War
P083: The 1622 Campaign: The Battle of Wimpfen
P105: The Battle of Stadtlohn: The End of the German War
P117: The Danish War: Dessau and Lutter
P149: Gustavus's Run of Victory: From Stettin to the Lech
P187: Gustavus versus Wallenstein, 1632: Alte Veste and Lutzen
P233: The War in Westphalia, 1632-33
P259: The Battle of Nordlingen: From Lutzen to the Peace of Prague
PP297-335: Glossary, Bibliography, Index, Index of Units

The chapters cover the associated campaigns, not just the titular battle. Each chapter is broken down into sections, and has a list of sources, extensive appendices and notes, and a map or two, usually of the relevant battle(s), and sometimes of the campaigning area. The appendices contain exhaustive army lists with microscopic details. Here is a breakdown of chapter 3, for example:
The 1622 Campaign: The Battle of Wimpfen
1622 Strategy; The Action of Mingolsheim, April 27, 1622; To Wimpfen; The Commanders; The Armies; The Battle of Wimpfen, May 6, 1622; Later Operations; 1622 Chronology.
Sources
"English accounts of Wimpfen and Hochst are limited to Gindley and Dodge. The principal German source is Wertheim, however Heilmann and Villermont are worth a look".
Appendix A: The Weingarten Action
(description)
Appendix B: Mingolsheim (or Wiesloch)
Army list (Tilly's) with the following column headings:
Unit name; Companies (number of); Estimated Strength; Loss; Notes. (This is the standard layout for all army lists)
Appendix C: Tilly and Cordoba at Wimpfen
(description of forces plus army lists)
Appendix D: The Baden Army
Army list
Appendix E: The Battle of Hoschst. June 20, 1622
Army lists for Christian of Brunswick's army; Cordoba's Corps; Caracciolo's Corps; Tilly's Army (including Anholt); (followed by two pages in small type on) The Action.
Appendix F: Catholic Forces, 1622
(two small paragraphs)
Appendix G: Mansfield's Army
Army list (almost a page of small type)
Appendix H: Battle of Fleurus, August 29, 1622
Army list and description
Two maps - Wimpfen and Hochst
Notes.
As you can see, microscopic detail.

The opening chapter of Breitenfeld also gives a breakdown of the armies and their tactics - see sections "Tilly's Art of War" and "The Military Reforms of Gustavus Adolphus"; the second chapter fills in the "Background of the War". The military detail in the first chapter is essential to anyone studying (or wargaming) the Thirty Years' War (the author however dispenses with the apostrophe). I wish I had had this information thirty years ago when I started wargaming the period. Many writers on battle tactics dismissed the `caracole' or mounted firearms tactics as being useless; here the author, taking the contemporary writers at their word, has managed to explain how and why they actually worked - until changes in tactics and technology did render them ineffective. He also points out that "push of pike" was actually with the pointy end, and not as so many re-enactors claim, by shoving with the upright stock. No doubt Health and Safety officers were the first casualties back in the 17th century.

"The basic premises of pre-Gustavian strategy are sufficiently unfamiliar as to render activities incomprehensible; even historians (who should know better) too often condemning apparent incompetence, over-caution, and cowardice. Actually these strange manoeuvres fell within the constraints of then-contemporary strategy, which was very different from that of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, or even Marlborough" (p84).

"In view of the universal condemnation accorded the caracole for the last 350 years, it is necessary to point out the virtues of the tactic - if only as a reminder that Tilly, Maurice, and their contemporaries were not "blind idiots". The caracole, as opposed to the cavalry charge with cold steel, was "un-aggressive" in that "instead of relying upon the impact of the mass...reduced, in battle, to a debilitated popping of pistols" In the words of Roberts, "...the whole performance was nearly as futile as it was elaborate." Yet, the caracole had struggled against cold steel throughout the16th century and come off the victor. Why?
As Du Picq, Keegan, Griffith, and others have pointed out, the real force of a cavalry charge is moral, not physical. Sword and lance are inefficient killing instruments; even the most casual exchange of fire will produce more losses than a mounted melee. Cold steel may break and scatter a unit; it will not produce many casualties. Similar considerations governed the replacement of pike by musket.
Charging cavalry do not crash in to each other like medieval knights at a tournament. There are, in fact four main outcomes to a cavalry collision: First, one or the other side will break before contact. The victor may pursue. If the defender withdraws to safety in good order, and the attacker does not pursue, it is simply "bounced". Second, both halt at a distance, often a very short one. They may skirmish, exchange shots, or disengage. Third, the two may open ranks and actually pass through each other, trading sword strokes in passing. Fourth, the two come together and stop, striking with cold steel. They may even become intermingled in a wild "Hollywood style" melee. After 5-15 minutes, the loser may break and rout, or both may lose interest and separate. During the 18th and 19th centuries, the first result was by far the most common, the fourth the least. The situation was somewhat different in 1600. The deep formations favoured by Tilly had a double effect on morale. As only 10% of the men were in the first rank, these would be the men least likely to shrink from contact. Further, the multiple ranks behind inhibited withdrawal. As has been pointed out by Du Picq and Keegan, in such masses, the men in front cannot flee until the men behind do. Second, the heavy armour worn by the first rank made contact rather less dangerous. Thus the pre-contact rout first case was less common in 1615 than 1815. Similarly, the depth of formations made case three less likely as well (although there were examples). The caracole was predicated on one and two constituting the norm. By the time the aggressor had closed to pistol range, a weaker unit would probably already have broken. If it stood (i.e. case two), a well executed caracole might expect to send a wavering unit over the edge. If it was sufficiently prepared to stand and return fire, then cold steel would probably not have broken it either. Even then, the pistols would inflict loss. If the enemy did waver under fire, the cuirassiers could draw their "armour-smashers" and finish him. The morale impact of arkebusiers [the author's annoying term for mounted arquebusiers, which, conventionally, should be Harquebusiers, I believe] was less because they fired at a much longer range: 50 meters as opposed to 10.
The caracole did have very real drawbacks. The "moral impact" was less than that of a charge with sword or lance. Troops accustomed to caracole were often reluctant to close (i.e. cases three and four), and could be intimidated by opponents who did. Also the wheeling manoeuvres rendered a formation vulnerable to counterattack. On the plus side, a slow trot was much easier to control than the flat-out gallop. Even after the caracole was discarded, such generals as Conde, Montecuccoli, and Cromwell preferred to trot" (pp12-13).

Breitenfeld (pp27-28):
"...At 2:00, Pappenheim ordered his wing to advance. The cuirassiers moved at a brisk trot, "with considerable impetus," the arkebusiers [sic] and Holstein in close support... The "moral force" of 3,800 heavy cavalry seemed irresistible, especially since Gustavus chose to meet them at the halt. Most horse would have wavered, and understandably. But the king had prepared his men well, and these were the pick. At precisely the right moment - Pappenheim's first rank had already fired, and the caracole was halted - every Swede discharged his weapon, 860 muskets and 2450 pistols. The moral shock was all out of proportion to the actual impact (perhaps 150 hits on 2500 men). The Swedish cavalry sallied forth to "bounce" the disordered Imperials. A few swords crossed and some pistols flashed, but no real contact was made. The musketeers poured in a second volley. The Imperials disengaged and slowly faded back from the barrier of steel and fire. Pappenheim's "charge" had been "repelled" - that is, the Swedes had survived the first caracole. Their elation was palpable... With obstinate valour, Pappenheim moved farther around the flank and came back, again and again, seven "charges" in all... After the failure of the seventh caracole, around 4:00 P.M., Pappenheim's cuirassiers were exhausted, disorganized, and loosely strung out along the length of the Swedish flank." A "flat-out charge" by fresh Swedish cavalry eventually broke the Imperialist horse.

I have quoted the above at length because of its importance to me. His analysis of infantry tactics and deployment is also excellent, and makes the "incomprehensible" comprehensible, and you feel that the people of the time really did know what they were doing after all.

The maps are clear and informative, and there are many battle-maps that I have never seen before, even of significant or famous battles, Lutter in particular.


I have used the term `Wargamers Guide' to describe this book, and some of you may consider that to be a demeaning description. I have been a wargamer for thirty... Read more ›

4 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Guthrie's Military History of the Thirty Years War, October 10, 2006

By 

T. Turner (Central NJ United States) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Battles of the Thirty Years War: From White Mountain to Nordlingen, 1618-1635 (Contributions in Military Studies) (Hardcover)

This book and its companion volume are an excellent addition to anyone interested in military history. The scope of Guthrie's work is limited in discussion of the tertiary theaters during this conflict, but this only serves to pique the reader's interest. Political causes for each campaign are only briefly described. The real value of this volume is the detail regarding unit strengths, positions, composition, and command quality and control. The reader is guided into a better grasp of the tactical and strategic evolutions of each phase of the war. Highly recommended to those requiring more than the usual cursory synopsis of early 17th century warfare.